

On Bureaucracy, Culture, and Reform

Mücahit Bektaş

ÖZGÜR PRESS

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+90.850 260 09 97
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www.ozguryayınlari.com
info@ozguryayinlari.com

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Mücahit Bektaş
Recep Tayyip Erdogan University, Political Science and Public Administration

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Preface

If I had written this preface in the years when my doctoral dissertation was accepted, I would, in all likelihood, have begun with clichés such as "With globalization... With the Oil Crisis..." or "Since Ancient Greece... After the French Revolution... With the invention of the steam engine...." But those clichés are now dead. Long live our new cliché: "With AI...."

Yes, "With AI..." would have been the best clichéd opening for my preface. But that is not because my doctoral dissertation is about AI. Not at all. My dissertation deals with the period before AI, with the final moments of the "classical" era. Yet even though AI technologies did not shape the content or the writing of my dissertation, they did shape the formation of this book project. That is because AI has transformed not only mechanical processes but also human behavior, perceptions, and expectations. To put it more plainly in relation to our subject, people are now interested in texts that address a topic directly. They no longer want to encounter, within the main text, ancillary discussions that are only there to make that topic more intelligible. AI can now supply that context for people in a matter of seconds. Put differently, if the reader lacks background knowledge about a secondary issue mentioned in the text, that knowledge can now be reached easily, together with its context.

When I was writing my doctoral dissertation, AI technologies were not yet widespread enough to shape everyday social life. As a natural consequence, the dissertation took the form not of a lean text but of a comprehensive and lengthy work containing many different issues. Today, however, AI technologies have spread across society, and preparing a text that reflects that reality has become a necessity for my book project as well. In truth, even before AI became widespread, the dissertation itself was already quite extensive and long. One reason for that was the tendency to discuss every issue in full detail under the pretext of "introducing the foreign literature." Yet those issues should have been limited by the scope of the dissertation. In that sense, this is also a written expression of my own self-criticism regarding my dissertation.

As a result of all these considerations, three separate books have been produced from my doctoral dissertation: "On Bureaucracy, Culture, and Reform", "NPM Reforms in Anglo-Saxon and Continental European Cultures", and "Administrative Culture and Public Administration Reforms in Türkiye". In this way, the original dissertation has been reorganized into works that are more focused, more accessible, and better suited to contemporary reading practices. Each of these works possesses its own internal coherence of meaning, yet when they are read as a book series they also form a broader meta-coherence. I hope these books will prove useful, both individually and together, to academics interested in public administration, to policymakers, and to anyone with an interest in this field.

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Introduction

Bureaucracy has become one of the most fundamental elements of public administration alongside the emergence and development of the modern state. The expansion of the state's sphere of responsibility, the diversification of public services, and the increasingly complex character of social needs have made it necessary for administrative organization to assume a more systematic, specialized, and continuous form. The organizational counterpart of that necessity has, to a great extent, been bureaucracy. Indeed, bureaucracy has acquired importance not only as a technical instrument that enables public affairs to be conducted but also as a structure that makes the implementation of political decisions possible, carries institutional memory, and guarantees the continuity of public order. At the same time, the historical development of bureaucracy shows that this structure has been debated not only for its functional and indispensable aspects but also for its tendencies to accumulate power, become rigid, resist change, and at times make democratic oversight more difficult.

This reveals the inadequacy of treating bureaucracy solely as a technical-administrative form of organization. Bureaucracy is, on the one hand, an institutional mechanism built on rules, procedures, and hierarchy, but on the other hand it is a social phenomenon shaped by human behavior, organizational habits, values, worlds of meaning, and relations of power. In other words, the way bureaucratic structures function cannot be understood only through legal limits of authority, job descriptions, or organizational charts. It is also necessary to consider how the cultural context within which these structures are situated affects decision-making processes, modes of implementation, and responses to change. For this reason, it is impossible to think about bureaucracy independently of culture, or culture independently of the question of reform.

Public administration reforms also become more intelligible when viewed through this intersection. Especially after the 1970s, reform debates that gathered speed on a global scale developed around criticisms of the rigidity and inefficiency of traditional public administration and of its limited capacity to respond to changing social expectations. In this process, different reform approaches, above all New Public Management, sought to make the public sector more flexible, performance-oriented, results-centered, and responsive to citizen expectations (Barzelay, 2001, p. 2; Hood, 1991). Over time, however, it became clear that reforms did not succeed merely by transferring new techniques, methods, or organizational models. The fact that the same reform instruments produced markedly different outcomes in different countries, and even in different institutions within the same country, made the determining role of culture much more visible. In this respect, reform is not only a matter of design. It is also a matter of implementation, adaptation, and cultural reception.

The importance of culture at this point becomes visible at both the social and institutional levels. The meanings that societies attach to authority, rules, hierarchy, initiative, uncertainty, and change directly affect the ways public institutions function. Similarly, public institutions themselves produce, over time, their own distinctive administrative and bureaucratic cultures. This culture shapes many areas, from employees' patterns of behavior to styles of decision-making, from relations with citizens to the internal distribution of power. The success of reform initiatives therefore depends not only on the quality of legal and organizational arrangements but also on the character of the bureaucratic culture that reform encounters, on entrenched habits, and on forms of institutional resistance (Pollitt & Bouckaert, 2011, p. 19; Sargut, 2001). Within this framework, culture should be regarded not as an external variable in the reform process but as one of its central components.

Starting from precisely this point, the present study addresses the multilayered relationship among bureaucracy, culture, and reform at the conceptual and analytical levels. Its main aim is to show that bureaucracy should be understood not only as an organizational structure or management technique but also as a dynamic field shaped within specific cultural codes and political relations. To that end, the study first examines the historical development of the concept of bureaucracy, its basic characteristics, and its place in public administration. In this part, both the necessary and functional aspects of bureaucracy and the problematic sides that emerge alongside its growing power are discussed. The concept of culture is then addressed through its anthropological, political, and institutional dimensions, the meanings of administrative and bureaucratic culture are clarified, and it is shown why processes of change and reform cannot be understood without taking the cultural dimension into account. In the final stage, the interaction between bureaucratic culture and public administration reforms is brought onto a more concrete plane, and the mutual effects of the bureaucracy-politics relationship and reform processes are analyzed.

In this respect, the study argues that it is not enough for public administration reforms to be regarded normatively as "necessary" or to be "well designed" in technical terms. Whether reforms succeed or fail is determined to a large extent by the nature of bureaucratic structures, the characteristics of institutional culture, and the limits set by the political context. Put differently, reform cannot be read either merely as a problem of administrative efficiency or merely as a problem of political will. Reform is also concerned with transforming institutional patterns of behavior, entrenched worlds of meaning, and bureaucratic relations of power. For that reason, reform is difficult to grasp without understanding bureaucracy, just as the stance of bureaucracy toward reform is difficult to understand without grasping culture.

In conclusion, this study aims to evaluate three basic concepts that are often treated separately in the field of public administration—bureaucracy, culture, and reform—within an integrated framework. Such an approach, it is argued, can contribute both to a deeper understanding of classical debates on bureaucracy and to explaining why contemporary public administration reforms are successful in some contexts but remain limited in others. The line followed throughout the study is directed precisely toward that aim. The contribution of the study therefore lies not in treating bureaucracy, culture, and reform as separate literatures, but in showing how each becomes intelligible only through its relation to the others. Bureaucracy provides the institutional form, culture gives meaning to administrative behavior, and reform reveals the tensions that emerge when existing patterns are asked to change.

Section 1

1. The Definition and Nature of Bureaucracy

This chapter examines the conceptual dimension of bureaucracy, its place and importance in public administration, and its growing power in today's bureaucracies. The conceptual discussion is developed historically, since bureaucracy has acquired different meanings across different periods of state formation and administrative development. Alongside an etymological assessment, the chapter traces how bureaucratic organization appeared in early centralized states, how it was transformed through industrialization, and how it came to be evaluated in both positive and negative terms. Once this conceptual ground is established, the discussion turns to the functions bureaucracy performs in public administration. In that section, where the backbone of the argument is formed by bureaucracy's functional and positive aspects, the main claim is that bureaucracy is a necessary and, in some cases, even an obligatory mode of organization. The final subsection, by contrast, focuses on bureaucracy's negative aspects and emphasizes the importance of oversight and control mechanisms.

1.1. Defining Bureaucracy

A useful starting point is the etymology of the term, since the word bureaucracy already carries within it a particular understanding of office, rule, and administrative power. In this respect, the term bureaucracy is a compound noun with roots comparable to those of democracy, aristocracy, and oligarchy. It is formed from *bureau*, derived from the word *bure*, meaning a dark-colored tablecloth and by extension office, workplace, or room, and *kratos*, meaning rule, domination, or power (Dudley, 2008, p. 221; Dursun, 2012, p. 133; Eryılmaz, 2013, p. 19, 2015, p. 260; Hummel, 2000, p. 121).

It is known that ever since large and relatively centralized states appeared on the stage of history, bureaucracy—or bureaucracies—have existed de facto. Civilizations such as Ancient China, Egypt, Persia, and Rome are all said to have possessed bureaucratic structures, even if not developed in the modern sense (Farazmand, 2009, p. 3). The entry of bureaucracy into the academic literature in its modern meaning, however, dates to the eighteenth century. Although there are different views, the first use of bureaucracy in the sense of "the rule of offices" is generally attributed to the French economist Vincent de Gournay in 1745 (Eryılmaz, 2013, p. 19, 2015, p. 260).

It is not accidental that this designation came from a French economist. With the centralization of France in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, an administrative class performing services under the monarch emerged. Administrative units that arose through delegation of authority and specialization diversified and grew stronger, especially under Louis XIV. Prussia later carried this development further, and bureaucratic structures in something close to their current sense—especially including their negative aspects—came into being (Dreyfus, 2014, pp. 34–35; Poggi, 2014, pp. 94–95).

The literature offers many technical definitions of bureaucracy. Yet the most widely accepted view within the scholarly discipline is the conceptualization developed by the German sociologist Max Weber. It should be noted at once that Weber preferred to describe bureaucracy rather than provide a sharply delimited definition (Eryılmaz, 2015, p. 267). In this sense, bureaucracy may be said to be a complex phenomenon for Weber (Kundakçı, 2016, p. 81; Parsons, 2015, p. 582). Because of this quality, Weber's bureaucracy, situated within the pure authority type of legal-rational authority, is characterized by the following features (Dursun, 2012, pp. 142–143; Gajduschek, 2003, p. 702; Kundakçı, 2016, p. 85; Mansfield, 1973, p. 477; Weber, 2012a, 2014, pp. 55–59, 2016, pp. 55–58):

- Division of labor
- A rigid hierarchical structure
- Rational rules
- Technical expertise
- General and fixed rules
- Written documents

- Full-time and continuous employment
- Organizational size
- Salaried officials
- Impersonality
- A legally defined sphere of authority
- A career structure
- A separation between private and public life
- Adherence to rules

Although Weber recognized that bureaucratic organizations are closely related to the social, political, and economic conditions in which they exist (Dudley, 2008, p. 222), his understanding of bureaucracy may be summarized in general terms through specialization, hierarchy, impersonality, a system of rules, written records, and merit. In Weber's view, institutionalization, rationalization, and process orientation were expected to reduce the effects of cultural variation on bureaucratic organization (Jreisat, 2011, p. 63).

Alongside Weber's understanding of bureaucracy, many other definitions and theories of bureaucracy were advanced both during the same period and before and after it. Some of these definitions concentrated on structural and institutional features, while others focused on process or on actors—that is, bureaucrats themselves (Garston, 1993, p. 5). Bureaucratic definitions and theories may broadly be grouped into three categories: positive, negative, and neutral-realist. More plainly, bureaucracy has been seen by some writers as the organization of neutrality and a smoothly functioning system, by others as the primary source of inefficiency, and by still others as an unavoidable phenomenon of governance in the modern world, capable of both positive and negative outcomes depending on how it is operated (Farazmand, 2009, pp. 5–6).

According to different authors, bureaucracy has been described as red tape, poor management and inefficiency, rational organization, public administration, rule by officials, large-scale organizations, and modern society (Albrow, 1970; Eryılmaz, 2013, p. 19, 2015, p. 260). In short, it is clear from the foregoing that, like many authors, Weber attached a positive meaning to bureaucracy, whereas writers such as Karl Marx and Ludwig von Mises are among those who attached a more negative meaning to it (Dursun, 2012, p. 141). More realist interpreters include relatively modern authors such as Dwight Waldo (Farazmand, 2009, pp. 5–6; Hummel, 2000, pp. 121–124).

When the arguments put forward by the first two positions are examined, it may be said that the main reason for their divergence lies in the fact that, as a phenomenon, bureaucracy has different facets and dimensions on which analysts choose to concentrate (Eryılmaz, 2013, p. 20). Yet bureaucracy should not be assigned either a wholly positive or a wholly negative meaning. Bureaucracy is best understood as an administrative instrument whose effects depend on the political, institutional, and cultural conditions under which it operates. For that reason, it may be argued that realist interpretations offer the sounder approach today.

1.2. The Place and Importance of Bureaucracy in Public Administration

As the preceding discussion has already suggested, bureaucracy, present in both the private and public sectors, has both positive and negative aspects (Akçakaya, 2016, p. 673; Eryılmaz, 2013, pp. 72–76). This leaves people facing a condition in which bureaucracy is not something one necessarily desires, yet something one cannot do without. The main theme of this section is that, despite many criticisms in its early phases, bureaucracy became an indispensable instrument of governance in the modern period, valued especially for its capacity to support effectiveness, efficiency, continuity, and specialization. The following subsection addresses the increasingly negative aspects of bureaucracy, especially under today's changing conditions.

In its present meaning, the emergence of bureaucracy's place and importance in public administration may be understood broadly through two distinctions: politics versus bureaucracy, and patrimonial versus rational bureaucracy. This should not be taken to mean that there is no relationship whatsoever between bureaucracy and politics. What is meant, rather, is that each has its own separate existence and distinctive characteristics.

In terms of the first distinction, Hegel held an organic view according to which politics and bureaucracy ought to form a unity, whereas Weber emphasized, in a much sharper manner, the separation of bureaucracy from politics. Wilson, more realistically, regarded bureaucracy and politics as distinct while also stating that the two spheres interact with one another (Sager & Rosser, 2009, p. 1144).

The second distinction requires turning to the history of bureaucracy, or more generally to the history of administration. As in Weber's theory of bureaucracy, discussions of bureaucracy as a concept frequently refer back to bureaucratic structures in ancient civilizations such as Egypt and China. This is in fact related to the reality that every period has its own form of governance or bureaucratic organization (Bennis, 2016, p. 305). In Weber's classification, the distinction between patrimonial bureaucracy and legal-rational bureaucracy becomes relevant here. In this respect, Weber argues that the greatest difference between patrimonial and legal-rational bureaucracy lies in the historical growth of work and division of labor, specialization, and the separation of the private from the public sphere (Weber, 2012b, pp. 371–380).

If Weber's classification is taken into account, it becomes possible, in summary terms, to characterize the bureaucratic structure of the ancient period as patrimonial and that of the modern period as rational (Rudolph & Hoeber-Rudolph, 1979, p. 196). Unlike patrimonial bureaucracy, a form of rule shaped around the relationship between unfree officials and their masters and carried out on the basis of tradition (Eryılmaz, 2013, pp. 66–67), rational bureaucracy is founded on the separation of the private and the public, grounded in law, organized hierarchically, and impersonal in character (Albrow, 1970; Eryılmaz, 2013, pp. 66–67).

In light of this, it may be said that patrimonial bureaucracy has steadily lost importance in the contemporary world, whereas legal-rational bureaucracy has become increasingly important. Accordingly, when analyzing the place and importance of bureaucracy in public administration, it should not be forgotten that the relevant frame here is Weber's conceptualization of legal-rational bureaucracy. Although criticisms of the core principles of the "traditional (Weberian) method" emerged in the 1980s as if to announce the end of public administration, and although Anglo-Saxon countries such as the United Kingdom, the United States, New Zealand, and Australia are said to have embraced a largely business-like approach to management (Hughes, 2014, pp. 29–32), it may still be argued that this new approach did not simply replace Weberian bureaucracy, but reworked some of its principles in light of changing managerial and social expectations (OECD, 1998, p. 5).

It should also be noted that in the former socialist countries where legal-rational bureaucracy was absent, and where its necessary and positive aspects never fully took root, the process unfolded very differently, even if other factors such as culture are set aside (Çiner & Olgun, 2015, p. 222). For example, Jenei argues that in Hungary the implementation of business-like reforms without first establishing the necessary and positive aspects of legal-rational bureaucracy led to corruption (Jenei, 2009). It is also argued that reform movements outside the Anglo-Saxon world were attempts to "modernize" public administration and may be described as Neo-Weberian (Pollitt & Bouckaert, 2011, p. 19). In this study, then, the phenomenon of bureaucracy is not rejected. Rather, legal-rational bureaucracy in the Weberian sense is adopted, with its positive aspects taken as foundational.

The maturation and spread of the capitalist system between the eighteenth and twentieth centuries produced sharp transformations in administration just as it did in many other areas (Dreyfus, 2014, p. 20). Indeed, modern bureaucracy is often said to share key characteristics with capitalism and capitalist modes of production such as Taylorism and Fordism, including division of labor, specialization, and rationalism (Aslan, 2012, pp. 127–130). Some writers go even further and define bureaucracy as "a useful social invention developed during the Industrial Revolution to organize and manage the activities of firms," emphasizing that rational bureaucracy was applied by firms before it was by states (Bennis, 2016, p. 305).

The reason for stressing the relationship between capitalist production, the Industrial Revolution, and bureaucracy is to make clear the qualities through which bureaucracy came to occupy its place in public administration. The frequent depiction of bureaucracy as the operational core of the state, or as a machine-like social organization, reflects this historical association between bureaucracy, rationalization, and modern forms of collective production (Bennis, 2016, p. 305; Hague & Harrop, 2004).

Once the metaphor of the rudder and the engine is considered, it becomes clear that the relationship between bureaucracy and politics has several dimensions. Particularly in the policy-making process—the field in which the state becomes concrete—one can locate bureaucracy in terms of whether it is active or passive. In some situations bureaucracy may be more influential than politicians in the policy process, while in others politicians' direction may be more decisive. In still other situations, influence may be distributed more evenly between the two actors (Durgun, 2012, pp. 228–229; B. G. Peters, 2001, pp. 220–221).

It would not be wrong to say that the first two of these situations are the ones most frequently encountered. It is useful to add that the last possibility, in which politicians and bureaucrats each carry out the roles assigned to them within a division of labor, actually reflects the ideal arrangement one would want. In any event, these actor-centered classifications provide useful data for explaining bureaucracy's function in public administration.

In line with this, it is appropriate to list bureaucracy's functions, following Heywood, as administering public affairs, offering political advice, articulating and aggregating interests, and maintaining political stability (Heywood, 2012a, p. 460). Since the functions of offering political advice and articulating and aggregating interests are part of the public policy-making process, some authors treat them together as a single whole (Eryılmaz, 2013, pp. 36–37). Here, however, the more detailed formulation is preferred.

The administrative function rests on the assumption that the government or political authorities determine which policies are to be carried out, while bureaucracy implements those policies (Durgun, 2012, p. 229). Put more plainly, the governance of the state consists, broadly speaking, of two parts: "administration," represented by bureaucracy, and "government," represented by political institutions, as idea and action. This results from the fact that in the modern era, especially with the growth of the state, increasingly complex governmental activity has made specialization and division of labor necessary. In short, while the political wing determines policies in line with social demands under democratic principles, the bureaucratic wing takes the measures—such as planning—needed to put those policies into effect. It should also not be forgotten that bureaucracy, at least in theory or in the ideal case, is supposed to act under the command of the executive, the government, and politicians (Eryılmaz, 2007, p. 247; Heywood, 2012a, p. 458). At this point, however, Weber's emphasis on authority "grounded in law" within rational bureaucracy must not be overlooked. In other words, politicians determine policies within the legal framework granted to them, and bureaucrats, in turn, implement those decisions in accordance with the law.

Earlier it was noted that bureaucracy has a political side as well as a technical one. In this respect, bureaucracy, alongside the executive, also offers political advice during the formation of public policy (Durgun, 2012, p. 228). Owing to the advantages conferred by specialization and career service, the knowledge possessed by bureaucracy occupies an important place in the process from the preparation of public policies to their maturation (Hague & Harrop, 2004, p. 290; Heywood, 2012a, p. 459).

The source of public policies is sometimes politicians responding to voters' demands, but in other cases it arises from the solutions proposed by bureaucrats in the face of a particular problem. There are even situations in which demands and proposals originating from politicians are formulated and politicized by bureaucrats (Eryılmaz, 2013, p. 36).

In the latter case, it is often argued that bureaucracy, by virtue of certain characteristics that place it above politicians—such as knowledge and expertise—takes decisions in its own interest or in the interest of specific groups, or shapes decisions already being made. This anomalous condition, formulated as clientelism, can arise not only in countries where democracy is underdeveloped and military and/or political elites are dominant, but also in democratic countries, for example when bureaucracy falls into the orbit of political parties (Hague & Harrop, 2004, p. 290; Heywood, 2012a, p. 459).

In short, offering political advice and articulating the interests of pressure groups amounts to summarizing bureaucracy's position in the policy-making process. In this respect, B. G. Peters (2001, pp. 238–244) argues that bureaucrats can make a positive, "soft" contribution to the development of policies through the opportunities provided by their knowledge and expertise, but can also adopt a blocking, "hard" position through those same resources.

The final function discussed here, and one that also reveals bureaucracy's importance in public administration, is stability and continuity. This function is at the same time one of the sources of power that bureaucracy possesses vis-à-vis the political wing, alongside expertise, the ability to make quick decisions, certainty, institutional ideology, and technical knowledge (Akbey, 2013, pp. 53–54; Merton, 2016, p. 128). B. G. Peters (2001, pp. 238–244) emphasizes this asymmetry by noting that elected ministers are temporary, whereas core public services and career officials remain in place over time. Ministers therefore rarely have enough time to master the full complexity of these services, which can produce disruptions in public service and, ultimately, public dissatisfaction.

The presence of bureaucrats equipped with the capacities required to provide public services, by contrast, allows problems and needs to be addressed without interruption and thereby secures order and, as a consequence, social peace (Heywood, 2012a, p. 456). Put more directly, through this function bureaucracy can provide stability—peace and security—in countries where political stability cannot be ensured for military, economic, social, or similar adverse reasons, and can also play a major role in resolving large-scale problems through the effective organization of resources (Eryılmaz, 2013, pp. 82–83).

Alongside all of this, the factor of elections is another dimension that needs to be mentioned in connection with continuity and stability. Political cadres and governments are renewed through elections held at regular intervals. Politicians who wish to return to office produce policies and take decisions in line with the wishes of the voting public. Yet this can sometimes lead to short-term and irrational decisions. Bureaucrats, by contrast, occupy more continuous and relatively stable positions, which makes more rational and effective decision-making possible (du Gay, 2005, p. 51; Farazmand, 2009, p. 6). That said, continuity and stability, despite their positive aspects, can also have negative effects on bureaucratic personalities, such as fostering superiority over politicians, visionlessness, and resistance to change (Heywood, 2012a, p. 460).

In summary, bureaucracy occupies its place in public administration through a set of basic functions: carrying out public-administrative tasks and procedures, offering advice in the formation of policy, representing stakeholders' interests, and securing public stability and continuity. These are also the features that make bureaucracy positive and indispensable. Yet even though bureaucracy is indispensable, it remains important to build mechanisms that preserve the balance between bureaucracy and politics—that is, democracy. Otherwise, bureaucracy may drift toward an elitist form of rule that becomes increasingly insulated from citizens' needs and democratic control.

1.3. The Growing Power of Bureaucracy: Contemporary Bureaucracies

Many of the criticisms directed at bureaucracy from the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries onward still seem valid today. For that reason, any account of contemporary bureaucracies must emphasize, to a large extent, these negative conditions, which were already clearly visible in the past. The growing power of bureaucracy, often at the expense of political authority, helps explain why bureaucracy has acquired a pejorative meaning in democratic debates (Reed, 2005, p. 116; von Mises, 2010, p. 69).

Today, bureaucracy has a very broad field of application. More plainly, bureaucracy is the organizational operating form not only of public, private, and military professional organizations but also of structures such as trade unions, civil society organizations, and political parties that emerged as part of industrial modern society, across both the public and private sectors (Aytaç, 2005, p. 252). Built on Weber's model of legal-rational bureaucracy, this modern bureaucratic structure, because of its rigid and centralized character, is unable in many areas to respond adequately to the contemporary world and the problems it faces (Eryılmaz, 2013, pp. 82–83).

Although Weber's theory of bureaucracy regards bureaucracy as superior to other forms of organization because of features such as rationality, efficiency, predictability, continuity, and neutrality (Aytaç, 2005, p. 253; Eryılmaz, 2013, p. 72), "rationality" in particular has failed to yield the results expected or claimed for it. It has proved insufficient in meeting the needs and solving the problems that have emerged in the face of the social, economic, cultural, and political changes of the twenty-first century (Reed, 2005, pp. 116, 118). Moreover, if bureaucracy is not subject to effective political and judicial oversight, its rational, hierarchical, continuous nature, together with its distance from direct accountability to the public, can lead it toward authoritarianism (Farazmand, 2009, pp. 6–7).

Another problematic issue related to rationality concerns the mode of action that Weber and Weberian bureaucracy assign to, and expect from, public employees and officials (Weber, 2016, pp. 58–63). Although Weber himself acknowledged that the ideal could never be fully realized, the virtues expected of the exemplary official, rather than approximating that ideal, have often drifted in the opposite direction. Creating inequalities of power, acting in line with the interests of political elites, pursuing personal advantages, and displaying political behaviors are all examples of the by-no-means-exceptional deviations from the assumptions of bureaucratic rationality and impersonality of office (Eryılmaz, 2015, pp. 281–282).

Weber's theory of bureaucracy, even in its early period, was subjected to serious criticism for being mechanical, soulless, detached from reality, neglectful of social and psychological factors, and for that very reason impossible to apply in practice (Hodgetts, 1997, pp. 28–39; Öztaş, 2015, pp. 167–168). As already noted, bureaucracies and bureaucrats who do not in fact act "rationally and impersonally," and who therefore do not function like a machine, can produce highly destructive outcomes when they enter into political decisions and actions by relying on the power resources they possess. Historical experiences, ranging from authoritarian regimes to military interventions, show that civil and military bureaucracies can produce destructive outcomes when their power resources are detached from democratic and legal oversight (Farazmand, 2009, pp. 6–7).

None of this should be taken to mean that Weberian bureaucracy is unnecessary or that democratic development requires a wholesale abandonment of bureaucratic structures. On the contrary, the existence of experts and impartial personnel working under the command and oversight of democratically elected political authorities and laws is a requirement of democracy (Eryılmaz, 2013, p. 84, 2015, pp. 286–287; von Mises, 2010, pp. 65–89). Indeed, with the exception of Marxist interpretations (Dursun, 2012, p. 133; Eryılmaz, 2013, p. 19), nearly all of the criticisms directed at bureaucracy do not argue for its complete elimination but rather for a reduction in the scope and intensity of its authority and responsibility. In this sense, contemporary governance reflects a retreat from the postwar developmental state, in which the state and therefore bureaucracy had reached enormous proportions (Clarke, 2005, pp. 213–215), toward a position in which the state acts more as decision-maker, coordinator, and regulator than as direct implementer (Heywood, 2012a, pp. 462–463; Koven, 2009, p. 149).

A new period seems to have begun when the hierarchical, rigid, and mechanical traditional approach to management, criticized in public institutions as much as in the private sector[1] (Sobacı, 2014, p. 51), was largely abandoned by the private sector in the 1950s and 1960s. In that period, although not completely, the Weberian bureaucratic model was set aside in favor of a shift from an *administrator* ethos to a *manager* ethos (Hughes, 2014, p. 150).

Yet even though such changes occurred in the private sector and studies emphasizing the negative aspects of traditional bureaucracy appeared relatively early in relation to the timing of later reforms, the public sector did not enter a parallel process of change.[2] For example, the first theoretically grounded criticisms in this field are known to have been advanced by figures associated with Public Choice Theory (Lane, 2000, p. 48), such as the Chicago School (Poterba, 1998) and the Virginia School of Economics (Buchanan, 1975).

Public choice theory took shape around the question of whether decision-making is individual or collective and reached its final form through integration with the public policy process. It argued that, contrary to the assumption that rationalized human beings in the modern world make individual and rational decisions, individuals may also act collectively and arrive at irrational decisions in order to maximize their interests (Buchanan & Tullock, 1999, pp. 3–10). In terms of the present study, the theory suggests that bureaucrats may collectively steer public policy so as to increase the budgets and resources of their own units (Heywood, 2012a, p. 456).

Bureaucracy also expanded because of political, social, and economic changes in addition to internal reasons, and it became almost synonymous with inefficiency. Beginning with the Industrial Revolution and continuing through the First and Second World Wars, this process produced deeply negative consequences for human life. In order to repair these destructive outcomes and rebuild political and social order, various approaches to governance such as the developmental state, the social democratic state, and the welfare state were adopted, even though their methods and intellectual foundations differed (Coşkun, 2013, pp. 51–52; Heywood, 2012a, pp. 138–139; Hughes, 2014, pp. 78–80).

The governing approaches adopted for these reasons and for the other negative conditions they produced led to an expansion of the state's sphere of activity and, naturally, to unsustainable increases in public expenditure (D. Osborne, 1993, p. 349; S. P. Osborne & McLaughlin, 2002, p. 8). The fact that bureaucrats, in line with the assumptions of public choice theory, also made irrational decisions aimed at enlarging their own budgets and spheres of authority (Aksoy, 1998, p. 8) only deepened the damage caused by this growth of the state.

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[1] It should not be forgotten that classical theorists such as Taylor and Fayol built their theories on models drawn from private-sector businesses.

[2] For example, Ludwig von Mises wrote his critique of traditional bureaucracy, Bureaucracy, as early as 1944.

Although critiques of traditional administration are known to date back as early as the 1940s, serious reform efforts did not move onto the agenda of politicians and other stakeholders in a sustained way until the oil-driven economic crisis of the 1970s (Barzelay, 2001, p. 1; Bilgiç, 2013; Lynn, 2006, p. 104). Yet this was not merely a narrowly financial process. It was also a process shaped by the environment triggered by the 1973 oil crisis together with other long-running managerial and fiscal problems, as well as by many social, cultural, philosophical, and technological developments unfolding globally (Bilgiç, 2013, pp. 33–34).

As noted earlier, the traditional approach to management represented by Weber, Taylor, and Fayol was built on assumptions formed under the influence of the global conditions of its own time. In a world marked by two world wars and a Cold War, and by scientific and technological developments moving at remarkable speed, it is hardly surprising that conceptions of management also changed. Developments in information and communication technologies, in particular, weakened the "administration" associated with the modern or industrial age and the bureaucratic structures attached to it, while at the same time strengthening the "management" associated with the information age (Hood, 1998, p. 4).

Alongside these changes, which may plausibly be described as structural, important differences also emerged in the way society viewed life, government, and politics. The industrial society grounded in rationality and in the belief that everything could be predetermined and that there was a single correct answer has weakened. In its place, a postmodern society is said to have emerged in which there is no single truth and relativism is dominant; production is personalized beyond standardized forms, with factory-style production and workshop production running in hybrid ways; sensitivity to the individual, pluralism, and cultural difference has increased; hierarchical and centralized structures have loosened; and large organizations have given way to smaller units that together form a whole (Ateş, 2013b).

Although there is no precise date, shifts also occurred after the 1970s in people's preferences concerning production, consumption, and standards of living. Just as people are resistant to intervention in their personal lives and desire "quality" of life alongside wealth accumulation and economic growth (Ateş, 2013b), they also projected these preferences onto the governance of the state. In this respect, a reaction against the welfare-state model became especially visible. The equal distribution of public resources by the welfare state, and the relatively low living standards thought to result from it, were criticized, and ideas calling for the state's sphere of activity to be narrowed in favor of individuals—that is, left to the private sector—became widespread in society (S. P. Osborne & McLaughlin, 2002, p. 8).

The maturation of the need, or necessity, for change that emerged from the economic, technological, social, cultural, and philosophical factors outlined above (Sobacı, 2014, pp. 55–61), and its eventual implementation, first materialized at the beginning of the 1980s under British Conservative Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher (Barzelay, 2001, p. 2). Yet the fact that the new approach to management first took shape in the United Kingdom does not mean that it was an approach unique to the British. On the contrary, for the reasons already mentioned, it also had a global character (Hood, 1991, p. 3, 2016, p. 749).

This transformation, in which all of the state's mechanisms were reformed as a whole within the framework of neoliberal policies, represented a transition from administration to a market-based understanding of management and held that business practices from the private sector should be applied to the public sector (Lynn, 2006, pp. 114–115). In other words, it represented a move away from an old and outdated understanding of administration centered on procedures and processes toward a new understanding of management centered on results within a cost-benefit logic (Hood, 1998, p. 5).

In simple terms, New Public Management, understood as the overall body of reforms implemented in many countries and many fields—not only in the United Kingdom but also in New Zealand, France, Sweden, Australia, and the United States (Hood, 1991, p. 3, 2016, p. 749)—includes and prioritizes the adoption of an entrepreneurial understanding in public policy-making, the use of successful private-sector management techniques as models, the efficient use of resources, the promotion of competition, the transition from centralization to decentralization, and an emphasis on performance and quality standards (Barzelay, 2001, p. 2; S. P. Osborne & McLaughlin, 2002, p. 9; Sobacı, 2014, p. 63).

It should be added that this transformation and its characteristics also represent a transition from modern bureaucracy, that is, Weberian bureaucracy, to postmodern bureaucracy. The postmodern "turn" that occurred through intellectual and philosophical differentiation found its counterpart in administration as well. In short, postmodern bureaucracy and New Public Management may be said to rest on parallel and/or similar assumptions (Ateş, 2013a, pp. 98–101; Barzelay & Armajani, 2016, pp. 789–791; Özmen, 2013, p. 77).

The first administrative examples of this doctrinal transformation, which may also be described as a paradigm shift (Al, 2002; Hood, 1991, 2016), appear to have been inspired by and modeled on the Japanese ideal of excellence (Al, 2002, pp. 108–111). Disciplined under the label of Total Quality Management, this ideal of excellence addresses management especially along the axis of economic rationality and formulates principles on that basis (Hood, 1998, p. 5).

The early arrangements of New Public Management, especially its emphasis on economic rationality, together with fiscal and economic measures arising from the other factors previously mentioned, were based on the partial or complete dismantling of Keynesian economics and/or the welfare-state model (Lane, 2000, p. 48). Alongside the basic assumptions of public choice theory and the postwar developmental state, the public debts that reached unmanageable levels with the 1973 oil crisis made such "urgent" measures appear necessary. For that reason, it would be wrong to reduce New Public Management, seen as a paradigmatic shift, to "nothing more than cutting public expenditures."

In this context, it is useful to touch briefly on the debate in Turkish scholarship between *Yeni Kamu Yönetimi* and *Yeni Kamu İşletmeciliği*. As has often been noted, the period stretching from the 1980s into the 1990s had a distinctly business-like character, and businesses were taken as models. On that basis, the term associated with business or managerialism was often preferred over the more general term for management (Al, 2002, pp. 108–111). In fact, there is also a fairly widespread view that the reforms undertaken in Anglo-Saxon countries such as the United Kingdom and New Zealand between roughly 1980 and 1990 differ from those undertaken later, and in other countries, and that it is not correct to gather all post-1980 reforms under a single umbrella (Hughes, 2014; Pollitt & Bouckaert, 2011).

Yet it would not be wrong to say that in Western debates the issue has not been whether the new approach should be labeled "business" or "management," but whether it represents an internally coherent whole, whereas the debate in Turkish scholarship has largely stemmed from translation. For example, although Hughes's *Public Management and Administration* (2012) was translated into Turkish as *Kamu İşletmeciliği ve Yönetimi* (2014), in the section discussing the meanings of *management* and *administration*, the translation preferred *yönetim* for management and *idare* for administration (Hughes, 2014, p. 150).

Leaving these differences in translation aside, the real issue is whether the transformation in question represents a coherent and integrated paradigm of change. At this point, two broad assumptions may be mentioned. The first holds that the reforms from 1980 onward do not display consistency across either time or place, that reforms differ from period to period and country to country, that countries showing consistency share a common political, cultural, and administrative past, and that Anglo-Saxon countries exercised influence within international organizations such as the World Bank, IMF, and OECD, which then imposed this one-size-fits-all program on the countries under their influence (Bouckaert, 2007; Çiner & Olgun, 2015; Jenei, 2009; Pollitt & Bouckaert, 2011). The second assumption argues that although the reform agenda concentrated on different issues at different times, it nonetheless rested, in essence, on a shared intellectual framework and represented a paradigm (Al, 2002; Ateş, 2013a, 2013b; Hood, 1991, 1998, 2016).

In this study, the reforms carried out after 1980 are accepted as manifestations of a paradigm, and the various reform packages known by different names across time and place are gathered, as in Al's (2002, pp. 108–111) work, under the heading of New Public Management. Although Hughes (2014) lists the drawbacks of this approach, which Hood also adopts, it was considered incorrect to confine the global reform programs of the post-1980 period within the reductionist label of "managerialism."

Moreover, the reforms undertaken after 1980 did not aim, as is sometimes suggested, to adopt nothing but managerialism or to eliminate bureaucratic structures entirely. More plainly, it is not correct to say that New Public Management completely abolished the "old," that is, traditional Weberian public administration, and built something entirely new. Rather, New Public Management preserved the positive aspects of traditional administration while emphasizing efforts to create a more effective and efficient form of governance (Al, 2002, p. 101; Ateş, 2013a, pp. 93, 102, 2013b, p. 411; Çiner & Olgun, 2015, pp. 220–221; Hughes, 2014, pp. 168–169; Köseoğlu & Sobacı, 2015, p. 300; Nohutçu & Balcı, 2013, p. 20).

As explained in detail above, the new approach to management significantly increased the importance of the policy process and the role assigned to bureaucrats within it. Yet this new situation also created another problem: through resources such as expertise and informational monopoly, bureaucrats could influence the policy process in their own favor despite the different wishes of politicians (Eryılmaz, 2013, p. 112; Heywood, 2012a, p. 465). In short, it is well known that bureaucrats shape policies in line with their own preferences at many stages of policy, from budgeting to the provision of information and advice, by directing politicians through bureaucratic maneuvering (B. G. Peters, 2001, pp. 238–244).

In summary, legal-rational bureaucracy in the Weberian sense remains, despite all its negative features, an indispensable mode of organization for the modern world. For that reason, mechanisms of oversight and control that can eliminate or at least minimize its drawbacks must be established. In this sense, New Public Management can be interpreted, at least in part, as an attempt to limit the rigidity, proceduralism, and inefficiencies associated with traditional bureaucracy. As later sections discuss in detail, the regulatory and supervisory agencies that came onto the agenda after privatization also support this claim.

Yet this interpretation should not be read as an unqualified endorsement of New Public Management. While NPM sought to overcome some of the rigidities of traditional bureaucracy, it also generated new questions concerning fragmentation, accountability, public value, and the limits of market-oriented reform. The point, therefore, is not that NPM solved the problem of bureaucracy, but that it redefined the terms through which bureaucracy, management, and reform came to be debated.

Section 2

2. The Interaction of Culture With Administration and Reform

After the Industrial Revolution, the world began to be read through a new concept called modernism. The dynamics of this world, described as modern, were imagined as being shaped by the characteristic properties of machines and, like machines, as operating through predictable, passive, designable, and internally consistent rules. Today, however, that paradigm has changed, especially under the influence of developments in information and communication technologies, and a more flexible, skeptical, and pluralist social outlook has become established on a global scale (Ateş, 2013b).

A similar transformation has taken place in public administration. The modern understanding of administration—traditional public administration—whose theoretical foundations were laid by Weber and whose main features may be summarized as rigid, hierarchical, impersonal, and rational, has lost its functionality in that form. In its place, a post-bureaucratic approach to administration—flexible, humane, attentive to cultural values, pluralistic, and encouraging initiative and leadership—has become widespread in public administration and is now pursued by many states (Ateş, 2013a, p. 93; Özmen, 2013, p. 77).

This global transformation also changed the method of research on administrative reform. The cultural perspective increasingly challenged and supplemented the earlier rationalist perspective (Lane & Wagschal, 2012). In this respect, criticisms were directed at the logic that began to dominate administration through the combination of globalization, which had accelerated since the 1950s, with the modern rational paradigm—a logic that standardized human minds (Marcuse, 2010) and produced a "one-size-fits-all" model of governance (Newman & Nollen, 1996).

As the importance of culture became better understood, studies in this field intensified, and it became clear that even though public and private organizations may possess similar institutional skeletons, they often respond differently to the same events. These differences, it was emphasized, derive from cultural variation at both the national and institutional levels (Sargut, 2001, p. 137; Trompenaars & Hampden-Turner, 1997, p. 13). Japanese firms provide one of the clearest examples of this. The decline in managerial efficiency in the Anglo-Saxon world and in Continental Europe, especially after a certain point, led observers to focus on the Japanese experience, which produced successful outcomes in productivity and effectiveness. Research on the Japanese experience often emphasized the role of strong cultural values in supporting efficiency and productivity, although such explanations should not be treated as monocausal (T. J. Peters & Waterman, 2004).

Yet the vital effect of culture on institutions and organizations should not lead us into the mistaken belief that successful outcomes are simply a matter of building a successful culture. Culture should not be reduced to something simple and easily transformable. It must instead be treated as a highly complex phenomenon (de Witte & van Muijen, 1999, p. 497). That complexity results from the fact that culture is shaped by the environment in which it exists even as it also shapes that environment.

The issues discussed in the following subsections show the role culture plays, at the macro and meso levels, in the relationship between administration and reform. Accordingly, culture is first addressed in anthropological, political, and institutional terms in order to establish a macro- and meso-level perspective. The discussion then turns, in line with the substance of the study, to administrative culture and bureaucratic culture. In the final subsection, an effort is made to clarify the direction and magnitude of the mutual interaction between reform and culture, which is the central concern of this work. The following discussion therefore does not treat culture as a decorative background to reform. It treats culture as one of the conditions through which reform is interpreted, resisted, translated, or institutionalized.

2.1. Culture from Anthropological, Political, and Institutional Perspectives

Although culture encompasses the whole of human life, it is extremely difficult to define and remains one of the most ambiguous and contested subjects in the social sciences. Culture, which is a central object of inquiry in disciplines such as political science, sociology, public administration, and business administration, is anthropological in origin and forms the backbone of work in that field (Smircich, 1983, p. 339). Because it is a borrowed concept, different definitions and classifications of culture have been proposed depending on the way the issue is handled and the method used (Edgar & Sedgwick, 2008, p. 82; Hofstede, 2003).

From an anthropological perspective, culture has a vital function. Anthropologists argue that every living being develops a strategy in order to survive, and that for human beings this strategy is culture (Bodley, 2011, p. 10; Smircich, 1983, p. 342). The key point here is that human beings live in groups. In order to survive in nature and improve their physical and/or psychological condition, they must be able to anticipate the behavior of others. As a result, cooperation becomes possible among people, and shared patterns of behavior can be formed (Haviland et al., 2008, p. 103).

The fact that in European languages the word *culture* shares its roots with human activities such as agriculture, animal husbandry, and cultivation—which require accumulated knowledge, cooperation, and division of labor—shows that culture corresponds to a social mode of behavior (Edgar & Sedgwick, 2008, p. 82). In this respect, medieval European usage associated culture with cultivation and settled agricultural life, while often devaluing hunting and gathering societies as "uncultured"; this classification reflected the hierarchical and exclusionary assumptions of its own historical context (Smith, 2007, p. 13).

Despite its complexity and contestation, definitions of culture may be grouped as descriptive, historical, normative, psychological, structural, and genetic (Smith, 2007, p. 13). These classifications relate both to the missions assigned to culture and to the ways in which culture is used synonymously with other concepts. Although culture carries many meanings, it still needs a working definition. It is therefore useful to define culture, in broad terms, as the values and perceptions that the members of a society collectively possess and circulate among themselves, and that are reflected in behavior while also helping to interpret it (Haviland et al., 2008, p. 103).

That definition is useful, but it remains necessary to clarify what exactly these "shared," "circulated," and "commonly possessed" things are—that is, the components of culture. In this respect, culture consists of knowledge, beliefs, artistic products and works, values, rules, customs and traditions, and all the capacities and habits acquired afterward by the human being as a member of society (Journet, 2009, pp. 15–16). It is also possible to summarize these shared values more generally as material and symbolic products. As later paragraphs make clear, culture also corresponds to actions built jointly by symbols, heroes, rituals, and values (Hofstede et al., 2010, pp. 7–10).

Anthropologists note that some animals also display behaviors with cultural qualities. Yet those behaviors are biological, instinctive ones rather than truly social. Human cultural behavior, by contrast, is not an inherited internal endowment but an acquired quality stemming from life in community. Put more directly, culture is a pattern of behavior learned in and with society and transmitted from generation to generation (Bodley, 2011, pp. 10, 12). As Kartarı puts it, "culture is created by a specific social structure, exists in practice, and constantly renews itself" (Kartarı, 2014, pp. 17–21).

To say that culture is a social pattern of behavior also brings the concepts of role and action to the fore. Culture, learned and transmitted across generations, tells people how they should act in a given role—whether as police officer, teacher, worker, manager, bureaucrat, or politician (Hsu, 1979, p. 520). That, after all, is exactly what is meant by a pattern of behavior. After role and action, the concept of identity becomes essential. Identities are built, in simple terms, on differences and similarities (Kartarı, 2014, pp. 17–21). The fact that culture offers individuals behavioral guidance (Lundberg, 2008, p. 1402), leading them to become similar within the group and different from those outside it, clearly reveals its role in the construction of identity (Edgar & Sedgwick, 2008, p. 167).

This collective construction of identity also gives rise to what may be called social culture, expressed through labels such as community, society, and collectivity (Heywood, 2012b, pp. 169–170). Social culture may be described, at least in its earlier conceptualization before globalization and mobility took on their current meanings, as the cooperation and way of life that people living on the same territory and in close physical proximity create through shared abstract and concrete values (Nişancı, 2012, p. 1281).

Today, however, governance and political organization do not necessarily coincide with societies. The idea of the "nation," which emerged out of social events such as the Reformation, the Renaissance, and the French Revolution in Continental Europe, and which generated global changes, produced after the First World War a paradigm in which states, rather than societies, were equated with nations (Lane, 2008, p. 242). This paradigm spread both because of the requirements of the age and because of the will of sovereign states.

For that reason, some societies today are located under more than one state and therefore under more than one mode of governance, while some states contain more than one society. Consequently, both for the sake of obtaining data and for making data comparable, the nation-state and its corresponding national culture become analytically necessary. In short, in order to examine the relationship between administration and culture, it is national culture rather than social culture that must be clarified (Hofstede et al., 2010, p. 21).

National culture does not simply mean the culture belonging to a nation. It is also seen as the main element that forms the nation and holds it together. Nations, defined as communities gathered around shared culture, language, religion, history, and traditions (Heywood, 2012b, p. 341), may arise organically through physical proximity and historical coexistence, but they may also be formed over time under a political authority through traditions, culture, and habits shaped by various political and economic motives (Giddens, 2008, pp. 350–355). It would, however, be wrong to say that national culture is wholly homogeneous and static. Bounded by political and geographical borders, nations—and thus national cultures—often display a variable and heterogeneous character, except perhaps in countries with very ancient histories and strong traditions of statehood (Edensor, 2002, pp. 37–38).

Since Giddens places Türkiye alongside classical nation-states such as France and Britain (Giddens, 2008, pp. 350–355), and since this points to a relatively more homogeneous cultural unity than in some other nation-states, the concept of national culture is useful for the present study. This also parallels Hofstede and his colleagues' preference for national culture over social culture (Hofstede et al., 2010, p. 21). For similar reasons, the attitudes and behaviors of the people who have constructed a political unity over a particular territory—that is, the nation (Heywood, 2012b, p. 341)—must be delimited, in line with the scope of this study, to the economic, political, and social fields relevant to the argument.

In this respect, political culture—defined in broad terms as a kind of cluster in which the dominant political feelings, beliefs, and values relating to politics among the members of a nation or the citizens of a state come together (Oktay, 2007, p. 214)—is highly functional because it gives a national-level picture while leaving aside dimensions that fall beyond the scope of the study. Put more clearly, adopting the concept of political culture provides data that help interpret cultural factors in both concrete domains (the country) and abstract ones (governance).

A few points should be stressed in order to avoid misunderstanding. Political culture does not refer to public opinion or a temporary climate of views within a given period. Rather, it refers to the long process—transmitted from generation to generation—through which material and symbolic products, institutions, symbols, attitudes, and values orient behavior (Heywood, 2012a, p. 264). As noted earlier, since states often contain more than one society and therefore more than one culture, political culture may also be defined as a summary of the individual values and norms that shape attitudes toward politics, political institutions, and political systems (Hague et al., 2016, p. 201; Hague & Harrop, 2004, p. 89). Another important point is that while political culture is often transmitted naturally across generations, there are also cases in which external political cultures imposed through conquest or colonialism reshape local culture (Oktay, 2007, p. 215).

Although it is generally accepted that each country or state has a different political culture, there are also comparative studies that group countries according to their basic cultural-political textures in order to facilitate comparison. One of the earliest and most important such works, grounded in Weber's comparison of Protestantism and capitalism (Hague et al., 2016, p. 202), is Almond and Verba's (1989) *The Civic Culture*, which examines the cultural interaction between democratic institutions and citizens in countries such as the United States, West Germany, Mexico, Italy, and Great Britain in order to identify political culture (Oktay, 2007, p. 215).

In that study, Almond and Verba (1989) classify national political cultures into three broad groups: participant culture, in which citizens are closely concerned with national politics and are both willing and able to take part in policy-making; parochial culture, in which individuals do not define themselves as political actors at the national level and instead inhabit narrower and more local identities; and subject culture, in which people believe they have no real influence over the central government or national policies (Heywood, 2012a, p. 264). It would also not be wrong to say that these patterns are shaped in part by how distant or isolated people are, physically, from centers of policy production and implementation (Hague & Harrop, 2004, p. 89).

Almond and Verba's work, taken here as an example of national-level comparisons of political culture, supplies a macro cultural perspective within politically defined territorial boundaries. At the more meso level, analyses of the cultural differences between institutions, organizations, and administrations are important for understanding how culture affects, in particular, reforms associated with New Public Management and, more generally, all administrative and political reforms. It is also well known that research on public administration reforms often adopts precisely this kind of macro-meso-micro cultural stratification as a method (Bouckaert, 2007, pp. 31–32; Keraudren, 1996).

In line with a deductive method, it is appropriate at this point to proceed by examining organizational culture, leaving administrative and bureaucratic culture to the next subsection. Organizational culture may be defined, in general and summary form, as the phenomenon through which beliefs, ideas, language, rituals, and myths created by a founder and later shared by employees come together to guide feelings and actions and thereby build purpose, commitment, and order within an institution (Pettigrew, 1979, p. 572). Beyond this, there are many definitions that parallel the logic of culture in general but differ depending on which organizational features they emphasize (Akıncı-Vural, 2012, pp. 40–41):

- The core values adopted by the institution
- The philosophy that guides the organization's policies toward employees and customers
- Shared views about how things are done there
- The collective programming of the mind
- The basic beliefs and assumptions shared by organizational members
- Strong beliefs about how work should be organized, how authority should be used, and how people should be rewarded and controlled
- A pattern of shared beliefs, attitudes, predictions, and expectations that shapes how people in the organization should behave and influence one another and shows how things are done
- The feelings continuously shared by a group of people with regard to work in the organization
- The totality of an organization's fundamental values and beliefs together with the symbols, ceremonies, and myths that communicate them to employees

Compared with anthropological studies of culture, organizational culture has a shorter history. It first appeared in the late 1960s in the United States in the form of "industrial subculture", based on the observation of cultural motifs in employees' behavior (Yağmurlu, 1997, p. 717). Later, although many related studies already existed, the first clear and disciplined work was written by Pettigrew (1979), thereby establishing the concept of organizational culture in the literature (Hofstede et al., 1990, p. 286).

As noted earlier, the complexity surrounding the conceptualization of culture naturally also applies to organizational culture. For this reason, uncertainty about how the subject should be researched or diagnosed has caused the literature to grow very large. When studies on organizational culture—whether scientific or otherwise—are classified by method, they can be broadly divided into two groups: those that ask what organizations have and those that ask what organizations are (Ehrhart et al., 2014, p. 125).

Setting those conceptual debates aside, it is reasonable to describe organizational culture as an identity that distinguishes the employees or members of one organization from those of another (Hofstede, 1998, p. 2), as a guide showing how work should be done and how human relations should be organized (Schein, 2009, p. 37), and as an instrument that gathers under one umbrella all of the symbolic and ideational dimensions of the organization (Alvesson, 2011, p. 14).

After definitions and descriptions, it is worth briefly mentioning the determinants of organizational culture, because they provide useful clues for interpreting and making sense of the relationship between culture and reform, especially reforms undertaken under the umbrella of New Public Management. These determinants may be grouped as follows (Erkmen, 2010, pp. 61–70):

- Organizational design and structure
- Personnel selection and the socialization process
    - Recruitment
    - Placement
    - Specialization at work
    - Performance measurement and reward
    - Compliance with important values
    - Reinforcement of stories and folklore
    - Acceptance and promotion
- Ideologies, basic assumptions, and heroes
- Mythology and symbols
- Ceremonies, rites, and customs
    - Rites of entry to and exit from the organization

  - Rites of promotion
  - Rites oriented toward innovation
  - Rites of integration
- Language

Taken together, these determinants clearly show that both material and symbolic, or concrete and abstract, elements shape organizational culture jointly. Put differently, when we recall that organizations consist of both formal and informal structures, this shows that structural components as well as culture play important roles in reform processes (Akıncı-Vural, 2012, p. 39). Accordingly, while the cultural dimension should be given due weight in examining New Public Management, the institutional dimension must not be neglected either.

In summary, culture in the general sense is the totality of the ideas, beliefs, and values that express both human behavior and the abstract and concrete world built through that behavior (Kartarı, 2014, p. 31). Culture is also a system that is shared, learned, symbol-based, constantly changing and developing, and composed of multiple parts (Haviland et al., 2008, pp. 104–119). Political culture may be summarized as a cluster of dominant political feelings, beliefs, and values within a nation or among the citizens of a state (Oktay, 2007, p. 214).

Organizational culture, which is directly relevant to the subject of this study, corresponds to what is shared within an organization, relatively stable and deep structures of meaning, and such things as symbols, expressions, history, tradition, collective identity, and collective understanding (Ehrhart et al., 2014, p. 131). Put more simply, all general or specific definitions of culture can be summarized as forms of action and discourse that both produce and are produced by life in community.

To form a clear sense of what organizational culture is and is not, it is necessary to say something about organizational climate and the distinction between the two. The concept of organizational climate emerged in management studies in the late 1950s and early 1960s. The question of how work and the workplace affect human psychology brought psychology into industrial relations and working life in an increasingly visible way. Initially the focus was on human psychology, but later the relationship between human psychology and organization itself became central. In short, the concept of organizational climate arose from the effort to determine the relationship between employees' psychology and the organization (Halis & Yaşar-Uğurlu, 2008, p. 103; Karcıoğlu, 2001, pp. 268–269).

Although many definitions have been offered, it is useful to begin with Forehand and Gilmer's (1964, p. 362) formulation:

> *"We shall use the term in this paper to refer to the set of characteristics that describe an organization and that (a) distinguish the organization from other organizations, (b) are relatively enduring over time, and (c) influence the behavior of people in the organization."*

As they themselves noted, earlier definitions already existed, but they proposed this one in order to make organizational climate measurable as an object of research. Elsewhere, organizational climate has also been defined more broadly as "the quality, or set of qualities, of the work environment" (Guion, 1973, p. 120). If one looks more closely at what determines organizational climate, the range is very wide: size, age, goals, temperature, lighting, specialization, loyalty, communication, and leadership, all of which may be gathered under dimensions such as context, physical environment, structure, process, and systems-values-norms (James & Jones, 1974, pp. 1097–1098).

Since climate is not the central concern of this study, it is sufficient to address it through its relationship with culture and to emphasize the distinction between the two. It should first be said that the two concepts are often used interchangeably because they share some components. Yet they are not interchangeable concepts; they are concepts that stand in very close relation to one another. Above all, organizational climate concerns not what is objectively the case but how employees perceive what exists and how they feel about it (Tutar, 2016, p. 155). Since organizational culture is one of the components of what already exists within the organization, employees' perceptions of culture help constitute organizational climate (Özmutaf, 2019, pp. 401–402).

As these remarks indicate, while a distinction between organizational climate and organizational culture can be made, that distinction is not especially simple or immediately transparent. To make it somewhat clearer, it is useful to cite Dinçer's comparison through the lens of expectations and fit: organizational climate is closely related to organizational culture and measures the fit between employees' values and organizational culture. It is the general atmosphere that emerges from people's perceptions of how work within the enterprise ought to be. If employees embrace the culture of the enterprise, the organizational climate is good; if not, it is weak or poor. Organizational climate is shorter-term than organizational culture. It is generally temporary and may vary over relatively short periods of time. Yet the atmosphere prevailing among employees significantly affects their motivation, morale, and therefore organizational success (Dinçer, 2013).

From the standpoint of this study, organizational climate is certainly important, but because the reforms examined here operate at the national level and involve more than one institution under the umbrella of New Public Management, the more lasting and encompassing concept of culture has been adopted. Put differently, because this study does not examine a single reform, institution, manager, or case in isolation, organizational culture rather than organizational climate is preferred.

Once culture has been defined in its various forms, it becomes both useful and, at some points, necessary to address cultural differences so that comparisons across countries can help identify the reasons for successful and unsuccessful administrative reforms. As we know, beliefs, values, and ways of thinking are among the components that determine whether and how people act. Thus, although there are many reasons why people's actions differ, culture can clearly be one of the sources of those differences (Sargut, 2001, p. 137).

Scientific studies on the effects of these cultural differences vary depending on the questions they seek to answer. Accordingly, a number of theories have been developed, such as information systems theory, cultural dimensions theory, value orientations theory, and communicative action theory. Some of these aim to understand differences, while others aim to manage them (Kartarı, 2014, pp. 73–75).

Because it fits the content and purpose of this study, Geert Hofstede's cultural dimensions theory is examined in more detail. Hofstede moves from the micro level to the macro level, and although that may not initially have been his purpose, he offers a functional synthesis of individual, organizational, and national culture. This helps researchers and other readers understand which cultural dimensions are effective in reforms and at what level.

Hofstede argues that culture is learned over the course of life and that an important part of this learning occurs in childhood. In his theory, culture functions like computer software—a "mental program" that shapes personality and, more concretely, guides behavior (Hofstede et al., 2010, p. 21). This mental software has three levels of differentiation—human nature, culture, and personality—and Hofstede accordingly defines culture as the collective mental programming that distinguishes the members of one group or category of people from another (Kartarı, 2014, pp. 17–21).

As this definition suggests, Hofstede concentrates on cultural differences. In his view, cultures differ from one another in many respects. To make those differences intelligible, culture is imagined as an onion-like system made up of values at the center, and, around them, rituals, heroes, and symbols—that is, material and symbolic products (Hofstede, 2001; Hofstede et al., 2010, pp. 8–9; Kartarı, 2014, pp. 95–96).

In this framework, values correspond to things that are not usually visible but can be seen in behavior; symbols refer to gestures, words, images, and objects carrying complex meanings; heroes are persons—real or fictional, living or dead—who hold an esteemed place within a culture and serve as models for behavior; and rituals are collective actions carried out by individuals even when they make no direct contribution to obtaining the desired result (Hofstede, 2001, p. 10).

Before turning to the dimensions themselves, outlining Hofstede's views on culture and its components helps provide a sound perspective on how those dimensions should be interpreted. Hofstede developed cultural dimensions theory from survey results collected among IBM employees in forty different countries (Kartarı, 2014, p. 101; Şişman, 2014, p. 59). Because the survey was administered within the same company but in different national settings, it allowed both national and organizational culture to be examined comparatively.

According to the first published findings, Hofstede's cultural dimensions consisted of four categories: Power distance, which concerns whether individuals can grasp unequal distributions of power in institutions and organizations; uncertainty avoidance, which concerns how comfortable or uncomfortable they feel in uncertain situations; individualism, which concerns the degree to which individuals define themselves apart from, rather than in alignment with, the group; and masculinity vs. femininity, concerning the effects of gender on values and emotions, with men seen as more competitive and less sensitive to social values and women the reverse (Hofstede & McCrae, 2004, pp. 62–63). Later, the framework was expanded by adding a time dimension—long-term versus short-term orientation—and then a sixth dimension, indulgence versus restraint (Hofstede, 2011, pp. 7–8; Minkov & Hofstede, 2011, pp. 13–15).

Long-term versus short-term orientation was first identified in a survey designed under the Chinese Culture Connection project and administered in 1987 among students in twenty-two countries with Confucian cultural backgrounds (The Chinese Culture Connection, 1987). Michael Harris Bond interpreted the results and found that Confucian teachings were strongly associated with economic growth (Hofstede & Bond, 1988). Since none of Hofstede's original four dimensions showed such a connection, this became the fifth dimension (Hofstede, 2001, p. 351, 2011, p. 13).

The indulgence versus restraint dimension, added most recently by Michael Minkov on the basis of World Values Survey data, is the sixth and final dimension. It may be regarded as roughly complementary to the long-term versus short-term dimension and stands in a negative relation to it. It addresses matters neglected by the other dimensions but common in the happiness literature, such as how satisfied people are with their lives and how happy they feel (Hofstede, 2011, pp. 15–16; Hofstede et al., 2010, pp. 278–279).

In summary, Hofstede's definition of culture, much like those of other authors, understands culture as the set of values, beliefs, rituals, and symbols produced by human beings as they live together and used to make behavior meaningful. Through these constructed layers, individuals distinguish their own group from other groups and thereby define their identities. In this study, which examines the role culture—especially bureaucratic and administrative culture—plays in reforms undertaken under the umbrella of New Public Management, the general characteristics of culture are important, but Hofstede's dimensions are especially functional. The value of Hofstede's framework for the present study does not lie in treating national culture as a fixed or deterministic explanation of reform outcomes. Rather, it lies in showing that reform instruments encounter different assumptions about hierarchy, uncertainty, initiative, authority, time, and social obligation, all of which are directly relevant to bureaucratic culture.

To make that point more concrete, policymakers who propose reforms in order to solve problems must keep in mind that tightly controlled and rigid procedures will not succeed in societies that embrace hedonistic ways of life, and that long-term programs will not be successfully implemented in societies with short time horizons. If the desired results are to be obtained, politicians and policymakers must either cultivate within institutions the cultural traits that fit the spirit of reform or redesign reform programs in light of existing cultural features (Bouckaert, 2007, pp. 49–52).

More generally, research on the relationship between reform and culture repeatedly examines culture through three layers: macro, meso, and micro. Hofstede's perspective corresponds clearly to the macro level. For the meso level, this study turns in the next subsection to administrative and bureaucratic culture. The micro-cultural level, however, remains outside the scope of the present work.

2.2. Administrative and Bureaucratic Culture

The preceding discussion showed that culture guides behavior and gives meaning to events, roles, and institutional practices. This subsection examines the effects of administrative culture on the administrative realm—public administration and bureaucracy—through the material and symbolic products possessed by individuals and organizations within the field of public administration and public institutions, and through the effects of those products on actions and decisions.

Just as political culture refers to culture in a specific sphere at the national level, administrative culture refers to a sphere connected with public administrative activity at the organizational level. From a deductive perspective, the cultural layers discussed above clearly shape administrative culture in one way or another and to a certain degree (B. G. Peters, 2001, p. 36). Put more directly, administrative culture is influenced by social or national culture, political culture, and organizational culture, and in large part synthesizes all of these dimensions. Yet administrative culture is not simply the sum of these layers. It has its own logic, since it is formed through the repeated practices, authority relations, legal routines, and symbolic codes of public administration.

Although some authors, such as Wilson (1887), compared countries' public administrations, comparative administrative analysis based on predefined criteria can be traced back to Weber. As noted earlier, Weber's work marks the beginning of comparative inquiry both in administrative science and in the social sciences more broadly (Howlett, 2002, p. 5, 2003, p. 474). To recall briefly, Weber classified forms of governance according to their sources of legitimacy as traditional, legal-rational, and charismatic authority (Weber, 2014), thereby making it possible for the first time to compare administrative systems through one of their defining features.

Yet the direct, systematic, and widely recognized treatment of administrative culture's effects on public administration—especially public policies and reforms—and of the ways it differs from other systems of administration came to prominence through the comparative public administration movement (Howlett, 2002, p. 5, 2003, p. 474). Comparative public administration emerged after the Second World War as a product of the developmental administration approach adopted by the United States in order to repair wartime destruction in both Europe and developing countries, and it aimed to design reform programs that took national differences into account (Altunok, 2018, p. 4).

The principal foundation of comparative public administration was the assumption that administrative systems are dependent variables[3] shaped by the societies within which they exist, culture above all among them (Ayman-Güler, 2013). Since the main concern of this study is administrative and bureaucratic culture, there is no need to go into extensive detail here. It is enough to note the relevance of Fred Riggs, one of the best-known figures in this field, and his theory.

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[3] Although this view contains points consistent with the argument of this study, one should also not forget the existence of artificial situations in which governance or the style of governance is shaped by external causes independent of society.

Even in the 1950s and 1960s, the growing impact of globalization on political life strengthened the perception that common criteria had to be developed in order to compare governmental and administrative traditions (Riggs, 1991, p. 473). In that context, the Comparative Administration Group was established in the United States with government support, and comparative analyses were written especially on the development of backward or developing countries (Riggs, 1976).

The most important actor within that group was Riggs, and the most important output was his theory of the prismatic society. Working from the assumption that social structure is the main factor shaping administration, Riggs divided societies into fused (primitive) and diffracted (modern-industrialized) societies. By fusion he meant the concentration of politics, public administration, economy, business, education, sociology, and theology in one undifferentiated whole. In a modern society, he argued, these must exist as separate spheres. Between fused and diffracted societies he also located prismatic societies—transitional or semi-industrialized societies such as Türkiye and Thailand (Riggs, 2006, pp. 36–38).

In short, as its name suggests, the theory sought to study developing societies and their administrations and to turn them into modern industrialized societies by designing reform programs suited to their social structures. Riggs and his theory are useful because they make comparison possible on the basis of social structure. At the same time, they were sharply criticized, especially from the standpoint of dependency theory, for being connected to U.S.-led developmental agendas, anti-communist geopolitical strategies, and the transfer of one administrative model to other societies (Ayman-Güler, 2013).

After Riggs and his followers, work in the field of administrative culture stagnated for a time. The concept regained visibility and popularity with Knill's (1998) *European Policies: The Impact of National Administrative Traditions* (Howlett, 2003, p. 474). Knill argued that in the implementation of European Union reform packages, not only coalitions with local actors but also administrative tradition itself was decisive, and he developed his analysis through French, German, and British administrative traditions (Knill, 1998).

It is useful to draw a general picture from the works written in the 1950s and the 1990s, especially those of Riggs and Knill. In the former, a macro-level analysis aimed to identify social culture and, through it, formulate policies that would produce social transformation. In the latter, the goal was to determine whether the reforms to be implemented stood in a negative, neutral, or positive relation to national administrative traditions and, on that basis, to identify what strategies should be adopted if necessary. With that historical context in mind, the concept of administrative culture can now be defined.

In this study, despite the existence of labels such as administrative style (Howlett, 2002) and administrative tradition (Knill, 1998), the term administrative culture is preferred. The description often used for organizational culture—"the way things are done" (Schein, 2009, 2010)—can also be used here. In short, administrative culture may be defined as the factor that determines how things are or should be done in public institutions and therefore how behavior is shaped, varying from country to country, from level to level within a country (national, federal, local, and so on), and even from department to department (Claver et al., 1999, p. 455).

Although public institutions are organizational structures, that does not mean administrative culture is merely a subcategory of organizational culture. Administrative culture is a broader umbrella concept. Because the state's field of service is so wide, administrative culture contains many administrative and managerial structures and therefore exhibits cultural variation in organizational terms. In addition, since it is linked to the execution of state authority, it also has a political aspect (Dwivedi & Gow, 1999, pp. 20–21). In summary, administrative culture should be seen as a point of intersection—and perhaps fusion—between organizational culture and political culture (Henderson, 2004, p. 236).

Because of its complexity, administrative culture is difficult both to identify and to prepare for through proper institutional arrangements. Various methods have therefore been proposed, such as direct observation of public administration in practice, analysis of materials—whether physical or digital—produced by institutions, and the use of surveys and interviews with employees (Claver et al., 1999, pp. 456–457).

It is also useful to define administrative culture more explicitly through the lens of "culture," because doing so can reduce some of this complexity and make it easier for researchers and practitioners to produce sound diagnoses. In this respect, Riggs classifies and explains administrative culture in terms of its functions and results in the following way (Riggs, 2002, pp. 61–62):

1. The Arts: music, literature, sculpture, and painting. We may write *Culture*, capitalized, for this concept and *Aesthetic Administrative Culture* for the aesthetic products seen in Public Works that glorify the achievements of a

People and a State—they adorn public buildings, parks, murals, and sculptures, and they promote ceremonial music and public festivals.

2. Knowledge and Sophistication: the result of an excellent education. Preparing humane public officials, such as members of the Administrative Class, who are capable of integrating and implementing complex policies for the general welfare is an example of *Educated Administrative Culture* at its best. The tradition of generalist career bureaucracies is as ancient as the Chinese mandarinate. It reached India via the British Imperial Indian Civil Service, from which it migrated to the English Administrative Class and, radically transformed, the American career civil services.

3. Shared Beliefs and Practices: the anthropological sense of a culture includes all the distinctive attitudes and behaviors of a community—in this sense we may speak of *bureaucratic culture*, referring to the characteristic lifeways of public officials, including military personnel as well as civil servants. The bureaucratic culture may be seen as one dimension of a total *cultural system* that exists in a single society—or, more broadly, we find patterns of bureaucratic culture that reproduce themselves in many societies where the dynamics of governance by officials generates distinctive cultural features that exist independently of the local cultural system.

4. People who share a Culture: anthropologists also refer to the community whose members adhere to shared beliefs and practices as a culture. In this sense, bureaucratic cultures pertain to *bureaucracies* or, more broadly, to society, but modern societies are increasingly heterogeneous as global forces intrude into and transform their ways of life. In this context, bureaucracies increasingly resemble each other across political boundaries, both because administrative organizations spontaneously produce their own distinctive beliefs and practices, and also because public officials actively borrow and export some of their characteristic features.

5. Shared Attitudes: in a metaphoric sense, we speak of a group's code of conduct as its organizational *culture*. The code of silence, for example, is a common attitude of public officials who conceal each other's misconduct, perhaps hoping thereby to escape personal responsibility—we may call it *self-protective administrative culture*. One way to identify this form of administrative culture is to observe the changes in attitude and behavior of officials when they are on duty by comparison with how they act when they are off duty.

6. Improvement: a systematic effort to enhance skills and capabilities as exemplified in programs of physical culture. Administratively, this can take the form of in-service training and we might understand *normative*

administrative culture as activities that improve the efficiency and quality of public administration through research, education and training. Normative administrative culture results from efforts by political leaders and top bureaucrats to reform (or 're-invent') organizational structure and guidelines in order to achieve more efficiency and responsible governance. No doubt, conscientious public servants also seek to improve their own performance. In this sense administrative culture involves the enhancement of administrative performance.

Among these dimensions, the category of shared beliefs and practices is particularly important for this study because it encompasses bureaucratic culture. It helps clarify a concept that is otherwise complex and uncertain. As is repeatedly noted whenever culture is discussed in anthropological, social, political, organizational, or similar senses, bureaucratic culture may be seen as an identity made up of visible and invisible components—language, symbols, values, beliefs, and knowledge—that shape the behavior of a specific social group, namely those who work in public organizations, and that provide meaning to events and phenomena (Husain, 2015, p. 20).

As its name suggests, bureaucratic culture covers matters related to bureaucracy and indeed to bureaucracy itself. In other words, bureaucratic culture may be understood as the identity through which bureaucracy recognizes itself, reproduces its routines, and gives meaning to its authority. The use of terms and descriptions drawn from bureaucracy to define bureaucratic culture is helpful in making the concept more concrete. Thus, such notions as awareness of public property, gift-giving and bribery, patronage and nepotism, the separation of citizen and administrator, and the use of public power (F. Demir, 2011, p. 158), together with practices such as excessive attention to protocol, being sent abroad to improve one's knowledge and refinement, paying close attention to the type and location of one's residence, or avoiding *Beyoğlu in the evenings*[4] *as a marker of status-conscious bureaucratic respectability in a particular historical context (Özen, 1996, p. 11), are among the concrete and pejorative manifestations of bureaucratic culture.*

Although bureaucratic culture may resemble anthropological culture in terms of structure and process, it is not an internal or innate feature stemming simply from the society into which one is born. More plainly, bureaucratic culture is shaped not only by external factors such as beliefs and dispositions acquired through professional

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[4] Beyoğlu (Pera) was a district in the Ottoman era where non-Muslims lived in large numbers, and where taverns and Western-style entertainment venues were common. Because of this, it was frowned upon for Muslim government officials to spend time there. This shows that Max Weber's distinction between 'office life and private life' cannot in fact be sustained in practice, since bureaucracy also draws private life into its orbit.

education, workplace socialization, and intellectual interaction, but also by internal factors such as structures, authority relations, rules, and procedures, which in a sense give it life (Zafarullah, 2013). From the standpoint of management and reform, it is also useful to consider the following tendencies alongside the determinants already mentioned (Claver et al., 1999, pp. 456–457):

- The decision-making process is centralized and not updated.
- There is a prevailing reluctance toward innovative processes.
- A high degree of sameness and uniformity exists.
- Employees are highly unwilling to change existing beliefs.
- The management style is authoritarian and the level of control and supervision is high.
- Communication channels are very limited and generally one-way, from top to bottom.
- Employees avoid uncertainty, seek stability, have limited room to take initiative, and are oriented toward obeying orders.

In summary, the explanations given about bureaucracy also encompass bureaucratic culture, and because these features are cultural they result in the construction of an identity. As is well known, identities determine where and how people should behave and speak and how they should interpret events, phenomena, and symbols. In this sense, studies of bureaucratic culture and reform are also actor-centered studies. Put differently, the present work focuses on the discourses and actions bureaucrats produce while reforms are being designed and/or implemented.

Bureaucratic culture can be considered across a very wide spectrum, from relations with the state or the private sector to everyday life and personal relations. Yet pursuing that line of inquiry here would go beyond the purpose and scope of the study and would only make the topic more complex and harder to understand. For that reason, and because relevant information and explanations are provided in the preceding and following sections, bureaucratic culture is not elaborated further here.

2.3. Culture, Change, and Reform

This subsection first offers a broad discussion of the relationship between institutional-organizational change and culture, and then evaluates that relationship within public institutions through the lens of administrative-bureaucratic culture. Rather than pursuing a general epistemological analysis of change, it focuses directly on change in its institutional form and on the relevant conceptualizations.

It has often been emphasized that culture guides human behavior. Once the interaction between change and organization is considered, a new discussion emerges through the distinction between institution and organization. Throughout the study, these two terms are often used synonymously or side by side, which signals that “institution” is generally being used to refer to a concrete organizational structure. Yet other views exist. Douglass C. North, for example, discusses change through a distinction between institutions and organizations. For him, institutions are the formal and informal rules, conventions, and modes of action that reduce uncertainty and guide people in society, while political, economic, and social organizational structures constitute organizations (North, 2010, p. 107).

Mentioning North’s distinction does not mean that the present study fully adopts his framework or fully rejects it. Rather, his argument creates a productive field of debate for the purposes of this work. In his terms, formal institutions correspond to legal and regulatory frameworks ranging from laws to directives, while informal institutions correspond to what this study and the relevant literature call culture. Organizations, in turn, are the structural and functional arrangements shaped by institutions. This explains why North departs from the more familiar use of the terms: for him, durable change depends less on organizations themselves than on the formal and informal institutions that shape behavior within them.

Once differences in terminology are set aside, this distinction between institution and organization—at first glance somewhat detached from the main context—can be seen as providing guidance to policymakers on change. Its importance lies in the fact that it directs attention toward the elements that shape behavior and argues that the habits and conventions that emerge through long social processes, that is, culture as an informal institution, resist change more strongly than formal institutions, the procedural and artificial culture constructed by people and politicians (North, 2010, p. 107).

Bearing in mind the conceptual depth provided by this distinction, it is useful to return to the relationship between culture and institution-organization and to examine their connection with change. Since the aim of this study is to understand the function of administrative and bureaucratic culture in public-sector reforms, an approach that treats culture together with legislation and procedures does not generate data suited to that aim.

Organizational change is the process by which organizations move from their current state to a new state that is more effective and more efficient (Jones, 2017, p. 283). Although organizational development has many causes, it is clear that in public administration, too, change driven globally by concerns with effectiveness and efficiency has been especially influential. The managerial reflections of these global trends include participation, teamwork, openness, quality, innovation, performance orientation, and diversity (Aycan et al., 2016, p. 306)—principles that can plausibly be said to stand in tension with Weberian bureaucratic administration.

The driving force of change is created, above all, by economic pressures but also by the general climate produced by these global tendencies and by a learning process in which theoretical and practical knowledge come together. In short, the individuals who are the main agents of change are set in motion by such incentives (North, 2010, p. 107). When the conditions that gave rise to New Public Management are considered together with what followed from them, this general picture appears convincing. Under the environment created by the global oil crisis, a series of principles was advanced and a learning process formed around them.

Change within organizations has several dimensions. It may involve human resources issues, from recruitment and promotion to work practices and hours; functional issues, from procedures to institutional organization; technological issues, such as the improvement of technical infrastructure; and organizational capability issues, such as the design of organizational culture (Jones, 2017, p. 283). In short, change may occur in all areas of an institution. At the same time, it may cover only one or some of these dimensions rather than all of them.

When the agenda of change extends across such a broad terrain, including structural, functional, cultural, and related areas, it is often described as restructuring or reorganization (Jones, 2017, p. 283). One may therefore say that restructuring is a process of leaping from one equilibrium to another while requiring, during the transition, a temporary disruption of the existing equilibrium (Dinçer & Yılmaz, 2003, p. 15). In brief, when change and restructuring are considered together, it becomes clear that the level of resistance may increase or decrease depending on the depth and scale of change.

In this respect, it is useful to classify change according to its method, intensity, and scope, including restructuring. Although the literature uses different labels, it generally divides change into revolutionary change, in which hard, radical, and wide-ranging decisions are implemented, and evolutionary change, in which gradual, narrower, and more time-spread decisions are adopted (Jones, 2017, p. 300).

Macro-level analyses suggest that change usually follows a gradual, evolutionary path, only to be interrupted and given a revolutionary character by major destructive factors such as war, political and military coups, and occupations (North, 2010, p. 107). Authors who address change at the organizational or administrative level, while not denying these macro factors, emphasize the radical effects of paradigm shifts in economics, politics, and society and the legal-structural arrangements that follow them, and therefore define top-down, large-scale managerial transformations as revolutionary change (Meyerson, 2015, p. 89).

Whether evolutionary or revolutionary, change always encounters obstacles. These obstacles, often described as resistance to change, may be summarized as follows: institutions and individuals attached to the existing order; shortages in the financial and human resources needed to carry out reforms; employees demotivated by earlier failures or by other factors; and opposition from groups that believe they will lose out after change (Kim & Mauborgne, 2015, pp. 108–109).

If one wants to specify these obstacles more precisely, they can be grouped at three levels (Jones, 2017, p. 284): The organizational level, including structure, culture, strategy, differences in functional orientation, power, and conflict; the group level, including norms, commitment, and groupthink; and the individual level, including cognitive biases, uncertainty, mistrust, and habits of selective perception and retention.

Many different obstructing factors and actors can be identified in the path of change, both in general and in particular cases. For present purposes, however, the above framework is sufficient. What matters even more than the obstacles themselves is how change is to be carried out and what methods should be followed. The literature provides a wide range of answers to that question, varying depending on the perspective adopted.

Taken together, these recipes for reform generally converge around a number of principles: decisions should be shaped with the participation of all employees; employees should be persuaded and motivated regarding change; a shared vision and common definition of the problem should be created; and not only managers but employees as well should be encouraged to assume responsibility in implementation (Beer et al., 1990, pp. 161–164, 2015, pp. 240–241).

In change-management processes, important responsibilities fall on institutional managers, leaders, or those running change programs. In other words, change processes are often led from above. In this respect, Garvin and

Roberto propose a four-stage method of persuasion to ensure that employees—who are among the key targets of change and whose acceptance is crucial for success—embrace the program rather than resist it (Garvin & Roberto, 2011, p. 19):

1) Prepare your organization's cultural "soil" months before setting your turnaround plan in concrete—by convincing employees that your company can survive only through radical change.
2) Present your plan—explaining in detail its purpose and expected impact.
3) After executing the plan, manage employees' emotions by acknowledging the pain of change—while keeping people focused on the hard work ahead.
4) As the turnaround starts generating results, reinforce desired behavioral changes to prevent backsliding.

These proposals were largely designed for smaller organizations and for the private sector rather than for public institutions. That does not make them dysfunctional. On the contrary, they can serve as models for broader approaches suitable to public administration. What matters here is that leaders—or, put differently, political or administrative managers seeking to implement reform—can only succeed by persuading the employees who are the direct targets of change. This means, more plainly, that actors who might otherwise stand against change are brought to support it through persuasion.

Even though it has not been stated directly up to this point, one thing follows clearly from what has been said: discourse and language occupy a crucial place in the process of persuasion. The success of change depends in part on how well the language used reflects reality. When one considers that employees construct their actions in organizational socialization processes on the basis of realities they have come to believe, and that discourse and language can reconstruct those realities, the vital importance of the leader's "language of change" becomes obvious. For that reason, leaders or managers must reconstruct reality through discourses that support change (Ford, 1999, pp. 480–481).

It should also be emphasized that all of the recommendations just listed—preparing the cultural ground, persuading employees to support change, reconstructing reality discursively—fall within the category of evolutionary change. In the change literature, it is often stressed that except in very special circumstances, and especially where cultural change is concerned, an evolutionary method that is spread over time, measures reactions carefully, and takes the necessary precautions soberly tends to produce the best results (Meyerson, 2015, p. 89).

This preference for an evolutionary process is also easy to infer logically. It is obvious that people cannot quickly grasp the desired change, understand that its results will benefit both the institution and themselves, and reorganize their cultural values accordingly. To be sure, history provides examples of revolutionary change, and of attempts to use that method. Yet those experiences often produced painful outcomes and were generally undertaken in situations where greater losses were expected if change was not carried out at all.

None of this means, however, that leadership, motivation, and persuasion are sufficient on their own. Human resources in all their aspects must be aligned with change (Aycan et al., 2016, p. 306); the duration of the change program must be chosen carefully; the process must be divided into stages and turned into shorter-term programs; those leading change must possess compatible skills and visions; senior managers themselves must believe in and commit to change; and the burdens and responsibilities employees will bear during the process must be calculated properly and distributed as evenly as possible (Sirkin et al., 2015, p. 211).

After these general reflections on change, and on organizational change in particular, cultural change must also be discussed. If change is, in the words of Dinçer and Yılmaz, a leap from one equilibrium to a new one (Dinçer & Yılmaz, 2003, p. 15), it necessarily entails new patterns of behavior and new institutional relations. Since culture is also defined here as the way things are done (Claver et al., 1999; Schein, 2009, 2010), it would not be wrong to say that organizational change also makes cultural change unavoidable.

All of the issues discussed above concerning change regulate how employees will perform their work and how they will establish relations within the institution, including the organization of the institution itself and the distribution of authority and responsibility (Erkmen, 2010, p. 112). Put more directly, organizational change means a transformation in the internal logic of the organization—its vision, paradigm, imaginaries, beliefs, shared meanings, language, and behavioral codes (Morgan, 1998, p. 136). Change and culture must therefore be examined together.

Looking specifically at the recent change in the field of management, the relevant process goes back to the 1970s. The economic crisis that followed the oil shock was felt in management as in many other fields. Around this crisis there emerged a now-common managerial paradigm—one that can be summarized through principles such as quality, performance, effectiveness and efficiency, participation, teamwork, employee support and empowerment, and the learning organization (Barzelay & Armajani, 2016, p. 792; Lewis, 1994, p. 43). This paradigm became the key to cultural change in both the private and public sectors.

The cultural fabric of some countries and organizations supported this paradigm or was compatible with it (Erkmen, 2010, p. 109), while others were quite distant from those values. Evaluating the core principles of New Public Management together with Hofstede's dimensions of national culture can help identify which countries possess administrative cultures supportive of change. Since those country-level analyses are addressed in the next part of the broader project, this subsection emphasizes instead bureaucratic culture and, more generally, culture's obstructive side.

If culture, in the anthropological sense, is understood as a survival strategy (Bodley, 2011, p. 10; Smircich, 1983, p. 342), and change is understood as a threat to that strategy, then the emergence of resistance becomes almost inevitable. Put differently, the source of cultural resistance to change lies in a mismatch or conflict between cultural codes and the content of change. Beyond this reflexive response to perceived threat, culture is also said to possess a structurally inert quality. This does not mean culture is fixed. Culture can adapt to the conditions of time and environment and is dynamic in that sense, but because it resists abrupt, short-term, and large-scale change, it can appear static (Ehrhart et al., 2014, pp. 179–180).

The transition from a context dominated by traditional public administration and culture to one dominated by New Public Management is clearly not an evolutionary process in the pure sense. Even though it is known that cultural change can produce more successful outcomes with fewer losses when it proceeds evolutionarily (Meyerson, 2015, p. 89), the speed and scale of change in the twenty-first century often make that impossible. For that reason, rather than simply stretching change over time, policies must be adopted that create a cultural environment capable of adapting to change. Otherwise, institutions may suffer damage and, in the case of private firms, even disappear from the market (Cameron & Quinn, 2017, pp. 2–6). Cultural change in public administration, although it differs from the private sector in some respects, broadly follows the same logic. Yet the distinctive nature of public administration deepens those differences and intensifies the surrounding debates, above all because Weberian bureaucratic administration and New Public Management rest on sharply different cultural assumptions.

Administrative change, or more commonly administrative reform, may be defined as the conscious and planned process of restructuring the structure, functioning, and style of public administration, although different definitions are possible depending on the changing codes of the period, such as transparency, accountability, economy, quality, and participation (Coşkun & Nohutçu, 2005, pp. 3–4). In addition, and parallel to the view of Dinçer and Yılmaz (2003), administrative reform may also be understood as a search for a new equilibrium in decision-making processes and in the relationship between bureaucracy and policy (Tutum, 1994, p. 5).

In summary, although change in the administrative sphere may be described in different ways, such as reform, restructuring[5], or management improvement, depending on the depth of transformation and the balance between administration and politics (Bozkurt et al., 2008, p. 105), what matters more than the label is the conditions under which it arises today, the areas it reorganizes, and the goals it seeks to achieve.

In general terms, administrative reform has the following characteristics (Sobacı, 2014, pp. 14–15):

- It is a conscious, intentional, and artificial activity.
- It affects a very large number of people and actors.
- It is a dynamic concept that continually develops.
- It is not an end in itself or a self-standing objective.
- It is a staged activity and an open-ended process.
- By its nature, implementation is decisive in administrative reform.
- It rests on people's optimism about the future.
- It is not, in itself, inherently good or bad, desirable or undesirable, successful or unsuccessful.
- It is a result of economic, social, political, and technological developments.
- It is not only an administrative and technical issue but also a political one.
- Because it emphasizes change and novelty and has a political dimension, it is time-consuming.

The statement that administrative reform is a result of developments around it and affecting it allows us to interpret reform as a process whose core principles are shaped by those surrounding, external factors. In this respect, one may say that the general paradigm, or reform trend, today is built around principles such as economic and political freedoms, welfare, justice, tolerance, compromise, peace, knowledge, ethics, and quality, and that policies are designed around them (Aktan & Yay, 2019, p. 6).

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[5] Some of the literature also describes restructuring as a narrower process of change than administrative reform (Sobacı, 2014). Because the change policies examined here are diverse, this study does not emphasize the distinction between the two terms. Yet since the changes carried out within the framework of New Public Management are broadly a matter of reform, the term administrative reform is used here as the primary label.

Alongside these broad tendencies, which may also be read as a shift from modernism to postmodernism (Ateş, 2013b), public administration has also seen a more specific set of tendencies: value creation, mission, prioritizing citizens' preferences, results orientation, initiative, measurable responsibility, performance, flexibility, delegation of authority, market-centeredness, competition, and quality control (Ateş, 2013a, pp. 101, 104; Barzelay & Armajani, 2016, p. 792). As already noted, these trends are the administrative reflection or source of public administration reform in the face of the economic, social, and political difficulties that long predated but were accelerated by the 1973 oil crisis (Bilgiç, 2013, pp. 33–34).

Within this framework, public administration reforms have set goals such as reducing costs while increasing effectiveness and efficiency, improving and raising the quality of products and services, training and developing human resources so that they fit changing conditions, making organizational structures more flexible and simplifying hierarchies, ensuring the participation of other stakeholders and greater policy variety in policy-making, and making accountability possible and widespread by conducting processes transparently (B. G. Peters, 2001, pp. 362–365).

In light of all this, it is clear that reforms spread across a very wide terrain, and reforms of such breadth are likely to encounter many obstacles. Cultural factors are among the first of these. Aktan and Yay (2019) group the obstacles to change under headings such as the status quo, the system, human nature and behavior, and interest and pressure groups, and they interpret resistance in an actor-centered way while distinguishing between active and passive forms.

This subsection limits itself to that broad picture. The relationship between public administration reforms—especially those organized around New Public Management—and administrative and bureaucratic culture is taken up more directly in the next chapter. In summary, both culture and change may be seen as survival strategies. Culture preserves patterns of behavior that have enabled continuity over time, while change introduces new patterns intended to respond to altered external conditions. The tension between them emerges because both claim to secure institutional survival, but they do so through different temporal logics: culture protects what has already worked, whereas reform anticipates what may be needed next.

Culture seeks to preserve behaviors that have helped it survive through long experience, while change seeks to implement new behavioral codes capable of responding to a changing environment and changing external conditions. If institutions are to survive, culture and change must be made to coexist in mutual compatibility. That is only possible through interaction, balance, and reciprocal transformation between the two. It should also not be forgotten that, in this process of transformation, not all actors possess equal power.

Section 3

3. Bureaucratic Culture and Public Administration Reforms

The previous chapters outlined the conceptual and theoretical dimensions of bureaucracy and culture. This chapter seeks, in light of that discussion, to establish the theoretical and analytical framework necessary for a more concrete analysis. To that end, it is organized around two subsections: the relationship between bureaucracy and politics, and the relationship between bureaucratic culture and public reform. The first concentrates less on the simple interaction between bureaucrats and politicians than on the political dimension of bureaucracy itself. It therefore emphasizes the distinction between party politics and political decision-making and discusses the importance of political decision-making within contemporary bureaucracies.

The second subsection, on bureaucratic culture and public administration reform, moves these core concepts onto a more concrete analytical plane in order to clarify their reciprocal relationship. Put more plainly, bureaucracy and bureaucrats are taken as the concrete expression of bureaucratic culture, while public policy is treated as the concrete expression of public administration reform. On that basis, policy processes are examined in detail, and then the role played by bureaucracy and bureaucratic culture within those processes is analyzed. Once it is remembered that the New Public Management framework at the center of this study took shape as a series of policy packages, the methodological rationale for the approach adopted here becomes clearer.

3.1. The Relationship Between Bureaucracy and Politics

The relationship between bureaucracy and politics began to be debated shortly after public administration emerged as a distinct discipline. The growth in the volume of work handled by central government clearly played a role here; increasingly complex governance made division of labor and specialization necessary. Rather than repeating earlier accounts of the history of bureaucracy, this section turns directly to the dimensions of the bureaucracy-politics relationship. The focus is on bureaucracy, public administration, and bureaucrats, but at the center of the analysis stand bureaucrats, or public managers, as the agents of action. In short, the relationship between bureaucracy and politics is interpreted here in an actor-centered way.

Returning to the origins of the issue is a useful place to begin. The idea that public administration should be treated as a distinct scientific field gained prominence—if not for the first time—through Thomas Woodrow Wilson and his essay "The Study of Administration" (Levitan, 2001, p. 4). In that famous article, which became a touchstone for many later debates, Wilson argued that administration should move away from the rapidly changing, contentious, and turbulent atmosphere of politics and move closer to the world of business, where technical knowledge and expertise are required (Wilson, 1887, p. 209, 2016, p. 13). In short, administration should shed its overtly political character and approach the science of management.

In a text shaped by the scientific, political, and social assumptions of 1887, the repeated references to agitation and conflict, and the overall tone of the article, make clear that what Wilson meant by politics was primarily party politics, electoral politics, or day-to-day politics. du Gay likewise argues that Wilson believed administration should remain distant from the corrupt politics of parties, while policy and decision-making, in some sense, still belonged to administration itself (du Gay, 2002, p. 176).

Although this study does not adopt the broader Foucauldian view that politics permeates every sphere of social life (Keskin, 2000), it is still necessary to note that the meaning of politics expanded significantly after Wilson. From the perspective of this study, actions such as decision-making, policy production and implementation, and the determination of vision and mission can all be treated under the umbrella of politics (Pollitt & Bouckaert, 2011, pp. 161–162). With that in mind, Wilson's distinction between politics and administration appears above all as a distinction centered on neutrality, understood as distancing administration from the daily politics of parties (Wilson, 2016, p. 13), and that is the axis along which this study approaches the bureaucracy-politics relationship.

Even writers such as von Mises, known from early on for their strong criticisms of bureaucracy, emphasized the necessity of bureaucracy if arbitrariness and partisanship were to be prevented and a rational, impartial, and democratic administration were to be established (Levitan, 2001, p. 8; von Mises, 2010, pp. 65–69). At the same time, however, it is also well known that they argued bureaucracy should be limited not only by political constraints but also in the spheres of policy and decision-making, and that administration should be responsible only for implementing decisions taken under the guidance of politics (du Gay, 2002, p. 176; Goodnow, 2016).

Bureaucracy, initially conceived as something distant from politicians and party politics and therefore as a neutral process of decision and execution, later came to be understood through machine-like metaphors that emphasized its operational, impersonal, and rule-bound character (Bennis, 2016; Hague & Harrop, 2004, p. 290). More plainly, by the beginning of the twentieth century bureaucracy was widely imagined as a machine made up of mechanical gears, acting soullessly according to law and rules and simply implementing commands from above (Weber, 2012a, pp. 336–342, 2012b, pp. 323–326, 764). Weber's views on this matter, although later debated and in part revised in practice, were accepted and applied for a long time.

Yet the bureaucracy-politics distinction, summarized as the separation between decision-making and implementation, has been the object of serious criticism from the moment it was proposed. Scholars have questioned both how valid the ideal type of bureaucrat and administration really is—grounded as it is in specialization, rules, written documents, the separation of public and private life, and impersonality (Eryılmaz, 2013, pp. 60–63)—and whether such a sharp distinction is conceptually defensible at all (Waldo, 2016, p. 204).

Even earlier, the classical approach to administration had been criticized by many authors, above all Elton Mayo, as dehumanizing, and it was argued that workers could not be assumed always to behave rationally (Hodgetts, 1997, pp. 28–39). In this respect, the complete separation of politics from bureaucracy and the strict maintenance of separate spheres appears impossible—or at least extremely difficult—for precisely these "human" reasons. Today, despite disagreements over the scope, direction, and content of the interaction, the existence of a bureaucracy-politics relationship is generally accepted.

In reality, the position and function of bureaucracy vary across historical periods and contexts. Kaufman therefore argues that bureaucracy moves among three values—representation, politically neutral competence, and administrative leadership—and that reform and restructuring programs at times evolve toward representation, at times toward neutrality, and at times toward leadership (Kaufman, 1969, 2016). These values can indeed be observed in administrative practice.

For example, criticisms directed at public services often concern the fact that they are not suited to society's needs and do not include all stakeholders (representation), that they are shaped along the axis of a particular segment, ideology, or party (neutrality), or that they cannot be delivered in a timely, efficient, and effective way because public employees avoid taking initiative and playing a leading role (leadership). In broad terms, such criticisms support Kaufman's claim.

More plainly, even today, despite the claims of neutrality, impersonality, apoliticality, and rationality made by traditional Weberian public administration theory, public services often remain shaped by the day-to-day politics of parties. Bureaucracy cannot always detach itself from ideological alignments; it protects elite interests and can itself become an elite.

It is worth noting that many efforts, such as the theory of representative bureaucracy, have sought to minimize such problems. In this approach, bureaucracy is regarded as a small-scale reflection of society, and it is argued that the participation of the relevant social groups in the making of policy enables more accurate decisions, smoother and more complete implementation, and a more genuine form of accountability (Krislov, 2016, p. 523).

Alongside Kaufman's cycle of values, another important analysis of the bureaucracy-politics relationship is Rosenbloom's (1983, 2016) treatment of public administration through the separation of powers. For Rosenbloom, public administration contains the executive, legislative, and judicial dimensions and therefore develops historically within administrative, political, and legal forms that correspond to these three powers. More concretely, he argues that public administration includes an administrative dimension seen as distinct from politics, a political dimension active in policy formation, and a legal dimension tied to administrative law and personnel matters such as disciplinary procedures, with one or another of these dimensions becoming more prominent over time.

In light of all this, and given the present study's concern with the relationship between administrative-bureaucratic culture and public administration reform, it is useful to synthesize Kaufman's administrative leadership with Rosenbloom's legislative-political dimension. In other words, that synthesis supports the perspective adopted here: public managers and bureaucrats play political roles, take active and leading positions in the formation and implementation of public policy, and exercise leadership over those working within the institutions they manage. This is also broadly compatible with the assumptions of New Public Management.

Because the role bureaucracy and bureaucrats play throughout the public policy process is examined in the next subsection, the focus here is on leadership. Leadership matters in the bureaucracy-politics relationship because, in contrast to the traditional Weberian definition of the public official, the postmodern paradigm—or, in more practical terms, New Public Management—defines the relevant actor as entrepreneurial and willing to take initiative (Ateş, 2013a, 2013b; Özmen, 2013; Parker & Bradley, 2004).

The concept underlying debates on leadership is authority. Authority, defined as the capacity of a leader to induce followers to obey or align themselves, makes it possible to redefine reality and direct employees accordingly in order to achieve certain outcomes (Presthus, 2001, pp. 454–455, 462). This notion resembles Weber's conceptualization of charisma in some respects, and in both frameworks leaders and their characteristic features occupy the center (Uysal-Sezer, 1993).

The power possessed by a leader who can direct followers systematically and persuade them, when necessary, to act together toward a common goal does not in fact stem from prior achievements so much as from the confidence and belief invested in that leader (B. Demir & Düşün, 2015, p. 252). Weber's concept of charisma can therefore be reinterpreted, stripped of its transcendental assumptions, as a persuasive capacity that emerges from an individual's knowledge, personal experience, cultural environment, and education (Itzhaky & York, 2003, p. 372; Jermier, 1993).

It is argued that leaders can direct change and motivate followers to act in line with shared purposes even without possessing mystical charisma—or even without being conventionally "charismatic"—simply through channels of interaction and communication (DiTomaso, 1993, p. 266). Of course, this does not refer to ordinary or low-level communication, but to high-quality interaction. Dialogue conducted at that level increases social interaction and makes it possible to establish a form of authority resembling the effects of charismatic authority (Kakabadse et al., 1996, pp. 379–380).

At this point, it is useful to recall that although charisma appears in Weber's typology of authority, the form of authority on which he thought administration should be built was not charismatic but legal-rational authority. For Weber, authority in administration rests not on personal qualities but on law and rules (Eryılmaz, 2013, pp. 64–65). The present study, however, adopts the view that leaders play a decisive role in administration and in change.

It is well known that leaders can produce change at different degrees, from the micro to the macro level. They can alter the behaviors and discourses of employees and followers, but they can also bring about institutional and structural change (Avolio, 2004, p. 1558). Put more plainly, leaders can have soft effects, such as changing organizational behavior, and also sharper, more revolutionary effects, such as transforming the organization of an institution or even a government (B. G. Peters & Helms, 2012, p. 27). Recent work has interpreted the change in Türkiye's system of government along precisely these lines (Ateş & Bektaş, 2018).

To be sure, leadership has also been criticized in democratic terms. It has been argued that change shaped around the leader's own truths disregards employees' views and contains an excessive amount of personal judgment (Körösényi, 2005, p. 359). Although there is merit in those criticisms, one should not forget that followers or employees may also be persuaded without coercion through the leader's communicative ability, that change need not involve imposition (Bell, 2014, p. 91), and that actions contrary to law and democratic or social values can be prevented through effective oversight mechanisms (Eryılmaz, 2013, pp. 180–184).

This claim should not be read as a defense of unconstrained executive or bureaucratic discretion. Leadership becomes administratively valuable only when it operates within legal limits, democratic accountability, professional standards, and transparent mechanisms of review. Especially in developing countries such as Türkiye, where representative democracy and its procedures often operate slowly and where many reform packages still need to be implemented, the speed and mobility provided by leadership are particularly important for institutional transformation (B. G. Peters & Helms, 2012, p. 27).

Assigning responsibility for change to leadership also means that change must begin from above. This should not be taken to mean that demands for change never come from below or that the lower ranks have no voice in reform programs. Yet if one wants to formulate a coherent reform agenda suited to actual needs, implement it smoothly and fully, and then evaluate the outcomes and take corrective measures, it is reasonable to adopt a method led from the top. It has even been suggested that top-down, managed change is a "peaceful" revolution, whereas revolutions driven from below more often involve violence (Richter, 2001, p. 464). Whatever one thinks of that analogy, historical experience shows that when demands for change from below are ignored by those above, the results are rarely peaceful.

Leaders, or teams that assume leadership at the top, possess various "peaceful" methods for managing change, among which social learning occupies a special place. Managing social learning means ensuring that the actions, knowledge, and techniques required by change are internalized by employees so that the innovative "culture" needed for policies, structures, and systems of management can be established (Hatch, 2011, pp. 352–353; Korten, 2001, p. 487). Put more simply, leaders are expected not only to issue instructions but to participate in carrying out the work of change together with their teams (Barnett, 2001, pp. 498–499), thereby adapting both employees and themselves to the demands of change through theoretical and practical means (Schein, 2010, pp. 365–366).

At the same time, the style leaders adopt must fit the cultural values of the country, institution, or employees concerned, depending on the dimension of change at stake. Leaders or leadership teams must therefore first know their institutions well and observe their cultural features carefully. They must then act in ways suited to that structure. In a flexible culture, for example, innovative, entrepreneurial, and visionary leadership styles are appropriate; in a culture dominated by hierarchy, employees must be coordinated, monitored, and directed more closely (Hartnell & Walumbwa, 2011, pp. 228–229).

The reason leadership is given such importance in this study is that under present conditions it has become necessary to make decisions quickly and in ways responsive to people's needs. More plainly, postmodern society generates different needs and therefore requires different solutions. It is evident that a centralized, static, rigid, and dehumanized system of rules and procedures built on unrealistic assumptions and leaving almost no room for individual initiative or discretion, as in the traditional model of public administration (Eryılmaz, 2013, pp. 71, 79–82), cannot function adequately in a paradigm where citizen satisfaction is central (Ateş, 2013a, 2013b).

Although Weberian management theory does not imagine all decisions as being taken by politicians alone, but instead leaves the sub-decisions and policies necessary for implementing major goals to bureaucrats—because politicians delegate some of their authority downward in response to growing workloads—it nevertheless refuses to see this as policy-making in the full sense (du Gay, 2002, pp. 139, 141, 178–181). The present study accepts this distinction only partially.

New Public Management begins from the fact that impersonality is never wholly possible. It therefore seeks both to take precautions against the personal shortcomings of employees and to create structures in which managers can systematically direct employees toward clearly defined goals. In this approach, where management rather than administration is emphasized, formal and informal structures and rules are redesigned in ways compatible with leadership

(Hughes, 2014, pp. 171–172). What is at stake here is more than routine decisions, routine work, or simple delegation of signature authority.

This study argues that public managers should act in an entrepreneurial, citizen-centered, and satisfaction-oriented manner; that they should, like politicians, have authority in some matters together with proportionate responsibility; that they should be able to lead their institutions; and that they should be capable of designing policies in line with the goals determined by politicians. In short, the strict bureaucracy-politics dichotomy is rejected, and bureaucracy is redefined by acknowledging its political dimension.

In summary, the political dimension of bureaucracy consists of two main parts: participation in the formation, implementation, and direction of policy, and the exercise of leadership within the institution. Bureaucracy of course has many other dimensions that may be called political, ranging from its relations with civil society organizations to its interaction with military bureaucracy. But only those two dimensions are examined here. Because the public-policy dimension is treated in a more cultural way in the next subsection, the emphasis in this section has been on leadership.

Leadership is considered a political dimension because it involves basic attributes such as decision-making and initiative, but also because it includes motivating employees to act toward a common purpose and directing them in line with the decisions taken. In short, leadership, once regarded as a quality peculiar to politicians, has become a feature of appointed public managers as well, provided it operates within the boundaries of responsibility, accountability, and transparency.

3.2. Bureaucratic Culture and Public Administration Reform

Public administration reform can also be regarded as a public policy encompassing a wide spectrum from the reorganization of institutions to their improvement (Sobacı, 2014, pp. 15–16). It may therefore be said that the role of bureaucracy and/or bureaucratic culture in reform resembles the role bureaucracy plays in policy processes more generally. In order to make a systematic and analytical assessment, this section takes policy processes as its point of departure. It therefore addresses a number of issues ranging from the definition of public policy to the detailing of policy stages and the classification of policies.

As with many major concepts in the social sciences, there are many different definitions of policy. Sharing the same semantic roots as politics, policy in the public sense may be defined as the set of measures taken in response to problems, the actions carried out in the name of the public, and all the acts and statements that the state intends or desires in order to solve a problem, even if the original source of the initiative lies outside government (Birkland, 2015, pp. 8–9).

Yet the best-known definition, and the one adopted in this study, is Thomas R. Dye's (2013, p. 22) formulation, which treats public policy as encompassing both governmental action and deliberate governmental inaction. One might criticize this as too general and therefore insufficiently explanatory. But once one considers how much of modern life the public sphere and the nation-state encompass, the simplicity of the definition becomes less problematic. Public policy covers a very broad field, and its apparently plain formulation conceals a highly intricate content.

This broad understanding is important for the present study because public administration reform is itself a form of public policy. Reform does not stand outside the policy process; it is designed, justified, negotiated, implemented, and resisted through the same political and administrative mechanisms that shape other public policies.

To add conceptual clarity, it is useful to recall Çevik and Demirci's (2012, pp. 12–13) *description* of what public policy is and is not:

- It operates and emerges within a process.
- It cannot be sharply separated from administration.
- It is broader than a decision and includes decisions within it.
- It encompasses behaviors as much as intentions and goals.
- It has both anticipated and unanticipated outcomes.
- It includes both positive action and the choice to remain inactive.
- It assigns important roles to public institutions, though public institutions are not the only actors in the policy process.
- It is often defined as a set of actions aimed at public purposes, though those purposes are not always explicitly stated from the start.

It is also useful, as a complementary point, to mention the sources of public policy. Public policy rests on a number of indispensable resources: the use of force, law, personnel, money, information, organization, compromise among political and administrative actors and/or with target groups, time, infrastructure, and political support (Dodds, 2013, pp. 22–23). Put simply, these resources range from the state's coercive power to political backing and together form the building blocks of public policy.

Public policies have also been classified in different ways according to their aims, methods, and outcomes. Among the best-known typologies are Lowi's distributive, redistributive, regulatory, and self-regulatory policies; Anderson's substantive and procedural policies; Edelman's material and symbolic policies; Wade and Curry's collective and private policies; and O'Hare's direct and indirect actions (Theodoulou, 2013a, p. 125). Of these, Lowi's typology is especially functional both internationally and in the Turkish case, since most public policies involve the distribution or redistribution of public resources, the regulation of relations between the private and public sectors, and the creation of new institutions to improve service delivery (Ünal, 2013, pp. 193–194).

In short, public policy has many important dimensions, concerning both individuals and society as a whole. It is not random but intentional, even if not all of its outcomes can be calculated in advance. It is an actor- and process-centered phenomenon grounded in precaution against actual or likely problems, in change based on knowledge[6], and in distribution under conditions of social compromise and justice. These actors may be grouped broadly into three categories: official actors such as political authorities and the bureaucracy; unofficial actors such as civil society organizations and the media; and international actors such as the European Union, the United Nations, and the World Bank (Yıldız & Sobacı, 2013, pp. 18–19).

Although international actors have clearly played a major role in many reforms undertaken under the banner of New Public Management (Bayırbağ, 2013, p. 49), the focus here is limited, for reasons of scope, to official actors. More specifically, the aim is to clarify the roles of politicians and bureaucrats in policy processes. To do that properly, the main models of public policy analysis must first be outlined.

The literature makes use of several such models, among them the group model, institutional model, elite model, process model, and systems model (Çevik & Demirci, 2012, p. 75). The group model proceeds from the assumption that public policy is shaped by the struggle among political groups organized around particular interests. According to this view, such groups organize for or against a policy in order to implement it, change it, or abolish it (Dye, 2013, p. 22). The institutional model, in turn, assumes that institutions consist of formal and informal rules, norms, and cultural elements, and that the behaviors and decisions of employees are shaped by these elements. While earlier versions of the model emphasized only rules and legal structures, contemporary versions also take human behavior, culture, and psychology into account (Gül, 2013, pp. 75–78). The elite model, which argues that a small number of elites determine policy and control officials and administrators, may be summarized as follows (Dye, 2013, p. 24):

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[6] This does not mean that policy is independent of value judgments (Theodoulou, 2013b). Knowledge is ultimately interpreted by actors, and actors themselves are shaped around values such as culture.

- Society is divided into the few who have power and the many who do not. Only a small number of persons allocate values for society; the masses do not decide public policy.
- The few who govern are not typical of the masses who are governed. Elites are drawn disproportionately from the upper socioeconomic strata of society.
- The movement of nonelites to elite positions must be slow and continuous to maintain stability and avoid revolution. Only nonelites who have accepted the basic elite consensus can be admitted to governing circles.
- Elites share consensus on behalf of the basic values of the social system and the preservation of the system. In America, the bases of elite consensus are the sanctity of private property, limited government, and individual liberty.
- Public policy does not reflect the demands of masses but rather the prevailing values of the elite. Changes in public policy will be incremental rather than revolutionary.
- Active elites are subject to relatively little direct influence from apathetic masses. Elites influence masses more than masses influence elites.

The process model, as its name suggests, analyzes public policy through its stages. Although there are different formulations of these stages, what matters is the idea of policy as a sequence of steps. Accordingly, the process model may include such stages as problem identification, agenda setting, policy formulation, adoption, implementation, evaluation, and termination or change (Theodoulou, 2013a, p. 124), or alternatively problem emergence, agenda setting, alternative selection, enactment, implementation, and evaluation (Birkland, 2015, p. 26).

Finally, in the systems model the political system is understood as a whole together with its environment. Public policy is determined according to the wishes and demands processed within that system. The process is summarized as the transformation of inputs into outputs through the political system, often described as a black box (Easton, 1965, p. 32; Theodoulou, 2013b). Inputs include election results, public opinion, communication with elected officials, media, and the personal experiences of decision-makers; outputs include laws, regulations, and decisions (Easton, 1965, p. 32). In the black-box mechanism, structural, social, political, and economic environments affect politics and policy-making and thus transform inputs into outputs (Birkland, 2015, p. 26). Although other models exist, such as bureaucratic corporatism, which gives priority to bureaucratic actors, the focus here remains on these broader and more explanatory models.

These models should not be understood as mutually exclusive or as invalidating one another. Used together, each illuminates a different dimension of public policy and provides rich data for both researchers and practitioners (Çevik & Demirci, 2012, p. 75).

The dominance of the paradigm of the day clearly matters here. The rationality celebrated by modernism and the Weberian understanding of administration, when considered in light of the foregoing discussion, cannot be said to operate fully in the policy process. Policy is a phenomenon in which many factors—cultural and individual values of every kind, as well as political and administrative forces—interact, especially in decision-making (Çevik & Demirci, 2012, p. 75). For that reason, it is now understood that absolute rationality cannot be constructed and that people operate within what has often been called bounded rationality, even if some of their decisions remain in certain respects rational (Hekim, 2013, p. 53; Köseoğlu, 2013, p. 249).

Alongside bounded rationality, it is also necessary to mention subjective rationality as a counterpart to Weber's claim that modern administration rests on law-based rationality. In this view, individuals act on the basis of cultural values and personal interests and seek to maximize those interests (Cahn, 2013, pp. 87–89). This parallels the economic assumption of *homo economicus*. In consequence, the actor and the elements that shape the actor become relatively more important than other variables in explaining policy formation (Ostrom, 2013, p. 175).

If people wish to protect and maximize their interests, the first strategy available to them is to unite and act collectively. Put differently, individuals enter policy processes together with others who share a common ground. These groups may be profession-based, such as doctors, engineers, or police officers, or sector-based, such as bureaucrats. Whatever their form, such groups seek to play an active role in shaping policies that affect them and to block arrangements against their interests while promoting those that serve them (Birkland, 2015, p. 169).

Determining whether and how interest groups influence policy processes and outcomes is therefore crucial if one is to devise effective strategies and obtain the desired results. In this respect, interest groups may be identified in the following ways (McFarland, 2013, p. 49):

- Empirical observation reveals the actors operating within a policy system.
- These actors appear as groups and individuals representing group interests.
- They interact and affect one another's behavior.
- Even when one can infer interests from behavior, the representatives of interest groups generally pursue what they themselves define as their interests.
- Interests frequently change during the interaction process.
- Observation must continue long enough to detect fluctuations in power, in interest groups, and in policy formation activities.

In summary, whether an interest group shapes policy according to its own priorities is identified largely through empirical observation. Similarities and differences between the original purpose of a policy and the outcomes that emerge during the process help identify the groups that have exercised influence. Such identification is crucial if policy is to be completed successfully and in line with its intended purpose. Otherwise, policy risks serving the personal interests of specific groups rather than the public good.

As noted earlier, public policy may involve many official, unofficial, and international interest groups. Yet because this study is concerned with the role of bureaucrats as representatives of administrative and bureaucratic culture, the focus here falls on their influence. Although public policy is often described as an inherently political activity and it is sometimes argued that governments alone should determine policy while excluding bureaucrats from the process (Stone, 2016, p. 843), in reality this is not possible. Career bureaucrats and technocrats operate actively in policy either within subgovernments or, at times, as what has been called hidden participants (Heclo, 2013, p. 71; Kingdon, 2013; Meier, 2013, p. 237).

Indeed, some strands of the literature even describe bureaucrats as policy elites. On that view, bureaucrats participate as both a group and as carriers of elite preferences in the process from agenda-setting to policy formation (Kingdon, 2016, p. 657). Yet it would be wrong to explain the effectiveness of bureaucracy and bureaucratic culture in public policy only in those terms. In settings like Türkiye, the tradition of bureaucratic tutelage may also affect the formation of policy (Heper, 2015, pp. 120–121), just as structural and technical resources of power do. As the empirical part of this broader project makes clear, reform processes are shaped not only by cultural differences and elite interests but also by Weberian administrative structures.

These resources of bureaucratic power may be listed, together with brief explanations, as follows (Eryılmaz, 2013, pp. 112–119; Meier, 2013, pp. 241–243; B. G. Peters, 2001, pp. 234–236):

> *Knowledge and expertise*. Modern bureaucracies are organized on the basis of specialized knowledge. Since political authorities are selected according to political criteria and cannot possibly possess expertise on every matter, bureaucrats enjoy an advantage over politicians in the formation and direction of policy through the technical knowledge they possess.
>
> *The ability to make quick decisions*. Politicians often reach decisions only after a series of democratic procedures and in many cases fail to reach them at all. Depending on the complexity of the governmental system or organizational structure, their decision-making processes may take much longer than those of bureaucrats.
>
> *Performance and stability*. Because Weberian bureaucracy treats officialdom as a career profession and has been widely institutionalized in that form, bureaucratic cadres display continuity in contrast to the frequently changing political class. This generates policy stability and, in turn, performance gains.
>
> *Institutional ideology*. With some exceptions, governments, executives, and legislatures are composed of actors and groups holding different views. Bureaucrats, by contrast, are often able to act around a single line of thought in relation to policy, while politicians are pushed toward uncertainty.
>
> *Political neutrality*. Even if there are exceptions at the individual level or in socialist variants, bureaucracy is in theory and, to a large extent, in practice organized at a distance from parties, ideologies, and factions. This allows bureaucrats to remain insulated from rapidly shifting intra-party balances and from the populist decisions that intensify especially during election periods, thereby leaving them freer to make decisions aligned with their own interests.
>
> *Professionalism*. The growing number and complexity of public services in the modern world have increased the need for technically skilled and experienced personnel. This has resulted in decision-making positions being occupied by more bureaucrats.
>
> *Autonomous organization*. This is not a power source available to all bureaucracies, but some public institutions are organized outside ministerial hierarchy. Even if their leaders are appointed by politicians, such bodies can move and decide autonomously in certain respects, whereas politicians

in democratic settings lack similar zones of autonomy and are constrained by elections and related factors.

Planning and budgeting. These two areas are of great importance to the executive. From technical design to economic and financial planning and allocation, they involve a level of technical complexity that politicians cannot easily manage or supervise without specialized training. In policy areas of this kind, the superiority of a bureaucratic order built on specialization and career is almost inevitable.

Political support. In some situations bureaucrats can align themselves with interest groups and/or elites or even act as their representatives. Put differently, bureaucrats may form alliances against politicians. In such cases politicians may try to create counter-bureaucracies of their own.

Legal authority. The legitimacy of politicians is shaped by their decisions, domestic and international context, and balances among pressure groups. Bureaucrats, by contrast, derive legitimacy from positive law. In some circumstances, bureaucratic decisions may therefore appear more legitimate than those taken by politicians.

Leadership. This criterion is shaped by the political side. Political leadership may weaken politicians in relation to a hierarchically organized bureaucracy when it comes to building consensus and ensuring implementation. Put simply, the political side may in some cases be fragmented, while the bureaucratic side acts as a more unified whole.

When these resources of bureaucratic power are evaluated together with policy processes, they provide a perspective suited to the aims of this study. Each resource becomes active at one or more stages and contributes to the shaping of policy. It should also be noted that the analysis here concerns mainly upper-level bureaucracy. In the implementation of reforms and policies, street-level bureaucrats such as police officers and teachers—those who come into direct contact with citizens—also occupy a role too important to ignore (Birkland, 2015, p. 205; Lipsky, 2016). Because of the limits of the present study, however, that issue is not explored further here.

Bureaucracy's strong involvement in policy processes has pushed politicians to search for different solutions. Earlier sections already argued that bureaucracy cannot be completely abolished and that even if it could, this would not produce beneficial results. The goal instead is to minimize bureaucratic stages, structures, and culture so as to build a more flexible and citizen-centered administration. For that reason, the appointment of political bureaucrats in place of purely administrative ones—as seen in the United States and, after changes in the system of government, in Türkiye as well—emerges as one possible solution. Where administrative bureaucrats are distant from political accountability and in some respects more powerful than politicians in negative ways (Çevik & Demirci, 2012, p. 37), appointing leaders who possess technical expertise but are also politically accountable, dismissible when necessary, willing to take initiative, and capable of leadership appears to be one of the best ways of ensuring effective and purpose-consistent policy implementation.

Yet this solution is not without risk. Political appointment may strengthen policy coherence and democratic responsiveness, but it can also weaken merit, administrative neutrality, and institutional continuity if it is not constrained by law, professional standards, and transparent accountability mechanisms. The issue, therefore, is not simply whether senior bureaucrats should be political or administrative, but how political responsiveness can be combined with professional competence and institutional integrity.

These political bureaucrats—technopols or technocrats with political responsibility—may be regarded as one consequence or requirement of New Public Management. They differ from administrative bureaucrats especially in cultural motivation and patterns of behavior, but they also differ from party politicians and from the hurried, restless, and populist politics described by Woodrow Wilson (1887, 2016). More plainly, political bureaucrats are a new class of officials who possess the technical knowledge and skills of administrative bureaucrats while cooperating with the political authority that appoints them and using their power resources to implement policies in the way politicians want them implemented (Heclo, 2013, p. 72).

In today's world, the state's growing needs, expanding service branches, and the multiplication of policy demands (Theodoulou, 2013a, p. 125) have made it almost impossible for all public policies to be designed and followed personally by politicians. This has led to policies outside major flagship programs and large budgets being left to senior bureaucrats. In that sense, political bureaucrats can also be seen as a practical necessity. It is unrealistic to expect a purely "administrative" bureaucrat to act as a manager, take initiative, and design and implement policies in line with the government's major goals. Since policy is itself a political act of decision-making (Stone, 2016), political management also becomes necessary (Lindblom, 2016, p. 237).

In short, if bureaucrats cannot be prevented from steering policies in their own favor, blocking policies against their interests, or producing policies for their own benefit, then bringing them within the sphere of political accountability and appointing them from within the political class becomes a plausible response (Heclo, 2013, p. 73). Such appointments concern, of course, the upper levels rather than the lower ranks. This resembles, in certain respects, the American spoils system, and recent changes in Türkiye can also be read in that direction, particularly insofar as senior administrative appointments become more closely tied to political leadership. The system has both advantages and disadvantages. But if the argument as a whole is taken seriously, it becomes easy to conclude that a new bureaucratic identity and culture consistent with New Public Management must be created—one capable of decision-making, initiative, leadership, and entrepreneurship.

In a chapter devoted to bureaucratic culture and public reform, it is also helpful to include New Public Management explicitly in the analysis in order to achieve a more integrated picture. Here the concept of meta-policy becomes important. The increasing diversity and complexity of policies, and the interactions among them, gave rise to the concept of meta-policy, which seeks to reduce complexity and provide methodological coherence. More plainly, meta-policy refers to the situation in which multiple policies are gathered under the same paradigm or perspective (Dror, 1975, pp. 247–248).

This does not mean that New Public Management automatically resolves the democratic and cultural problems associated with bureaucracy. On the contrary, by expanding managerial discretion, multiplying semi-autonomous agencies, and redefining citizens partly through service and performance categories, it may also generate new forms of fragmentation and accountability tension. Its relevance here lies not in being a complete solution, but in revealing how reform attempts to reshape bureaucratic culture through new managerial values.

Similar sets of policies that serve a common purpose must therefore be evaluated together, and before implementation an integrative action plan and a suitable environment must be created. In this respect, meta-policy making consists of the following stages (Köseoğlu, 2013, p. 255):

- The functioning of values
- The functioning of reality
- The functioning of problems
- The examination, functioning, and development of resources
- The design, evaluation, and redesign of policy-making systems
- The allocation of problems, values, and resources
- The determination of policy-making strategy

Meta-policy, which may be summarized as the "policy of policy," is therefore intended to serve as a guide for decision-makers and/or implementers in ensuring the necessary concrete and abstract conditions for action. Once one recalls that the reforms and policy changes taking place in public administration since the 1980s have also clustered around common values—whether described as neoliberalism, New Public Management, or postmodernism—it becomes reasonable to say that politicians, too, should have developed a policy, that is, a meta-policy, along those lines. That assumption is examined in other parts of the broader project and is not pursued further here.

Seen from this perspective, public administration reform cannot be reduced to the adoption of separate policy instruments. It requires a meta-policy capable of aligning institutional design, political direction, bureaucratic incentives, and administrative culture. Without such alignment, reform packages may remain formally adopted but culturally resisted, selectively implemented, or redirected by bureaucratic actors according to existing institutional habits. The reform of bureaucracy therefore depends not only on changing rules and structures, but also on reshaping the cultural and political conditions under which bureaucrats interpret, translate, and implement reform.

Conclusion

Throughout this study, bureaucracy, culture, and reform have been treated not as three disconnected headings but as three interwoven dimensions that simultaneously shape the structure, operation, and capacity for transformation of modern public administration. The point of departure was the historical and conceptual nature of bureaucracy; from there the analysis moved to the effects of culture on the administrative realm; and finally it sought to clarify the reciprocal influence of these two dimensions on public administration reform. The fundamental conclusion reached is this: bureaucracy is not merely a technical apparatus of administration. It is a living structure shaped by cultural codes, institutional habits, political relations, and historical accumulation. For that reason, public administration reforms cannot be understood solely through legal arrangements, organizational charts, or managerial techniques. Their real character emerges only when one asks how bureaucratic structures and bureaucratic culture respond to change.

As the first chapter showed, bureaucracy became, with the rise of the modern state, an indispensable mode of organization for ensuring continuity, order, and predictability in public affairs. When features such as specialization, division of labor, hierarchy, written rules, merit, and institutional continuity are taken into account, Weberian legal-rational bureaucracy can be seen as corresponding to a historical necessity in public administration. Yet this same bureaucratic structure can, by its internal logic, harden into rigidity, expand its own field of power, and, when detached from political and social oversight, generate problems of democratic legitimacy. Bureaucracy should therefore be neither wholly celebrated nor wholly rejected. The real issue is to preserve its necessary and functional aspects while establishing a balance that limits its tendencies toward rigidity, closure, and concentration of power.

The discussion of culture in the second chapter shows why that balance cannot be achieved through institutional design alone. Culture is the world of meaning that shapes how people interpret events, what forms of behavior they regard as natural, how they approach authority, and whether they see change as threat or opportunity. Administrative and bureaucratic culture, in this sense, structure how work is done in public institutions, how relations are organized, and within what limits reform initiatives are perceived. The success of reforms therefore depends not only on the quality of reform texts themselves but also on the cultural ground on which they land. It is for precisely this reason that the same reform program can produce very different outcomes in different countries, in different administrative traditions, and in different bureaucratic structures.

From this point of view, perhaps the most important finding of the study is that public administration reform is not only a legal, organizational, or managerial matter, but also, in a decisive sense, a cultural one. Reforms certainly have legal, organizational, technical, and fiscal dimensions. But each of these dimensions is either supported or constrained by the institutional culture in which the reform takes place. Especially in settings dominated by traditional bureaucratic structures, tendencies such as hierarchy, centralization, risk avoidance, excessive adherence to rules, and reluctance to take initiative become major sources of resistance. By contrast, principles associated with new approaches to management—participation, flexibility, performance, responsibility, citizen orientation, and learning—can succeed only if they are not merely inserted into legislation but also reflected in bureaucratic patterns of behavior. Reform therefore concerns not only structure but mentality and institutional reflexes as well.

As the third chapter argued in detail, the relationship between bureaucracy and politics is another central axis determining the character of reform. Traditional public administration made a sharp distinction between politics and administration, assuming that politics decides while bureaucracy implements. Historical experience and theoretical debates on public policy, however, show that this distinction cannot be sustained in absolute form. Bureaucracy is not merely an implementing mechanism. Through its knowledge, expertise, institutional memory, continuity, and technical capacity, it influences, directs, and at times shapes policy processes. Any approach that ignores this political dimension of bureaucracy therefore reads reality incompletely. What is needed instead is to recognize bureaucratic influence and then ask under what limits that influence can be rendered legitimate, accountable, and compatible with the public good.

At this point, leadership and management also acquire special importance. New Public Management, unlike the classical administrative ideal type, brings forward a public manager who is more entrepreneurial, more capable of initiative, more results-oriented, and more able to steer an institution toward defined goals. This shows that bureaucrats are no longer merely passive implementers of rules but have become actors who manage change, motivate employees, and translate policy goals into institutional practice. Yet this new role must always be considered together with democratic legitimacy, accountability, and transparency. Otherwise leadership ceases to be an instrument that accelerates reform and instead opens the door to arbitrariness and personalized rule. A healthy balance between reformist managerialism and legal-political oversight is therefore indispensable.

When the overall framework of the study is taken into account, New Public Management itself appears not merely as a set of technical instruments but as a paradigm resting on particular cultural assumptions. Performance, quality, efficiency, decentralization, flexibility, competition, customer-citizen orientation, and accountability all rise on a specific social and administrative cultural basis. It is therefore misleading to assume that these principles can be transferred into every administrative context in exactly the same way. When reform programs are designed without regard to the administrative tradition, bureaucratic culture, political structure, and institutional capacity of the country in which they are to be implemented, they can fall short of their intended results and at times even generate new problems. The success of reform thus depends less on the mechanical transfer of universal recipes than on an approach adapted to local context, attentive to cultural reality, and careful of institutional balance.

This also means that reform should not be judged only by whether it formally adopts internationally circulating models such as New Public Management. The more important question is whether those models are translated into the local administrative setting in a way that preserves legality, accountability, public value, and institutional capacity.

In conclusion, this study shows the insufficiency of reductionist approaches that treat bureaucracy as an obstacle to be removed, culture as an absolute center of resistance to change, and reform as a technical intervention that always produces positive results. Bureaucracy is an indispensable carrier of modern public administration; culture is the basic terrain that determines how that structure works; and reform is a political-administrative process of change that acquires meaning within the tension and interaction between the two. A sound public administration reform should therefore not aim to abolish bureaucracy, but to transform it under democratic oversight into a structure that is more flexible, more open, more accountable, and more responsive to citizens' needs. In the same way, reform must proceed not by excluding culture but by taking seriously those dimensions of culture that can be steered and transformed. Only then can reform cease to be a surface-level adjustment and become a durable transformation that penetrates institutional life. Genuine change in public administration becomes possible only when structure, culture, and politics are thought together, and when reform is understood not as a technical act of redesign but as a contested process of institutional transformation.

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