

## The 21st-Century Projection of the People's Republic of China A Multipolar System or a Power Transition?

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### Abstract

Power transition theory points to a shift in power among states within the global system. A change between the hegemonic power and a rising great power would lead to a comprehensive transformation of the global order. Developed by A. F. K. Organski, power transition theory focuses on the potential power transition between the United States of America and the People's Republic of China in the contemporary global order. It is argued that the Belt and Road Initiative, launched by the People's Republic of China particularly in recent years, constitutes a significant component of the power transition process between the United States of America and the People's Republic of China. Accordingly, the People's Republic of China has implemented the Belt and Road Initiative with the aim of replacing the United States of America, the hegemonic power within the global order. This study claims that the People's Republic of China does not seek a multipolar system, but rather a power transition vis-à-vis the United States of America. Ultimately, it is clarified that the Belt and Road Initiative is not merely a development and geopolitical project.

### Introduction

Power Transition Theory, developed by Abramo Fimo Kenneth Organski (A. F. K. Organski), argues that within the hierarchically structured international system, a power transition may occur between the hegemonic power and a great power (de Graaff, ten Brink, & Parmar, 2020). The theory focuses on the process whereby a rising power challenges the existing order by refusing to

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accept the position of the hegemonic power and emerges as a revisionist actor within the global system (Chan, 2025). A state that is rising and expanding its economic capacity will, over time, aspire to attain the position of the hegemonic power (Hopewell, 2025). It will demand a revision of the existing status quo and will seek to increase its economic power in order to realize this objective (Bätz, Klöckner, & Schneider, 2022). In power transition theory, where economic growth constitutes the fundamental driving factor, a rising state can seek a power transition within the global system only once it has sufficiently enhanced its economic strength (Larsson, 2018).

This study argues that the People's Republic of China does not aim for a multipolar system, but rather pursues a power transition (Wang, Chen, & Koppenjan, 2022). The main objective of the study is to explain that, contrary to its discourse, the People's Republic of China does not seek a multipolar system, but instead targets a power transition vis-à-vis the United States of America (Heimann, Kruck, Paikowsky, & Zangl, 2025). Another objective of the study is to explain that the Belt and Road Initiative was implemented with the aim of enabling, and if possible accelerating, a global power transition (Chen, Huhe, & Lin, 2025). The study claims that the People's Republic of China has implemented the Belt and Road Initiative as a crucial and necessary step in economic development, in line with its objective of dismantling United States hegemony and bringing about a power transition (Kauppila & Kopra, 2022).

Within the framework of these objectives, the study will first elaborate on A. F. K. Organski's Power Transition Theory. The positions of states within the global system as conceptualized by Power Transition Theory (Hopewell, 2025), and the implications of these positions for states, will be discussed. In the final section, it will be determined whether the People's Republic of China demonstrates a demand for a power transition in its discourse and practices (Bätz, Klöckner, & Schneider, 2022). An assessment will be made as to whether the power transition demanded and/or likely to occur with the support of the People's Republic of China's Belt and Road Initiative is genuinely feasible (Maity & Kumar, 2025).

Like all studies, this study also has its limitations. The study aims to contribute to the existing literature (Moyer, Meisel, & Matthews, 2023). A review of the relevant literature reveals that there is an insufficient number of studies examining the Belt and Road Initiative of the People's Republic of China as a geopolitical project that facilitates and/or seeks to bring about a power transition (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China, 2014). For this reason, the study aims to fill this gap in the literature

by analyzing the issue through the lens of Organski's theory (Irwin, Mandel, & MacLeod, 2023).

Ultimately, the study concludes that the primary objective of the People's Republic of China is not the transformation of the global system into a multipolar order, but rather the realization of a power transition (Chen, Huhe, & Lin, 2025). The Belt and Road Initiative is acknowledged as an instrument aimed at reshaping global governance (Bätz, Klöckner, & Schneider, 2022). It is determined that the Belt and Road Initiative constitutes a significant stage in the competition between the United States of America and the People's Republic of China, and that current conditions are designed accordingly (Duggan, Gottwald, & Bersick, 2024). It is understood that the global order is being reshaped through the continuation of the Belt and Road Initiative, and that countries are experiencing a transitional period in their geostrategies (Maity & Kumar, 2025).

### **1. A. F. K. Organski's Power Transition Theory and Its Components**

Power Transition Theory was theorized by A. F. K. Organski. By analyzing the hierarchical structure of the international system, the theorist focused on the possibility that interstate relations may undergo a transition process. Organski identified the sources of state power and the causes of war (Organski, 1958). The point of departure of the theory is the possibility that the nature and scope of the relationship between the dominant power and rising powers within the international system may change (Bätz, Klöckner, & Schneider, 2022). By evaluating the competition between the dominant power and the rising power, the theory assesses the likelihood of a transition occurring among states in the international system (Larsson, 2018). According to the theory, rising powers experience a sense of dissatisfaction vis-à-vis the dominant power (Moyer, Meisel, & Matthews, 2023). Rising powers that are dissatisfied with the international system, its functioning, and their position within it challenge the operation of the international system (Schweller, 2015; Heimann, Kruck, Paikowsky, & Zangl, 2025).

The theory examines power struggles among rising powers and evaluates the impact of power on states (Bätz, Klöckner, & Schneider, 2022). A. F. K. Organski argues that three factors should be considered when measuring state power: population, political effectiveness, and economic power. Economic power, according to Organski, is expressed in terms of industrialization (Kai, 2017).

A. F. K. Organski's theory of the transition of power was formulated after the collapse of the Soviet Union. According to the theory of the transition of power, the current global system is undergoing a shift in power Dynamics (Bätz, Klöckner, & Schneider, 2022). This shift will occur between rising powers and hegemonic powers. Rising powers, whose power increases with their rise, are dissatisfied with their place and position within the global system (Moyer, Meisel, & Matthews, 2023).

The rising power believes it deserves a higher position within the global system and therefore seeks to move up a notch. It perceives itself as being on the same level as the hegemonic power, which is positioned one notch above it. In such a situation, the rising power, unwilling to remain below the hegemonic power, seeks to assert its status as a greater power within the global system (Moyer, Meisel, & Matthews, 2023).

According to A. F. K. Organski, the primary factor enabling states to become rising powers is the economy. A state that succeeds in improving and developing its economy advances in the distribution of power within the international system. In addition to the economy, population constitutes an important factor (Goldstein & Pevehouse, 2017). Population growth is regarded as an improvement in demographic indicators. A state whose demographic indicators improve is able to position itself among rising Powers (Chan, 2025). As states' economies develop and their demographic indicators improve, they are able to formulate policies of influence over smaller states. In the hierarchical international system (Bätz, Klöckner, & Schneider, 2022), if states are satisfied with their own position and, more importantly, are not disturbed by the position of the dominant power, the system continues without change (Cieciura, 2016). However, if a rising power is dissatisfied with both its own position and that of the dominant power, it demands change in the international system. This situation necessitates the reorganization of the international system (Kai, 2017).

According to A. F. K. Organski, within the global system the hierarchy of states is determined by economic power and political influence, with the state possessing the greatest economic capacity and the deepest political influence constituting the dominant power of the international system (de Graaff, ten Brink, & Parmar, 2020). This power is positioned at the apex of the system. Beneath the dominant power are the great powers. Great powers that maintain a certain distance from the dominant power are economically and politically weaker than it (Okur, 2016). However, because great powers occupy the tier immediately below the dominant power (Bätz, Klöckner, & Schneider, 2022), they possess the potential to become rivals to the dominant

power over time (Kai, 2017). Below the great powers are the middle powers. Middle powers are compelled to adapt to the global system. At the lowest level of the hierarchical international system are small powers (Okur, 2016).

According to Power Transition Theory, it is the rise of great powers that has the potential to disrupt the functioning of the international system (Heimann, Kruck, Paikowsky, & Zangl, 2025). In fact, as long as great powers do not rise significantly, they do not seek to challenge the dominant power, because there exists a substantial power gap between the dominant power and the great powers (Kai, 2017). However, once a great power perceives that it has risen sufficiently, it becomes dissatisfied with the dominant power's management of the international system. It also becomes discontented with its own position within the system and seeks to rise further. A great power that aspires to rise further may cause relations within the global system to evolve into conflict (Cieciura, 2016). Power Transition Theory anticipates that the relationship between the rising power and the dominant power will evolve into conflict, because, according to the theory, a rising power that seeks to replace the dominant power cannot achieve this without conflict (Kai, 2017).

Within the global system, rising powers will inevitably challenge the dominant power over time (Wang, Chen, & Koppenjan, 2022). This is because dissatisfaction with their own position and the desire to become the dominant power prevail within rising powers. A rising power that seeks to alter the existing situation is dissatisfied with the dominant power's control over the governance of the global system (Larsson, 2018). This situation is sought to be changed by achieving parity with the dominant power. A dissatisfied rising power will demand a power transition within the global system (Rauch, 2018). Once the rising power attains parity with the dominant power, it seeks a change in the order. The dominant power, however, will not wish to relinquish its position. According to the theory, this renders conflict between the rising power and the dominant power inevitable. A rising power that does not wish to engage in conflict is compelled to accept the position of the dominant power (Rauch, 2018; Heimann, Kruck, Paikowsky, & Zangl, 2025).

The remarkable economic rise of the People's Republic of China over the past decades has led to a growing focus on the possibility of a power transition between China and the United States of America (Heimann, Kruck, Paikowsky, & Zangl, 2025). The rise of the People's Republic of China as a great power has shifted attention toward a potential power transition with the United States of America, the dominant power within the system (Kauppila & Kopra, 2022). The declining influence of the United States of America within the global system constitutes one of the principal reasons for this focus

(Kai, 2017). Perceiving the rise of the People's Republic of China as a threat, the dominant power, the United States of America, has sought ways to isolate China within the global system (Okur, 2016). The People's Republic of China's rising and strengthening economic power, its population of approximately one and a half billion, and the expansion of its political policies constitute the primary reasons for the frequent reference to power transition theory (Irwin, Mandel, & MacLeod, 2023).

The United States of America regards the People's Republic of China as the principal actor in a potential power transition, viewing it as a rising power (de Graaff, ten Brink, & Parmar, 2020). Among the most important reasons for this perception are the People's Republic of China's unpredictable economic expansion and its possession of the world's largest population<sup>2</sup> (Heimann, Kruck, Paikowsky, & Zangl, 2025). However, when factors such as resources, investments, influence policies, and military expenditures are taken into account, it is evident that the economy of the People's Republic of China still lags behind that of the United States of America (Goldstein & Pevehouse, 2017). Nevertheless, the fact that the People's Republic of China possesses one of the fastest-growing economies in the world and is positioned immediately behind the United States of America has led to the construction of power transition scenarios by the United States (Bätz, Klöckner, & Schneider, 2022). Moreover, the People's Republic of China's strong and authoritarian political system is considered significant within the framework of Power Transition Theory (Kai, 2017).

Rising powers pursue influence policies in order to strengthen their positions within the global system. Such influence policies are regarded as particularly important for states that seek to bring about a power transition within the global system (Fels, 2017). The expansion of the People's Republic of China's influence policies and the strengthening of its international relations have prompted questions as to whether it aims to achieve a power transition (Kauppila & Kopra, 2022). In addition, the People's Republic of China's frequent expressions of dissatisfaction with the functioning of the global system are consistent with a demand for a potential power transition in international relations (Kai, 2017).

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2 According to the 2024 population census, India has surpassed China by a narrow margin. Today, India is recognized as the most populous country in the world. However, the sustainability of India's position as the country with the largest population is of significance. For this reason, India's population, as the world's most populous country, must once again exceed that of China in the next census. In this way, it will be definitively established that India will maintain its status as the world's most populous country for many years to come.

The influence expanded by the People's Republic of China through the Belt and Road Initiative suggests the possibility of a power transition by disrupting the functioning of the international system (Heimann, Kruck, Paikowsky, & Zangl, 2025). Spanning every continent, the Belt and Road Initiative has been transformed into a central pillar of the People's Republic of China's economy (Exnerová, 2021). By enabling the expansion and deepening of China's economy, the Initiative appears to possess the capacity to challenge the hegemonic position of the United States of America within the global system (de Graaff, ten Brink, & Parmar, 2020). The emergence of indications that the Initiative may surpass the hegemonic position of the United States constitutes the primary reason for evaluating the Belt and Road Initiative through the lens of Power Transition Theory (Duggan, Gottwald, & Bersick, 2024).

As a rising power, the People's Republic of China is strengthening its economy and expanding its spheres of influence through the Belt and Road Initiative (Petrone, 2019). The implementation of the Belt and Road Initiative by the People's Republic of China, as the world's second-largest economy (Heimann, Kruck, Paikowsky, & Zangl, 2025), suggests that it will ultimately facilitate a power transition between China and the United States of America. The People's Republic of China appears to be preparing for a potential power transition by weakening the position of the United States of America, the world's largest and dominant power within the global system (Okur, 2017).

Indeed, the People's Republic of China anticipates a power transition within the global system and designs its international relations accordingly (de Graaff, ten Brink, & Parmar, 2020). The economic and influence-related dimensions of the Belt and Road Initiative substantiate this objective. At this point, explaining the objectives of the People's Republic of China through the lens of Power Transition Theory is of particular importance (Petrone, 2019).

The Belt and Road Initiative, the latest in a series of economic policies pursued by the People's Republic of China over many years, has raised the possibility of a power shift within the global system (Heimann, Kruck, Paikowsky, & Zangl, 2025). It is believed that the People's Republic of China, having strengthened its power through the Belt and Road Initiative (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China, 2014), will eventually rise to a position where it can challenge the hegemonic power, the United States. Dissatisfied with its current position and believing it deserves a higher status, the People's Republic of China, empowered by the Belt and Road Initiative, could challenge the United States, the dominant force in the global system (Bätz, Klöckner, & Schneider, 2022).

It is understood that the People's Republic of China, which has expanded the economic capacity and influence policies required by Power Transition Theory through the Belt and Road Initiative, possesses the capability to bring about a power transition by weakening the policies of the dominant power (Kauppila & Kopra, 2022). For this reason, evaluating the Belt and Road Initiative through the framework of Power Transition Theory appears to be a viable approach for understanding the objectives of the People's Republic of China (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China, 2014). The limited number of studies in the literature that examine the economy, influence, and the Belt and Road Initiative of the People's Republic of China from this perspective is significant in terms of the contribution this study seeks to make to the international relations literature (Jarosiewicz & Strachota, 2013).

## **2. A Multipolar System or a Power Transition?**

Years after A. F. K. Organski formulated Power Transition Theory, the global political order has assumed a different character. Global international relations entered a new order with the end of the Cold War and the dissolution of the Soviet Union (Chen, Huhe, & Lin, 2025). In this new order, the United States of America emerged as the greatest power within the global system, and a unipolar system was envisaged (Heimann, Kruck, Paikowsky, & Zangl, 2025). The decades that followed proved sufficient for countries such as Russia and the People's Republic of China to consolidate their positions as great Powers (Brown, 2015). The economic and political rise of the People's Republic of China in the Asia-Pacific region has, over time, been interpreted as a reaction against United States hegemony (Bätz, Klöckner, & Schneider, 2022). Moreover, the People's Republic of China's statements declaring that it seeks not a unipolar but a multipolar system have demonstrated a stance in opposition to United States hegemony (Baruah, 2021).

The People's Republic of China has sought a system within the global order that would safeguard its interests. However, United States hegemony and the Western liberal order differ significantly from the People's Republic of China's economic structure and its approach to institutionalizing political relations (de Graaff, ten Brink, & Parmar, 2020). In this context, the existing unipolar and Western-centric global system poses, in a sense, a threat to the People's Republic of China and to the order it seeks to establish. For this reason, it is observed that the People's Republic of China has pursued a far more revisionist policy vis-à-vis the hegemony of the United States of America and the West (Maity & Kumar, 2025).

In addition, the Belt and Road Initiative announced in 2013 symbolizes the People's Republic of China's (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China, 2014), revisionist stance within the global system through its nature, objectives, debt diplomacy, geopolitical rationales, sources of financing, and geoeconomic goals (Exnerová, 2021). It is understood that the Belt and Road Initiative has pioneered a phase of globalization encompassing global international relations and states, particularly across Eurasia. The economic and political cooperation developed through the Belt and Road Initiative reinforces the argument that the People's Republic of China seeks to assume new and multifaceted roles within the global system (Baruah, 2021). The Belt and Road Initiative constitutes a comprehensive set of development and investment projects with geopolitical dynamics that channel investments toward Eurasia. Possessing clear geoeconomic objectives, the Belt and Road Initiative has been identified as the project with the largest economic investments of the twenty-first century (Jarosiewicz & Strachota, 2013). From infrastructure investments to telecommunications operations, and from highways to air routes, virtually every form of transportation and investment network is encompassed within the scope of the Initiative (de Graaff, ten Brink, & Parmar, 2020).

The Belt and Road Initiative, which includes both land and maritime main connections, reaches the Middle East, Africa, and Europe via overland routes through Asia (Snow, 2009). Its maritime route connects the East and South China Seas to the Indo-Pacific Ocean, the Mediterranean, and the Atlantic Ocean (Irwin, Mandel, & MacLeod, 2023). On the land routes, investments aimed at facilitating infrastructure and interstate trade are prioritized. On the maritime routes, the focus is on port projects and ensuring the security of maritime commerce (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China, 2014).

Thanks to the Belt and Road Initiative, the People's Republic of China has gained access to the furthest continents of the world by land and sea (Moyer, Meisel, & Matthews, 2023; Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China, 2014). By investing even in the United States and South America, the Belt and Road Initiative has managed to establish partnerships with countries on every continent. These partnerships provide the People's Republic of China with economic advantages (Kauppila & Kopra, 2022).

Furthermore, an advantage of economic partnerships is that they can lead to political cooperation. The fact that economic partnerships contribute to the development of political relations over time is seen as another reason why the

People's Republic of China attaches great importance to the Belt and Road Initiative (Irwin, Mandel, & MacLeod, 2023).

There are multiple reasons behind the People's Republic of China's decision to implement an overarching project such as the Belt and Road Initiative (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China, 2014). The most important and fundamental reason is to complete its own economic development program as the world's second-largest economy (Larsson, 2018). Another significant motive for the People's Republic of China is to surpass the economy of the United States of America. In a global order where infrastructure development and enhanced connectivity have become a competitive dynamic, China is investing in globalizing and developing regions within the framework of the Belt and Road Initiative (Hopewell, 2025). By gaining access to emerging markets, the People's Republic of China seeks to position itself to compete with United States influence and the U.S. economy (Jarosiewicz & Strachota, 2013).

Moreover, for the financially supported Belt and Road Initiative, China has established financial centers such as the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank and created funding mechanisms. These financial centers are operated by China, an Asian state, and differ in their functioning and governance from Western institutions (Duggan, Gottwald, & Bersick, 2024). The Belt and Road Initiative, which includes stakeholders from every continent, is maintained through summits and aims to enhance inter-state connectivity by promoting bilateral, multilateral, regional, and subregional cooperation (de Graaff, ten Brink, & Parmar, 2020). In this way, the Initiative not only emphasizes economic power but also political influence, redefining globalization in which the People's Republic of China assumes a central, bridging role (Brown, 2015).

In this context, the Belt and Road Initiative cannot be understood merely as an investment and development Project (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China, 2014); it also aims to redefine the global order (Wang, Chen, & Koppenjan, 2022). It marks the beginning of the establishment of a new order under the leadership of the People's Republic of China. As the world's largest economic power, the United States of America perceives the Belt and Road Initiative, launched under China's leadership, as a threat in response to the intensifying bilateral competition (de Graaff, ten Brink, & Parmar, 2020). By strengthening interstate competition, the Belt and Road Initiative offers alternatives to the regions and countries economically dominated by the United States and integrates them into the economic-political framework of a new Asian-centered order led by China (Chan, 2025).

The People's Republic of China has stated that a unipolar system is unacceptable and emphasizes that the global system must inevitably evolve into a multipolar structure. It underscores that United States hegemony is intolerable and asserts that the global system cannot have a single leader (Hopewell, 2025). However, it is assessed that the objectives China has set through the Belt and Road Initiative reflect broader, distinct, and more covert aims regarding the global system (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China, 2014). Accordingly, the People's Republic of China does not, in fact, aim for a genuinely multipolar system. Rather, China seeks to bring about a power transition in the global system by dismantling United States hegemony. Following this power transition, China aims to establish a global system in which it assumes the role of the hegemon (Snow, 2009).

The People's Republic of China states that it seeks to eliminate United States hegemony and desires the global system to evolve not into a post-hegemonic phase, but into a multipolar system (Jarosiewicz & Strachota, 2013). It asserts that the Belt and Road Initiative is a project based on geopolitical connections with clear geoeconomic objectives (Bätz, Klöckner, & Schneider, 2022). However, the primary purpose behind China's implementation of an intercontinental geopolitical and geoeconomic project such as the Belt and Road Initiative is not to transform the global system into a multipolar order (Kauppila & Kopra, 2022; Heimann, Kruck, Paikowsky, & Zangl, 2025).

## Conclusion

Since its inception, Power Transition Theory has evaluated the relationship between the dominant power in the global system and rising powers. According to the theory, as a rising power accumulates strength, it attains the capability to challenge the dominant power within the global system. Once the rising power has sufficiently consolidated its power, it can confront the hegemon and facilitate a power transition within the system.

Power Transition Theory posits that a rising power occupies a position immediately below that of the dominant power. A rising power dissatisfied with its position seeks to ascend further. In time, it will aim to replace the hegemon within the global system. In such a scenario, the dominant power will be unwilling to relinquish its position. Consequently, there exists a potential for a power struggle between the rising power and the hegemon. Power Transition Theory thus theorizes and evaluates the likelihood of a power transition or power struggle between the rising power and the dominant power.

With the announcement of the Belt and Road Initiative, the People's Republic of China, whose position in the global system has rapidly risen and

grown stronger, has begun to question its place within the global system. According to the People's Republic of China, the global system it is questioning has shown that the reality of the United States being the hegemonic power must now change. The rising great power, the People's Republic of China, believes it is now on equal footing with the United States. However, it is necessary to understand that it desires a power transition, not a multipolar system. Because the People's Republic of China believes that the economic and political power it has expanded through the Belt and Road Initiative is now conducive to a power transition. In this way, the People's Republic of China wants to emerge as the hegemonic power. It aims for a new global system where it becomes the hegemonic power, not a multipolar one.

The expansion and strengthening of the People's Republic of China's economy, as well as the deepening of the government's influence, can be interpreted as necessary conditions for a rising China. According to Power Transition Theory, it is essential for a rising power to possess robust and extensive economic and influence policies. A rising power whose economy has strengthened and whose influence has deepened is considered capable, under the theory, of displacing the dominant power. Accordingly, the People's Republic of China appears capable of surpassing the United States' hegemonic position through its economic power and influence policies.

It is possible to define the goal of the People's Republic of China not as establishing a multipolar system, but as facilitating a power transition. Through the Belt and Road Initiative, China's initial objective is to counter the hegemonic power of the United States and the unipolar system by promoting a multipolar order. However, it is more accurate to assess that the ultimate aim of the Chinese government is not a multipolar system, but a global system under China's own hegemony. China seeks to create a global system in which it, rather than the United States, assumes the dominant role. To achieve this, it must first dismantle or remove the hegemonic power of the United States. Therefore, through the Belt and Road Initiative, China initially attempts to transform the global system into a multipolar structure. In the subsequent phase, the Initiative is intended to consolidate the system under China's hegemonic dominance, effectively moving toward a unipolar system led by China. From this perspective, it can be concluded that China's ultimate global objective is not a multipolar system, but a power transition.

At this point, it is important to note that China currently lags significantly behind the United States in terms of economic and influence policies. Transforming the global system into a multipolar order and subsequently achieving a power transition appears extremely challenging. In the short and

medium term, such a transformation seems unlikely; it may only be feasible over the long term. A long-term transformation of the global system would require China to advance and strengthen its economic and influence policies without any diminution.

It is difficult to be certain about the future course of the People's Republic of China. It is difficult to be certain that the Belt and Road Initiative will continue successfully. If the Belt and Road Initiative does not deliver the desired success to the People's Republic of China in the medium term, it is clear that a power transfer between the United States and China, and consequently a change in the global system, will not be possible.

This study demonstrates that China's stance within the global system is aimed at a power transition rather than multipolarity. The vision China has presented is sufficiently powerful to potentially enable a power transition within the global system. Indeed, the Belt and Road Initiative appears to have been implemented precisely because it targets a global power transition. However, when the current global system is examined realistically, it becomes evident that China is not yet in a position to challenge the economic and political influence of the United States. Therefore, while the Belt and Road Initiative is clearly a project designed to facilitate a power transition, it is also evident that such a transition is unlikely to occur in the medium term.

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