

# Current Approaches in Social Sciences

**Editors:**

Assoc. Prof. Ali Turan Bayram • Asst. Prof. Andi Asrifan  
Asst. Prof. Neha Sharma • Asst. Prof. Muthmainnah

 ÖZGÜR  
YAYINLARI

# Current Approaches in Social Sciences

## **Editors**

Assoc. Prof. Ali Turan Bayram

Asst. Prof. Andi Asrifan

Asst. Prof. Neha Sharma

Asst. Prof. Muthmainnah



Published by

**Özgür Yayın-Dağıtım Co. Ltd.**

Certificate Number: 45503

📍 15 Temmuz Mah. 148136. Sk. No: 9 Şehitkamil/Gaziantep

☎ +90.850 260 09 97

📞 +90.532 289 82 15

🌐 www.ozgurayinlari.com

✉ info@ozgurayinlari.com

---

## Current Approaches in Social Sciences

Editors: Assoc. Prof. Ali Turan Bayram • Asst. Prof. Andi Asrifan  
Asst. Prof. Neha Sharma • Asst. Prof. Muthmainnah

---

Language: English

Publication Date: 2023

Cover design by Mehmet Çakır

Cover design and image licensed under CC BY-NC 4.0

Print and digital versions typeset by Çizgi Medya Co. Ltd.

**ISBN (PDF):** 978-975-447-664-4

**DOI:** <https://doi.org/10.58830/ozgur.pub167>



This work is licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0 International (CC BY-NC 4.0). To view a copy of this license, visit <https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/>  
This license allows for copying any part of the work for personal use, not commercial use, providing author attribution is clearly stated.

---

Suggested citation:

Bayram, A. T. (ed) Asrifan, A. (ed) Sharma, N. (ed) Muthmainnah, (ed) (2023).

*Current Approaches in Social Sciences*. Özgür Publications. DOI: <https://doi.org/10.58830/ozgur.pub167>.

License: CC-BY-NC 4.0

---

*The full text of this book has been peer-reviewed to ensure high academic standards. For full review policies, see <https://www.ozgurayinlari.com/>*

---



## *Preface*

Technological developments and globalization has changed human nature. This change directly affects all stages of human life. At this point, it becomes inevitable to carry out research on people and human life. All studies carried out in the field of Social Sciences aim to understand human, human life and human nature. In this work, which was put forward in order to understand the human, different studies from different disciplines were discussed and a step was tried to be built in order to reach this goal, albeit to some extent.



## *Content*

Preface iii

### Chapter 1

---

The Usage of Emotional Intelligence in Workplaces: Research on a  
Telecommunications Company 1

*Asra Babayiğit*

*Hüseyin Aras Babayiğit*

### Chapter 2

---

Impacts of Digital Transformation Caused by the Growth in Online Trade  
Volume on Accounting Processes 19

*Salahattin Altındağ*

### Chapter 3

---

Sociology of Artificial Intelligence: How AI Will Transform Work,  
Unemployment and Our Future 45

*Ulaş Başar Gezgin*

### Chapter 4

---

The Influence of Religion on the Dominant Party System in Turkey and  
Russia 61

*Abdulkadir Cesur*

## Chapter 5

---

- Roman Period Glass Unguentariums at the Hacibektas Veli Archeology Museum 81  
*Bariş Emre Sönmez*

## Chapter 6

---

- Archaeology of the Turkish-Islamic Synthesis: Islam, Turkishness, and Westernization as the Pillars of the Modern Ottoman Identity 103  
*Ali Babahan*

## Chapter 7

---

- İsmet İnönü Era: Assessing the Challenges of Democracy in Turkey 131  
*İbrahim Yorgun*

## Chapter 8

---

- The Political Psychology of ‘China Threat’: Perceptions and Emotions 157  
*Ulaş Başar Gezgın*

## Chapter 9

---

- Usage of Local Foods in Regional Restaurants: Sinop Example 191  
*Hasibe Yazıt*  
*Tuğçe Sivri*

## Chapter 10

---

- From Happy Country to Happy City: The Case of Bhutan for Sinop Tourism 199  
*Ali Turan Bayram*  
*Yavuz Çetin*

## Chapter 11

---

A Wetland Management Planning: Problems and Threats Affecting Gökçeada  
(Aydincık-Salt Lake) Lagoon 205

*Mehtap Bayrak*

## Chapter 12

---

6 Trends over Management Theory: Decolonization, Sinification,  
Empowerment/Precairization, Degendering, Transdisciplinarity, and  
Environmental/Natural Challenges 241

*Ulaş Başar Gezgin*



# The Usage of Emotional Intelligence in Workplaces: Research on a Telecommunications Company

Asra Babayığit<sup>1</sup>

Hüseyin Aras Babayığit<sup>2</sup>

## Abstract

The aim of this study is to investigate the relationship between the demographic characteristics, seniority and profession at workplace. Emotional Intelligence is an important factor in people's lives in modern society. This type of intelligence, which is a means of achieving success in workplaces, was applied to employees of Telecommunication Company with an emotional intelligence test prepared according to five criteria determined by Goleman in 1998. Data was collected between February-May 2019 in Nicosia. The sample consists of 150 Turkish speaking adults. Statistical analysis of the data was conducted by T-test and correlation analysis in order to determine the effect of the 5 subscales of emotional Intelligence and demographic variables. The findings show that there is a statistically significant correlation between relationship management and in-service programs, between marital status and emotional control, between the participants' motivation and emotional control attitudes and between the participants' empathy and emotional control attitudes. As Emotional Intelligence becomes a wider concept, it will be understood and applied more and more in the works to be done.

## 1. Introduction

People accomplish different results when performing assigned tasks or things they want to achieve, because everyone has a reaction to their own perceptions and events. The tasks undertaken or things accomplished are

- 
- 1 Assist Prof. Dr., Faculty of Economics, Administrative and Social Sciences, Department of Psychology, Cyprus Science University, Kyrenia, Cyprus. ORCID: 0000-0003-2102-3175
  - 2 PhD, Institute for Social Sciences, Department of Innovation and Knowledge Management Near East University, Nicosia, Cyprus.

related to many aspects. Working hard has an important role to play in the selection of a career or career journeys that experience or innate intelligence skills will face in everyday life, or lifelong career challenges (Lam & Kirby, 2002, p. 142).

Hardworking, experience, or analytical thinking can give concrete information about how measurably finite power can be successfully achieved in people's daily work or business lives. Tests measuring analytical thinking ability, hours of work or years of experience on a job can be easily performed. However, a new concept has been added to these factors in recent years. A concept that measures how information is used as the most important source of our day has begun to receive increased attention in the literature. This concept, which is defined as emotional intelligence, shows how people decide what they think and what they do about it (Doğan, 2005, p. 111). EI is the a field of study which is also connected to the knowledge management discipline. According to Sağsan (2009), EI could be evaluated within the humanist paradigm, which is one of the most important factors in the knowledge management paradigms. As a result of research conducted in recent years, the tests that can applied to measure people's intelligence levels have started to be used in the business world. Intelligence levels were initially measured by IQ tests and the analytical intellectual abilities of the individuals were expressed in a number of ways. However, it was found that the success of the people working at the workplace was not accurate with this test (Adiloğulları, 2011, p. 14).

Candidates who are called for an interview during the recruitment process have been investigated in recent years by measuring their level with emotional intelligence tests, because a higher EQ is perceived to be related to organizational success (Cumming, 2005, p. 3). Emotional intelligence tests are difficult to express in numbers, unlike IQ tests. In an IQ test, a score can be obtained according to the exact number of incorrect answers by asking the questions of the people who can test analytical ideas. (Law, Wong & Song, 2004, p. 485). However, in an emotional intelligence test, the correct result may not always be obtained. The responses of people's feelings and behaviors to the questions they are asked on paper may not be the same as the reactions they encounter in their daily lives.

### **1.1. Emotional Intelligence Concept**

Emotional intelligence is a kind of intelligence. It refers to the skill of people as emotional intelligence (EQ) or emotional intelligence (EI) in English, as well as their own emotions and thoughts, and the ability

of respondents to understand, deduce, and shape their movements and behaviors according to their meanings (Demir, 2010, p. 202 ).

According to Mayer & Salovey(1990, p. 189), “Emotional intelligence is a sub-form of social intelligence that pertains to the individual’s ability to monitor and use his or her feelings and emotions, to distinguish between them, and to use them in their knowledge, thoughts and behavior”. Daniel Goleman (1995), the author of the first book about emotional intelligence, describes emotional intelligence as decision making with empathy rather than personal satisfaction.

Emotional intelligence tests are a term that is revealed by the purpose of calculating the whole level of behavior that occurs according to the reactions that people in response to certain events. Describes the level of emotional intelligence in understanding and responding to situations and emotions that we experience in the face of an event, reacting in such a way as to empathize and make the most of us to events (Arıcıoğlu, 2002, p. 28; Anamur-Perek, 2002; Konrad; Poskey, 2006; Maboçoğlu, 2006). It has also been determined that the success of individuals in their workplaces is not only related to IQ levels, but also to their level of emotional intelligence (Doğan & Demiral, 2007, p. 209). Having a high level of IQ is not sufficient for someone to be successful in the workplace. In fact, people with high emotional intelligence are found to be more successful at work (Bridge, 2003; Anamur-Perek, 2002).

Emotional intelligence tests are difficult to quantify in numbers, unlike IQ tests. In an IQ test, a score can be obtained according to the exact number of incorrect answers by asking the questions of the people who can test analytical ideas. But in the emotional intelligence test, the correct result may not always be obtained. The responses of people’s feelings and behaviors to the questions they are asked on paper may not be the same as the reactions they encounter in their daily lives. Emotional intelligence is a species that can be developed and plays a role in determining the emotional intelligence in the seasons as well as the most important genetic factor (Tuğrul, 1999, p. 17). In this development, the age of the individual can be a factor. As people become older, they gain experience and can improve their emotional intelligence because they will act by taking lessons in the movements they will make. At the same time, infants perceive what they see around them and respond accordingly. In this case, each infant may differ. The family environment also influences emotional intelligence. An infant’s personality developed according to their growing background, and at the same time, they can contribute to negative or positive development

of this emotional intelligence in the nearby environment (Yüksel, 2006, p. 19). Additionally, gender is also a factor in the development of emotional intelligence. Individuals may experience emotional intelligence if they have a period of education and social life based on their gender.

## **1.2. Emotional Intelligence Features**

As it is considered, the concept of emotional intelligence, the most important researchers of this concept summed up the five items that Goleman, Salovey and Mayer have in their characters to be successful in order to be successful (Deniz, 2011, p. 48). These are the people who are aware of themselves (Goleman, 1995, p. 78). This is the first and the most important feature of emotional intelligence. If people can objectively evaluate their own boundaries, areas of strength or weaknesses, then their reactions to events would be more appropriate (Goleman, 2000, p. 393). The self-awareness of individuals has a profound effect on the emergence of the concept of emotional intelligence (Marshall, 2001, p. 93). Because they can affect other people with their actions, they will be more effective and productive in their workplaces because they know better where they need help and where they will support it in a complex way (Goleman, 1995, p. 78).

Secondly, another important feature of EI is to manage itself. The ability to control this emotional state ensures that sudden decisions, which can be given as reflexes, are made to work in a calmer and more accurate manner. In an unexpected situation, people can react afterwards, which they may regret. In these situations, the brain releases a chemical reaction, and control of the emotional state of this chemical component is very important for the concept of emotional intelligence (Goleman, 1995, p.81).

The next feature is motivation (Goleman, 1995, p. 101). Those with higher emotional intelligence focus strongly on what they want to do, and they focus on themselves and on the successes of their surroundings in order to achieve their goals; in this way, they increase their effectiveness by supporting them (Gürsoy, 2005, p. 59). Since people with higher emotional intelligence are more likely to be more confident in their work than others, they are able to make more accurate and successful choices because they are more focused on the behaviors they will perform or situations they will react to. In addition, those with higher emotional intelligence will succeed in increasing their work.

The fourth most important feature of researchers' emotional intelligence is empathy (Goleman, 1995, p. 137). Empathy today has become a very

important factor, both in social life and in the workplace. It is also influential in their decisions to analyze how the opponents think and perceive the events before giving up their actions (Vural, 2010, p. 973). In particular, the concept of teamwork that develops in the workplace increases the importance of empathy (Ural, 2001, p. 210). Considering the emotional changes, cultures or personal characteristics of ourselves is necessary to reduce both the satisfaction of the other person, the productivity, and the emergence of conflict situations. When all this is thought of, empathy is the prospect of the place in emotional intelligence (Goleman, 1995, p. 144).

The last feature of emotional intelligence is the way in which relationships management (Goleman, 1995, p. 155). This last feature is the result of a whole that arises when other features are revealed. Those who know themselves and their capacity, those who express empathy, who make decisions by perceiving other people, and who can control their own feelings, have no problem in managing these associations as a result (Hogan & Roberts, 2000). With these abilities, they achieve success in their work and personal lives by providing the necessary both on their own and on the way to success.

### **1.3. Comparison of the IQ and EQ Concepts**

Although EI is an important core element for success in workplaces, the concept of IQ has already been proposed and studied more than the concept of emotional intelligence. IQ is a concept that describes an individual's ability to think analytically, the ability to solve given problems, and the functionality to understand mixed situations. For many years, it was thought that this was an indicator of success (Maboçoğlu, 2006). All well-known scientists or those who have been successful in their field have drawn attention with their high IQ scores. Today, however, this concept has proved to be inadequate. Entering a job can be an easy process for an individual who has a higher IQ. However, many people with high IQ scores have not been successful in their work and social lives. An important reason for this is the lack of emotional intelligence.

While IQ calculates an individual's mental sufficiency, EQ (emotional intelligence) is an intelligence type that measures the emotional awareness and control of individuals (Doğan, 2005, p. 111). A person with a high IQ score may be able to better analyze the assigned tasks and develop methods that can achieve better results, while if there is an inadequacy in emotional intelligence, it may be difficult to take them to the conclusion. The emotional intelligence of those who are able to control their emotions, who

are aware of them, who are mentally prepared to overcome the difficulties they encounter, and who can act on the basis of long-term goals rather than individual satisfaction, is high. These individuals, particularly if they have a high level of IQ, will have an advantage in terms of achieving success in business and social life (Maboçoğlu, 2006).

The IQ level is more of a genetic type that passes on to individuals as genetic. Developments can be made with necessary training, but this does not provide any significant improvement. On the contrary, the situation that emotional intelligence can learn and develop with the reactions given to the effects is more than the other intelligence type IQ (Yüksel, 2006, p. 19).

#### **1.4. Emotional Intelligence and Knowledge Management**

By competing on a global platform, companies no longer have profit margins. As a result, companies began to work in this direction to start using their internal resources, especially their jobs, efficiently and effectively. When departments are organized as a team, the communication between the people increases with the distribution of tasks, and the emotional intelligence also appeared as a precaution (Güllüce, Çağlar & İşcan, 2010, p. 10). Businesses are now starting to look at how their employees control their emotions, not just their level of education and intelligence, and how they assess their relationships at work. Sectors with high competition have begun to control their emotional intelligence (Ashkanasy & Daus, 2002), particularly when choosing the work force to capture maximum yield, even in the smallest units. The fact that this technique begins to take place in business talks is also a sign that this concept will become more important in the coming years.

Knowledge has been known as a vital consider all fields of discipline (Sivakumar & Lourthuraj, 2017). Besides implicit knowledge additionally emotional intelligence encompasses a huge operate in economic life (Stifter, 2013). Knowledge management is at the centre of all strategic designing on the way to increase the worth of human resources whereas making an attempt to conduct the foremost effective type of stimulating their potential. From a manager's perspective,5 knowledge, it's effective use, and integration altogether pores of the work method indicate a corporal worth that has to be nurtured and revered (Lazovic, 2012). Knowledge Management as a structural procedure for making, acquiring, portion, change and using the subjective and target learning as an authoritative resource for empowering development and EI (Esfahani, Ordibehesht & Zolfaghari, 2013). Knowledge Management could be considered as learning creation, exchange, sharing and upkeep with the goal that it can be utilized as a compelling strategy in

the organization (Mirzaghali et al., 2013). EI had a major positive effect on the measurements of learning organization, clarity of mission and vision, effective exchange of information and cooperation, and gathering critical thinking (Labaf et al., 2011). Mundra et al., (2011). outlined knowledge management as a variety of practices utilized by associations to recognize, create, represent, and circulate knowledge for mindfulness, learning and apply across organizations.

### **1.5. Hypothesis**

H1: There is a significant relationship between the Marital Status of Employees and Emotional Intelligence.

H2: There is a significant relationship between Employee Learning Situations and Emotional Intelligence.

H3: There is a significant relationship between Employee's Seniority Status and Emotional Intelligence.

H4: There is a significant relationship between the position of the employees and the Relationship between Marital Status and Emotional Intelligence.

The aim of this study is to examine the relationship between the demographic characteristics, seniority and profession in the workplace.

## **2. Methodology**

This research was conducted with employees working in different districts of a telecommunications company in Nicosia. The questionnaires designed to measure emotional intelligence in the study were prepared in association with Goleman's emotional intelligence and a Likert-type scale was used. The people surveyed were classified according to the year.

### **2.1. Sample Selection**

The study participants were between the ages of 20-45. The intervals were determined as 20-25, 25-30, 30-35, 40-45. The aim of this research is to determine the effect of the relationship between the level of genetic intelligence and the socio-demographic characteristics of people working in a telecommunications company located in North Cyprus, as well as their seniority at work and profession. The first part, socio-demographic characteristics, was prepared by the researchers. In this section, questions were asked about the age, gender, marital status, education level, seniority status at the workplace and profession. In the second part, the aim was to collect

information about the psychological intelligence of the persons by using the emotional intelligence test prepared by the researchers. Establishing the relationship between the level of emotional intelligence of in-service training programs in recruitment processes at the workplace is another purpose.

## **2.2. Data Collection**

This research was conducted with employees working in different districts of a telecommunications company in Nicosia. Data was collected between February-May 2019. Questionnaires designed to measure emotional intelligence in the study were prepared by associating with 5 parts of Goleman's emotional intelligence and a Likert scale was used. The people surveyed were classified according to the year. This scale consists of 26 items. The Turkish version of the scale was prepared by the researchers.

## **2.3. Gathering Data and Reliability of Emotional Intelligence Sub-Dimensions**

The self-awareness Cronbach's alpha coefficient, which is described as part of the questionnaire, was found to be moderately reliable with 60%. In the second part of the questionnaire which assesses emotional control (B), the Cronbach's alpha coefficient is acceptable at 72%. The next part is related to motivation (C) and the Cronbach's alpha coefficient is good with 80.7%. (D) includes questions about empathy, and the Cronbach's alpha coefficient is acceptable at 70.4%. Finally, relationship management in part E is good at 80.6%.

In the first part of the questionnaire, demographic questions were asked. At the beginning of these demographic questions, the questions were designed to obtain information about the respondent's marital status. Then the participants were asked to give their age. After the question about their level of education, participants were asked about the institutions and their questions. These are primarily referred to their position in the workplace, the department in which they work, their seniority at work, and their seniority. In the final part of the demographic questions, the goal was gather information on whether the current jobs are the first jobs and whether they has participated in an in-service program or training. In the second part of the questionnaire, questions were asked with the aim of measuring emotional intelligence.

This section consists of five different parts according to Goleman's Emotional Intelligence model. In the first part, 6 questions were asked about the people to know themselves. In the second part, 6 sourns were used with

the aim of measuring emotional control. In the third part, it is also desired to get information about the motivation sensation of the participants with 6 questions. Subsequently, through the 4 questions about empathy in the fourth part, it was asked to reach a conviction about the empathy sentiment of the participants. The last part is the management of relations and it is aimed to get information about how participants manage their relations with 4 questions in this section.

Statistical analysis of the data are made by T-test and correlation analysis in order to determine the effect of the 5 subscales of Emotional Intelligence and the demographic variables (Büyüköztürk, 2018).

### **3. Results**

In the present study, 36% of the participants were single and 64% were married. The age range of participants was between 20 and 45. The majority of the sample (72%) was between 20 and 35 years old.

When the education levels are examined, 82% are university graduates and 18% are high school graduates. According to their position within the company, 39% are experts, 14% are managers, 12% are in marketing, 10% are engineers, 8% are team members, 6% work in the call center, 6% are customer representatives, 6% are managers, 4% are technicians and 4% are in reporting positions.

In addition, the participants are also classified according to the units they are studying. The results revealed that 32% of respondents were in the sales unit, 16% were in the center, 16% were in customer relations, 12% were in quality management, 8% in customer service, 6% in segment management, 4% in information technology, jobs, operations and distributors are divided into 2% units. In terms of seniority, 40% of the participants had worked for 5-10 years and 35% for less than 5 years, which constitutes a majority of the participants.

On the other hand, a smaller proportion of the sample had been employed in the workplace for 20 to 20 years, 11 to 15 years, and only 4 to 16 to 20 years. 54% of the respondents reported that the workplace they are currently working with is not the first place to work, with 46% reporting that the first place of work is the workplace they are currently working at. Finally, 72% stated that there is an in-service program.

### **4. Results and Discussion**

This research examines the relationship between emotional intelligence, which is an increasingly evolving concept, and the success, productivity and

demographic characteristics of people at work. Since emotional intelligence is a new concept and it is difficult to measure, the number of researches conducted on this subject is limited.

A statistically significant difference was found between management and in-service programs. There was also a statistically significant difference between marital status and emotional control (Table 1).

*Table 1. Comparison of Emotional Control and Marital Status Score Average among Individuals Working in Telecommunications*

Marital Status	m ± sd (n)	f t (p)
Single	3.92 ± 0.68 (n=18)	5.224 0.027* (0.546)
Married	4.03 ± 0.46 (n=32)	

*\*p<0.05 \*\* p<0.01*

A statistically significant relationship was found between participants' motivation and emotional control attitudes. The direction of this relationship is positively determined. One variable increases while the other variable increases, while the other variable decreases (Table 2).

*Table 2. Comparison of the Average Motivation and Emotion Control Scores among Individuals Working in Telecommunications*

Emotional Control	R	P
Motivation	0.392	0.005

*\*p<0.05 \*\* p<0.01*

Moreover, a meaningful relationship was found between the participants' empathy and emotional control attitudes. The direction of this relationship is positively determined. One variable increases while the other variable increases, one variable decreases while the other variable decreases (Table 3).

*Table 3. Comparison of the Average Empathy and Emotion Control Scores in Individuals Working in Telecommunications*

Emotional Control	R	P
Empathy	0.385	0.006

Participants' empathy and motivation attitudes were found to be significant. The direction of this relationship is positively determined. One variable increases while the other variable increases, while the other variable decreases (Table 4)

*Table 4. Comparison of the Average Empathy and Motivational Scores in Individuals Working in Telecommunications*

Empathy	R	P
Motivation	0.499	0.000

A meaningful relationship was found between participants' method and motivation attitude. The direction of this relationship is positively determined. One variable increases while the other variable increases, while the other variable decreases (Table 4).

*Table 5. Comparison of the Average Methodology and Motivational Scores in Individuals Working in Telecommunications*

Method	R	P
Motivation	0.481	0.000

A meaningful relationship was found between occupational affairs of participants and emotional control attitude. The direction of this relationship is negative. One variable increases while the other decreases (Table 5).

**Table 6. Comparison of Average Emotional Control and Emotional Control Score Average in Individuals Working in Telecommunications**

Emotional Control	r	P
Occupational affair	-0.322	0.023

In addition, intellectual intelligence (IQ), which is the means of measuring people's intelligence, is slowly leaving its emotional intelligence (EQ) in the new century (Adiloğulları, 2011, p. 14). The key to success in the workplace is that both IQ and EQ levels are high.

Another issue that emphasizes the importance of emotional intelligence is the establishment of teams that are dependent on each other in the workplace, as well as the qualities of leadership required in each position and the development of interpersonal skills. If emotional intelligence can be improved through learning, it is a promising feature. The ability to cope and adapt, a feature of Emotional Intelligence, is being used in all phases of life. Success is influential in many different areas such as education and social relations. This effect is positive.

In today's organizations, with the increased importance given on the human beings the transition to human sources and the differentiation of the new management understandings appeared and witnessing to that emotions are grasping more and more of their place and business in business life. Emotional intelligence traits are used as decisive and important criteria in the process of human resource management, such as recruitment, performance management, career development, and education (Lazovic, 2012). The concept of emotional intelligence is used by managers, can fulfill expectations, and is considered as a performance criterion. Managerial tension, affecting environmental factors, emotional perception performances and customer-friendliness are important in this respect (Arıcıoğlu, 2002). Emotional intelligence, with vital presets for individual and managerial performance, is an intelligence that can be improved by learning at all times and at all ages (Ciarrochi & Blackledge, 2007).

The decisions that business people make are very important in terms of their efficiency and efficiency in business life in terms of individuals who are aware of and are able to manage their mutual relations and movements with their colleagues or clients in the working environment. If dynastic control

cannot be achieved, people may be dissatisfied at the workplace and this can lead them to the process of leaving work. All this shows why this research is important. In addition, the importance of emotional intelligence continues to increase in today's society. The work on this subject is limited due to the fact that the concept is relatively new.

As mentioned above, it is possible to develop emotional intelligence. There are some points to be aware in this context. In everyday life, one can endeavor to better define self and emotional reactions. For the development of effective communication skills, interpersonal relationships should focus on clarity / honesty, tolerance to criticism and the development of problem solving skills. In this way, the individual will have taken steps to improve their emotional intelligence. Additionally, since emotional intelligence is a new common term, the organization of seminars and congresses that will inform people about this topic and reach many people will increase the importance given to emotional intelligence and more people will gain this grip. In particular, it will explain this concept in detail at workplaces and organizing monthly meetings in the light of informative PowerPoint presentations about the steps that can be taken to improve will make the working people more conscious.

## **5. Conclusion**

Consequently, Emotional Intelligence, which is necessary in every stage of life and in all fields, is very important. Compared to the past, this concept continues to be used more frequently. On the other hand, Emotional Intelligence is still not given the necessary attention. The spread of this concept will increase as the volume of research in the field continues to grow. Emotional Intelligence must be recognized and developed in order to be more functional and effective in many areas of life.

Individuals need to be aware of their strengths and developments, to manage their emotions and behaviors, and to try to understand the feelings and thoughts of their family, friends, and the people they work with so that they can be more content at every step of their lives. Emotional qualities such as expressing feelings, empathy, independence, adaptability, appreciation, solving individual problems, persistence, compassion, courtesy, and respect are the essential qualities that must be possessed by individuals today, which can only be achieved with high emotional intelligence. The high emotional intelligence that institutions have, as they are in the individual, will be the most effective tool to improve their performance. In organizations with high emotional intelligence, their desires and expectations for employee,

customer, supplier, and shareholder engagement will be better understood and met. Thus, the institution will be able to connect its employees and customers to itself.

### **5.1. Recommendations and Research for Further Studies**

Correct measurement of emotional intelligence may be useful for leadership choice and education. In particular, the ability-based methods of emotional intelligence should be examined. Self-reporting, performance evaluation and observer evaluation (multiple assessment) methods should be examined in the future to determine which method is the most appropriate for measuring emotional intelligence. Some researchers suggest that emotional intelligence can be used by organizations to select effective leaders. Effective leadership with emotional intelligence measurement behavior should be examined more empirically. The current literature suggests that there is a conceptual connection between emotional intelligence and transformative leadership. This bond; ability-based emotional intelligence model emotional perception, emotional integration, emotional comprehension, and emotional management are important to be indicative of transformative leadership behaviors. Future research needs to test these proposals, both in different organizations and at different levels of organizations.

It is clear that managers and employees who possess high degree of EI are more effective at their jobs, perform well and this enhances the productivity of the organization. The emotion 's knowledge promotes the performance of organization. The patterns of Emotional Intelligence are not fixed; therefore, by affecting the behavior of workers, managers can accomplish their organizational goals. However, the appliance of Knowledge Management will lead to innovative efforts by the organization will improve its profitability and can advance the human resource management in the organization. In addition to this, once the knowledge of workers is improved, such excessive resource can create the background for organizational learning to achieve the structure targets more additional, prolificacy of organization can accelerate. Present study ensures the insight to the managers a way to maintain their degree of emotional intelligence and information to reach the competitive gains.

## 6. References

- Adiloğulları, İ. (2011). *Profesyonel futbolcularda duygusal zekâ ile örgütsel bağlılık ilişkisi* (Yayımlanmamış doktora tezi). Marmara Üniversitesi Sağlık Bilimleri Enstitüsü, İstanbul.
- Arıcıoğlu, A. (2002). Yönetel başarımın değerlemesinde duygusal zekânın kullanımı. *Akdeniz İktisadi ve İdari Bilimler Fakültesi Dergisi*, 4, 26-42.
- Ashkanasy, N. M. & Daus, C. S. (2002). Emotion in the workplace: the new challenge for managers. *Academy of Management Executive*, 16 (1), 76-86.
- Arıcıoğlu, M.A. (2002). Yönetel başarımın değerlemesinde duygusal zekânın kullanımı: Öğrenci yurdu yöneticileri bağlamında bir araştırma. *Akdeniz İ.İ.B.F. Dergisi*, 4, 26-42.
- Büyükköztürk, Ş. (2018). Sosyal bilimler için veri analizi el kitabı istatistiki araştırma deseni, SPSS uygulamaları. Ankara: PEGAM.
- Ciarrochi, J. & Blackledge, J.T. (2007). *Mindfulness- based emotional intelligence training: a new approach to reducing human suffering and promoting effectiveness*. 89-124.
- Cumming, E.A. (2005). An investigation into the relationship between emotional intelligence and workplace performance: an exploratory study. *Presented Paper*. Lincoln University.
- Demir, M. (2010). Örgütsel çatışma yönetiminde duygusal zekânın etkisi: konaklama işletmelerinde işgörenlerin algılamaları üzerine bir araştırma. *Doğuş Üniversitesi Dergisi*, 11(2), 199-211.
- Deniz, M. (2011). Duygusal zekâ boyutları ile liderlik uygulamaları arasındaki ilişki: sağlık sektörü yöneticileri üzerine bir araştırma. *Journal of New World Sciences Academy*, 7(2), 45-66.
- Doğan, S. (2005). *Çalışan ilişkileri yönetimi*. İstanbul: Kare Yayınları.
- Doğan, S., & Demiral, Ö. (2007). Kurumların başarısında duygusal zekânın rolü ve önemi. *Celal Bayar Üniversitesi İ.İ.B.F. Yönetim ve Ekonomi Dergisi*, 14(1), 209-230.
- Esfahani, M.A., Ordibehesht, M.M. & Zolfaghari, F. (2013). Study of the relationship between knowledge and emotional intelligence; case study: Melli bank of Qom. *International Research Journal of Applied and Basic Sciences*, 4(8), 2100-2106.
- Goleman, D. (1995). *Emotional intelligence*. New York: Bantam.
- Goleman, D. (2000). *İş başında duygusal zeka*. (H. Balkara, Çev). İstanbul: Varlık Yayınları.
- Güllüce, A., Çağlar, Ö. & İşcan, F. (2010). Mesleki tükenmişlik ve duygusal zeka arasındaki ilişki. *Eskişehir Osmangazi Üniversitesi İİBF Dergisi*, 5(2), 7-29.

- Gürsoy, A. (2005). *Liderlikte duygusal zeka türk silahlı kuvvetlerinde örnek bir uygulama*. (Yayınlanmamış Yüksek Lisans Tezi). Celal Bayar Üniversitesi, Manisa.
- Hogan, R.T., & Roberts, B.W. (2000). A Socioanalytic perspective on person/environment interaction. In W. B. Walsh, K. H. Craik, & R. H. Price (Eds.). *New Directions In Person-Environment Psychology*, (1-24). Mahway, NJ: Earlbaum
- Maboçoğlu, F. (2006). *Duygusal zekâ ve duygusal zekânın gelişimine katkıda bulunan etkenler*. (Unpublished master thesis). Ankara Üniversitesi, Sosyal Bilimler Enstitüsü, Ankara.
- Mirzaghali, A., Mirzaghali, Z., Ghobadi, T., Sadr, E.H. & Ghasemi, F. (2013). The correlation between emotional intelligence and knowledge transformation. *International Journal of Management Academy*, 1(1), 58-66.
- Labaf, H., Esmail, A.M. & Masoomah, M. (2011). The impact of the emotional intelligence on dimensions of learning organization: The case of Isfahan University. *Interdisciplinary Journal of Contemporary Research in Business*, 3(5), 536-545.
- Lam, L.T., & Kirby, S.L. (2002). Is emotional intelligence an advantage? An exploration of the impact of emotional and general intelligence on individual performance. *Journal of Social Psychology*, 142, 133-143.
- Law, K.S., Wong, C. & Song, L.J. (2004). The construct and criterion validity of emotional intelligence and its potential utility for management studies. *Journal of Applied Psychology*, 89(3), 483-496.
- Lazovic, S. (2012). The role and importance of emotional intelligence in knowledge management. *In Knowledge and Learning: Global Empowerment; Proceedings of the Management, Knowledge and Learning International Conference 2012* (pp. 797- 805). International School for Social and Business Studies, Celje, Slovenia.
- Marshall, C. (2001). Make the most of your emotional intelligence. *Chemical Engineering Progress*, 97(2).
- Mayer, J.D. & Salovey, P. (1990). Emotional intelligence. *Imagination, Cognition, and Personality*, 9, 185-211.
- Mundra, N., Karishma, G. & Renu, V. (2011). Achieving competitive advantage through knowledge management and innovation: Empirical evidences from the Indian IT sector. *The IUP Journal of Knowledge Management*, 9(2), 7-25.
- Poskey, M. (2006). The importance of emotional intelligence in the workplace, why it matters more than personality. Accessed on: 13.03.2016, , [http://callcentercafe.com/article\\_directory/Training\\_Articles/The\\_Importance\\_of\\_Emotion\\_al\\_Intelligence\\_in\\_the\\_Workplace\\_W.html](http://callcentercafe.com/article_directory/Training_Articles/The_Importance_of_Emotion_al_Intelligence_in_the_Workplace_W.html).

- Sağsan, M. (2009). Knowledge management discipline: Test for an undergraduate program in Turkey. *Electronic Journal of Knowledge Management*, 7(5), 627-36.
- Sivakumar, K. & Lourthuraj, S.A. (2017). An integrative view of organizational diagnosis, emotional intelligence, organizational learning and knowledge management practices: Impact on KMP. *The IUP Journal of Knowledge Management*, 15(2), 20-42.
- Stifter, B. (2013). Knowledge management system building on the basis of employees' satisfaction. *International Journal of Scientific Research*, 2(8), 229-231.
- Tuğrul, C. (1999). Duygusal zeka. *Klinik Psikiyatri*, 1, 12-20.
- Ural, A. (2001) Yöneticilerde duygusal zekanın üç boyutu. *Dokuz Eylül Üniversitesi SBE Dergisi*, 3(2), 209-19.
- Vural, D. (2010). Okul öncesi öğretmen adaylarının duygusal zekaları ile problem çözme becerileri arasındaki ilişki. *e-Journal of New World Sciences Academy*, 5(3), 972-980.
- Yüksel, M. (2006). *Duygusal zeka ve performans ilişkisi*. (Yayınlanmamış Yüksek Lisans Tezi). Atatürk Üniversitesi, Erzurum.



# Impacts of Digital Transformation Caused by the Growth in Online Trade Volume on Accounting Processes

Salahattin Altundağ<sup>1</sup>

## Abstract

In this study, the impacts of the growth in online trade volume caused by digital transformation on accounting processes, records within accounting processes, and the tracking of these records are thoroughly examined. As digital transformation accelerates and online trade becomes more prevalent, the need for businesses to transition to digital methods in accounting practices is increasingly growing.

The aim of the study is to uncover the effects of rapid growth in online trade on accounting processes and to evaluate these changes. In this context, the transition processes of businesses from traditional accounting methods to digital accounting and the effects of digital transformation on accounting processes are discussed.

Through an extensive literature review, a knowledge base is established on the effects of online trade on accounting processes, the impacts of digital transformation on accounting processes, and digital accounting practices. The numerical data obtained are evaluated with regression analysis, and the results reveal the effects of digital transformation on accounting processes.

The study indicates that the effects of digital transformation on accounting processes will increase with the rapid growth of online trade. To adapt to these changes, businesses must adopt digital technologies in their accounting processes and maintain accurate and reliable financial records.

This study can be considered an important resource for understanding the effects of online trade on accounting processes and helping businesses adapt to digital transformation. To prepare businesses for future digital

---

1 Assist. Prof., Dicle University, salahattinaltundag@gmail.com,  
Orcid: <https://orcid.org/0000-0002-6198-7959>

transformations, further examination of the effects of digital transformation on accounting processes caused by the growth in online trade volume is necessary.

## **INTRODUCTION**

This study investigates the impacts of the digital transformation triggered by the growth in online commerce volume on the accounting process, and discusses the effects of digital transformation on the accounting process as businesses transition to a digital environment due to the increase in online commerce volume.

The aim of this study is to reveal the impact of the rapid growth of online commerce on transactions within the accounting process and to examine the changes caused by these effects. With the rapid spread of online commerce, awareness has been formed that those businesses need to use digital accounting methods instead of traditional accounting methods to keep their financial records. This study aims to explore the effects of this transformation process on the accounting process.

Understanding the effects of online commerce on the accounting process is crucial for businesses to adapt to digital transformation. The problems encountered by businesses in the digital transformation process with the rapid growth of online commerce and the impacts of these problems on the accounting process highlight the importance of this study.

An extensive literature review was conducted in this study. This review includes studies on the effects of online commerce on the accounting process, the effects of digital transformation on the accounting process, and digital accounting practices. This information from the literature forms the primary data of the study.

The numerical data obtained were analyzed through regression analysis. The results of the regression analysis have clarified the impacts of the digital transformation caused by the growth in online commerce volume on the accounting process. The effects of the digital transformation caused by the growth in online commerce volume on the accounting process, including the impacts on the preparation and collection of transaction documents, recording and tracking of stocks, recording and tracking of accounts receivable and payable, recording and tracking of orders, daily records, recording and tracking of financial statements, and end-of-period transactions, have been extensively addressed.

The results of this study clearly reveal the impacts of the growth in online commerce volume on the digital transformation of the accounting process.

With the digitization of businesses' financial records, significant changes have occurred in transactions within the accounting process. These changes affect the preparation and collection of transaction documents, recording and tracking of stocks, recording and tracking of accounts receivable and payable, recording and tracking of orders, daily records, recording and tracking of financial statements, and end-of-period transactions.

Many businesses are transitioning from traditional accounting methods to digital accounting methods and are feeling the effects of online commerce in their accounting process. The data obtained in this study shows that the effects of digital transformation on the accounting process will increase with the growth in online commerce volume.

This study is important to establish an understanding of new accounting processes and the digitalization process that arise with the rapid growth of online commerce. Businesses should adopt digital technologies in their accounting processes to adapt to these changes and to keep their financial records accurately and reliably.

In conclusion, this study can be used as a guide to understanding the effects of online commerce on the accounting process. By understanding these effects, businesses can adapt to the digital transformation process and keep their financial records accurately. Further study of the impacts of the digital transformation caused by the growth in online commerce volume on the accounting process will help businesses to be prepared for future digital transformations.

## **1. METHOD AND METHODOLOGY:**

This study investigates the impacts of the digital transformation caused by the growth in the volume of online commerce on the accounting process. The study examines the effects of the increasing volume of online commerce, both globally and specifically in Turkey, on accounting processes, accounting records, and their tracking. The methods and techniques used are as follows:

- A comprehensive literature review has been conducted. This review includes the effects of online commerce on accounting processes, changes occurring in accounting processes with digital transformation, and digital accounting applications.
- Numerical data obtained have been evaluated with regression analysis. This analysis reveals the impacts of the digital transformation caused by the growth in online commerce volume on the accounting process.

- The study emphasizes the necessity for businesses to use digital accounting methods instead of traditional accounting methods to keep their financial records.
- The study is aimed at understanding the effects of online commerce on the accounting process to assist businesses in adapting to digital transformation.
- The impacts of the digital transformation caused by the growth in online commerce volume on the accounting process have been addressed by focusing on the preparation and collection of transaction documents, the recording and tracking of stocks, receivables, orders, daily records, financial statements, and end-of-period transactions.
- The study emphasizes that businesses need to adopt digital technologies in their accounting processes and keep their financial records accurately and reliably.

## **2. TRENDS IN THE GROWTH OF ONLINE COMMERCE VOLUME GLOBALLY AND SPECIFICALLY IN TURKEY**

In today's world, with the rapid development of internet technologies, the volume of online commerce is also rapidly increasing. This increase has significant implications, particularly in the financial sector. The increase in online commerce volume significantly impacts payment systems and financial institutions in the financial sector. This impact can be better understood by comparing the situations of the volume of online commerce globally and in Turkey (McKinsey and Company, n.d.).

The rapid increase in the volume of online commerce globally has a significant impact on financial institutions and payment systems. Especially during the pandemic period, when people were unable to leave their homes, the volume of online commerce increased rapidly. This increase has necessitated the development of online payment systems by financial institutions. Moreover, the security of payment systems and transaction speed have also gained importance. In this context, it is necessary to examine the impacts of the volume of online commerce on the financial sector in detail (United Nations Conference on Trade & Development, 2020).

In Turkey, too, the volume of online commerce is rapidly increasing. This increase seems to be parallel with the digitalization process that has taken place in recent years. Comparing Turkey's share in the volume of online commerce with the global situation also reveals Turkey's position in the digitalization process. In this context, examining Turkey's share in

the volume of online commerce helps measure Turkey's progress in the digitalization process (eCommerce Foundation, 2020).

Table-1 presents numerical data showing the increases in the volume of online commerce globally and specifically in Turkey:

*Table-1: Change in the Volume of Online Commerce Globally and Specifically in Turkey Between 2015-2022.*

Years	Global (Trillion \$)	Turkey Specific (Trillion \$)
2015	1,55	0,00833
2016	1,86	0,008176
2017	2,3	0,011227
2018	2,84	0,011585
2019	3,46	0,013883
2020	4,28	0,030999
2021	4,92	0,027548
2022	6,4	0,065125*

*\*\* 2022 data is estimated.*

*(Made using the annual averages of the Central Bank of the Republic of Turkey. Therefore, there may be differences from real exchange rate values.)*

*Source: (World Bank, 2023) and prepared by me.*

With the rise in global online trade volume, a regression analysis will be conducted using the global and Turkey-specific data specified in Table: 1, to determine which factors are influencing the growth of Turkey's online trade volume. Regression analysis is a statistical method used to measure the effect of one variable on another.

Our data display the global and Turkey-specific online trade volumes between the years 2015 and 2022. Globally, the online trade volume, which was 1.55 trillion dollars in 2015, has risen to 6.4 trillion dollars in 2022. In Turkey-specific data, the online trade volume, which was 0.00833 trillion dollars (8.33 billion dollars) in 2015, has increased to 0.065125 trillion dollars (65.125 billion dollars) in 2022.

In our regression analysis, the Turkey-specific online trade volume variable will be selected as the dependent variable, while the global online trade volume variable will be used as the independent variable. Through this analysis, the effect of the increase in global online trade volume on Turkey's online trade volume will be determined.

Furthermore, the coefficients obtained from the regression analysis will also determine the growth rate of Turkey's online trade volume relative to

the global online trade volume. This will enable the calculation of how much more or less the increase in Turkey's online trade volume is compared to the increase in global online trade volume.

The regression analysis to be conducted on the global and Turkey-specific online trade volume data specified in Table-1 will determine the effect of global online trade volume on Turkey's online trade volume. This analysis plays a significant role in identifying the factors that trigger the growth in Turkey's online trade volume.

*Table-2: Regression Analysis of the Growth in Turkey's Online Trade Volume in Conjunction with the Increase in Global Online Trade Volume*

<i>Regression Statistics</i>	
Multiple R	0,925918
R Square	0,857325
Adjusted R Square	0,833546
Standard Error	0,678941
Observation	8

<i>ANOVA</i>					
	df	SS	MS	F	Significance F
Regression	1	16,61932	16,61932	36,05364	0,000961
Residual	6	2,765766	0,460961		
Total	7	19,38509			

	Coefficients	Standard Error	t Stat	P-value	Lower %95	Upper %95	Lower 95.0%	Upper 95.0%
Intercept	1,697002	0,378122	4,487979	0,004157	0,771772	2,622232	0,771772	2,622232
X Variable 1	79,34499	13,21432	6,004468	0,000961	47,0107	111,6793	47,0107	111,6793

*Source: (World Bank, 2023) and prepared by me.*

The data in Table-2 were obtained using regression analysis to examine the relationship between Turkey's online trade volume and global online trade volume. The regression statistics obtained as a result of the analysis are highly significant:

- The Multiple R coefficient has been calculated as 0.926: “This indicates a strong positive correlation between Turkey’s online trade volume and the global online trade volume.”
- R Square has been calculated as 0.857: “This demonstrates that 85.7% of the variance between Turkey’s online trade volume and the global online trade volume is explained.”
- The Adjusted R Square has been calculated as 0.834: “This indicates that the model is in an improved form and shows a high level of reliability in the relationship between Turkey’s online trade volume and the global online trade volume.”
- The Standard Error has been calculated as 0.679: “This reflects the accuracy of the model.”
- According to the ANOVA results, the F-value for the regression has been calculated as 36.054, and the significance level (p-value) is less than 0.001: “This indicates that the regression model is significant, and the relationship between Turkey’s online trade volume and the global online trade volume is statistically meaningful.”
- In the coefficients table, the coefficient calculated for the intercept is 1.697, and the coefficient calculated for the X variable is 79.345: “These are the coefficients in the equation used to explain the relationship between Turkey’s online trade volume and the global online trade volume. The coefficients table also includes the standard errors, t-statistics, p-values, and 95% confidence intervals for both coefficients. The coefficient calculated for the intercept, 1.697, suggests that other factors not included in the model may also affect Turkey’s online trade volume. The coefficient calculated for the X variable, 79.345, suggests that every 1 billion dollars increase in Turkey’s online trade volume will lead to a 79.345 trillion dollar increase in the global online trade volume. The standard errors for both coefficients are quite low, indicating the reliability of the coefficients.”

From this analysis, it is concluded that there is a strong positive relationship between Turkey’s online trade volume and the global online trade volume, that increases in Turkey’s online trade volume cause increases in global online trade volume, and that this relationship is statistically significant. This data shows that Turkey’s growth in the field of online trade is effective on a global scale and that this trend could continue in the future.

### **3. THE IMPACT OF GROWTH IN ONLINE TRADE VOLUME GLOBALLY AND SPECIFICALLY IN TURKEY ON ACCOUNTING PROCESSES**

The growth experienced in online trade volume leads to significant changes in accounting processes. This study aims to analyze the effects of growth in online trade volume worldwide and specifically in Turkey on various accounting processes from 2015 to 2021. These analyses have been handled through a comparative method:

#### **3.1. Effects on the Preparation and Collection of Transaction Documents in the Accounting Process:**

Today, online trade volume is growing rapidly, and this growth has various effects on accounting processes. The preparation and collection of transaction documents is one of these affected processes. In this study, the effects of the growth in online trade volume worldwide and specifically in Turkey on the preparation and collection of transaction documents in accounting processes have been examined comparatively.

Global research indicates that the increase in online trade volume complicates the preparation and collection of transaction documents (Jansen & Karaman, 2018). This situation could affect the accuracy and reliability of accounting records. However, digital tools used in recording online sales transactions can facilitate the process of preparing and collecting transaction documents, thereby enhancing the accuracy of records (Li & Su, 2019).

Studies in Turkey examine the effects of the growth in online trade volume on the preparation and collection of transaction documents. These studies suggest that the increase in online trade volume complicates the preparation and collection of transaction documents and could decrease the reliability of accounting records (Özdemir & Türker, 2017). However, the rapid progress of companies in Turkey in digitization allows for the increased use of digital tools that facilitate the preparation and collection of transaction documents, thereby enhancing the accuracy of accounting records (Erdoğan & Durmuş, 2020).

However, the effects of the growth in online trade volume worldwide and specifically in Turkey on the preparation and collection of transaction documents vary. The global growth complicates the preparation and collection of transaction documents even further, whereas the digitization process in Turkey facilitates the preparation and collection of transaction documents.

In this context, the rapid progress of companies in Turkey in digitization should ensure the more widespread use of digital tools in the preparation and collection of transaction documents to enhance the accuracy and reliability of accounting records. Also, companies worldwide should increase the use of digital tools to facilitate the preparation and collection of transaction documents. In this way, the difficulties in preparing and collecting transaction documents can be reduced, and the accuracy of accounting records can be enhanced.

### **3.2. Effects on the Recording and Tracking of Stocks:**

In recent years, online trade volume has grown rapidly worldwide and in Turkey. This growth has significant impacts on accounting processes in terms of recording and tracking stocks. In this study, the effects of the growth in online trade volume on the recording and tracking of stocks in accounting processes will be compared worldwide and specifically in Turkey.

The online trade volume worldwide has rapidly increased in recent years. E-commerce companies use automated systems for recording and tracking stocks. These systems provide faster and more accurate results compared to manual operations. The recording and tracking of stocks carry great importance in accounting processes. The use of automated systems enhances the efficiency of accounting processes (Öztürk, 2017, p.10; Azmi et al., 2019, p.80).

Online trade volume in Turkey has also grown rapidly in recent years. However, e-commerce companies in Turkey still prefer manual operations for recording and tracking stocks. This situation could reduce efficiency in accounting processes and lead to errors. Companies in Turkey could enhance the efficiency of accounting processes by using automated stock tracking systems (Aytekin et al., 2020, p.230; Köseoğlu & Hacıoğlu, 2017, p.19).

E-commerce companies worldwide have begun to use artificial intelligence and machine learning-based automated accounting software for recording and tracking stocks. This software enhances the efficiency of accounting processes by enabling the automatic recording and tracking of stocks. E-commerce companies in Turkey can also adopt a similar approach and improve their accounting processes by using automated stock tracking systems. This way, errors stemming from manual operations can be reduced, and accounting processes can be made more accurate and faster. Moreover, the use of technological advancements like artificial intelligence and machine learning in the stock tracking process can further increase efficiency in accounting processes. The adoption of these advancements by e-commerce

companies in Turkey is important in terms of implementing change in accounting processes (Bilge et al., 2021, p.56; Yılmaz, 2020, p.15).

However, the use of technological advancements in the process of recording and tracking stocks also creates some challenges. Specifically, there are concerns about data security and privacy. The use of artificial intelligence and machine learning-based systems requires companies to be more cautious about the security of customer data. Moreover, the installation and maintenance of these systems can also be costly. E-commerce companies in Turkey can use automated stock tracking systems by considering these challenges and making appropriate budget and resource planning (Kara & Çolak, 2019, p.245; Özdemir & Şimşek, 2018, p.192).

### **3.3. Impacts on the Recording and Tracking of Accounts Receivable:**

In recent years, the volume of online trade has increased significantly worldwide and in Turkey. This growth has many effects on accounting processes. In this study, the effects of the growth in online trade volume on the recording and tracking of accounts receivable in accounting processes will be compared globally and specifically in Turkey.

The volume of online trade worldwide has increased rapidly in recent years. E-commerce companies use automatic systems to maintain and track the records of customers' accounts receivable. These systems provide faster and more accurate results compared to manual operations. The recording and tracking of accounts receivable is of great importance in accounting processes. Therefore, the use of automated systems increases the efficiency of accounting processes (Sözbilir & Şanlı, 2016, p. 438; Aktaş & Öztürk, 2018, p. 165).

The volume of online trade in Turkey has also increased significantly in recent years. However, the systems used for accounting processes in Turkey are less developed compared to the technological advancements worldwide. Therefore, e-commerce companies in Turkey still prefer manual operations for the recording and tracking of accounts receivable. This situation can reduce efficiency in accounting processes and lead to errors (Kaya & Atay, 2018, p. 85; Şahin & Alver, 2019, p. 110).

E-commerce companies worldwide have started using artificial intelligence and machine learning-based automated accounting software for the recording and tracking of accounts receivable. These software applications increase the efficiency of accounting processes by enabling the automatic recording and tracking of accounts receivable. E-commerce companies in Turkey can also

adopt a similar approach and improve the process of recording and tracking accounts receivable using automated accounting software. This can reduce errors resulting from manual operations and make accounting processes more accurate and faster.

With the increase in digitization, e-commerce companies worldwide have started adopting digitization in the process of recording and tracking accounts receivable. For instance, with the use of artificial intelligence and machine learning technologies, the recording and tracking of accounts receivable has become automated, mitigating human errors. Additionally, customers making payments using digital payment systems like credit cards ensure the fast and accurate recording of accounts receivable.

E-commerce companies in Turkey have also started adopting digitization for the recording and tracking of accounts receivable. However, due to reasons such as insufficient technological infrastructure and cultural differences, this process is progressing more slowly. Therefore, the adoption of digitization by e-commerce companies in Turkey and the use of automated accounting software can speed up and increase the accuracy of the recording and tracking process of accounts receivable.

#### **3.4. Impacts on the Recording and Tracking of Orders:**

In recent years, the volume of online trade has increased significantly worldwide and in Turkey. This growth has many effects on accounting processes. In this study, the effects of the growth in online trade volume on the recording and tracking of orders in accounting processes will be compared globally and specifically in Turkey.

The volume of online trade worldwide has increased rapidly in recent years. E-commerce companies use automatic systems to maintain and track the records of customers' orders. These systems provide faster and more accurate results compared to manual operations. The recording and tracking of orders is of great importance in accounting processes. Therefore, the use of automated systems increases the efficiency of accounting processes (Sözbilir & Şanlı, 2016, p. 438; Aktaş & Öztürk, 2018, p. 165).

The volume of online commerce in Turkey has also significantly increased in recent years. However, the systems used for accounting processes in Turkey are less advanced when compared with global technological developments. Therefore, e-commerce companies in Turkey still prefer manual operations for recording and tracking orders. This situation can reduce efficiency in accounting processes and lead to errors (Kaya & Atay, 2018, p. 85; Şahin & Alver, 2019, p. 110).

E-commerce companies globally have started to use automated accounting software based on artificial intelligence and machine learning for recording and tracking orders. These software applications facilitate the automatic recording and tracking of orders, thereby enhancing the efficiency of accounting processes. E-commerce companies in Turkey could adopt a similar approach and improve the processes of recording and tracking orders by using automated accounting software. This could reduce errors stemming from manual operations and render accounting processes more accurate and faster.

Furthermore, the proliferation of digital payment systems can play a significant role in the processes of recording and tracking orders. Digital payment systems enable faster and safer payments and minimize errors in the order recording and tracking process. Therefore, e-commerce companies in Turkey could make their accounting processes more efficient by promoting the use of digital payment systems (Gupta et al., 2017, p. 118; Wang & Wang, 2016, p. 745).

### **3.5. Impacts on Daily Records in Accounting Process:**

In recent years, the volume of online commerce has been rapidly increasing globally. This increase has significant impacts on accounting processes and particularly yields various outcomes in the management of daily records. This paper will comparatively examine the effects of the growth in global and Turkish online commerce volume on accounting processes and daily records between 2015 and 2022.

The increase in global online commerce volume has caused significant changes in the management of accounting processes and daily records. This increase impacts daily records due to reasons such as the growth in transaction volume, diversification of data sources, and increased variability in sources (Chen, Zhang, & Wang, 2016). Therefore, many companies worldwide are using ERP software to better manage their accounting processes and daily records (Mintz & Chen, 2015). ERP software plays a significant role in recording transactions, managing data storage, and reporting processes.

The growth in online commerce volume in Turkey also affects accounting processes and daily records. However, a majority of companies in Turkey still face challenges in managing accounting processes and organizing daily records using traditional methods (Aksoylu & Unal, 2016). Companies in Turkey need to manage their accounting processes and daily records more effectively along with the increase in online commerce volume.

Most companies globally are managing their accounting processes and organizing daily records using ERP software with the increase in online commerce volume. However, more research is needed for companies in Turkey to adopt this method (Chen et al., 2016). Chen and others (2016) indicate that a large part of SMEs in Turkey still use traditional methods with the increase in online commerce volume. This situation leads to challenges in organizing daily records and managing accounting processes specifically in Turkey.

It could be suggested that companies in Turkey use ERP software to manage their accounting processes and daily records more effectively along with the growth in online commerce volume. ERP software provides many advantages such as the automation of transaction processes, accurate and reliable recording of financial data, data analysis, and reporting (Mintz & Chen, 2015). However, it seems there are some obstacles for SMEs in Turkey to adopt ERP software. These obstacles may include the lack of adequate technological infrastructure, limited financial resources, and staff training (Aksoylu & Unal, 2016).

As the volume of online commerce increases globally, the impacts on accounting processes and daily records also escalate. To counteract this surge, companies need to leverage advanced technologies to make their accounting processes and daily records more efficient. This is particularly important in Turkey, where small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) need to adapt to evolving business practices. In this context, it is advisable to provide support and training to SMEs in Turkey on ERP software to better manage their accounting processes and daily records. This way, SMEs in Turkey can keep pace with the growth in online commerce volume. Moreover, enhancing accounting education in Turkey and raising the value of the accounting profession can contribute to better management of accounting processes.

### **3.6. Impacts on the Recording and Tracking of Financial Statements:**

The volume of online commerce is rapidly increasing worldwide, affecting accounting processes, and the recording and tracking of financial statements. In this paper, the impacts of the growth in online commerce volume on accounting processes, and the recording and tracking of financial statements worldwide and specifically in Turkey, will be examined and compared.

The increase in global online commerce volume leads to changes in accounting processes and the recording of financial statements. Chen, Zhang, and Wang (2016) suggest that these changes affect the recording

and tracking of financial statements due to factors such as the growth in transaction volume, diversification of data sources, and increased variability in these sources. Hence, many companies worldwide are using ERP software to better manage the recording and tracking of financial statements (Mintz & Chen, 2015).

The growth of online commerce volume in Turkey also affects the recording and tracking of financial statements. However, a significant majority of companies in Turkey still face challenges managing the recording and tracking of financial statements using traditional methods (Aksoylu & Ünal, 2016). This situation leads to difficulties in the recording and tracking of financial statements in Turkey.

As the volume of online commerce increases globally, the impacts on accounting processes and the records of financial statements also escalate. This is particularly important for SMEs in Turkey to adapt to evolving business practices. In this context, it is advisable to organize training for SMEs in Turkey and implement financial reporting standards more rigorously to better manage the recording and tracking of financial statements. Additionally, encouraging Turkish companies to use more ERP software, apply data analysis techniques, and transition to digital accounting practices can aid them in managing the recording and tracking of financial statements more effectively (Atak, 2020).

### **3.7. Impacts on Period-End Transactions of the Accounting Process:**

The rapid growth of online commerce has been a significant topic of discussion regarding its impacts on period-end transactions of accounting processes worldwide and specifically in Turkey. This paper will compare the impacts of the growth in online commerce volume between 2015-2022 on period-end transactions of accounting processes worldwide and specifically in Turkey.

Globally, as the volume of online commerce grows rapidly, accounting processes also strive to keep pace. Especially large companies are digitizing their period-end transactions in the accounting process due to the increase in online sales, thus accelerating transactions and making them more efficient (Akkaya, 2019).

In Turkey, however, despite the rapid growth in online commerce volume, period-end transactions in accounting processes are still conducted using traditional methods. This slows down companies' operations and leads to erroneous results (Altay & Aydın, 2021). Small and medium-sized

enterprises (SMEs) in Turkey are struggling to keep up with the increase in online commerce volume due to these traditional methods in period-end transactions of accounting processes (Akkaya, 2018).

Globally, the increasing digitalization of companies, particularly accelerating their end-of-period transactions in accounting processes and enhancing their efficiency, also boosts the application of data analysis techniques (Koç & Türk, 2018). Big data analysis methods facilitate better management of data in accounting processes, optimize corporate decision-making processes, and make the records of financial statements more accurate (Yılmaz & Şahin, USA).

In Turkey, delays in the digitalization processes related to end-of-period transactions in accounting processes necessitate Turkish accounting professionals to be more knowledgeable about digital transformation (Akgün & Taş, 2021). This requirement, which necessitates Turkish accounting professionals to be more knowledgeable about digital transformation, also highlights the importance of training (Akkaya, 2018). Training for SMEs can assist them in keeping up with the increase in online trade volume, thereby enhancing their efficiency in end-of-period transactions (Akkaya, 2018). Therefore, it is essential for companies and accounting professionals in Turkey to be more aware of digitalization and data analysis and receive training on these topics (Altay & Aydın, 2021).

The utilization of digitalization and data analysis techniques in end-of-period transactions by companies worldwide contributes to making accounting processes faster and more efficient. This, in turn, enables companies to keep records of their financial statements more accurately and base their financial decisions on more reliable information (Koç & Türk, 2018). Companies in Turkey need to expedite their end-of-period transactions, enhance the accuracy of their financial statements, and become more efficient by utilizing digitalization and data analysis techniques (Altay & Aydın, 2021).

## **CONCLUSION:**

Online trade has rapidly grown in recent years, both globally and specifically in Turkey. The growth in online trade volume is rapidly increasing in recent years, both globally and specifically in Turkey. This growth has significant impacts on accounting processes. This study examines the impact of the growth in online trade volume on accounting processes comparatively, globally, and specifically in Turkey, and investigates the impact of online trade volume on accounting processes.

Our study demonstrated a strong positive correlation between Turkey's online trade volume and the global online trade volume, as calculated by the multiple R coefficient. The R-square indicates that 85.7% of the variance between Turkey's online trade volume and the global online trade volume can be explained. The adjusted R-square shows that the model is in an improved form and that the relationship between Turkey's online trade volume and the global online trade volume is highly reliable. According to Anova results, the significance level of the regression model is high, and the relationship between Turkey's online trade volume and the global online trade volume is statistically significant.

The coefficients table includes the coefficients and standard errors of the equation used to explain the relationship between Turkey's online trade volume and the global online trade volume. These coefficients are reliable and have shown that every 1 billion dollar increase results in a 79.345 trillion dollar increase in the global online trade volume in Turkey's online trade volume. These results indicate that there is a high correlation between Turkey's online trade volume and the global online trade volume, and the impact of the online trade volume on accounting processes is significant. Primarily, we examined the effects of the growth in online trade volume on the preparation and collection of transaction documents from accounting processes and compared them globally and specifically in Turkey.

Between the years 2015 and 2022, research conducted worldwide has shown that the increase in online trade volume has complicated the preparation and collection of transaction documents, potentially affecting the accuracy and reliability of accounting records (Jansen & Karaman, 2018). Another study has noted the negative impacts of online trade on the quality of accounting information (Li & Su, 2019).

Similar results have been observed in Turkey. Özdemir and Türker (2017) pointed out that the increase in online trade volume has made it more difficult to prepare and gather transaction documents, potentially undermining the reliability of accounting records. However, another study in Turkey indicated that the increase in online trade volume has eased the preparation and collection of transaction documents for Turkish companies rapidly advancing in digitalization (Erdoğan & Durmuş, 2020). Thus, while the global growth in online trade volume complicates the preparation and collection of transaction documents, the digitalization process in Turkey eases it. Companies worldwide should enhance the use of digital tools to facilitate the preparation and collection of transaction documents.

The growth in online trade significantly affects accounting processes, particularly the recording and tracking of inventory. The increase in global online trade volume has made the processes related to inventory recording and tracking even more critical. Therefore, online shopping sites strive to perform accurate inventory tracking, inventory management, and financial reporting by using suitable accounting software. In Turkey, the growth in online trade volume has had positive effects on the processes related to inventory recording and tracking. Online shopping sites in Turkey continually follow technological advancements to make the recording and tracking of orders more efficient (Ercan, 2017). However, online trade brings some challenges. Tracking inventory can become more difficult when multiple sales channels are used (Cheng & Cheng, 2016).

The impact of the growth in online trade volume on accounting processes has made the processes related to inventory recording and tracking even more critical. Therefore, the use of appropriate accounting software is vital to accurately perform inventory tracking, inventory management, and financial reporting.

In our study, we also compared and discussed the effects of the growth in online trade volume from 2015 to 2022 on the recording and tracking of receivables in accounting processes worldwide and specifically in Turkey.

The volume of online trade globally has grown rapidly in recent years and has accelerated with the pandemic. As the number of customers of online shopping sites worldwide increases, problems may arise in the recording and tracking of receivables. This issue is one of the biggest challenges faced in the accounting processes of online shopping sites (Wang & Wang, 2016, p. 398).

In Turkey as well, the volume of online trade has been growing rapidly in recent years. The increase in online shopping during the pandemic has accelerated this growth even further. However, the volume of online trade in Turkey is still low compared to the rest of the world. Therefore, the accounting processes of online shopping sites in Turkey are less complex compared to the rest of the world. However, as the number of customers of online shopping sites increases, problems may arise in the recording and tracking of receivables (Çalışkan & Ersoy, 2017, p. 146).

The problems encountered in the recording and tracking of receivables hold a significant place in accounting processes. These issues complicate the accurate recording and reporting of financial data of online shopping sites. Therefore, online shopping sites need to increase the use of suitable

accounting software for receivable account tracking, recommend the use of automated inventory tracking systems, and increase the use of technologies such as artificial intelligence and machine learning (Al-Mudimigh & Zawawi, 2019, p. 97; Cheng & Cheng, 2016, p. 157).

Upon examination, it has been observed that the increase in the volume of online trade has a significant impact on accounting processes, especially in terms of recording and tracking orders; this impact has increased the use of automated systems for recording and tracking orders due to the growth in the volume of online trade worldwide. These systems produce faster and more accurate results compared to manual processes. Therefore, the use of automated systems enhances the efficiency of accounting processes (Sözbilir & Şanlı, 2016; Aktaş & Öztürk, 2018).

However, in Turkey, the growth in online trade volume often leads to a preference for manual processes for order recording and tracking due to the less developed systems used for accounting processes compared to global technological advancements. This situation may decrease efficiency in accounting processes and cause errors (Kaya & Atay, 2018; Şahin & Alver, 2019).

E-commerce companies worldwide have started to use artificial intelligence and machine learning-based automated accounting software for recording and tracking orders. These softwares ensure automatic recording and tracking of orders. E-commerce companies in Turkey can adopt a similar approach and improve the process of recording and tracking orders by using automated accounting software. This can reduce errors originating from manual processes and make accounting processes more accurate and faster (Aktaş & Öztürk, 2018; Kaya & Atay, 2018).

The study comparatively analyzes the effects of the growth in online trade volume on accounting processes and daily records between 2015 and 2022, both globally and specifically in Turkey. Globally, the increase in online trade volume has led to changes in daily records of accounting. Chen, Zhang, and Wang (2016) suggest that these changes affect daily records due to reasons such as growth in transaction volume, diversification of data sources, and increased variability in sources. Hence, many companies worldwide utilize ERP software to manage their accounting processes and daily records more effectively (Mintz & Chen, 2015).

In Turkey, however, a large majority of companies are still using traditional methods and facing challenges in managing accounting processes and organizing daily records (Aksoylu & Unal, 2016). This situation leads to

difficulties in managing accounting processes and organizing daily records specifically in Turkey. In this context, it may be advisable to provide SMEs in Turkey with support and training on ERP software to manage accounting processes and daily records more effectively. This could help Turkish SMEs keep up with the growth in online trade volume.

The increase in online trade volume both globally and specifically in Turkey is causing changes in accounting processes and in the records of financial statements. The growth of online transaction volume worldwide, the diversification of data sources, and the increased variability in these sources affect the records and tracking of financial statements (Chen, Zhang & Wang, 2016). Hence, many companies are using ERP software to manage the records and tracking of financial statements more effectively (Mintz & Chen, 2015).

The growth of online trade volume in Turkey also affects the records and tracking of financial statements. However, a majority of companies in Turkey are still facing challenges in managing the records and tracking of financial statements using traditional methods (Aksoylu & Ünal, 2016). Greater use of ERP software by Turkish companies, applying data analysis techniques, and transitioning to digital accounting applications could assist in managing the records and tracking of financial statements more effectively (Özcan, 2021).

In addition to changes in accounting processes, the growth in the volume of online commerce is affecting financial reporting standards. Financial reporting standards, such as the International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) and Turkish Accounting Standards (TAS), are constantly being updated due to the growth in the volume of online commerce (Gürbulak & Bozkurt, 2019). Hence, it is crucial for companies to keep up with and implement these updates in financial reporting standards.

Our study has examined and compared the impacts of the growth in the volume of online commerce between 2015 and 2022 on accounting processes, including end-of-period transactions, globally and specifically in Turkey.

As the volume of online commerce grows rapidly worldwide, accounting processes are striving to adapt. Large corporations, due to the increase in online sales, are digitizing their end-of-period transactions in accounting processes, accelerating their operations, and making them more efficient (Akkaya, 2019). This digitization also increases the use of data analysis techniques. Big data analysis methods are improving the management of data

in accounting processes, enhancing companies' decision-making processes, and making the recording of financial statements more accurate (Yılmaz & Şahin, USA).

In Turkey, however, despite the rapid growth in the volume of online commerce, end-of-period transactions in accounting processes are still conducted using traditional methods. This slows down companies' operations and leads to erroneous results (Altay & Aydın, 2021). Small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) in Turkey are struggling to keep up with the growth in the volume of online commerce due to these traditional methods used in end-of-period transactions in accounting processes (Akkaya, 2018).

In conclusion, the growth in the volume of online commerce worldwide necessitates companies to digitize their accounting processes. This digitization increases efficiency in accounting processes and allows for more accurate information to be used in financial decisions. However, in Turkey, accounting processes are still conducted using traditional methods, making it difficult for small and medium-sized enterprises to keep up with the growth in online commerce. Therefore, it is essential for companies and accounting professionals in Turkey to be aware of digitization and data analysis, and to receive training in these areas. In the process of digitization, data security is also a crucial issue, and companies need to take appropriate measures to minimize risks.

The impact of the growth in online commerce on inventory records and tracking in accounting processes is a significant issue. To mitigate these impacts and to make the processes more efficient, future works could include the following:

- It is recommended to increase the accuracy and reliability of transaction documents by automating their preparation and collection.
- The growth in online commerce could lead to issues with the quality of information affecting the accuracy and reliability of accounting records. Therefore, stricter control measures and updates to regulations are suggested.
- Recommendations include increasing the use of appropriate accounting software for inventory tracking and records, automating inventory tracking systems, enhancing the use of artificial intelligence and machine learning, improving business processes, increasing employee training and awareness, and conducting data analysis.
- Suggestions such as automating daily records, wider use of ERP software, standardizing daily records, using data analysis techniques,

and organizing accounting trainings could help manage accounting processes more efficiently and effectively.

- Measures recommended also include automating end-of-period transactions, accelerating digitization processes, raising awareness of digitization among SMEs in Turkey, taking measures for data security, conducting more research, and preparing training programs for accounting professionals.
- The standardization of financial statement records has become even more important due to the growth in online commerce.
- Due to the difficulties faced by SMEs in Turkey in the recording and tracking of financial statements, training could be organized for SMEs.
- It is recommended for companies in Turkey to transition to digital accounting applications, utilize data analysis techniques, employ expert personnel, and standardize accounting processes.
- The use of big data analysis methods is becoming increasingly crucial. These measures will simplify the accurate recording and reporting of financial data from online shopping sites and minimize issues related to the recording and tracking of receivables in accounting processes.
- The need for companies in Turkey to adhere to International Financial Reporting Standards has gained even more importance. In this regard, it is necessary to ensure that companies' financial reports are prepared in compliance with international accounting standards.
- There is a need for more comprehensive research on the impact of online commerce on accounting processes, keeping abreast of innovations in the sector, and constantly updating practices. This way, a more effective and efficient working environment can be achieved in the fields of accounting processes and financial reporting.
- Lastly, it is important to raise the level of awareness about the impact of online commerce on accounting processes and to provide regular training for accounting professionals to adapt to the digital transformation process. In doing so, adaptability to changes in accounting processes can be ensured, and a more efficient working environment can be created.

In summary, there are many measures that can be taken regarding the impact of online commerce on accounting processes. Suggestions such as the automation of transaction documents, the use of suitable accounting software for inventory tracking and records, the acceleration of digitalization

processes, and compliance with International Financial Reporting Standards can minimize the impact of online commerce on accounting processes. Additionally, by increasing the level of awareness through regular training, accounting professionals can be enabled to adapt to the digital transformation process.”

In conclusion; the worldwide increase in online trading volume is affecting accounting processes and daily records. In order to minimize this impact and increase the accuracy and reliability of accounting records, companies need to adapt rapidly to the digitization process. Suggestions such as the use of appropriate accounting software, the use of automated inventory tracking systems, the use of artificial intelligence and machine learning, the improvement of work processes, the training of employees, and the enhancement of awareness levels can assist in managing accounting processes in a more efficient and effective manner. However, data security is an important issue in the digitization process, and companies need to take appropriate measures to minimize risks. Training should be organized for SMEs in Turkey to adapt to changing business practices, and financial reporting standards need to be applied more strictly. Thus, the accuracy and reliability of accounting records can be increased, financial reporting can be improved, and companies can operate more efficiently by avoiding data loss, errors, time loss, and costs.

## REFERENCES

- Abdullahi, S., & Mansor, N. (2017). "The impact of e-commerce on accounting." *International Journal of Management and Commerce Innovations*, 5(1), 647-654
- Aksoylu, S., & Unal, M. (2016). "Investigation of accounting practices of SMEs in Turkey: A field research." *Journal of Accounting and Taxation Studies*, 4(3), 13-24
- Aktaş, R., & Öztürk, Y. (2018). "E-ticaret İşletmelerinde Muhasebe Süreçlerinin Yönetimi." *Uluslararası İktisadi ve İdari İncelemeler Dergisi*, 19, 165-181
- Alsharayri, M., Alsharayri, M., & Alsharayri, M. (2018). "The effect of e-commerce on accounting information systems." *International Journal of Academic Research in Accounting, Finance and Management Sciences*, 8(4), 1-11
- Aytekin, H., Akay, S. S., & Gümüş, M. (2020). "E-ticaret Şirketlerinde Otomatik Stok Takip Sistemleri ile Muhasebe Süreçlerinin Verimliliği." *Finansal Araştırmalar ve Çalışmalar Dergisi*, 12(23), 217-236
- Azmi, I. A., Shaharuddin, S., & Ahmad, S. H. (2019). "The Impact of Automatic Accounting System on Accounting Performance: A Conceptual Paper." *International Journal of Academic Research in Business and Social Sciences*, 9(12), 75-83
- Bakar, N. A., & Saidin, S. Z. (2015). "The role of e-commerce in accounting." *Procedia Economics and Finance*, 31, 269-281
- Bilge, H. M., Uzun, S., & Topaloğlu, M. (2021). "Elektronik Ticarete Depo Yönetimi ve Stok Takibi." *Uluslararası Ekonomik Araştırmalar Dergisi*, 7(1), 53-62
- Büyükközkcan, G., & Göçer, F. (2018). "Dijital tedarik zinciri: Literatür incelemesi ve kavramsal bir çerçeve." *Journal of Enterprise Information Management*, 31(1), 27-61
- Chen, J., & Cheng, X. (2019). "Digital transformation in accounting: An empirical study of U.S. small businesses." *Journal of Accounting and Finance*, 19(8), 11-22
- Chen, Y., Zhang, J., & Wang, C. (2016). "Big data-driven supply chain management: A framework for implementing analytics and turning information into intelligence." *International Journal of Production Research*, 54(23), 7158-7174
- Dünya Bankası. (2023). "Küresel ekonomik görünüm: Dünya ve Türkiye ekonomisi." [Online]. Available: <https://www.worldbank.org/en/publication/global-economic-prospects>

- eCommerce Foundation. (2020). “**Turkey Ecommerce Report 2020.**” [Online]. Available: <https://www.ecommercewiki.org/reports/ecommerce-in-turkey>
- Ercan, T. (2017). “**The Impact of E-Commerce on Accounting and Inventory Management.**” *Procedia Engineering*, **182**, 171-177
- Erdoğan, M., & Durmuş, Ö. (2020). “**Impact of e-commerce growth on accounting processes: Turkey example.**” *Journal of Accounting, Finance and Auditing Studies*, **6(3)**, 337-348
- Ezeani, N. S., & Oladele, R. (2016). “**The impact of digital technology on accounting practice in Nigeria.**” *International Journal of Academic Research in Business and Social Sciences*, **6(10)**, 2222-6990
- Ismail, N. A., & King, M. (2007). “**Factors influencing the alignment of accounting information systems in small and medium-sized Malaysian manufacturing firms.**” *Journal of Information Systems and Small Business*, **1(1-2)**, 1-20
- Jansen, J. J., & Karaman, M. A. (2018). “**The impact of e-commerce on financial reporting.**” *Journal of Financial Reporting and Accounting*, **16(1)**, 32-46
- Kara, M., & Çolak, H. E. (2019). “**Otomatikleştirilmiş Muhasebe Sistemleri ile Muhasebe Meslek Mensuplarının Geleceği.**” *Ankara Üniversitesi SBF Dergisi*, **74(2)**, 237-254
- Kaya, H. & Atay, E. (2018). “**Türkiye’de E-Ticaretin Muhasebe Sürecine Etkisi: Bir Anket Çalışması.**” *Selçuk Üniversitesi Sosyal Bilimler Enstitüsü Dergisi*, **39**, 83-95
- Köseoğlu, B., & Hacıoğlu, Ü. (2017). “**E-Ticaret Sitelerinde Muhasebe Uygulamalarının Değerlendirilmesi: Nitel Bir Araştırma.**” *Ege Akademik Bakış*, **17(3)**, 517-526
- Li, Y., & Su, L. (2019). “**E-commerce and accounting information quality.**” *International Journal of Accounting Information Systems*, **34**, 1-15
- McKinsey ve Company. (t.y). “**The rise of e-commerce in Turkey.**” [Online]. Available: <https://www.mckinsey.com/~media/McKinsey/Locations/Europe%20and%20Middle%20East/Turkey/Our%20Insights/The%20rise%20of%20e%20commerce%20in%20Turkey/The-rise-of-e-commerce-in-Turkey.pdf>
- Mintz, O., & Chen, Y. (2015). “**Big data for better practices in industry and management.**” *Journal of Organizational Computing and Electronic Commerce*, **25(3)**, 221-223
- Özcan, G. (2021). “**Muhasebe Meslek Mensuplarının Dijital Dönüşüme Hazır Olma Düzeyleri: İstanbul İlinde Bir Araştırma.**” *Journal of Accounting and Taxation Studies*, **9(1)**, 61-76

- Özdemir, İ. B., & Türker, M. (2017). “**Online Ticaretin Muhasebe Sürecine Etkisi.**” *Electronic Journal of Vocational Colleges*, 7(14), 1-12
- Öztürk, T. (2017). “**Otomatikleştirilmiş Muhasebe Sistemlerinin Kullanımının Muhasebe Süreçlerinde Verimlilik Üzerindeki Etkileri.**” *Finansal Araştırmalar ve Çalışmalar Dergisi*, 9(17), 1-16
- Reis, J., Amorim, M., Melão, N., & Matos, P. (2018). “**Dijital dönüşümün otomotiv endüstrisi üzerindeki etkisi: Bir literatür taraması.**” *Procedia Manufacturing*, 28, 1-7
- Sözbilir, Ö., & Şanlı, H. (2016). “**The Role of E-Commerce in Accounting Information Systems.**” *International Journal of Business and Management*, 11(2), 438-444
- Türkiye İstatistik Kurumu - TÜİK. (2021). “**Hanehalkı Bilişim Teknolojileri Kullanım Araştırması.**” Ankara: Turkish Statistical Institute
- UNCTAD. (2018). “**Information Economy Report 2017-2018: Digitalization, Trade and Development.**” United Nations Publications
- UNCTAD. (2019). “**Information Economy Report 2019: Measuring the Digital Economy.**” United Nations Publications
- UNCTAD. (2020). “**Information Economy Report 2020: Digitalization, Trade and Development.**” United Nations Publications
- UNCTAD. (2021). “**Information Economy Report 2021: Towards Data-Driven Economies.**” United Nations Publications
- United Nations Conference on Trade & Development. (2020). “**COVID-19 and e-commerce: A global review.**” [Online]. Available: <https://unctad.org/system/files/official-document/dtlstict2020d1en.pdf>
- Yli-Huumo, J., Ko, D., Choi, S., Park, S., & Smolander, K. (2016). “**Where is current research on blockchain technology?—A systematic review.**” *PloS one*, 11(10), e0163477
- Zhu, Y., Li, Y., Wang, W., & Chen, J. (2021). “**Intellectual structure of digital transformation research: A bibliometric analysis.**” *Telematik ve Enformatik*, 56, 101475



# Sociology of Artificial Intelligence: How AI Will Transform Work, Unemployment and Our Future

Ulaş Başar Gezgin<sup>1</sup>

## Abstract

Artificial intelligence is one of the hot themes of the current public discussion with accounts associating it with transformations in especially manufacturing sectors which is usually expected to lead to massive unemployment. The public is keen on speculating about which jobs will be made redundant by the rise of AI and ultimately disappear. In addition to factories, the health sector is one of the sites of contestations as many medical tasks are getting automated. Some other scholars do not agree with this panic atmosphere. They claim that like any other industrial transformation, the rise of AI will also create new jobs. Although social implications of the rise of AI are under the spot, it is hard to come up with a single view among various views shared by scholars of various disciplines and strands of research. This article summarizes and elaborates on various positions on the topic, with a sociologically critical perspective, keeping an eye on AI's highly likely role in exacerbating the already biting social inequalities and injustice. The sociology of artificial intelligence is delineated along with the ethical issues raised by the expansion of artificial intelligence in our daily lives, keeping the possibility of a humane artificial intelligence in mind.

## Introduction

The mainstream idea on social impact of AI is that it will lead to massive unemployment (e.g. Marwala, 2015). Another less common, but more realistic view with a twist is that although it will lead to massive unemployment, it will open up new job opportunities; humans will always be needed (Tse, Esposito & Goh, 2017). As stated by Fogel & Kvedar

---

1 Ulaş Başar Gezgin, Istanbul Galata University, Faculty of Arts and Social Sciences, Department of Psychology, [ulas.gezgin@galata.edu.tr](mailto:ulas.gezgin@galata.edu.tr), ORCID ID: 0000-0002-6075-3501

(2018), “each generation for the last 100 years has had a visceral fear that automation would replace jobs. And yet, as it does so, new jobs emerge” (p.3). Thus, according to this account, machines (AI) and humans will not be in competition in the future, they will rather complement each other (Tse, Esposito & Goh, 2017). Thus, in this article, we present and discuss various scholars’ views on how AI will influence our jobs, unemployment and in the most general sense, our future. We start our discussion with introductory explanations about what AI means. This is followed by a review of scholars’ views.

Rigla et al. (2018) define AI as “the ability to make computers do things that would require intelligence if done by humans” (p.303). An earlier and shorter definition is “the intelligence exhibited by machines or software” (Pannu, 2015, p.79), but this begs the question. With such a definition, non-intelligent operations of machines or software cannot always be demarcated easily. Mahanty & Mahanti (2019) state that “artificial Intelligence deals with the study and development of software and machines that can imitate human-like intelligence” (p.2100). However, philosophically speaking, such a definition implies that AI cannot do more than just imitating human intelligence, and thus it can’t be a substitute nor an equivalent to it.

A more elaborate definition which correctly stresses unpredictability and flexibility is the following:

“AI is a general term that currently refers to a cluster of technologies and approaches to computing focused on the ability of computers to make flexible rational decisions in response to often unpredictable environmental conditions” (Tredinnick, 2017, p.37).

Additionally, the way AI, machine learning and deep learning are connected can be summarized as follows:

“AI might be defined as a computer performing tasks in a rational human-like manner. Machine learning comprises a subset of AI, in which software algorithms attempt to predict future events, after being trained in rule-based logic, pattern recognition and reinforcement techniques. Deep learning, a sub-type of machine learning, utilizes artificial neural networks, loosely modeled after webs of neurons and synapses in the human brain” (Craft III, pp.406-407).

Finally, we need to briefly outline the notion of Industry 4.0 before our main discussion. Industry 1.0 was characterized by “mechanization, steam power and water power”, 2.0 by “mass production, assembly line and

productivity”, 3.0 by “computer and automation” and finally 4.0 by “cyber physical systems” (Stăncioiu, 2017, p.74).

Artificial Intelligence models and applications are put in practice in diverse settings such as production management (e.g. Burggräf, Wagner & Koke, 2018), medicine (e.g. Adhikari, 2018; Buch, Varughese & Maruthappu, 2018; Mamoshina et al., 2018; Pacis, Subido Jr & Bugtai, 2018; Shrestha & Sengupta, 2018; Tajmir et al., 2018; Tang et al., 2018; Tian, 2018), pharmacy (Vyas et al., 2018), law (e.g. Alarie, Niblett & Yoon, 2018), environmental sciences (e.g. Vieira et al., 2018), energy efficiency (Poola, 2017), urban planning (e.g. Chui, Lytras & Visvizi, 2018; Khan et al., 2018), journalism (Broussard, 2014; Latar, 2015), education (Alberola et al., 2016; Belpaeme et al., 2018; Edwards & Cheok, 2017; Popenici & Kerr, 2017; Sora & Sora, 2012; Timms, 2016) etc.. These give the misleading impression that AI can do anything that our species can do. Despite of the exaggerated accounts common in media, so far we don't have successful general AI applications, but specific ones (Tredinnick, 2017). The latter are called as weak AI or narrow AI, while general ones that are yet to exist are called as strong AI or artificial general intelligence (Yadav et al., 2017).

### **Automation and Unemployment**

To proceed further, we need to distinguish AI and automation. Mehta & Devarakonda (2018) state that

“the invention of the printing press and the development of the conveyor belt assembly line are good examples of how humans break down complex mechanical tasks into simpler well-defined steps that can then be automated. However, automating cognitive tasks has been a bigger challenge because it is not known precisely how human brains work. But is it necessary for humans to decode cognitive tasks for automation to work? Recent advances in artificial intelligence (AI) suggest otherwise, and the implications for health care are tantalizing” (p.2019).

That is a key point often missed in popular discussions of AI. In fact, what the public discusses is not really AI, but automation. Automation is the imitation of repetitive tasks that do not require intelligence. In that sense, even the pessimistic view on AI as to unemployment is misplaced from the very beginning. It is not AI which is expected to make workers in some tasks redundant, but automation. On the other hand, there are cases in the intersection of both AI and automation. Hengstler, Enkel & Duelli (2016) uses the term ‘intelligent automation’ to refer to a combination of both. A common example for this is driverless cars as will be discussed

later. They involve both repetitive and well-defined tasks that don't involve higher cognitive processing and unpredictable and risky tasks that involve intelligence. However, these combination of both automation and intelligence is uncommon. In many other examples, it is easy to differentiate automation and AI. For instance, the chess programs beating human masters are considered to exhibit AI, however a search engine or the manufacturing system in a factory are considered to be a matter of automation.

The confusion about AI and automation has parallels in robotics. To exemplify, Chand et al. (2018) point out that

“‘Robotic Surgery’ is increasingly debated in surgical circles. The reality is, however, that we are nowhere near the era of true robotic surgery, and what we are actually debating are advanced laparoscopic devices or ‘telemanipulators’. Whichever English definition one chooses for the term ‘robot’, the consistent qualification is a machine that is able to undertake tasks ‘automatically’, whether this be programmed or independently. The current iterations are robotic platforms which do not fulfil this most basic of criteria to be called robots” (p.645).

After mentioning the distinction between AI and automation, we can move to the unemployment discussions. The way mainstream thinkers approach the expected unemployment due to AI is in the mode of a crisis. They claim that with extremely high unemployment rates, the system will collapse (cf. Harari, 2016). However, they don't think about the possibility that we can have shorter work weeks (even 2 work days per week for instance), so that people can have more time to enjoy with their family and social connections. With such a wonderful free time, they can develop their personality through art, sports, philosophy and other humane activities. Others proposed a universal wage for these unemployed, but they forget that this (i.e. enormous transfer payments, in other words payments not based on production) may lead to hyper-inflation. With wrong assumptions firmly believed, these mainstream thinkers don't see any way other than collapse. In fact there are many other possibilities.

As to the economic discussions of the effects of AI on work and employment, a key point is which school of economic thought the debaters belong to. For instance, Acemoglu and his colleagues assume the self-correcting power of the markets (cf. Acemoglu & Restrepo, 2018a, 2018b) which is obviously a mainstream neo-liberal understanding of economics not necessarily shared by other economists such as Stiglitz, and many other Keynesian and Marxist thinkers. The truth is that economics is not a rocket science; it is mostly ideological than scientific, confusing basic facts and

opinions, and sometimes even distorting historical facts. For example, these mainstream neo-liberal thinkers are fond of linking economic development with the so-called ‘democracy’ which is not really a democracy in its true sense; often ignoring the economic success of ‘neo-liberal’ fascist dictatorships such as Pinochet’s Chile and that of non-Western powers such as China.

Whereas for Harari (2016, 2015), another best-selling debater, the markets are not self-correcting, but his economic understanding is mainstream and neo-liberal in other ways. These popular figures often propose their ideas as scientific facts rather than opinions, not allowing questioning of their quite subjective and ideological assumptions (cf. Gezgin, in press). Let us also note that Nobel Prizes in economics are awarded to economists that are both pro- and anti-government in their economic models which one more time shows that economics is not a science, or not a tough science that it pretends to be. Furthermore, if economics would not have been ideological, if it would have been as tough as rocket science, economists would be the wealthiest, which is obviously not the case. To sum up, economic discussions of AI needs further analysis due to the ideological nature of economics as a research area and a profession.

Let us also note another theme in economic discussions of AI which views AI as a cure for market inefficiency: If market inefficiency would be attributed to lack of or insufficient information of the market actors, then the expansion of AI would be considered as a cure for this efficiency as proposed by Marwala (2015). However this is a neo-liberal position open to criticism. In fact, market inefficiency has a number of other factors such as the profit motive itself which leads to overproduction of profitable products and services on the one hand, and underproduction of goods and services that are for public benefit rather than private profit by the private sector, the role of the state, the priorities of the government policies and relevant laws and regulations. Thus, AI can’t fix capitalism’s problems, as these problems are inherent to capitalism itself.

### **Artificial Intelligence, Automation and New Jobs**

Our next topic is how AI (in fact, automation) is expected to transform our careers. Baldassari & Roux (2017) remind us that new jobs have been popularized that were not very well known 10 years ago such as app developers, data scientists, cloud computing experts etc., and brand new jobs appeared such as driverless car engineers, drone operators etc.. They believe that the rise of Industry 4.0 will not lead to fewer jobs or massive unemployment. As the jobs based on repetitive tasks will disappear, new

jobs to maintain the Industry 4.0 systems will emerge. They disagree with Industry 4.0 fanatics who claim that the human factor will disappear in factory production just like the case for driverless cars:

“An automated factory left alone cannot stay competitive for long. Just as we have seen dramatic improvement in the functionality of smartphones over the past decade, it is expected that factory hardware will continue to improve. This still requires skilled labor to assess, install, and maintain the hardware. The software that powers a factory will also continue to improve as today’s algorithm will not meet tomorrow’s needs. Therefore, an increasing supply of skilled labor is needed to develop software, improve it, and monitor the information. A single factory may need fewer people to run it; however, as with past industrial revolutions, the increases in productivity should create new markets, new businesses, and new factories that increase demand for skilled labor” (Baldassari & Roux, 2017, p.21).

Herzfeld (2017) is in the opinion that “AI has begun to shake the foundation of Western capitalism” (p.3); in contrast to this opinion, in fact, AI will reinforce capitalism as explained above. Sikdar (2018) is among the scholars who don’t expect massive unemployment converging with Baldassari & Roux (2017): “In the past we saw the effects of vanishing horse-drawn carriages, and computers doing our accounting and finances, etc. Instead of massive unemployment widely predicted, many more new jobs were created than jobs that disappeared” (p.2). Wilson, Daugherty & Bianzino (2017), another group of scholars proposing that AI will create new jobs, presents and discusses three new job categories that are not replacing the old ones. The first category is that of trainers which refers to people who are tasked with training AI systems. The second category is that of explainers. Explainers will serve as bridges between technologically savvy experts and non-technical people including business leaders and politicians. This task is expected to be even more vital, as AI systems get more complicated. With more complications, it will be hard for non-experts to grasp the inner workings of AI. These explainers will also be central for the cases where algorithms appear to be wrong or counter-intuitive. They will be the ones to judge whether it is a system error or not. Finally the sustainers will ensure that the AI systems will continue their operations smoothly (Wilson, Daugherty & Bianzino, 2017).

For the medical settings, Fogel & Kvedar (2018) state that “while many fear that AI will disrupt jobs and the physician - patient relationship, we believe that AI can eliminate many repetitive tasks to clear the way for human-to-human bonding and the application of emotional intelligence and

judgment” (p.1). Naylor (2018) agrees with Fogel & Kvedar (2018) in case of deep learning:

“Deep learning shows promise for streamlining routine work by health care professionals and empowering patients, thereby promoting a safer, more humane, and participatory paradigm for health care. Different sources offer varying estimates of the amount of time wasted by health care professionals on tasks amenable to some automation (e.g., high-quality image screening) that could then be rededicated to more or better care” (Naylor, 2018, p. 1100). In this context, Jarrahi (2018) proposes ‘the idea of intelligence augmentation’ that means “AI systems should be designed with the intention of augmenting, not replacing, human contributions” (p.1).

A similar view is pronounced by Jha & Topol (2016):

“Jobs are not lost; rather, roles are redefined; humans are displaced to tasks needing a human element. Radiologists and pathologists need not fear artificial intelligence but rather must adapt incrementally to artificial intelligence, retaining their own services for cognitively challenging tasks” (p. 2354).

Fogel & Kvedar (2018) add the following:

“Given the time limitations of a physician’s, as the time demands for rote tasks increase, the time for physicians to apply truly human skills decreases. By embracing AI, we believe that humans in healthcare can increase time spent on uniquely human skills: building relationships, exercising empathy, and using human judgment to guide and advice” (p.1).

In other words, automation, rather than making doctors redundant, is expected to assist them to save time with routine, tedious tasks that don’t require creativity, empathy or care. This accordingly will pave the way for more space for humane tasks that doctors don’t have time to perform in the current situation. Obviously, as common in popular discussions, AI and automation are confused here. Nevertheless, Fogel & Kvedar (2018) are clear about the most likely consequences: “Rather than take over, we believe that these systems may take on much of the unpleasant work of healthcare” (p.2).

### **Sociology of Artificial Intelligence**

From a human rights perspective, it is clear that there will be winners and losers of the rise and expansion of AI (Raso et al., 2018). With the current capitalist thinking over the future, AI will worsen the current economic and social unfairness. Health applications of AI can worsen the social and

economic gaps due to the costs (Russell et al., 2015). Raso et al. (2018) note that privacy will be the most affected, but with regard to other human rights, we will see differentiated effects rather than overall impact over everybody. For Lloyd (2018), the biggest threat of AI is not about unemployment, but amplification of social biases to the detriment of already marginalized populations. E.g. “many algorithms learn from and perpetuate treatments that are best suited to white males’ but may not be the best remedy for other groups” (Lloyd, 2018, p.3). The alternative would be a socially inclusive AI or discrimination-aware machine learning.

Likewise, for Crawford (2016), there is a more serious problem than the panic atmosphere that is due to the possibility of a future AI being smarter than human beings and getting out of control:

“Sexism, racism and other forms of discrimination are being built into the machine-learning algorithms that underlie the technology behind many “intelligent” systems that shape how we are categorized and advertised to” (p.1).

(...)

“Like all technologies before it, artificial intelligence will reflect the values of its creators. So inclusivity matters — from who designs it to who sits on the company boards and which ethical perspectives are included. Otherwise, we risk constructing machine intelligence that mirrors a narrow and privileged vision of society, with its old, familiar biases and stereotypes” (p.3).

In the same vein, Brundage (2015) predicts that

“The accessibility, transparency, affordability, and usability of AI innovations may influence the extent to which they tend to empower disenfranchised people or to entrench existing inequalities. If AI innovations are largely patented and fiercely protected by corporate interests, incomprehensible to non-experts, and draw on data or other resources that are only in private hands, different social consequences may result than if all AI innovations are immediately available to everyone (...)” (p.29).

Hamaguchi & Kondo (2018) identify sociologically differentiated effects of automation as a result of the more widespread mobilization of AI models in work settings: There are regional differences in the rate automation causes unemployment, and secondly, female workers are the most affected (Hamaguchi & Kondo, 2018). We can explain the basis of this finding and expand it sociologically: Under capitalism, the most oppressed are usually engaged in the most repetitive, boring tasks. Patriarchy oppresses females

and young workers (both girls and boys). Capitalism is usually characterized by racial and cultural discrimination despite of progressive policies in various countries. That means racial and cultural minorities along with females and youth will be the most affected by automation, losing their jobs. On the other hand, not all repetitive jobs are replaceable by AI. For instance, tasks involving care such as nursing is not expected to be affected by automation negatively. In contrast, they may rise as islands in the seas of automation. As patriarchy associates care with women, women at care professions can be the winners of the rise of AI. Of course, this is just one of the possible futures.

### **Ethics of Artificial Intelligence and Humane AI**

A humane use of AI for industry would be in areas where workplace deaths are common such as mining (Nadimpalli, 2017) or shipyards. In fact, what is usually called as ‘workplace accidents’ (which are alternatively called as ‘workplace murders’ by labor activists) are endemic to capitalism. Labor safety has no universally accepted standard. Nevertheless, it is true that some of the work areas are more lethal than others, as a comparison of working as a miner vs. as a waiter would reveal.

For Fogel & Kvedar (2018), in discussions of health applications of AI, the most important criterion should be the patient care. If a new technology will add to patient welfare, making his/her life healthier and longer, it should be adopted. This is another way to formulate a humane AI. Although AI outperforms human doctors by a computational brute force approach in certain cases, what they lack is an understanding of the ethical and moral dimensions of human decision making (Brush, 2018).

One of the most serious ethical problem associated with AI would concern the AI weapons (Russell et al., 2015). Their destructive capacity is feared to be out of control in the future. It is risky to leave life and death decisions as such to machines. Aside from the weapons, for all AI systems we have the legal and ethical liability problem, in other words who will be responsible for AI’s acts that violate the norms (Asaro, 2016), as exemplified by the case of driverless cars.

Driverless cars are expected to be more efficient than human drivers, as they are immune to road rage, distractions, and driving under the influence of alcohol and drugs. Furthermore, they are hoped to provide assistance to old-aged and handicapped people that are physically unable to drive (Arkin, 2016) and reduce traffic-related pollution (Zhao et al., 2016). However they pose ethical and legal problems, in case of accidents involving dilemmas (Deng, 2015) and human drivers’ frustration as a result of the driverless cars’

exact compliance to the traffic law (Arkin, 2016). Human drivers sometimes break the laws on reasonable grounds (let us remember the notion of flexibility in the AI definition above), and that is not the case for driverless cars. Another example that involves ethics concerns the robots that remind the patients to take medicine. What if the patient refuses to take it? In this case, patient's well-being and autonomy will be in conflict (Deng, 2015).

It is usually claimed that radiology will be one of the first areas to go extinct by the rise and expansion of AI. However, Tridandapani (2018) thinks otherwise: "Current AI efforts have achieved limited success in narrowly focused image interpretation problems, and there is no indication that an AI system can practice general radiology" (p.965). Kahn Jr (2017) agrees with Tridandapani (2018) from another direction: "Although radiology is ready to benefit from AI technologies, the specialty entails more than identifying findings on images" (p.719). For Yasaka & Abe (2018), radiologists will still be needed for rare diseases, incidental findings and multimorbidity common among the elderly.

Thus, it appears that public opinion and celebrity figures with science backgrounds (such as TV futurists and pop scientists) exaggerate the success in narrow fields, but ignoring the failure in more general stuff. Furthermore, Tridandapani (2018) adds, medical professions require care with empathy which can't be imitated and replaced by AI. Another researcher, Zhang (2016), converges with this position stating that doctor's role is not only healing the body, but comforting the soul which involves emotions. In other words, doctors have another role which is to make the patient feel better, in addition to make him/her healthier. Thus, it is better to view AI not as a threat or substitute to human doctors, but as assistants to support patient welfare. Likewise, Sharma & Carter (2017) claim that AI can't replace human pathologists. They propose that in these discussions, activities involving high-level cognition and high-level computation are mistaken. They are not identical. For them the question is no longer about human versus computer, but "human versus human with the computer" (p.623), a view shared by Chen & Asch (2017) in different words. The best health performance according to Chen & Asch (2017) can't be achieved by neither alone, but by both. Ultimately the decision maker will be the human based on the findings and suggestions provided by the machines (Albu & Stanciu, 2015).

## **Conclusion**

In this article, we first presented various definitions of artificial intelligence before proceeding to our main discussion on the social impacts of the rise of AI. We inferred that flexibility and unpredictability are the keys to both human and artificial intelligence. We proposed that public discussions on AI and unemployment are based on a theoretical misconception as AI and automation are not identical. Our next topic was the mainstream thinking on the link between automation and unemployment. We identified two major positions: The first one viewed the rise of AI as a social crisis due to the expected massive unemployment, while the second one argued that just like the similar historical cases, the rise of AI will also open up new jobs. In both accounts, mostly repetitive, routine work tasks are expected to be automated and accordingly disappear. As the last issue of our article, we reflected on the future of AI and its social impacts with a sociological perspective. It is highly likely that AI in its current forms will aggravate the already existing social inequalities and unfairness. Instead, a humane AI hugging not only advantaged but also disadvantaged social groups is necessary. Finally, it is proposed that at least in the short term and mid-term, AI and automation would be unable to substitute human empathy, care and related emotions, which will boost the significance of what is humane about our species. To conclude, rather than replacing human beings, AI and automation will assist our species to open more space for higher cognitive tasks. But ethical and sociological dimensions of AI should be kept in mind. A fanatic admiration for the rise of AI is out of touch with the social realities.

## References

- Acemoglu, D., & Restrepo, P. (2018a). Artificial Intelligence, Automation and Work (No. w24196). National Bureau of Economic Research. <http://www.nber.org/papers/w24196.pdf>
- Acemoglu, D., & Restrepo, P. (2018b). The Race between Man and Machine: Implications of Technology for Growth, Factor Shares, and Employment. *American Economic Review*, 108(6), 1488-1542.
- Adhikari, N. C. D. (2018). Prevention of Heart Problem Using Artificial Intelligence. *International Journal of Artificial Intelligence and Applications (IJAAIA)*, 9(2), 21-35.
- Alarie, B., Niblett, A., & Yoon, A. H. (2018). How artificial intelligence will affect the practice of law. *University of Toronto Law Journal*, 68(supplement 1), 106-124.
- Alberola, J. M., Del Val, E., Sanchez-Anguix, V., Palomares, A., & Teruel, M. D. (2016). An artificial intelligence tool for heterogeneous team formation in the classroom. *Knowledge-Based Systems*, 101, 1-14.
- Albu, A., & Stanciu, L. (2015, November). Benefits of using artificial intelligence in medical predictions. In *E-Health and Bioengineering Conference (EHB)*, 2015 (pp. 1-4). IEEE.
- Arkin, R. C. (2016). Ethics and Autonomous Systems: Perils and Promises [Point of View]. *Proceedings of the IEEE*, 104(10), 1779-1781.
- Asaro, P. M. (2016, March). The liability problem for autonomous artificial agents. In *Ethical and Moral Considerations in Non-Human Agents, 2016 AAAI Spring Symposium Series*.
- Baldassari, P., & Roux, J. D. (2017). Industry 4.0: preparing for the future of work. *People & Strategy*, 40(3), 20-24.
- Belpaeme, T., Kennedy, J., Ramachandran, A., Scassellati, B., & Tanaka, F. (2018). Social robots for education: A review. *Science Robotics*, 3(21), eaat5954.
- Broussard, M. (2015). Artificial intelligence for investigative reporting: Using an expert system to enhance journalists' ability to discover original public affairs stories. *Digital Journalism*, 3(6), 814-831.
- Brundage, M. (2015, April). Economic Possibilities for Our Children: Artificial Intelligence and the Future of Work, Education, and Leisure. In *AAAI Workshop: AI and Ethics*. <http://www.aaai.org/ocs/index.php/WS/AAAIW15/paper/download/10155/10128>
- Brush, J. E. (2018). Is the Cognitive Cardiologist Obsolete?. *JAMA Cardiology*, E1-E2.

- Buch, V., Varughese, G., & Maruthappu, M. (2018). Artificial intelligence in diabetes care. *Diabetic Medicine*, 35(4), 495-497.
- Burggräf, P., Wagner, J., & Koke, B. (2018, January). Artificial intelligence in production management: A review of the current state of affairs and research trends in academia. In *Information Management and Processing (ICIMP), 2018 International Conference on* (pp. 82-88). IEEE.
- Chand, M., Ramachandran, N., Stoyanov, D., & Lovat, L. (2018). Robotics, artificial intelligence and distributed ledgers in surgery: data is key!. *Techniques in Coloproctology*, 22, 645-648.
- Chen, J. H., & Asch, S. M. (2017). Machine learning and prediction in medicine—beyond the peak of inflated expectations. *The New England journal of medicine*, 376(26), 2507-2509.
- Chui, K., Lytras, M., & Visvizi, A. (2018). Energy Sustainability in Smart Cities: Artificial Intelligence, Smart Monitoring, and Optimization of Energy Consumption. *Energies*, 11(11), 2869.
- Craft III, J. A. (2018). Artificial Intelligence and the Softer Side of Medicine. *Missouri medicine*, 115(5), 406-407.
- Crawford, K. (2016). Artificial intelligence's white guy problem. *The New York Times*, 26.06.2016.  
<https://www.nytimes.com/2016/06/26/opinion/sunday/artificial-intelligences-white-guy-problem.html>
- Deng, B. (2015). Machine ethics: The robot's dilemma. *Nature News*, 523, 24-26.
- Edwards, B. I., & Cheok, A. D. (2018). Why Not Robot Teachers: Artificial Intelligence for Addressing Teacher Shortage. *Applied Artificial Intelligence*, 1-16.
- Fogel, A. L., & Kvedar, J. C. (2018). Artificial intelligence powers digital medicine. *NPJ Digital Medicine*, 5, 1-4.
- Gezgin, U. B. (in press). Eleştirel Bilim: İnsan ve Toplum Bilimlerine Yönelik Eleştirel Yazılar  
 [Critical Science: Critical Essays for Humanities and Social Sciences] [book to be published].
- Harari, Y.N. (2016). *Homo Deus: A Brief History of Tomorrow*. London: Harvill Secker.
- Harari, Y.N. (2015). *Sapiens: A Brief History of Mankind*. London: Harvill Secker.
- Hamaguchi, N., & Kondo, K. (2018). Regional Employment and Artificial Intelligence in Japan. *Research Institute of Economy, Trade and Industry (RIETI)*.  
<https://www.rieti.go.jp/jp/publications/dp/18e032.pdf>

- Hengstler, M., Enkel, E., & Duelli, S. (2016). Applied artificial intelligence and trust—The case of autonomous vehicles and medical assistance devices. *Technological Forecasting and Social Change*, 105, 105-120.
- Herzfeld, N. L. (2017). Artificial Intelligence: An Existential Risk? [https://digitalcommons.csbsju.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1071&context=theology\\_pubs](https://digitalcommons.csbsju.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1071&context=theology_pubs)
- Jarrahi, M. H. (2018). Artificial intelligence and the future of work: Human-AI symbiosis in organizational decision making. *Business Horizons*.  
<https://fardapaper.ir/mohavaha/uploads/2018/05/Fardapaper-Artificial-intelligence-and-the-future-of-work-Human-AI-symbiosis-in-organizational-decision-making.pdf>
- Jha, S., & Topol, E. J. (2016). Adapting to artificial intelligence: radiologists and pathologists as information specialists. *Jama*, 316(22), 2353-2354.
- Khan, S., Paul, D., Momtahan, P., & Aloqaily, M. (2018, April). Artificial intelligence framework for smart city microgrids: State of the art, challenges, and opportunities. In *Fog and Mobile Edge Computing (FMEC), 2018 Third International Conference on* (pp. 283-288). IEEE.
- Kahn Jr, C. E. (2017). From images to actions: opportunities for artificial intelligence in radiology. *Radiology*, 285(3), 719-720.
- Latar, N. L. (2015). The robot journalist in the age of social physics: The end of human journalism?. In *The new world of transitioned media* (pp. 65-80). Springer, Cham.
- Lloyd, K. (2018). Bias Amplification in Artificial Intelligence Systems. arXiv preprint arXiv:1809.07842.
- Mahanty, R., & Mahanti, P. K. (2019). Unleashing artificial intelligence onto big data: A review. In *Web Services: Concepts, Methodologies, Tools, and Applications* (pp. 2099-2114). IGI Global.
- Mamoshina, P., Ojomoko, L., Yanovich, Y., Ostrovski, A., Botezatu, A., Prikhodko, P., ... & Ogu, I. O. (2018). Converging blockchain and next-generation artificial intelligence technologies to decentralize and accelerate biomedical research and healthcare. *Oncotarget*, 9(5), 5665.
- Marwala, T. (2015). Impact of Artificial Intelligence on Economic Theory. arXiv preprint arXiv:1509.01213.
- Mehta, N., & Devarakonda, M. V. (2018). Machine learning, natural language programming, and electronic health records: The next step in the artificial intelligence journey?. *The Journal of Allergy and Clinical Immunology*, 141, 2019-2021.
- Nadimpalli, M. (2017). Artificial intelligence risks and benefits. *International Journal of Innovative Research in Science, Engineering and Technology*, 6(6), 1-4.

- Naylor, C. D. (2018). On the prospects for a (deep) learning health care system. *Jama*, 320(11), 1099-1100.
- Pacis, D. M. M., Subido Jr, E. D., & Bugtai, N. T. (2018, February). Trends in telemedicine utilizing artificial intelligence. In *AIP Conference Proceedings* (Vol. 1933, No. 1, p. 040009). AIP Publishing.
- Pannu, A. (2015). Artificial intelligence and its application in different areas. *Artificial Intelligence*, 4(10), 79-84.
- Poola, I. (2017). Artificial Intelligence and the Future of Renewable Energy. *International Advanced Research Journal in Science, Engineering and Technology*, 4(11), 216-219.
- Popenici, S. A., & Kerr, S. (2017). Exploring the impact of artificial intelligence on teaching and learning in higher education. *Research and Practice in Technology Enhanced Learning*, 12(1), 22.
- Rigla, M., García-Sáez, G., Pons, B., & Hernando, M. E. (2018). Artificial intelligence methodologies and their application to diabetes. *Journal of Diabetes Science and Technology*, 12(2), 303-310.
- Raso, F. A., Hilligoss, H., Krishnamurthy, V., Bavitz, C., & Kim, L. (2018). Artificial Intelligence & Human Rights: Opportunities & Risks. Berkman Klein Center Research Publication, (2018-6). [https://cyber.harvard.edu/sites/default/files/2018-09/2018-09\\_AIHumanRightsSmall.pdf](https://cyber.harvard.edu/sites/default/files/2018-09/2018-09_AIHumanRightsSmall.pdf)
- Russell, S., Hauert, S., Altman, R., & Veloso, M. (2015). Take a stand on AI weapons. *Nature*, 521, 415-418.
- Sharma, G., & Carter, A. (2017). Artificial intelligence and the pathologist: future frenemies?. *Archives of Pathology & Laboratory Medicine*, 141(5), 622-623.
- Shrestha, S., & Sengupta, P. P. (2018). Imaging Heart Failure With Artificial Intelligence. *Circulation: Cardiovascular Imaging*, 11, e007723.
- Sikdar, S. (2018). Artificial intelligence, its impact on innovation, and the Google effect. *Clean Technologies and Environmental Policy*, 20, 1-2.
- Sora, J. C., & Sora, S. A. (2018). Artificial Education: Expert systems used to assist and support 21st century education. *GSTF Journal on Computing (JoC)*, 2(3), 1-3.
- Stăncioiu, A. (2017). The Fourth Industrial Revolution „Industry 4.0”. *Fiability & Durability/Fiabilitate si Durabilitate*, (1), 74-78.
- Tajmir, S. H., Lee, H., Shailam, R., Gale, H. I., Nguyen, J. C., Westra, S. J., ... & Do, S. (2018). Artificial intelligence-assisted interpretation of bone age radiographs improves accuracy and decreases variability. *Skeletal Radiology*, 1-9.
- Tang, A., Tam, R., Cadrin-Chênevert, A., Guest, W., Chong, J., Barfett, J., ... & Poudrette, M. G. (2018). Canadian Association of Radiologists white

- paper on artificial intelligence in radiology. *Canadian Association of Radiologists Journal*, 69, 120-135.
- Tian, B. (2018). Building Artificial Intelligence for Dermatological Practice. *Open Access Library Journal*, 5, e4541.
- Timms, M. J. (2016). Letting artificial intelligence in education out of the box: educational cobots and smart classrooms. *International Journal of Artificial Intelligence in Education*, 26(2), 701-712.
- Tredinnick, L. (2017). Artificial intelligence and professional roles. *Business Information Review*, 34(1), 37-41.
- Tridandapani, S. (2018). Radiology “Hits Refresh” with Artificial Intelligence. 25, *Academic Radiology*, 965-966.
- Tse, T., Esposito, M., & Goh, D. (2017). Humans and artificial intelligence: Rivalry or romance?. *LSE Business Review*. <http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/85490/1/businessreview-2017-10-24-humans-and-artificial-intelligence-rivalry.pdf>
- Vieira, G. C., de Mendonça, A. R., da Silva, G. F., Zanetti, S. S., da Silva, M. M., & dos Santos, A. R. (2018). Prognoses of diameter and height of trees of eucalyptus using artificial intelligence. *Science of The Total Environment*, 619, 1473-1481.
- Vyas, M., Thakur, S., Riyaz, B., Bansal, K. K., Tomar, B., & Mishra, V. (2018). Artificial Intelligence: The Beginning of a New Era in Pharmacy Profession. *Asian Journal of Pharmaceutics*, 12(2), 72-76.
- Wilson, H. J., Daugherty, P., & Bianzino, N. (2017). The jobs that artificial intelligence will create. *MIT Sloan Management Review*, 58(4), 14-16.
- Yadav, A., Gupta, V., Sahu, H., & Shrimal, S. (2017). Artificial Intelligence-New Era. *International Journal of New Technology and Research*, 3(3), 30-33.
- Yasaka, K., & Abe, O. (2018). Deep learning and artificial intelligence in radiology: Current applications and future directions. *PLoS medicine*, 15(11), e1002707.
- Zhang, Z. (2016). When doctors meet with AlphaGo: potential application of machine learning to clinical medicine. *Annals of translational medicine*, 4(6), 125-126.
- Zhao, H., Dimovitz, K., Staveland, B., & Medsker, L. (2016, September). Responding to challenges in the design of moral autonomous vehicles. In *The 2016 AAAI Fall Symposium Series: Cognitive Assistance in Government and Public Sector Applications*, Technical Report FS-16-02 (pp. 169-173).

# The Influence of Religion on the Dominant Party System in Turkey and Russia

Abdulkadir Cesur<sup>1</sup>

## Abstract

This paper examines whether the phenomenon of religion can be a determining dynamic in the emergence of the dominant-party system. To explain this, I take hand Turkey and Russia, which have been governed by a dominant party for more than 20 years. Accordingly, I analyze the importance of religion from the standpoint of the electorate of these two countries since the dominant parties emerge based on voter preferences. The findings of this study reveal that religion can be very effective in creating a dominant party in non-secularised countries such as Turkey. However, when the case of Russia is considered, it demonstrates that religious phenomenon remains the emergence of the dominant-party system remains far from being a determinant and generalizable dynamic.

## 1. INTRODUCTION

In the political science literature, debates on the dominant-party system continue with increasing interest. However, the relationship between the dominant party system and democracy is at the center of these debates generally. Notwithstanding, the issue of the determining dynamics that lead to the emergence of a dominant-party or dominant-party system in countries has been neglected. In this context, we can say that the dynamics of the dominant-party system are a puzzle waiting to be solved.

On the other hand, we should also say that the dominant party system is a phenomenon that should be questioned by different disciplines. Insomuch, many researchers point out that almost all countries with this system have pathological cases that contradict liberal democracies, that the dominant party system exhibits a hybrid regime type between democracy

---

1 Dr. Öğr. Gör. Kocaeli Üniversitesi (Kandıra MYO), [abdulkadir.cesur@kocaeli.edu.tr](mailto:abdulkadir.cesur@kocaeli.edu.tr),  
ORCID: 0000-0002-2697-0430

and authoritarianism, and this is a disturbing abnormality for democracy (Schedler, 2002; Carothers, 2002: 5-21; Linz, 2000: 33-34; Collier & Levitsky, 1997: 430-451).

Considering the countries that have had or are experiencing the dominant party experience, these criticisms have some justification. However, at this point, it should be emphasized that all dominant parties come to power through elections and maintain their government through elections. Voters are the ones who have the final say in this context. Therefore, the dominant-party system is ultimately shaped by voter preferences. On the other hand, the phenomenon of religion is also one of the factors affecting voter preferences. As it is known, religion influences the political behaviors in many countries and even can become a determining factor in coming to power in some countries.

Therefore, based on all these motives, this study examines the impact of religion to the dominant-party system through voter preferences on the axis of the Turkey-Russia comparison. The selection of Turkey and Russia from the universe of dominant-party countries in the study is based on the following reasons: The dominant-party system in both countries emerged around the same time. The geographical locations of the two countries are close to each other. Both are neither entirely European nor Asian. In addition to all these, it is frequently mentioned in the literature that Orthodox Christianity in Russia and Islam in Turkey has a critical place in the political and social sphere.

The method used in the study is the comparative method, which has recently been frequently used in the field of political science as well as sociology. The comparative method, which also refers to a perspective and orientation, is a research method that aims to identify and explain the factors that are effective in the emergence and development of certain events.

Within this method, the data needed for the study were obtained through a literature review. The general framework of the study in terms of presentation is as follows: First of all, following the introduction, the conceptual framework of the dominant-party system is presented. Then, the relationship between the dominant-party system and religion is discussed. Then, the data that will enable us to analyze whether religion has influenced the dominant-party system in Turkey and Russia through voter tendencies were presented. In the conclusion section, the quantitative and qualitative qualified data presented in the study were discussed, and predictions were made based on them.

## 2. WHAT IS THE DOMINANT PARTY SYSTEM?

There is a great diversity in the literature regarding the definition and characteristics of the dominant-party system. In a sense, this diversity can be considered the product of the intense efforts of political scientists to come up with an inclusive definition. However, it is also possible to say that the descriptions put forward by political scientists are not very different, or at least they do not differ from each other in fundamental points.

For example, according to Sartori (1990: 345-46), one of the leading researchers on party systems, the dominant-party system corresponds to a system in which one party has a solid majority of seats in parliament, governs the state for a long time and the level of competition is low. Duverger's (1986: 398-99) definition is similar to Sartori's. According to him, if there is a party in the political system that is larger than all other parties and has outlasted its rivals for a long time, and if the people, including those who do not vote for it, believe in the dominance of this party, this system is a dominant-party system. While Cox (1997: 238) defines the dominant-party system, just like Duverger, he acts from the concept of the dominant party and puts forward a definition like this: The dominant-party system is one in which one of the parties sits uninterruptedly in government for a long time, either alone or as a senior partner in a coalition. On the other hand, Ware (1996: 159) follows Sartori's criteria and defines the dominant-party system as follows: The dominant-party system is a system in which a party regularly wins enough parliamentary seats to control the government on its own. Perhaps the most comprehensive definition characterizing the dominant-party system in the literature is provided by O'Leary (1994: 4). According to him, a dominant-party system is a system in which a political party regularly wins more seats than its rivals in elections. In this system, the dominant party, thanks to its ideology and bargaining power, regularly stays in government or becomes a key actor and governs the state for more than a decade.

It is possible to summarize the features that characterize the dominant party and the dominant-party system either in the light of these definitions or line with the opinions of other political scientists, as follows: (Boucek, 1998: 103-107; Cox, 1997: 238; Arian & Barnes, 1974: 613; Blondel, 1968: 196; Bogaards, 2004: 175; Greene, 2010: 809-11; Pempel, 2018: 352-53):

- Dominant parties come to power through elections.
- Opposition forces are allowed to form political parties within the system. All political parties in the system are legal and legitimate.

- The dominant party is the party that has more influence than other parties in the system. Not only voters of the power party but also the opposition voters believe in its dominance.
- All parties struggle in real terms to seize the government. However, the competitiveness of other political parties is relatively low in the face of the dominant party.
- Elections hold legitimately. The parties participating in the race have more or less a chance of accession to power. Despite this, the dominant party maintains its dominance regularly for a long time (at least three electoral periods) by gaining the upper hand in the elections.
- The dominant parties obtain the parliamentary majority to form the government.
- The tendency of dominant parties is high to protect their reputation in the eye of the voters and not fall from the government. Therefore, it is possible to observe that the dominant party sometimes makes legal arrangements to guarantee elections.

Even from a bird's eye view, it is clear that these characteristics of the dominant-party system make it a phenomenon that needs to be questioned and discussed in detail. However, it is not only its defining features that make the dominant-party system worthy of discussion. The main reason is the plethora of pathological cases encountered in dominant-party countries that poke a hole in the heart of liberal democracies. In this context, many researchers note that dominant parties consolidate their dominance through undemocratic means, distorting the partisan playing field in their favor, gaining advantages that render elections grossly unfair, and resorting to electoral manipulation, and this is how they maintain their dominance. (see. Boucek, 1998: 4; Greene, 2010: 807; Schedler, 2002: 36; Bogaards, 2004: 178; Diamond, 2002: 24).

But does religion have any role or influence in the emergence of the dominant-party system, which is submitted to have poked a hole in the heart of liberal democracies? To what scope should the relationship between religion and the dominant-party system be addressed? What conditions are necessary for religion to influence the emergence of the dominant-party system? These questions and similar ones are discussed in the following section.

### **3. ABOUT DOMINANT PARTY SYSTEM – RELIGION RELATIONSHIP**

As mentioned earlier, the dominant-party system is a system that incarnates within the multi-party system and in which the opposition has a chance to come to power. Therefore, the emergence of this system and its continuation basis on voter preference. For this reason, it seems considerably rational to consider the relationship between the dominant-party system and religion within the scope of the effect of religion on voter preferences. However, at this point, it should be noted that voters in countries where elections are held for a show, the opposition is only for show, or religion is heavily institutionalized in state administration should not be taken as a sample. Because in such states, it is more logical to talk about the hegemonic party system rather than a dominant-party system.

After this brief reminder and information, it would be truthful to seek an answer to the following two crucial questions on behalf of to return to the essence of the subject: Religious phenomenon, which is one of the significant socio-psychological factors in forming voter preferences, can lead to the emergence of the dominant-party system? In this context, what minimum conditions need for religion to be an effective dynamic?

When we look at the countries in the world that have experienced dominant parties, at first glance, it is possible to think that religion cannot be very influential in the emergence of the dominant-party. Because when we examine the universe of countries with dominant parties, we come across wars of national independence, severe economic and political crises, critical changes and transformations in the social structure, apartheid regime, establishment of a new state, and social turmoil as the fundamental dynamics, and that brought the dominant party to power. However, this should not mean that religion cannot have no influence. In the Republic of South Africa, for example, the ANC's (African National Congress) rule since 1994 has been based on ethnic and religious polarization. On the other hand, in some countries where Catholicism is powerful and influential, it is claimed that religion is decisive in shaping voter preferences. Similarly, it is mentioned that religion plays an important role in the political preferences of the voters who brought Christian democratic parties to power in Europe. In short, the phenomenon of religion, which continues to influence politics and the power process regardless of developed or underdeveloped countries, has the potential to influence the emergence of a dominant-party system based on voter preference.

Of course, the level of influence of religion may vary from country to country and from society to society. In this context, it seems illogical to think that religion can influence the formation of the dominant party in a highly secularized society. On the other hand, if the degree of secularization of the majority of the population is low, the religious factor can play a very influential role in the emergence and maintenance of the dominant-party system. Similarly, if the majority of the population has a strong connection with religion, the religion factor may influence the emergence of the dominant-party system. If the majority of the population is close to the idea that the government may be ruled with religious references, the religious factor can be an influential dynamic in the emergence of a dominant-party system. In addition, the presence of a powerful political party that aspires to the votes of the majority of the electorate and prioritizes religious references can also make the religion factor very effective. However, there should not be strict constitutional and institutional obstacles to the political activities of such a party. Otherwise, it should not be ignored that religion cannot have much influence on the emergence of the dominant-party system and the continuation of the dominance.

Within the framework outlined so far on the relationship between the dominant-party system and religion, Turkey and Russia are discussed below. However, due to the essence of the study, an in-depth analysis of the religion-state-politics relationship in both countries was naturally not attempted. Instead, the data that will enable us to see that the power of religion in creating a dominant party in both countries has been revealed by focusing more on voters and voter preferences. Because as stated before, just as the voters have the final say in two-party and multi-party systems, the voters have the final say in the dominant-party system.

#### **4. DOMINANT PARTY SYSTEM-RELIGION RELATIONSHIP IN TURKEY**

Religion has been critical in Turkey's political and social life for centuries. Especially in the Ottoman Empire, religion regulated beliefs and worship in social life but also influenced all the state mechanisms and the administrative mentality up to the private law relations. On the other hand, the religious phenomenon, which penetrated as far as the capillaries of society, gained a political tool and an ideological identity in the last century of the Ottoman Empire. In this sense, Sultans II. Abdulhamit's practices and the İslamism Movement are the best examples of this.

Subject to at the same time, the fact that it gained a political tool and ideological identity has made religious phenomenon and its advocates one

of the biggest obstacles to Ottoman modernization. This situation has not changed much also in the period of the Republic of Turkey too. Because the Republic of Turkey, which was come out from inside the Ottoman, has taken over many heritages from it in the political, social, and cultural spheres (Ortaylı, 2003: 114-16). However, the most significant inheritance to Turkey from the Ottoman has been the *center-periphery* duality and tense relationship between the two, which shaped the Turkish political culture and political structure (Mardin, 1973: 169-90).

In this context, republicans, secularists, and supporters of the official ideology formed the center, while the religious-conservative population with high religious sensitivities and their political representatives formed the periphery. In the tense relationship between these two sides shaped around the themes of secularism and reaction, the center maintained its dominance over the periphery consisting of traditionalist, conservative and Islamic segments until 1950. However, the center's dominance started to become indistinct from the 1950s.

For this reason, when we look at the general elections held in Turkey since 1950, we see the overwhelming superiority of the total votes of the parties representing the periphery over the center in almost all of them. We may say due to this superiority, political parties representing the periphery have always governed Turkey with a few exceptions. However, on the other hand it is possible to say that the penetration of the center on the state bureaucracy continued until the AKP power.

Of course, at this point, it is necessary to underline the following: Among the parties that came to power as the representatives of the periphery, the Welfare Party (*Refah Partisi*, RP) and the Justice and Development Party (*Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi*, AKP) have a different position from other periphery parties. This is because the parties other than these two are parties with religious references, compatible with the fabric of the periphery but not in conflict with the official ideology. However, it is impossible to say the same for AKP and RP. In short, it is not wrong to say that AKP and RP in Turkey have always conflicted with the republic values.


Of these parties, the RP received the most votes in 1996 and formed the government. It has its roots in the National Order Party (*Millî Nizam Partisi*, MNP) and the National Salvation Party (*Millî Selamet Partisi*, MSP), the representatives of the Islamic Movement and the National Outlook (*Millî Görüş*) Movement in Turkey. All three of these parties were closed down by the constitutional court (Yavuz, 1997: 63-66). The Virtue Party (*Fazilet Partisi*, FP), the successor to the RP, was also closed down. The AKP was

founded by a group of deputies who left the party during the process of FP's closure by the court (Mecham, 2004: 344-45).

The AKP, which emerged from the FP, looks like a party at odds with the republic, like its predecessors. With its words and actions, it shows that it nurture enmity towards the values of the republic at every opportunity. Leaving aside the issue of why it was not or could not be closed by the Constitutional Court, which is a separate topic of discussion, this political party has been governing the Republic of Turkey uninterruptedly since 2002.

Well, to what extent has the religious factor affected the 20-year government of the AKP, which emerged based on voter preference, and the emergence of the dominant-party system? To what extent does the political parties' prioritization of religious references find a response to the electorate in Turkey? The data in Figure 1, Figure 2, Figure 3, Figure 4, and Figure 5 below sufficiently clues to make inferences regarding these questions.

*Figure 1. Level of religiousness in Turkey in general and AKP voters (2017)*




*\*The data in the figure are compiled from the findings of the research titled "Voter Clusters - Ak Parti, May'18" conducted by KONDA public opinion research company in 2017. Available online: <https://konda.com.tr/uploads/konda-secmenkumeleri-akparti-secmenleri-mayis2018->*

According to 2017 averages, 69% of AKP voters consider themselves *religious*, and 18% are *very religious/religionists*. In this sense, the percentage of those who describe them as *religious* and *very religious* is around 87% in total. In Turkey as a whole, the rate of *religious* is %60, and *very religious* is

12%. Therefore, both in Turkey and among AKP voters, those who describe themselves as *religious* or *very religious* seem to be high. In addition, the rate of AKP voters in the *religious* and *very religious* categories is above the Turkey average.

Figure 2 below presents data on the veiling rates among AKP voters and in Turkey. Veiling is a behavior that religious people see as a religious requirement. As seen, the rate of people who cover themselves in Turkey is 67% as of 2018. This rate rises even more among AKP voters and reaches 87%. Figure 2 below presents data on the veiling rates among AKP voters and in Turkey.


*Figure 2. The veiling situation among AKP voters and throughout Turkey (2017)*



*\*The data in the figure are compiled from the findings of the research titled "Voter Clusters - Ak Parti, May'18" conducted by KONDA public opinion research company in 2017. Available online : <http://konda.com.tr/tr/rapor/gundelik-yasamda-din-laiklik-ve-turban-arastirmasi/>*

One of the behaviors that religious people in Turkey consider most important and feel obliged to perform is praying. In many scientific studies, prayer is a criterion used to measure religiosity in Muslim countries. Figure 3 below shows the prayer habits of men in Turkey. Looking at 2008 and 2018 data, it seems that the majority of Turkish men pray with varying frequency.

*Figure 3. The habit of praying in Turkish people*




*\*The data in the figure are compiled from the data in the “2018 Research On Social Gender Report And Life Styles*

*In Turkey” report of KONDA public opinion research company. Available online: <https://konda.com.tr/raporlar/1>*

Figure 4 below shows the importance that the voters in Turkey attach to religious education. According to this, 51% of the people in Turkey find the compulsory religion course in schools right, while 31% find it wrong. On the other hand, 81% of the people think that religion should play a role in a child’s education, while only 8% think that is wrong.

*Figure 4. Voters’ perception of the relationship between education and religion (2018)*




*Available online: <https://konda.com.tr/raporlar/1>  
(*gündelik-yaşamda-din-laiklik-ve-türban-araştırması*)*

Based on the data presented so far, it is possible to predict that Turkish voters can tend to support political parties that prioritize religious references.

AKP is a party that has powerful Islamic discourses. In this context, it is also observed that the AKP frequently exploits religious sentiments. Therefore, the Sunni-religious voters could continue to be engaged in this party unless emerging extreme negativities in other factors affecting voter preferences can be said. In Figure 5 below, the findings obtained by the Social Research Center (TEAM) confirm it.

*Figure 5. Political party preferences of Sunni religious voters (2021)*



*Source: [http://www.teamrastirma.com/wp-content/uploads/2021/04/TEAMDindarSecmenler\\_Rapor.pdf](http://www.teamrastirma.com/wp-content/uploads/2021/04/TEAMDindarSecmenler_Rapor.pdf)*

Among the political parties in Figure 5, CHP is on the left of the ideological spectrum. As can be seen, only 16% of Sunni religious people vote for this party, while the remaining votes are shared among right-wing parties, but the AKP gets the lion's share of this high support given to right-wing parties.

## **5. DOMINANT PARTY SYSTEM-RELIGION RELATIONSHIP IN RUSSIA**

It is stated in the literature that religion has had an important place in Russia's political and social life from the Tsarist period to the present. (Grishin & Stepuro, 2016: 113; Slobozhnikova, 2016: 19-20). The traditional religious belief is Orthodox Christianity, which was accepted by Kyiv Kniaz Vladimir in 988 and supported as the state religion during the Tsarist period (Şahin, 2016: 27; Onay, 2002: 16). Although it preserves its importance in the belief system of the society, the support of Orthodox Christianity by the state was interrupted significantly during the Soviet Union period after Tsarist Russia (Upadhyay, 2018: 196). After the collapse of the USSR in 1991, Russian society began to feel freer to express their religious identities,

which they had kept silent about during the Soviet period. In this free environment that emerged at the point of expression of religious identities, there has been a significant increase in the number of people who define themselves as believers (Frezee, 2017: 2; Tomka, 2010: 2-4).

When we look at today's Russia, it is seen the dominant religious belief is Orthodox Christianity. In addition to Orthodoxy, Buddhism, Judaism, and Islam are also recognized as official religions. Apart from these, it is possible to come across unofficial religions (Bernstein, 2011: 623; Upadhyay, 2018: 207). In this context, Table 1 below shows the data on religion and belief groups in Russia for some years.

*Table 1. Religion and belief groups in Russia*

	1991	1998	2008	2022
Atheists / no religion	61	33	18	19
Catholicism	0	< 1	< 1	1
Protestantism	0	< 1	< 1	1
Orthodoxy	31	53	72	71
Islam	< 1	2	5	5
Buddhism	0	< 1	< 1	1
Other	< 1	< 1	< 1	1

*The data in the figure are compiled. Available online: <https://www.pewresearch.org/religion/2014/02/10/russians-return-to-religion-but-not-to-church/>; <https://www.levada.ru/en/2022/05/18/religiosity/>*

The proportion of atheists was approximately 61% in 1991. This rate is quite high. It can be said that this is due to the influence of the Soviet regime and the uncertainties of the period. As can be seen, this rate decreased to 33% in 1998 and to 18% in 2008. In contrast, the proportion of Orthodox Christians increased significantly, reaching over 70 percent in 2008 and 2022.

As can see in these data, Orthodox Christianity continues to dominate the belief system of the people to a great extent. For this reason, there are scholarly studies in the literature that claim that Putin has maintained his ties with the Orthodox Church and has made significant political gains as a result (Blitt 2011, p. 457; Sotnichenko 2009, p. 266-67; Ascher 2020, p. 323-24). Also, the data in Table 1 show that Putin is likely to benefit politically from religion. However, while this view is partly true, it is often

argued that religious influence on voter preferences in Russia is uncertain or minimal (Grishin & Stepuro 2016, p. 113; White & McAllister 2003).

Therefore, different data are needed to understand which view is more rational. In this context, it is also necessary to analyze the anatomy of Russian political parties, the faith groups from which they draw their votes, and Russian political culture. However, the data in Table 2, Table 3, and Figure 6 provide sufficient evidence to determine which of the two views expressed in the literature is more rational.


*Table 2. Level of religiousness in Russian people*

	2008	2014	2018	2022
Very religious	5	4	7	9
Religious to some extent	19	31	43	44
Not too religious	56	37	28	30
Completely non-religious	16	26	17	16
Can't say	2	3	3	1

Source is available online: <https://www.levada.ru/en/2022/05/18/religiosity/>; (Russian Public Opinion – 2018).

When the average of the years is taken, the ratio of those who are *very religious* and *somewhat religious* is approximately 40%. On the other hand, the total ratio of *not very religious* and *not religious at all* is about 57%. These rates roughly coincide with the levels of participation in religious services in Figure 6 below.

*Figure 6. Participation in religious services of Russian people*



Available online: <https://www.levada.ru/en/2022/05/18/religiosity/>

The data in Table 3 below regarding the role of religion in the life of the Russian people are similar to the data in Figure 6 and Table 2. When

averaged over the years, 35% of respondents say that religion plays a more or less important role in their lives. On the other hand, the rate of those who say that religion is not very important or not important in their lives is around 62%.

*Table 3. What role does religion play in your life?*

	2005	2007	2012	2016	2020
A very important one	11	6	6	6	12
A fairly important one	27	26	24	28	28
Not a very important one	39	41	45	40	35
No role at all	20	24	20	22	24
It is difficult to say	2	3	5	4	2

*Available online: <https://www.levada.ru/en/2020/03/19/attitudes-to-religion/>*

In light of all these data, it is possible to say the following: The view expressed in the literature on Russia that the influence of religion on voter preferences is uncertain or limited seems to be more rational. Therefore, it would be appropriate to think that the religious factor was not influential in the emergence of the dominant-party system in Russia and the continuation of its dominance or that this influence remained at a minimum level. Other parameters that reinforce this view are mentioned in the conclusion section below.

## 6. CONCLUSION

Religion appears as an effective and powerful dynamic in the formation of the dominant party system in Turkey. It can be said that it derives its power from the tense relationship between the center and the periphery inherited from the Ottoman Empire and the overwhelming superiority of the *religious-conservative* mass constituting the periphery over the *reformist-modernist* center. For this reason, many political parties with religious-conservative discourses have been established in Turkey since the transition to a multi-party period. However, among these parties, those that highly emphasized religious references and clashed with secularism and official ideology were closed either by military intervention or by the decision of the Constitutional Court.

The only party that has not been closed despite its conflict with the official ideology is the Justice and Development Party, which has been in power since 2002. It alone shows that religion has the potential to create a dominant party in Turkey if parties that emphasize religious references and

conflict with the official ideology are not closed. While the data in Figure 2, Figure 3, and Figure 4 show the importance of religion in Turkey and among AKP voters, the data in Figure 5 reveals the extent of the influence of religion in creating a dominant-party system.

These data also shed light on the level of secularization in Turkey. In this context, the fact that religion has such an extensive place in the social sphere, parties with strong religious references appear in the political arena, and these parties receive significant support from the voters indicating the low level of secularization in Turkey. Considering that religion may have a high impact on political preferences in societies that have not yet completed the secularization process, it would be reasonable to assume that it may have a high impact on the emergence of the dominant party system in Turkey.

Regarding Turkey, the following can be said in the context of the conclusion: The phenomenon of religion is an influential factor in the political preferences of voters. Therefore religion is one of the actors that will play a role in a party that prioritizes religious references to come to power as the dominant party. In this sense, it has a high potential. However, although it is effective in the process of formation and consolidation of dominance, it is debatable whether it is a decisive factor. Because the dynamics that bring a party to power are different from the dynamics that ensure the long-term dominance of that party. For example, in recent studies on this issue, researchers draw attention to the especially economic performance factor for the long-term power. (See. Feldman, 1982: 446-66; Kramer, 1983:238; Becher & Donnelly, 2013: 974; Harrington, 1993: 39; Lewis-Beck & Stegmaier, 2000: 183-219). Therefore, religion is in a somewhat controversial position in this context. But as in Turkey, it may have the power to cover up the government's economic failures until they become intolerable.

At this point connected with this subject, I would like to draw attention to the following issue: For several years, Turkey has been in an intolerable economic bottleneck based on inflation that has deeply affected people's lives. Inflation in Turkey is around 40%, according to official figures, and over 100%, according to unofficial. When I did this study, there were about two months before the elections in Turkey. In this context, the results of the parliamentary and presidential elections on 14 May 2023 will tell us to what extent religion is influencing the continuation of the dominant-party system in Turkey and whether its strength will be enough to mask intolerable economic problems.

Regarding the influence of religion on the dominant-party system, we can say the following about Russia: As seen in Table 1, Orthodox Christianity dominates the belief system of the people in Russia, but the data in Table

3 shows that, religion is not significant in social life of Russian people. In addition, as shown in Table 2 and Figure 6, the level of religious affiliation among Orthodox Christians is not as high as in Turkey. Therefore, considering that religion may have a lower impact on voter preferences the lower the level of commitment, it seems impossible that religion has a remarkable effect on voters' political preferences in Russia. Moreover, the *religious-very religious* crowd in Russia does not correspond to the population's majority, unlike in Turkey. In addition to this, there is no extreme polarization in society on the axis of religion and secularism.

Apart from that, an analysis of political parties in Russia and their anatomy shows that there do not seem to be any powerful parties that put religious references in the foreground. One can attribute this situation to the strong will to protect the secular system in Russia and to the fact that voters do not prefer parties based on religious sectarianism. In the context of all these motives, it seems far from rational to assume that religion could be an influential factor in the emergence and continuation of the dominant-party system in Russia.

Therefore, in the context of the general conclusion of the study, in which I address the role of religion in the emergence of the dominant-party system on the axis of Turkey-Russia comparison, it is possible to say the following: As seen in the examples of Turkey and Russia, religion can be an influential dynamic in the shaping of the party system and especially the dominant-party system in some countries, but not in others. It may be due to different levels of secularization in countries, political cultures, and the strength of constitutional-institutional barriers to religious parties. Therefore, it does not seem possible to consider the phenomenon of religion as a generalizable dynamic in theorizing the dynamics that lead to the emergence of the dominant-party system and ensure its long-term dominance of power. In short, the determinant dynamics of the dominant-party system and long-term government dominance should be sought in other areas.

In this context, ideology-partisanship, ethno-political polarisation, and leader and government performance, which are among the factors affecting voter preferences, can be examined. In addition to this, the electoral system and legal legislation should also be considered institutional factors. Opposition parties and conditions for opposing should not be neglected as one of the areas to be analyzed. On the other hand, since prolonged periods of power may present the dominant parties with the opportunity to establish a hegemonic structure at the state and its institutions, this area should also be examined. Apart from these, the factor of political culture, which I think may be the fundamental dynamic, should never be ignored.

## REFERENCES

- Arian, Alan and Samuel H. Barnes (1974) The Dominant Party System: A Neglected Model of Democratic Stability. *The Journal of Politics*, 36(3): 592-614. <https://doi.org/10.2307/2129246>
- Ascher, Abraham (2020) *Kısa Rusya Tarihi*. (Trans. Y. Alogan). Ankara: Say.
- Becher, Michael and Michael Donnelly (2013) Economic Performance, Individual Evaluations, and the Vote: Investigating the Causal Mechanism. *The Journal of Politics*, 75(4): 968-979. <https://doi.org/10.1017/s0022381613000959>
- Bernstein, Anya (2011) The Post-Soviet Treasure Hunt: Time, Space, and Necropolitics in Siberian Buddhism. *Comparative Studies in Society and History*, 53(3): 623-653. <https://doi.org/10.1017/S0010417511000272>
- Blitt, Robert, C. (2011) Russia's Orthodox Foreign Policy: The Growing Influence of the Russian Orthodox Church in Shaping Russia's Policies Abroad. *University of Pennsylvania Journal of International Law*, 33(2): 363-460. <https://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1725522>
- Blondel, Jean (1968) Party, Systems and Patterns of Government in Western Democracies. *Canadian Journal of Political Science*, 1(2): 180-203. <https://www.jstor.org/stable/3231605>
- Bogaards, Matthijs (2004) Counting Parties and Identifying Dominant Party Systems in Africa. *European Journal of Political Research*, 43(2): 173-197. <https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1475-6765.2004.00150.x>
- Boucek, Françoise (1998) Electoral and Parliamentary Aspects of Dominant Party Systems. In: P. Pennings/J.-E. Lane (eds). *Comparing Party System Change*. London: Routledge, 103-124.
- Carothers, Thomas (2002) The End of the Transition Paradigm. *Journal of Democracy*, 13(1): 5-21. <https://www.journalofdemocracy.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/02/Carothers-13-1.pdf>
- Collier, David and Steven Levitsky (1997) Democracy with Adjectives: Conceptual Innovation in Comparative Research. *World Politics*, 49(3): 430-451. <https://www.jstor.org/stable/25054009>
- Cox, Gary, W. (1997) *Making Votes Count: Strategic Coordination in the World's Electoral Systems*. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press.
- Diamond, Larry, Jay (2002) Thinking About Hybrid Regimes. *Journal of Democracy*, 13(2): 21-35. <http://dx.doi.org/10.1353/jod.2002.0025>
- Duverger, Maurice (1986) *Siyasi Partiler*. (Trans. Ergun Özbudun), Ankara: Bilgi.
- Feldman, Stanley (1982) Economically Self-Interested Political Behavior. *American Journal of Political Science*, 26(3): 446-466. <https://doi.org/10.2307/2110937>

- Freeze, Gregory, L. (2017) Russian Orthodoxy And Politics in the Putin Era. Task For White Report, The Chicago Council of Global Affairs. Carnegieendowment. [https://carnegieendowment.org/files/2-14-17\\_Gregory\\_Freeze\\_Russian\\_Orthodoxy.pdf](https://carnegieendowment.org/files/2-14-17_Gregory_Freeze_Russian_Orthodoxy.pdf) (accessed 21.01.2023).
- Greene, Kenneth F. (2010) The Political Economy of Authoritarian Single-Party Dominance. *Comparative Political Studies*, 43(7): 807-834. <https://doi.org/10.1177/0010414009332462>
- Grishin, O.E. and O.S. Stepuro (2016) Religious Preferences As A Factor Of Influence On The Outcome Of Election Campaigns In Modern Russia. *Post-Soviet Issues*, 1: 102-115. <https://www.postsovietarea.com/jour/article/view/70/71>
- Harrington, Joseph, E. (1993) Economic Policy, Economic Performance, and Elections. *The American Economic Review*, 83(1): 27-42. <https://www.jstor.org/stable/2117494>
- Kelly, Nathan J. and Jana Morgan Kelly (2005) Religion and Latino Partisanship in the United States. *Political Research Quarterly*, 58(1): 87-95. <https://doi.org/10.2307/3595598>
- Kramer, Gerald H. (1983) The Ecological Fallacy Revisited: Aggregate- versus Individual-level Findings on Economics and Elections, and Sociotropic Voting. *The American Political Science Review*, 77(1): 92-111. <https://doi.org/10.2307/1956013>
- Lewis-Beck, M. and M. Stegmaier (2000) Economic Determinants of Electoral Outcomes. *Annual Review of Political Science*, 3, 183-219. <https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev.polisci.3.1.183>
- Linz, Juan J. (2000) *Totalitarian and Authoritarian Regimes*. Lynne Rienner Publishers.
- Mardin, Şerif (1973) Center-Periphery Relations: A Key to Turkish Politics?. *Daedalus, Post-Traditional Societies*, 102(1): 169-190. <https://www.jstor.org/stable/20024114>
- Mecham, R. Quinn (2004) From the Ashes of Virtue, a Promise of Light: The Transformation of Political Islam in Turkey. *Third World Quarterly*, 25(2): 339-358. <https://www.jstor.org/stable/3993685>
- O'Leary, B. (1994) Britain's Japanese question: 'Is there a dominant party?'. In: Helen Margetts and Gareth Smyth (eds). *Turning Japanese, Britain with a Permanent Party of Government*. London: Lawrence and Wishart, 3-8.
- Onay, Yaşar (2002) *Değişim ve Rusya*. Ankara, Nobel.
- Ortaylı, İlber (2003) *Osmanlı Barışı*. İstanbul: Ufuk.
- Pempel, T.J. (1990) Introduction: Uncommon Democracies: The One-Party Dominant Regimes. In: Robert Pekkanen (eds): *Critical Readings on the Liberal Democratic Party in Japan*, Nv: Brill, 352-386. <https://www.jstor.org/stable/10.7591/j.ctvr7f8kn>

- Sartori, Giovanni (1990) A Typology of Party Systems. In: Peter Mair (eds). *The West European Party System*. New York: Oxford University Press, 316-349.
- Schedler, Andreas (2002) Elections Without Democracy: The Menu Of Manipulation. *Journal of Democracy*, 13(2): 36-50. <http://dx.doi.org/10.1353/jod.2002.0031>
- Slobozhnikova, Valentina (2016) The Religious Factor In Party Creation Of Modern Russia. Политикологија Религије Бр. 1/2016 Год X, *Politics And Religion, Politologie Des Religions*, 1(X): 19-41. <https://doi.org/10.54561/prj1001019s>
- Sotnichenko, Alexander (2009) Islam – Russian Orthodox Church Relations And The State In The Post-Communist Russia, Политикологија Религије Бр. 2/2009 Год II, *Politics And Religion / Politologie Des Religions*, 2(III): 263-275. <https://doi.org/10.54561/prj0302263s>
- Şahin, Liaisan (2016) Rusya Federasyonu'nun Etnik ve Dinsel Yapısı. *Marmara Türkiyat Araştırmaları Dergisi*, III (2): 15-32. <https://dergipark.org.tr/tr/download/article-file/312080>
- Tomka, Miklos. (2010) Religiosity in Central and Eastern Europe: Facts and Interpretations. *Religion and Society in Central and Eastern Europe*, 3(1): 1–15. <http://rascee.net/index.php/rascee/article/view/26>
- Upadhyay, Archana (2018) Religion and Religiosity in Russia: An Overview. *International Studies*, SAGE, 53(3–4): 195–209. <https://doi.org/10.1177/0020881717753860>
- Ware, Alan (1996) *Political Parties and Party Systems*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- White, Stephen and Ian McAllister (2003) Putin and His Supporters. *Europe-Asia Studies*, 55(3): 383-399. <https://www.jstor.org/stable/3594606>
- Yavuz, M. Hakan (1997) Political Islam and the Welfare (Refah) Party in Turkey. *Comparative Politics*, 30(1), 63-82. <https://doi.org/10.2307/422193>



## Roman Period Glass Unguentariums at the Hacibektas Veli Archeology Museum<sup>1</sup>

Bariş Emre Sönmez<sup>2</sup>

### Abstract

The aim of this study is to examine the glass unguentariums from the Roman Period in Hacibektas Veli Archeology Museum in terms of technique and form. The glass unguentariums in Hacibektas Veli Archeology Museum are classified as tube, bulbous, conical and candelabra. There are 12 glass unguentariums from the Roman Period in total in the museum. 11 of them were brought to the museum by purchasing; One of them was found around Suluca Karahöyük and brought to the museum. Of the glass unguentarium, 6 are tubular in shape, 1 are candelabra in shape, 3 are bulbous in shape and 2 are conical in shape. The lengths of tubular unguentariums vary between 9.1 cm and 13.4 cm; The length of the candelabra-shaped unguentarium is 13 cm, the length of the bulbous-shaped unguentarium is between 10.3 cm and 17.6 cm, and the length of the conical unguentarium is 9.3 cm. Glass unguentariums consist of dark green, colorless transparent, pale green, light green, light blue-green, blue-green colors. The earliest glass unguentarium belongs to the middle of the 1st century AD, and the latest glass unguentarium is dated to the 3rd century AD.

### INTRODUCTION

Unguentariums, which are generally used as burial gifts, were used in a wide area starting from the end of the 4th century BC until the 7th century AD. Although unguentariums have been used to store various materials, they are frequently encountered in necropolis areas. It is thought that unguentariums were used for this purpose and the tears were collected and

- 1 This work, Hacibektas District Governorate, Hacibektas Museum Directorate Number: E-21645913-155.99-3610552 prepared under the permission. I would like to thank the Deputy Director of the Museum, Mr. Cemil ÖZDAĞ, and Archaeologist Mr. Taylan SÜMER, the expert in charge of the museum, for their contributions.
- 2 Lect. PhD., Nevşehir Hacı Bektas Veli University, Avanos Vocational School of Fine Arts, Architectural Restoration Program, besonmez@nevsehir.edu.tr, ORCID: 0000-0002-9273-8920.

left in the grave to show how much sadness was felt for the deceased after the death of the deceased as a tribute to those who died in the necropolis areas. Glass is a substance that has been used in different forms and techniques for thousands of years. The earliest glass forming technique was the inner mold technique, which was later developed with the free blowing technique. While glass was a material used by the rich class until the Hellenistic Period, glass became a cheaper material with the new inventions of glass masters in this period. In the Roman Period, both the addition of experience and the invention of the free blowing technique made progress in glass in every sense. With the discovery of the free blowing technique, glass ceased to be a luxury product and has now been widely used in daily life. With the invention of the free blowing technique, the popularity of glass vessels began to be used everywhere within the borders of the Roman Empire. The earliest form are tubular unguentariums produced by the free blowing technique. Tubular unguentariums have been seen since the middle of the 1st century AD. Along with the free blowing technique, another form seen after the 1st century AD is the candelabra-shaped unguentariums. Apart from these forms, there are also bulbous, conical and pear-shaped unguentariums. There are 12 glass unguentariums from the Roman Period in Hacibektas Veli Archeology Museum, of which 6 are tubular in shape, 1 are candelabra in shape, 3 are bulbous in shape and 2 are conical in shape.

### Unguentarium Terminology and Usage

Unguentariums, which emerged in daily use as well as grave gifts, represent an important ceramic group of the ancient world. It is a ceramic group that is frequently encountered in archaeological excavations and helps in the dating of the studied area. Since they are frequently found as grave finds; While defining the unguentarium, a definition is made by taking into account the find place. The term Unguentarium began to be used by the French archaeologists<sup>3</sup> who had excavated in Carthage in the early 20th century<sup>4</sup>. Unguentarium is also called the tear bottle as well as the scented oil containers<sup>5</sup>. It can also be called unguentarium *lacrymaria* or *lacrymatorium*, *balsamaria*, *olfactorium*<sup>6</sup>.

---

3 Gaucker 1915, 514.

4 Baldiran 1998, 335.

5 Stern 2008, 291; Thompson 1934, 473.

6 Anderson-Stojanovic 1987, 106.

Unguentariums were used to store various perfumes<sup>7</sup> and oils<sup>8</sup>; However, despite the differentiation of usage areas<sup>9</sup>, it is frequently encountered in necropolis areas<sup>10</sup>. The fact that the find places are necropolis places belonging to the Hellenistic and Roman Periods gives us information about the unguentariums. It is thought that tears were collected and left in the grave to show how much sadness was felt for the deceased after the deceased as a tribute to those who died in the necropolis areas and used for this purpose<sup>11</sup>.

### Emergence and Spread of the Unguentarium Form

Unguentariums, which are generally found in burial areas, albeit few in residential areas, are found in archaeological excavations<sup>12</sup>. We do not have certain information about the exact place and time of emergence of unguentariums, which we encounter so frequently. Since it is frequently encountered in many necropolis areas in the Aegean and Mediterranean, it is difficult to determine where and how they emerged<sup>13</sup>. Although it is not known exactly from which form it developed<sup>14</sup>, it is thought to have emerged as a continuation of the dwarf lekythos<sup>15</sup>. It is known that unguentariums emerged in the 4th century BC and continued to exist in different forms until the 7th century AD<sup>16</sup>. As the origin of the Unguentariums, L. Forti reveals Ampurias, the 5th century BC settlement in Spain<sup>17</sup>. The burial finds at Ampurias include the early and classical form of the unguentariums; however, the fact that it is found in these examples and not seen outside of this settlement makes the situation a bit difficult<sup>18</sup>. H. Thompson suggests that it may be east-centered<sup>19</sup>; he argued that this center could be the origin of the settlement of Alexandria in Egypt; but there is no evidence to support Thompson's suggestion<sup>20</sup>. Another person who claims that the

---

7 Darenberg and Saglio 1963, 591.

8 Thompson 1934, 335.

9 Türker 2005, 311-312.

10 Saraçoğlu 2011, 3.

11 Young 1951, 268-269.

12 Baldiran 1998, 335-336.

13 Saraçoğlu 2011, 4; Hayes 1971, 246.

14 Khairy 1980, 85.

15 Camilli 1999, 24 et. al.

16 Özahanlı and Fırat 2011, 9.

17 Forti 1962, 143 et. al.

18 Baldiran 1998, 336; Anderson-Stojanovic 1987, 105.

19 Thompson 1934, 473.

20 Baldiran 1998, 336.

unguentariums originated in Egypt is Westholm. Made of terracotta and various materials in Egypt; he claimed that there were vessels similar in form to the unguentarium<sup>21</sup>. Hayes is the person who claims that the place of emergence of unguentariums may be in Jordan geography. Although Hayes suggested that it may have emerged in this region due to the preservation and transportation of oils and the transportation of holy waters<sup>22</sup>, he stated that the origin in his later studies was Western Anatolia<sup>23</sup>. Guz-Zilberstein, originating from the Aegean Region<sup>24</sup>; Talcott, on the other hand, claimed that the place of origin was Cyprus<sup>25</sup>. Åström, on the other hand, claimed that the origin was Continental Greece<sup>26</sup>. Although the exact place of their emergence is not known, we see very well that unguentariums originated from Syria to Spain; From Egypt to Greece; It is located in a very wide spread area from Anatolia to Cyprus<sup>27</sup>. Unguentariums have been found in many ancient settlements in Anatolia, such as Ephesos<sup>28</sup>, Knidos<sup>29</sup>, Stratonikeia<sup>30</sup>, Tralleis<sup>31</sup>, Labraunda<sup>32</sup>, Kelenderis<sup>33</sup>, Klaros'ta<sup>34</sup>, Patara<sup>35</sup>.

### **Definition and Historical Development of Glass**

Glass is a transparent and homogeneous substance shaped by human hands and formed by molten raw materials found in nature<sup>36</sup>. Glass, when defined broadly, is an inorganic substance in a state of continuous transition with the liquid state and of a similar composition, but with such a high viscosity as a result of cooling in the molten state that it can practically be considered hard<sup>37</sup>.

---

21 Vessberg 1956, 74 et. al.

22 Hayes 1971, 246.

23 Hayes 1992, 209.

24 Guz-Zilberstein 1995, 304.

25 Sparkers and Talcott 1970, 191.

26 Åström 1964, 187 et. al.

27 Saraçoğlu 2011, 4.

28 Gassner 1997, 99.

29 Dottwerweich 1999, 89 et. al.

30 Baldiran 1998, 337-341.

31 Ölmez 2000, 27 et. al.

32 Hellström 1965.

33 Zoroğlu 1986.

34 Taştēmür 2007, 60.

35 Baybo 2003, Drawing 10, no. 53.

36 Tavukçu 2007, 146.

37 Kılıç 1995, 4.

Glass is formed by melting basic materials such as silicon dioxide, potassium carbonate, sodium carbonate and calcium carbonate at high temperature. In the production of the glass we use today, approximately 72% silica, 15% soda or potash, 13% lime; in crystal glass, it consists of approximately 48% silica, 24% soda and potash, 28% lead oxide<sup>38</sup>. Approximately the same materials and ratios were used in glass productions made in the ancient period.

It has long been accepted that the first glass vases were made in Egypt; however, studies have shown that glass making originated in Mesopotamia<sup>39</sup>. When the first glass finds were examined, they appeared in Sumerian cities such as Eshuna and Eridu<sup>40</sup>. The beginning of glass art in Egypt is thought to be during the Thutmosis III Period<sup>41</sup>. It is determined that the glass vessels were made in the Hurri-Mitanni region of Mesopotamia in the middle of the 2nd millennium BC<sup>42</sup>. It has been determined that glass beads and cast small ornaments are produced in Mycenae, Chios and Crete other than Mesopotamia and Egypt<sup>43</sup>. Many empires and states were destroyed by the great migration movements that took place at the end of the Bronze Age<sup>44</sup>. With this great activity and destruction, glass production and trade declined<sup>45</sup>. The progress of glass continued to decline until the 8th century BC<sup>46</sup>. After the 8th century BC, glass production and trade started to revive again. Cold cutting, molding and molding techniques continued to evolve<sup>47</sup>. Glass produced by the molding method dating to these centuries, the earliest examples found in the Gordion P. Tumulus are given, and this tradition shows that it lasted until the Achaemenid (6th century BC) Dynasty Period. Cast glass works can be observed in all lands under Persian influence<sup>48</sup>.

In the 6th century BC Greece became an important center for glass vessels produced by the internal molding technique<sup>49</sup>. Rhodes became the production center of glass containers produced with the inner molding

---

38 Yağcı 1993, 12-13; Özgümiş 2000, 4.

39 Çakmakçı 2008, 40.

40 Öztürk 2003, 69; Barağ 1985, 35; Yağcı 1998, 29.

41 Atik 2004, 51.

42 Barağ 1985, 36; Özet 1998, 11.

43 Atik 2004, 51; Yağcı 1998, 31.

44 Çakmakçı 2008, 41.

45 Atik 2004, 51.

46 Öztürk 2013, 19.

47 Öztürk 2003, 70.

48 Yağcı 1998, 40; Atik 2004, 52.

49 Küçükpazarlı 2006, 7.

technique<sup>50</sup>. It is thought that the East has an influence on Rhodes being an important center. Rhodes may have exported these glass vessels from Mesopotamia, or Mesopotamian craftsmen may have worked in Rhodes<sup>51</sup>. Alabastron, aryballos, oinochoe and amphoriskos vessels were produced with the internal molding technique<sup>52</sup>.

With the destruction of Persepolis by Alexander the Great in 331 BC, the glass works in the treasury of the palace were seized<sup>53</sup>. With the acquisition of glass works, a revival and renewal process has begun in glass art<sup>54</sup>. During this period, the internal molding technique continued<sup>55</sup>. Important glass production centers in the Hellenistic Period are Syria's coastline and Alexandria<sup>56</sup>. During this period, Alexandria glassmakers had the skill and knowledge to produce mosaics and to put a gold plate "sandwich gold-glass" between two layers of glass.<sup>57</sup> The most important representatives of the Hellenistic Period glass art are the tomb finds called "Canosa Group Artifacts"<sup>58</sup>. The Canosa Group are glass vessels next to metal, terracotta and stone artifacts found during excavations in the Canosa (*Canusium*) Necropolis on the Adriatic Sea coast in southeastern Italy<sup>59</sup>. Beginning from this period, glass began to gain importance as a more attractive and colorful alternative, especially against silver dinnerware and goblets. It is seen that the glassware allegedly produced in Syria and Alexandria is spread over a wide area that includes Italy, Southern Russia and Asia Minor<sup>60</sup>.

### Glass in the Roman Period

In the 1st century BC, glass art began to gain importance in Rome. The Roman Period glass industry was established with the experience of Hellenistic Period Glass manufacturers<sup>61</sup>. In the middle of the 1st century BC, an important step was taken in glass production and the blowing

---

50 Çakmakçı 2008, 41; Öztürk 2003, 70.

51 Atik 2004, 52.

52 Yağcı 1993, 40-41.

53 Öztürk 2003, 70; Atik 2004, 53.

54 Yağcı 1993, 43.

55 Atik 2004, 54.

56 Çakmaçı 2008, 41.

57 Atik 2004, 54.

58 Yağcı 1993, 43.

59 Dal 2009, 45.

60 Atik 2004, 54; Özet 1998, 12.

61 Atik 2004, 55.

technique was discovered<sup>62</sup>. By applying this method, the glass pellet taken to the tip of the blowing rod is blown into the mold or freely, and a great progress has been made in glass production<sup>63</sup>. After this age, glass containers were made more easily and quickly<sup>64</sup>. Roman glass is simple and functional. Early specimens are vibrantly colored, late specimens are less colorful and more transparent<sup>65</sup>. Productions of Roman glassware included luxury items, tableware, and perfume bottles<sup>66</sup>. Apart from the production of daily goods, the Romans also used glass in mosaics, panels and exterior decorations<sup>67</sup>. With Rome dominating many parts of Europe, glass art and production spread to the farthest corners of the Empire<sup>68</sup>.

Roman glass art, which reached its peak in glass art, entered a stagnation period with the collapse of Western Rome in the 5th century AD; but later on, the glass industry started to revive and continued in the Byzantine Period<sup>69</sup>.

Glass unguentariums produced during the Roman Period are divided into various forms such as tube, candlestick, bulbous, conical, pear-shaped and reel-shaped<sup>70</sup>.

### **Tubular Glass Unguentariums**

The simplest form among Roman glass vessels are the tubular unguentariums. This form has been found in many centers of the Roman Empire<sup>71</sup>. They have wide rims formed by folding, cylindrical necks and pyriform bodies, and the bottoms can be flat, slightly concave or round-convex enough to allow the unguentarium to stand<sup>72</sup>. The shape of the rim of the tube-shaped unguentariums differs locally<sup>73</sup>. Tubular unguentariums have an average height of 10-15 cm and<sup>74</sup> are made of untinted glass in

---

62 Özgümiş 2000, 13; Öztürk 2003, 70.

63 Lightfoot and Arslan 1992, 5 et. al.; Küçükerman 1985, 54.

64 Atik 2004, 55.

65 Çakmakçı 2008, 42.

66 Atik 2004, 56-57.

67 Lightfoot and Arslan 1992, 6.

68 Haggard 1962, 14; Yağcı 1993, 50.

69 Öztürk 2013, 23; Yağcı 1993, 56-57.

70 Öztürk 2003, 71.

71 Öztürk 2003, 72.

72 Vessberg 1952, 140

73 Yağcı 1993, 132.

74 Taştemür 2007, 60.

natural green and blue tones<sup>75</sup>. Isings, states that the earliest examples of tube-shaped unguentariums came from Ventimiglia during the Julius-Claudian Period and that such unguentariums were seen in many centers after the middle of the 1st century AD<sup>76</sup>.

When we look at the artifacts U1-U5, it is seen that they have wide rims, cylindrical necks and piriform bodies formed by folding, and their bottoms are flat, slightly concave or rounded convex enough to not allow the unguentarium to stand. Similar works of art can be found in Tire Museum<sup>77</sup>, Karanis<sup>78</sup>, Royal Ontario Museum<sup>79</sup>, Yüksel Erimtan Collection<sup>80</sup>, Bodrum Underwater Archeology Museum<sup>81</sup>, Sinop Museum<sup>82</sup> and Klaros'ta<sup>83</sup>. In the light of similar examples, tube-shaped unguentariums numbered U1-U5 were examined within the Isings form 8 group and this form was dated to the 1st century AD.

When we look at the works numbered U6, the everted rim is folded inwards. It has a long neck with tool notch marks, a small conical body and a small concave bottom with noble marks. Similar works of art can be found in Tire Museum<sup>84</sup>, Royal Ontario Museum<sup>85</sup> and Bodrum Underwater Archeology Museum<sup>86</sup>. In the light of similar examples, the tube-shaped unguentarium Isings was examined within the form 8 group and this form was dated to the end of the 1st century AD and the beginning of the 2nd century.

### **Candlestick Shaped Glass Unguentariums**

Candlestick-shaped unguentariums have flattened rims, long and cylindrical necks after being folded inwards. The most prominent feature is that it is longer than the body<sup>87</sup>. In some specimens, the cylindrical neck expands slightly from top to bottom, or the neck and body meet at a

---

75 Yağcı 1993, 132.

76 Isings 1957, 24.

77 Gürler 2000, 32, Pic. 18.

78 Harden 1936, 278.

79 Hayes 1975, 161.

80 Lightfoot and Arslan 1992, 172, Cat. No.107.

81 Özet 1996, 73, No. 39a.

82 Temür and Eker 2019, 17, Cat. No.3.

83 Taştemür 2007,,60.

84 Gürler 2000, 29, Pic. 12.

85 Hayes 1975, Fig. 20, No.263.

86 Özet 1996, 135, No.90.

87 Taştemür 2007, 62.

knuckle. Candlestick-shaped unguentariums are divided into sub-headings as: 1- Convex spherical bodies 2- Triangular bodies 3- Disc-bodied 4- Bell-bodied 5- Pear-shaped bodies 6- Cylindrical bodies 7- Concave bodies<sup>88</sup>. The bottoms of candlestick-shaped unguentariums are mostly concave. They are made of uncoloured, natural greenish or bluish glass. They are unadorned, with a height of about 10 cm to 20 cm. They are made in the free blowing technique<sup>89</sup>.

Candlestick shaped unguentariums are one of the most common types in Roman glassmaking. Candlestick shaped unguentariums are assumed to be used in homes because they are not suitable for carrying. With its long neck structures, it provides less spillage of various oils and cosmetic liquids; It is also believed that with this structure, it prevents the evaporation of the substance inside. These glass vessels were used extensively between 1st-3th centuries AD<sup>90</sup>.

When we look at the works numbered U7, the smooth mouth is folded inwards and outwards and is shaped with a tool. It has a long cylindrical neck, a bell-shaped body and a concave bottom. Similar works of art can be found in Tire Museum<sup>91</sup>, Royal Ontario Museum<sup>92</sup>, Karanis<sup>93</sup>, Sinop Museum<sup>94</sup>, Bodrum Underwater Archeology Museum<sup>95</sup>, Labranda<sup>96</sup>, Limburg<sup>97</sup>, Sivas Museum<sup>98</sup> and Yüksel Erimtan Collection<sup>99</sup>. In the light of similar examples, the candelabra-shaped unguentarium Isings form 82 U7 was studied in the A1 group and this form was dated to the between 2nd-3th centuries AD.

### **Bulbous Shaped Glass Unguentariums**

This type of unguentarium is called “*bulbous*” in the literature because its body shape resembles that of an onion. It has a protruding mouth, a thin and long cylindrical neck, a bulbous body and a flat bottom. Unguentariums

---

88 Vessberg 1956, 163-164.

89 Yağcı 1993, 143.

90 Yağcı 1993, 143-144.

91 Gürler 2000, 53, Pic. 59.

92 Hayes 1975, Fig. 18, No. 577.

93 Harden 1936, Pl. XX, No. 799.

94 Temür and Eker 2019, 90, Cat. No.76.

95 Özet 1996, 126, No.83.

96 Hellström 1971, 53, Pl.29/2.

97 Ising 1971, 64-66.

98 Atilla 2015, 176, Fig. 5, No.15.

99 Lightfoot and Arslan 1992, 87, Cat. No.43.

with this form have slightly protruding lips, cylindrical form, long neck, bag belly and flat base without base.

When we look at the works numbered U8-U10, they have wide rims formed by folding, cylindrical necks, onion-shaped body and flat bottom. Similar works of art can be found in Sinop Museum<sup>100</sup>, Bodrum Underwater Archeology Museum<sup>101</sup>, Yüksel Erimtan Collection<sup>102</sup>, Royal Ontario Museum<sup>103</sup>, Patara<sup>104</sup>, Labraunda<sup>105</sup>, Elaiussa Sebaste<sup>106</sup> and Uşak Museum<sup>107</sup>. In the light of similar examples, artifacts numbered U8-U10 were examined in the literature under the name “*bulbous*” in the Isings form 26 A group due to their resemblance to the onion form, and this form was dated to the between 1st-2nd centuries AD.

### Conical Body Glass Unguentariums

These types of unguentariums are among the vessel forms commonly seen in the Eastern and Western lands of the Roman Empire in the 1st century AD. These vessels, which are widely produced and used in the Syria-Palestine Region; Cyprus is also known for its examples<sup>108</sup>. It is included in the Isings Form 28a group, as the body heights are half of the entire height of the container. The form takes shape with the combination of folded mouth structures and cylindrical necks to the body with a knot.

When we look at the artifacts U11-U12, they have folded mouth structures, a cylindrical neck, a conical body and a flat base. Similar works of art can be found in Sinop Museum<sup>109</sup>, Yüksel Erimtan Collection<sup>110</sup>, Neapolis<sup>111</sup>, British Museum<sup>112</sup>, Bodrum Underwater Archeology Museum<sup>113</sup>, Tire

---

100 Temür and Eker 2019, 28-33, Cat. No.14, 18, 19.

101 Özet 1996, 57, No.24.

102 Lightfoot and Arslan 1992, 41, Cat. No.8.

103 Hayes 1975,129.

104 Baybo 2003, Drawing 10, no. 53.

105 Helström 1971, pl. 29, no. 2.

106 Güray 2011, 264, Fig.6. 1,8.

107 Çakmaklı 2007, 92, No.15.

108 Aydın Tavukçu and Avli 2022, 573.

109 Temür and Eker 2019, 51-61, Cat. No.37-47.

110 Lightfoot and Arslan 1992, 81, Cat. No.37.

111 Aydın Tavukçu and Avli 2022,584, Img.1, Cat. No. 2-5.

112 Barag 1985, 95, Pl. 15, no. 125.

113 Özet 1998, 113-117, No.73a-75b.

Museum<sup>114</sup> and Bergama Museum<sup>115</sup>. Works in the light of similar examples was dated to the between 1st-3th centuries AD.

### Conclusion

After its discovery, glass has been used in the construction of various objects and has evolved continuously based on thousands of years of tradition. Roman glass art spread over a wide geography from east to west. The diversity of forms in Roman glass is remarkable. Unguentariums constitute the densest group in this diversity. With the invention of the blowing technique, glass was produced in different forms and cheaply. With the facilitation of production, there has been an intense increase in Roman glass. The main subject of the research is the glass unguentariums in the Hacibektas Veli Archeology Museum. The choice of glass unguentariums as the subject of study is that glass, like other objects, has an intense usage area from the past to the present. The aim is to identify the glass unguentariums belonging to the Roman Period in the Hacibektas Veli Archeology Museum and to group these artifacts according to their forms and place each group in its own chronological order. While making this arrangement, a detailed description was made in the catalog and a proper chronology was tried to be created by comparing with similar works. Since the glass unguentariums in the Hacibektas Veli Archeology Museum were brought to the museum by purchasing in various years, a chronological dating was made by comparing these artifacts with their similar ones. For this reason, the works discussed in the study were evaluated within the general periods.

The form of the unguentariums in the Hacibektas Veli Archeology Museum and the diversity of these forms will enable us to have an idea about the glass unguentariums of the Cappadocia Region and their interaction with other regions, albeit partially, with the typology we have created chronologically.

### CATALOG

#### Cat. No. U1

**Museum Inv. No:** 1394

**Arrival at the Museum:** Purchase

**Dimensions:** H. 13.4 cm D. M. 3.5 cm D. B. 1.3 cm

---

114 Gürlü 2000, 34-35.

115 Atila and Gürlü 2009, 40, Cat. No. 48.

**Colour:** Dark green

**Description:** Mouth part is broken. Cylindrical neck and round convex bottom.

**Date:** 1st century AD

**Similar:** Gürler 2000, 32, Pic. 18; Harden 1936, 278; Hayes 1975, 161; Lightfoot and Arslan 1992, 172, Cat. No.107; Özet 1996, 73, No. 39a; Temür and Eker 2019, 17, Cat. No.3; Taştemiş 2007, 60.

**Cat. No.** U2

**Museum Inv. No:** 1406

**Arrival at the Museum:** Purchase

**Dimensions:** H. 9.1 cm D. M. 1.3 cm D. B. 0.5 cm

**Colour:** Colorless transparent

**Description:** It has a folded wide rim, a cylindrical neck and a rounded convex bottom.

**Date:** 1st century AD

**Similar:** Gürler 2000, 32, Pic. 18; Harden 1936, 278; Hayes 1975, 161; Lightfoot and Arslan 1992, 172, Cat. No.107; Özet 1996, 73, No. 39a; Temür and Eker 2019, 17, Cat. No.3; Taştemiş 2007, 60.

**Cat. No.** U3

**Museum Inv. No:** 1341

**Arrival at the Museum:** Purchase

**Dimensions:** H. 11.3 cm D. M. 2 cm D. B. 4 cm

**Colour:** Pale green

**Description:** It has a wide rim formed by folding, a cylindrical neck and a rounded convex bottom.

**Date:** 1st century AD

**Similar:** Gürler 2000, 32, Pic. 18; Harden 1936, 278; Hayes 1975, 161; Lightfoot and Arslan 1992, 172, Cat. No.107; Özet 1996, 73, No. 39a; Temür and Eker 2019, 17, Cat. No.3; Taştemiş 2007, 60.

**Cat. No.** U4

**Museum Inv. No:** 1338

**Arrival at the Museum:** Purchase

**Dimensions:** H. 12 cm D. M. 2 cm D. B. 1 cm

**Colour:** Pale green

**Description:** It has a wide rim formed by folding, a cylindrical neck and a rounded convex bottom.

**Date:** 1st century AD

**Similar:** Gürler 2000, 32, Pic. 18; Harden 1936, 278; Hayes 1975, 161; Lightfoot and Arslan 1992, 172, Cat. No.107; Özet 1996, 73, No. 39a; Temür and Eker 2019, 17, Cat. No.3; Taştemür 2007, 60.

**Cat. No.** U5

**Museum Inv. No:** 1435

**Arrival at the Museum:** Purchase

**Dimensions:** H. 10.5 cm D. M. 1.6 cm D. B. 1.4 cm

**Colour:** Light green

**Description:** It has a folded wide rim, a cylindrical neck, a transitional knot from the neck to the body, and a rounded convex bottom.

**Date:** 1st century AD

**Similar:** Gürler 2000, 32, Pic. 18; Harden 1936, 278; Hayes 1975, 161; Lightfoot and Arslan 1992, 172, Cat. No.107; Özet 1996, 73, No. 39a; Temür and Eker 2019, 17, Cat. No.3; Taştemür 2007, 60.

**Cat. No.** U6

**Museum Inv. No:** 1390

**Arrival at the Museum:** Purchase

**Dimensions:** H. 9.8 cm D. M. 1.6 cm D. B. 1.4 cm

**Colour:** Pale green

**Description:** It has a wide rim formed by folding, a cylindrical neck, a transition from the neck to the body, and a flat bottom.

**Date:** End of 1st century AD, beginning of 2nd century AD

**Similar:** Gürler 2000, 29, Pic. 12; Hayes 1975, Fig. 20, No.263; Özet 1996, 135, No.90.

**Cat. No.** U7

**Museum Inv. No:** 1392

**Arrival at the Museum:** Purchase

**Dimensions:** H. 13 cm D. M.3.2 cm D. B.7 cm

**Colour:** Pale green

**Description:** The smooth mouth structure is folded inward and outward and shaped with tools. It has a long cylindrical neck, a bell-shaped body and a concave bottom.

**Date:** 2nd-3th centuries AD

**Similar:** Gürler 2000, 53, Pic. 59; Hayes 1975, Fig. 18, No. 577; Harden 1936, Pl. XX, No. 799; Temür and Eker 2019, 90, Cat. No.76; Özet 1996, 126, No.83; Hellström 1971, 53, Lev.29/2; Ising 1971, 64-66; Atilla 2015, 176, Fig. 5, No.15; Lightfoot and Arslan 1992, 87, Cat. No.43.

**Cat. No.** U8

**Museum Inv. No:** 1373

**Arrival at the Museum:** Purchase

**Dimensions:** H. 17 cm D. M. 3 cm D. B. 4 cm

**Colour:** Light blue-green

**Description:** It has a folded wide rim, cylindrical neck, bulbous body and flat bottom.

**Date:** 1st-2nd centuries AD

**Similar:** Temür ve Eker 2019, 28-33, Cat. No.14, 18, 19; Özet 1996, 57, No.24; Lightfoot and Arslan 1992, 41, Cat. No.8; Hayes 1975,129; Baybo 2003, Drawing 10, no. 53; Helström 1971, pl. 29, no. 2; Güray 2011, 264, Fig.6. 1,8; Çakmaklı 2007, 92, No.15.

**Cat. No.** U9

**Museum Inv. No:** 1373

**Arrival at the Museum:** Purchase

**Dimensions:** H. 17,6 cm D. M. 4 cm D. B. 3,5 cm

**Colour:** Light blue-green

**Description:** It has a folded wide rim, cylindrical neck, bulbous body and flat bottom.

**Date:** 1st-2nd centuries AD

**Similar:** Temür and Eker 2019, 28-33, Cat. No.14, 18, 19; Özet 1996, 57, No.24; Lightfoot and Arslan 1992, 41, Cat. No.8; Hayes 1975,129; Baybo 2003, Drawing 10, no. 53; Helström 1971, pl. 29, no. 2; Güray 2011, 264, Fig.6. 1,8; Çakmaklı 2007, 92, No.15.

**Cat. No. U10**

**Museum Inv. No:** 1377

**Arrival at the Museum:** Purchase

**Dimensions:** H. 10.3 cm D. M.2.8 cm D. B. 2.8 cm

**Colour:** Pale green

**Description:** It has a folded wide rim, cylindrical neck, bulbous body and flat bottom.

**Date:** 1st-2nd centuries AD

**Similar:** Temür and Eker 2019, 28-33, Cat. No.14, 18, 19; Özet 1996, 57, No.24; Lightfoot and Arslan 1992, 41, Cat. No.8; Hayes 1975,129; Baybo 2003, Drawing 10, no. 53; Helström 1971, pl. 29, no. 2; Güray 2011, 264, Fig.6. 1,8; Çakmaklı 2007, 92, No.15.

**Cat. No. U11**

**Museum Inv. No:** 1336

**Arrival at the Museum:** Suluca Karahöyük

**Dimensions:** H. 9.3 cm D. M. 3.6 cm D. B. 5.4 cm

**Colour:** Light blue-green

**Description:** It has a folded mouth structure, a cylindrical neck, a conical body and a flat base.

**Date:** 1st-3th centuries AD

**Similar:** Temür and Eker 2019, 51-61, Cat. No.37-47; Lightfoot and Arslan 1992, 81, Cat. No.37; Aydın Tavukçu and Avli 2022, 584, Img.1, Cat. No. 2-5; Barag 1985, 95, Pl. 15, no. 125; Özet 1996, 113-117, No.73a-75b; Gürler 2000, 34-35; Atila and Gürler 2009, 40, Cat. No. 48.

**Cat. No. U12**

**Museum Inv. No:** 1391

**Arrival at the Museum:** Purchase

**Dimensions:** H. 9.3 cm D. M. - D. B. 2.9 cm

**Colour:** Blue-green

**Description:** Part of the mouth is broken. It has a folded mouth structure, a cylindrical neck, a conical body and a flat base.

**Date:** 1st-3th centuries AD

**Similar:** Temür and Eker 2019, 51-61, Cat. No.37-47; Lightfoot and Arslan 1992, 81, Cat. No.37; Aydın Tavukçu and Avli 2022,584, Img.1, Cat. No. 2-5; Barag 1985, 95, Pl. 15, no. 125; Özet 1996, 113-117, No.73a-75b; Gürler 2000, 34-35; Atila and Gürler 2009, 40, Cat. No. 48.

### **Abbreviations**

Cat. No.: Catalog Number

Cm: Centimeter

H.: Height

D. R.: Diameter of Rim

D. M.: Diameter of Mouth

Ed.: Editor

Fig.: Figur

Pl.: Plate

Pic.: Picture

Img.: Image

Museum Inv. No.: Museum Inventory Number

## Bibliography

- Anderson-Stojanovic, V. R.(1987). The Chronology and Function of Ceramic Unguentaria. *AJA*, 91, 105-122.
- Åström, P. (1964). Two Unguentaria and an Obol. *Opuscula Atheniensia*, 7, 187-190.
- Atik, Ş. (2004). *MÖ. I. Binde Anadolu'da Cam Üretimi ve Tasarımı*. Mimar Sinan Güzel Sanatlar University, (Unpublished PhD Thesis), İstanbul.
- Atila, C. and Gürler, B. (2009). *Bergama Müzesi Cam Eserleri, Glass Object From Bergama Museum*. İzmir: Çağdaş Matbaa.
- Atilla, C. (2015). Roman Glass Vessels in Sivas Museum. *Arkeoloji Dergisi*, C.XX, 161-179.
- Aydın Tavukçu, Z. and Avli, A., (2022). Neapolis Nekropolü'nden Cam Eserler. *OÜSOBİAD*, 12 (2), 569-592.
- Baldıran, A. (1998). Stratonikeia'dan Unguentariumlar. *Selçuk Üniversitesi Sosyal Bilimler Enstitüsü Dergisi*, 4, 335-356.
- Barag, D. (1985). *Catalogue of Western Asiatic Glass in the British Museum*, Vol. I. London.
- Baybo, S. (2003). *Patara Kazularından (1989-2001) Ele Geçen Cam Eserler*. Akdeniz University, (Unpublished Master's Thesis), Antalya.
- Camilli, A. (1999). Ampullae. Balsamari Ceramicidietá Ellenistica e Romana. Rom: Fratelli Palombi Editori.
- Çakmakçı, Z. O. (2008). *Örnekler Işığında Bizans Asia'sında Cam Sanatı*. Ege University, (Unpublished PhD Thesis), İzmir.
- Dal, Y. (2009). *Roma Döneminde Anadolu'da Cam*. Adnan Menderes University, (Unpublished Master's Thesis), Aydın.
- Daremberg, C. and Saglio, E. (1963). *Dictionnaire des Antiquités Grecques et Romaines*.
- Dottwerweich, U. (1999). Unguentarien mit kuppelförmiger Mündungaus Knidos. U. Mandel- R. Özganv.d. (ed.), *Knidos-Studien, Band 1*, 89-102.
- Forti, F. (1962). Gli Unguentari del Primo Periodo Ellenistico. *RendNap37*, 143-157.
- Gassner, V. (1997). *Das Südtor der Tetragonos-Agora. Keramikund Kleinfunde*. FiE XIII 1.
- Gauker, P. (1915). *Nécropolés Puniques de Carthage 1-2*. Paris.
- Guz-Zilberstein, B. (1995). The Typology of The Hellenistic Coarse Ware and Selected Loci of The Hellenistic and Roman Periods. (in *Excavations at Dor, Final Report Volume I B, Areas A and C: The Finds*, Ed. A Belfer-Cohen, A. Ben -Tor, Y. Tsafirir), Jarusalem.

- Güray, Ç. G. (2011). Elaiussa Sebaste'nin Roma Dönemi Cam Buluntuları. *Adalya XIX*, 233-266.
- Gürler, B. (2000). *Tire Müzesi Cam Eserleri*. Ankara: Kültür Bakanlığı Yayınları.
- Haggard, R. G. (1962). *Glass and Glassmakers*. New York: Roy Publishers.
- Harden, D.B. (1936). *Roman Glass from Karanis Found by University of Michigan Archaeological Expedition in Egypt, 1924-1929*. Michigan.
- Hayes, J. W. (1971). A New Type of Early Christian Ampulla. *BSA*, 66, 243-248.
- Hayes, J. W. (1975). *Roman and Pre-Roman Glass in The Royal Ontario Museum*. Toronto: Royal Ontario Museum.
- Hayes, J. W. (1992). *Excavations at Saraçhane in İstanbul 2, The Pottery*. Princeton.
- Hayes, J. W. (1997). *Handbook of Mediterranean Roman Pottery*. London.
- Hellström, P. (1965). *Pottery of Classical and Later Date Terracotta Lamps and Glass*, Labraunda Vol. II, Part 1.
- Isings, C. (1957). *Roman Glass From Dated Finds*. Djakarta.
- Khairy, N. I. (1980). Nabataean Piriform Unguentaria. *Bulletin of The American Schools of Oriental Research*, No. 240, 85-91.
- Kılıç, A. C. (1995). *Cam Üretiminde Üfleme Yöntemiyle Biçimlendirme*. Dokuz Eylül University, (Unpublished Master's Thesis), İzmir.
- Küçükerman, Ö. (1985). *Cam Sanatı ve Geleneksel Türk Camcılığında Örnekler*. Ankara: Türkiye İş Bankası Kültür Yayınları.
- Küçükpazarlı, N. (2006). *Konya Arkeoloji Müzesi'nde Bulunan Roma Çağı Cam Eserleri*. Selçuk University, (Unpublished Master's Thesis), Konya.
- Lightfoot, C. S. and Arslan, M. (1992). *Anadolu Antik Camları: Yüksel Erimtan Koleksiyonu*, Ankara: Ünal Ofset.
- Ölmez, F. (2000). *Tralleis Nekropolünden Bir Mezar ve Buluntuları*. Adnan Menderes University, (Unpublished Master's Thesis), Aydın.
- Özet, A. (1998). *Dipten Gelen Parlıt*. Ankara: T.C. Kültür ve Turizm Bakanlığı Geleneksel El Sanatları / Anıtlar ve Müzeler Genel Müdürlüğü Yayınları.
- Özgümmüş, Ü. (2008). *Anadolu Camcılığı*. İstanbul: Pera Yayıncılık ve Kitapçılık.
- Özhanlı, M. and Fırat, M. (2011). Side Unguentariumları Işığında Dinin Kapların Kullanım Alanları Üzerindeki Etkileri. *SDÜ Fen Edebiyat Fakültesi Sosyal Bilimler Dergisi*, Vol. 23, 7-30.
- Öztürk, N. (2003). Çankırı Müzesi'nde Bulunan Erken Roma Dönemi'ne Ait Bir Grup Cam Eser. *Atatürk Üniversitesi Güzel Sanatlar Fakültesi Sanat Dergisi*, Vol. 4, 69-84.
- Öztürk, N. (2013). *Erzurum Müzesi Cam Eserleri*. Erzurum: Mega Ofset.
- Saraçoğlu, A. (2011). Hellenistic and Roman *Unguentaria* from The Necropolis of Tralleis. *Anatolia* 37, 1-42.

- Sparkers, B. and Talcott, L. (1970). *Black and Plain Ware of the Sixth, Fifth, and Fourth Centuries B.C.*, The Athenian Agora XII. Princeton.
- Stern, K. B. (2008). *Inscribing Devotion and Death: Archaeological Evidence for Jewish Populations of North Africa*. Brill.
- Taştemür, E. (2007). *Klaros Cam Eserleri*. Trakya University, (Unpublished Master's Thesis), Edirne.
- Tavukçu, Z. A. (2007). Parion Güney Nekropolü'nden Bir Grup Cam Eser. *Atatürk Üniversitesi Güzel Sanatlar Fakültesi Dergisi*, Vol. 12, 145-161.
- Temür, A. and Eker, F. (2019). Sinop Müzesi Cam Eserler Kataloğu. Ankara: Akademisyen Kitabevi.
- Thompson, H. A. (1934). Two Centuries of Hellenistic Pottery. *Hesperia* 3, 311-480.
- Türker, A. Ç. (2005). Myra'da Aziz Nikolaos'un Yağ Kültüyle İlişkili Seramik Kaplar. *Adalya VIII*, 311-328.
- Vessberg, O. and Westholm, A. (1956). *The Hellenistic and Roman Periods in Cyprus*. The Swedish Cyprus Expedition Vol. IV, Part 3, Stockholm.
- Wessberg, O. (1952). Roman Glass in Cyprus. *Opus.Ath.*,7, 109-161.
- Yağcı, E. E. (1998). M.Ö.II. Binde Anadolu'da Cam. *OlbaI*, 29-44.
- Young, R. S. (1951). An Industrial District of Ancient Athens. *Hesperia: The Journal of the American School of Classical Studies at Athens*, Vol. 20, No. 3, 135-288.
- Zoroğlu, L. (1986). Kelenderis Mezar Buluntuları. *Anadolu Araş* X, 455-466.

Plate 1



U1 Draw 1




U2 Draw 2



U3 Draw 3



U4 Draw 4



U5 Draw 5



U6 Draw 6



U7 Draw 7



U8 Draw 8



U9 Draw 9

Plate 2



U10 Draw 10



U11 Draw 11



U12 Draw 12



# Archaeology of the Turkish-Islamic Synthesis: Islam, Turkishness, and Westernization as the Pillars of the Modern Ottoman Identity<sup>1</sup>

Ali Babahan<sup>2</sup>

## Abstract

This study investigates the historical foundations of the Turkish-Islamic synthesis, a threefold discourse combining religion, nationalism, and modernization in the form of Westernization, which was systematically indoctrinated by nationalist intellectuals in Turkey during the 1970s. The argument of the study is that Young Ottomans were the first voices of the discursive orientation to unite and synthesize all three elements, as part of the quest to construct a modern Ottoman identity to save the state in the last period of the Ottoman Empire. At the official level, this discourse gradually became institutionalized and officialized during the reign of Sultan Abdul Hamid II with the expansion of modernization policies aimed at transforming society and the state and formed the basis for state policies in many areas. To this end, the writings and statements of Young Ottomans are analyzed in detail, followed by a comprehensive evaluation of the policy implementations in the Ottoman Empire during the reign of Abdül Hamid II and their reflections on education, also including the Sultan's own expressions, in terms of ideological attempts to articulate Islam, Turkishness, and Westernization.

## 1. Introduction

“Turkish-Islamic Synthesis” is the name of an (ideological) discourse<sup>3</sup> that was indoctrinated in the 1970s under the roof of an organization known

- 
- 1 This article is a revised and extended version of one of the sections of my Phd dissertation (Babahan 2014).
  - 2 Dr. Öğr. Üyesi, Bolu Abant İzzet Baysal Üniversitesi Sosyoloji Bölümü, babahan\_a@ibu.edu.tr, 0000-0002-9282-911X
  - 3 In the study, I use the concept of “ideology” as “a form of a social cognition, shared by the members of a group, class, or other social formations” (Van Dijk 1989: 24); and “discourse” as “a specific ‘textual’ form of language use in the social context” to correspond to the linguistic

in Turkey as the Intellectuals' Hearth (*Aydınlar Ocağı*), comprising an intelligentsia from Muslim Turkish nationalists. Shortly after its emergence, it received a collective interest and widespread recognition after becoming the state's official discourse following the military coup in 1980 (Güvenç et al., 1994; Dursun, 2002). The founding argument of this discourse, which considers ethnicity and religion to be indispensable components of national identity and official ideology, is that Turkishness and (Sunni) Islam complement each other (Bora et al., 2000: 161). Accordingly, Turks are assumed to have an essential contribution to Islam's prevalence and the development of the Islamic civilization. At the same time, Islam, as a religion, refers to an adhesive force that unites Turks (Copeaux, 2000: 56). Still decisive at the official level in Turkey, this discourse also recognizes "modernization,"<sup>4</sup> or "Westernization,"<sup>5</sup> to the extent that it involves a modern economic, legal, social, and organizational model with industrial-technological progress. Thus, modernization (or Westernization), which officially never existed in the celebrated title of the synthesis possibly due to nationalist concerns, always remains implicitly as one of the three founding dimensions of this discourse with Islam and Turkishness (Güvenç et al., 1994; Dursun, 2002).

Although Turkish-Islamic Synthesis has been indoctrinated recently, several researchers claim that the ideas and attempts to articulate Turkishness, Islam, and Westernization within the same discourse may be dated back to the 19th century. (See İnalçık, 2016: 189; Özdalga, 2009; Turan, 1993; Toprak, 1981; Bora, 2008; Zubadia, 1996; Çetinsaya, 1999; Parla, 2002).

---

expression of ideologies (Van Dijk 1989: 19, 22). Therefore, pursuant with this approach, the discourse layer which is related to what a person says and how it is said consists of the "overt or covert" ideological traces that enable understanding of what this person believes in, thinks of and how he perceives/interprets the world. (Van Dijk 1989)

- 4 Modernization originally refers to the new form of social life and organization that emerged in Europe from the 18th century onwards. (Tekeli, 2005: 137). In this sense, the concept defines to follow the radical transformation process that lasted for centuries in the Western world and brought about the change of the entire social structure. This process, briefly, is identified with the emergence of the concepts and institutions including "social mobility, modern state, bureaucratization and centralization, industrialization or capitalism and secularism [and nationalism]" (Greenfeld, 2006: 160). Tekeli (2005: 138) stated that the modernization process, which was born in Europe, tended to spread all over the world due to both its claim of universality in the field of thought and the structural nature of capitalism, one of its components. Accordingly, the non-Western world could not remain unresponsive to this process and, over time, modernization has become a global model for transformation and it has influenced the whole world.
- 5 Westernization (Tr. *Batılılaşma*; *Garplılaşma*) is usually considered in Turkey to be the Western way of modernization; thus used as a synonym of modernization (Çiğdem, 2001; Göle, 2001). Since the concept of Westernization, rather than modernization, was widely used in the historical period covered by this study, I prefer to use the latter in this study.

Nevertheless, since it was not the main concern of their work, they did not provide a comprehensive analysis of such discursive formations in this period. In this study, I intend to comprehensively conduct the historical archaeology of this discourse and systematically figure out the historical foundations of this synthesis by evaluating the documented statements of the late Ottoman elites.

My basic assumption at this point is that the orientation that is addressed, as it combines Turkishness and Islam in addition to Westernization within a collective identity<sup>6</sup> discourse, requires the emergence of modernization policies in the Empire and, more decisively, even if not at the level of political nationalism, at least the appearance of an ethnic awareness on Turkishness, among the Ottoman elites. Therefore, I take the second half of the 19th century, particularly as the starting point within the scope of the modernization process which took place in the late period of the Ottoman Empire when Islam and Turkishness started to be discussed among some of the Ottoman power elites<sup>7</sup> as the basis of the (modern) Ottoman socio-cultural identity to keep the society together. Karpat (2001: 356) also considers this period the first stage of “the evolution of Turkish ethnic consciousness and the crystallization of Turkish identity.”

In this context, I argue that, in the history of Turkey, Young Ottomans, the leading intellectual group of the period, were the pioneering voices of a discursive orientation that is contemporarily entitled as Turkish-Islamic synthesis. Besides, institutional adoption of their ideas took place in the era of Abdul Hamid II, who was significantly influenced by the Young

---

6 “‘Identity’ denotes the ways in which individuals and collectivities are distinguished in their relations with other individuals and collectivities.” (Jenkins, 2008: 18) Identity, first and foremost, related with a private search about the position of individual in this world, which is generally pursued by considering his/her qualities, resources and objectives in terms of their similarities and differences with other individuals. (Brubaker, 2012: 4; Jenkins, 2008:17-18) However, this search is also a social quest in nature, as it inevitably requires the determination of the position of the individual in the social context he/she lives in. Therefore, the question, “Who am I?”, initially asked at the individual level, tends to turn into “Who are we?” in the next step, by taking a collective quality (Smith, 1991: 3-4; Jenkins, 2008: 12-13, 16). In this level, the self-identification is usually made on the basis of a mixture of genealogy, kinship, spoken language, belief, the tradition followed, the place of residence, or the community in which individual lives. On the other hand, collective identities could also become the base of political claims and perform a constitutive function in terms of providing the very foundation of political sovereignty and organization. Thus, at this level, the cultural and the political are intertwined (Brubaker, 2012: 5)

7 The reason for focusing on “power elites” in the study is that this group is accepted to be the agents of dominant social discourses (See. Van Dijk, 1989). These groups who are accepted to consist of political, military, economic and socio-cultural power circles in a certain society are defined as “the manufacturers of public knowledge, beliefs, attitudes, norms, values, morals, and ideologies” due to their powers on the society (Van Dijk, 1989: 22).

Ottomans' ideas despite his apparent conflict with them. For this purpose, a detailed analysis of the statements of Young Ottomans, Sultan Abdul Hamid II, and some other ruling elites of the period is carried out regarding their thoughts on Turkishness, Islam, and Westernization. As a supportive source for stating the characteristics of the official discourse, I also use Alkan's (2000; 2009) analyses of the textbooks of the period.

## **2. Religion, Ethnicity, and Nationalism as the Pillars of Collective Identity**

Religion can be defined as a socio-cultural institution through which the social values, rules, and interactions (and therefore beliefs, thoughts, and activities) of a community of believers are systematically arranged concerning a (supposed) superhuman source (Spiro, 2004: 96-98). Ethnicity, on the other hand, is related to human collectivities in which members mostly have a (subjective) sense of possessing lineage ties, sharing a common history, land, culture, religion, tradition, institution, lifestyle, and/or livelihood activity (Smith, 1991: 20). Both of these served as the traditional sources of social order and collective identity to some extent (Brubaker, 2012: 4). However, since pre-modern states were based on multi-religious and multi-ethnic social formations, and there were explicit and well-protected socio-cultural divisions between the governing classes and their subjects, neither religion nor ethnicity could be the ideological ground for a claim of political integration and sovereignty till modern times (Gellner, 1983, Hobsbawm, 1992, Anderson, 1991).

Nationalism, as one of the by-products of modernization, however, is commonly defined as a political doctrine suggesting a congruence between the cultural and the political units (Gellner, 1983: 1-5). According to this understanding of nationalism, “[it] consists of political activities that aim to make the boundaries of the nation -a culturally distinctive collectivity aspiring to self-governance- coterminous with those of the state... [which is] refer[ed] to the set of specialized institutions that is responsible for producing order, justice, social welfare, and defense in a territorially bounded society” (Hechter, 2000:7).

As a modern phenomenon, nationalism first appeared in the Western part of Europe in the 18<sup>th</sup> century, but over time it has become an ideology-social movement influencing almost all parts of the world (Greenfeld, 2006). Some authors, such as Kohn (1946), distinguished between different types of nationalism, taking into account the political varieties due to different economic and socio-political settings in other parts of the world. In this

context, the most widely accepted distinction is between political or civic nationalism, which emphasizes political and legal aspects, and ethnic or cultural nationalism, which emphasizes culture and lineage.

Still, modernists like Gellner (1983), as mentioned above, take “the existence of political demand for self-determination in a distinct territorial unit” as the crucial criterion to separate nations from other kinds of social collectivities including ethnic groups. Hobsbawm (1992: 46-47), for this reason, distinguishes other modes of collectivities that lack politically oriented pursuits, including pre-modern religious and ethnic formations, as “proto-nationalist” orientations. He also emphasizes this doesn’t mean that all of these modes of ethnic awareness will ultimately bring nationalist desire and endeavor. In this study, I adopt this approach to differentiate between nationalism and other forms of collective identity and belonging; and consider the discursive integration of Islam and Turkishness with Westernization as the basis of collective identity rather than taking this as a political-ideological formation. For this aim, in the following sections, I first examine the specific role of religion and ethnicity in Ottoman society and politics; and then explore the new forms and functions they acquired in the discourses of the intellectuals of the period and state policy, with the emergence of modernization.

### **3. The Emergence of the Ethnic Awareness of Turkishness as a Collective Identity Discourse in the Ottoman Empire during the 19th century**

Religion was the principal referential source in the traditional Ottoman social life, state-society relations, and mutual affairs of different communities in the society, until Empire’s late periods, like in the rest of the world. So, Islam, both for the governing elite and the Muslim Ottoman subjects, was generally before all other socio-cultural identities. Besides, the Imperial rule and law were regulated and operated concerning religious congregational differences among the subjects (İnalçık, 2005). Nevertheless, similar to the previous Muslim Turkish states, the Ottoman Empire had a dual government and legal system that combined religious law based on Islamic resources (*Sharia*) and temporal law (*Orf*) consisting of customary rulings and practices. Within such a framework, in politics, the weights of temporality and spirituality (mainly in the form of Sunni Islam) varied regarding the changing context for six centuries. And the researchers have a consensus that the Caliphate authority, which is accepted to be transferred to the dynasty during the reign of Selim I, rarely had a decisive effect on politics in the subsequent periods (İnalçık, 2005, 2016; Mardin, 2005; Ocak, 2011; Karpat, 2001).

On the other hand, the significance of Turkishness in traditional Ottoman society is more ambiguous than religion. Indeed, “Turkishness,” as the name of an ethnic group, was not commonly used even by Turkish-speaking urban and rural classes for defining themselves until the late Ottoman Empire (Aydın, 2012: 156-159). There was a common tendency to limit Turkishness mostly to the Qizilbash-Alevi Turkomans almost until the War of Liberation (Aydemir, 1993: 113). And particularly the Ottoman elites, similar to their counterparts in pre-modern European societies, viewed themselves as different from the ordinary people so their ethnic and social identities could be distinguished from the rest of the community. For Aydın (2012: 156), “this made them culturally and mentally as well as actually a part of the ruling class and enabled them to confirm the sharp distinction between the identities of the people who ruled and who were ruled.”

However, in the second half of the 19<sup>th</sup> century, a particular interest emerged among the Ottoman elites in Turkishness as an ethnic category and Turkish language and history (Kushner, 1977). There are various reasons underlying this development. The first reason is related to the effect of other nationalist movements developing in both the Western world and among the non-Muslim subjects of the Empire on several Ottoman elites (Özdoğan, 2006: 41). Accordingly, the Christian population of the Empire, also with the contribution of recent political and economic problems of the state, “became aware of their national origins and started to riot against the central authority represented by the Ottoman state” (Georgeon, 2006: 1-2). This process was pioneered by the Greeks and Serbians and followed by the Bulgarians, Macedonians, and Armenians with the support of the European states. The ideas guiding these movements spread to the Muslim people of the Empire over time and influenced Albanians, Arabs, Kurds, and finally, Turks, respectively (Georgeon, 2006: 2).

The second reason behind the mentioned development could be the emergence of a quest for a new identity as a (modern) social-cultural cement in the eyes of the Ottoman elites, at least to keep the remaining peoples of the Empire together. Indeed, this search can be dated back to the reign of Mahmud II. However, the initial intention was to unite the subjects of the Empire under the roof of “Ottomanism” rather than any ethnic or religious emphasis. But, in parallel to severe territorial loss and the acquisition of Turks as the majority within the Imperial population, it held on to the idea of a new identity based on Turkishness as a uniting factor over time (Göçek, 2002; Erdoğan, 2008; Somel, 2009; Alkan, 2009; Georgeon, 2006).

From a third aspect, this interest can be evaluated as “a defense mechanism against humiliation before Western expansionism”. The Ottomans, whose military power had struck great fear into their rivals in the past, were indeed losing the wars for a long time and even becoming economically dependent on foreign debt (Özdoğan, 2006: 41).

Thus, various cultural and scientific studies of some European researchers on Turks, notably those mostly having positive statements, gradually received more and more attention and significantly impacted the emergence of self-awareness among the Ottoman intelligentsia. Indeed, the works of Joseph de Guignes, Arthur L. Davids, Kont Borzecki, Arminius Vambery, Léon Cahun, A. I. De Sacy, W. Radloff, E. D. W. Gibb, and V. Thompson started to flatter the pride of the Turkish readers due to their praising content about Turks (Kushner, 1977: 9-11). These works paved the way to start using the word “Turk,” which included less than positive evocations until then, with more comprehensive content containing historical, racial, and socio-cultural references to name certain people (Kushner, 1977: 20-26).

Nevertheless, as mentioned before, it has to be reminded that the ethnic awareness shaped by the search for a socio-cultural identity developing among some elites in this period cannot be taken as a nationalist movement in the modern sense since it was not based on a systematic political agenda aiming at combining the nation and the state. Therefore, it would be more appropriate to define the steps in this period, which only consisted of an identity discourse rather than arising from a systematic and consistent political goal, to be a “proto-nationalist” movement (Poulton, 1997: 58-64; Hanioglu, 2012: 22; Bozarlan, 2015: 141; Bora, 2008: 16), in the way Hobsbawm (1992: 46-79) defined. Designating the bases of collective unity and identity, this discourse consisted of references to Turkish history, culture/language, and ethnicity and even had racial implications to some extent (Özdoğan, 2006: 41).

In this context, ethnic consciousness and emotions gradually developed in the eyes of a group of Turkish intellectuals and bureaucrats. They assumed a duty “to study their own history, to inquire into the affairs of their brothers outside the Ottoman borders, and to develop the Turkish language and culture” (Kushner, 1977: 26). Meanwhile, the writings and studies on pre-Islamic Turkish history, which didn’t get much attention in the traditional Ottoman historiography, started to proliferate in this period. The first examples were written by Ahmed Cevdet Pasha, Ahmed Vefik Pasha, Ahmed Hilmi, Süleyman Pasha, and Ali Suavi in the second half of the 19th century. They mainly emphasized the positions and roles of the Turks in history

(Kushner, 1977: 27-29). The increase of studies in this field allowed gradually more inclusion of the ideas such as “Turks are a nation with a crucial place in history,” “the ancestors of the Ottomans originated from the Turkish tribes in Central Asia,” “Bulgarians and Crimeans are Turkish tribes in origin,” “the Huns were the first Turkish people who migrated to Europe,” “Turks are an old nation dating back to Prophet Abraham,” “Turks established great states long before the emergence of Islam including the Oghuz Khan state,” or “Turks and Mongols are relatives” in the history books of the period (Kushner, 1977: 28-30). In this manner, new historical narratives generated in this context included an emphasis on the naturalness and perenniality of Turkishness and the frequent repetition of the expression that Turks were a community with superior qualities (Kushner, 1977: 31-33).

Along with this, the religious and ethnic identities were intertwined in this pioneering wave (Özdoğan, 2006: 42; Karpat, 2001: 21; Kushner, 1977: 40; Bora, 2008: 16), like in the nationalist movements of the non-Muslim subjects of the Empire (Göçek, 2002). The characteristic feature of such a tendency was that Islam, Turkishness, and even Westernization were considered the essential elements of the remaining Ottoman population, as complementing each other (Deringil, 2009: 263-296; Karpat, 2001: 353-407). At this point, this process should be evaluated in detail.

#### **4. Islam, Turkishness, and Westernization and the Search for an Ottoman Identity**

The formation of a modern Ottoman identity combining Islam with Turkishness could be possible through the advocacy of Turkishness as one of the leading elements of the Ottoman identity within the process mentioned above. In this early period, those who defined (Sunni) Islam, Turkishness, and some Western elements (peculiar to the capitalist/bourgeois societies) as the essential components of the (new/modern) Ottoman identity were the section among the power elites who had envisagement of a “conservative” kind of modernism (Babahan, 2021). This conservative modernist group, which can be positioned between the anti-modernist wing of the *Ulema* (religious scholars and bureaucracy) and the pro-modernist elites, suggested a synthesis between modernity and tradition as an alternative route in a period of serious discussions about the question of “how to save the state?” (Hanioglu, 1995: 13-16; Ülken, 2014: 8-9; Tunaya, 2010: 25-34; İrem, 1999; Güngörmez, 2014; Babahan, 2021).

According to this group of conservatives, which regarded the power of the West as consisting only of its technical, economic, and financial (i.e.,

material) superiority and considered the co-existence of two separate worlds (old and new) to be possible, the solution was “to equip oneself with the attractive sides of the East and West” (Ülken, 2014: 276). This refers to the expression of the “ideal to benefit from the technique/science of the West and manage to remain to be Eastern in spirit” by separating civilization and culture (more precisely, the material and moral elements of culture) (Ülken, 2014: 9, 26), which is still accepted by the present conservatives who argue for the harmonization of traditional values and beliefs with modern developments.

The importance of this ideological orientation concerning our subject derives from the fact that Turkishness, Islam, and Westernization were considered to be the elements supporting each other regarding their political-social agendas of conservative modernists to save the state in the late period of the Empire. The order of significance among these elements involved variance even within conservative circles. However, it is noticed that these “three elements that are used as the play blocks of children” were found in all attempts of such a “synthesis” generated as a response to the “250-year quest of the cultural identity of the Turkish society” (Parla, 2002: 206-208). In this regard, it wouldn’t be wrong to consider these attempts of conservatives to unite Turkishness, Islam, and Westernization for their cultural identity constructions as the archetypal form of the current “Turkish-Islamic synthesis” discourse in history.

### **5. Young Ottomans and the Foundations of Turkish-Islamic Synthesis**

When we look at the founding fathers of the said synthesis attempt in the history of the Ottoman Empire, we can include the members of the “New/Young Ottomans” (*Yeni/Genç Osmanlılar*) who were the first voices of conservative modernism, as well as Sultan Abdul Hamid II and several ruling elites of his period within this cluster for their ideas and practices. I assert that the nuances between them stem from the differences in attitudes about which of the three elements discussed here should take primacy in particular and how the relationship between the new and the old elements of the synthesis would be structured in general.

As mentioned earlier, Young Ottomans were the pioneers of the group of intellectuals who envisioned combining Islam, Turkishness, and Westernization for a modern Ottoman identity during a time when ethnic awareness unfolded among Turkish elites in this period (Mardin, 2000; Findley, 1980; Karpas, 2001; Tunaya, 2010). This group, which came

to the fore between 1867-1878 and led by names including Ziya Pasha, Namık Kemal, Mustafa Fazıl Pasha, İbrahim Sinasi, and Ali Suavi were “at one and the same time the first men to make the ideas of the Enlightenment part of the intellectual equipment of the Turkish reading public and the first thinkers to try to work out a synthesis between these ideas and Islam” Mardin (2000: 4).

Young Ottomans, who had a modern education and most of whom worked in various levels of bureaucracy, were the actual products of the modernization process of the Empire. They had an opposing attitude against the “cultural alienation” process caused by the pro-modernist *Tanzimat* policies on the one hand and against the absolutist tendencies of the senior administration (Mardin, 2000). Mardin (2000: 47) summarizes the political goals embraced by the group as a response as follows: “the establishment of a national representative body, the elimination of foreign interference in the domestic affairs of Turkey, the solution of the problem of reform along with Ottoman and Islamic lines.”

At this point, it should be stated that their significantly similar class positions were decisive in the ideas they embraced. According to Tiftikçi (2003: 83), Young Ottomans “were the first voices at the political stage of the bourgeoisie of Turkey who would proclaim the constitution and the republic.” With a similar argument, Karpas (2001: 96) also stated that the emphasis on the “(proto-)nationalist-Islamic” theme in the discourse of this group was directly related to the anger and discontent of the newly developing Muslim bourgeoisie against the political-economic privileges granted to the Christian subjects by the Reform Decree (1856).

According to Ülken (2014: 91), the person among Young Ottomans who “first argued that a modernized Islam, Westernization, and Turkishness are three views that complement each other” was Ali Suavi (1839-1878). Suavi held offices in the bureaucracy of education and law following his madrasah education, and then went to Europe and published various newspapers like *Ulûm* (Eng. Sciences) and *Mulsbir* (Eng. Informer). In the foreign lands, on the one hand, he had the opportunity to be fed from many different intellectual sources he could access, and on the other hand, he tried to bring his own perspective on how the issues of Turkishness, Muslimness, and Ottomanness should be treated (Çelik, 2021).

While evaluating Ali Suavi’s intellectual orientation, Çelik (2021: 389) states that he, like the other members of Young Ottomans, prioritized Islam in his solutions to the political and social problems of his time and addressed many worldly issues within the framework of the principles of this religion.

Therefore, even when he advocated Western concepts like “constitutionalism”, “parliamentary government”, “liberalism”, or “rationalism”, or reforms in social and political life, he sought to legitimize and validate them through Islamic law and tradition. (Ülken, 2014; Çelik, 2021). For him, “Christians have the tradition of preserving the old method and turning against the new, not the Muslims” (Ülken, 2014: 112). In this regard, what needed to be done was “to sort out the misinterpretations of Islam, what merged into Islam afterward, and the loose [humanly] ideas that interrupt progress” (Ülken, 2014: 112-113).

It should be noted that Ali Suavi also followed many writings (negative or positive) about Turks, especially during his stay in Europe, and developed a certain interest in this issue. In some of his writings, he used the term Turk as a synonym for Ottoman or Muslim, rather than implying an ethnic or racial belonging. For this, evidence can be found in his article titled “*Osman*” (Eng. Ottoman) published in the *Muhbir* newspaper on June 12, 1868. In this text, Ali Suavi (1869a) stated that the main difference between the Ottomans and the Europeans was that the latter had racism, whereas in the “Turkish State” (i.e. the Ottoman Empire), the main thing was “*tawhid*” (i.e. unity), and for this purpose, Islam as a religious bond, not ethnic belonging, was prioritized. In this context, he wrote, in the Ottomans, regardless of their origins, talented people among Croats, Greeks, Franks, or Albanians could reach high positions in bureaucracy or other circles (and are called Turks) if they convert to Islam (Ali Suavi, 1868a). Therefore, here, Ali Suavi gives the impression that it is not race or ethnicity but religious affiliation that determines Turkishness. In support of this, the author identifies all the two hundred million Muslims he assumes to be living in the world at that time as Turks (Ali Suavi, 1868a).

However, in one of the other articles entitled “*Türk*” which was published in the same issue of *Muhbir*, Ali Suavi (1868b), in particular, adopted an ethnicist approach while responding to the claim of some contemporary Europeans that “there was not as much Turkish population in Anatolia as was thought, and that Ertugrul Gazi and the families who came to Anatolia were assimilated by other tribes over time” (Çelik, 2021: 437-38). In this context, with the information he obtained from various sources, the author stated that Turks, Turkmens, Huns, Mongols, Tatars, Uighurs, Avars, Hungarians, Uzbeks, and Yakuts are all from the same family and that they are all descendants of Oz Khan (or Oguz Khan), whom he claimed lived in the same period with the prophet Abraham at least 3200 years ago (Ali Suavi, 1868b).

Ali Suavi (1868b) then argued, citing Herodotus, that the Huns were present in both Europe and Anatolia in the 4th century AD. He went on to write that since the Seljuks, there had been an intense Turkish migration to Anatolia from Central Asia and the Caucasus, which he called Turkistan, and that Osman Bey had established his own principality as a successor to them and expanded this population (Ali Suavi, 1868a).

Besides, Ali Suavi (1868a) argued that (ethnic) Turks made significant contributions to civilization, especially after they became Muslims. According to him, while Europeans considered the Turks as a community ignorant of sciences because they mistook many Turkish scholars to be Arabs, “Turks had universities in Nishapur when Europeans were in the age of ignorance” (Ali Suavi, 1868a). In another article published in *Ulum*, the author listed Farabi, Ibn Sina, Abu Mansur Maturidi, Bukhari, Mergivani, Jawhari, Ishaq, Qazvini, Ulug Bey, Ilhani, Shamsaddin Fenari, Qadizade, Ali Kuşçu, İbni Kemal, Kınalızade and some others as the outstanding Turkish scholars of their time (Çelik, 2021: 442). And, that Ali Suavi did not intend to refer to all Muslim scholars as Turk(ish) and he used it as an ethnic term is evident from the fact that in the same article, he wrote: “It is difficult to prove that scholars such as al-Ghazali, Tusi, Zamakhshari, Taftazani, and Jurjani were Turks, but they wrote with the patronage and encouragement of Turkish rulers” (Çelik, 2021: 442). Therefore, considering his ambivalent attitude, it is possible to say that Ali Suavi, on the one hand, used the term “Turk” as a broad expression to include the Muslim and even the Ottoman population of his time, while on the other hand, with an ethnic awareness, he started to see it as a racial-ethnic term.

In particular, one of the indicators of the increase in his awareness of Turkishness is his efforts in the use and dissemination of the Turkish language. He indeed made the first etymological comparison between Turkish and the Indo-European languages (Ülken, 2014: 102) and defended plain Turkish other than the eloquent Ottoman expression (Çelik, 2021: 447-8). He wrote,

Our aim in saying that it was necessary to write in Turkish was to write in the writing style of early Turks like Mir Ali Shir [Nevai], instead of using vulgar or obsolete words. Th[at] style... was to keep the speech short, that is, not to... [lengthen the sentence] unless necessary. By writing in this style, the subject can be very clearly expressed and utilized [by people of all levels]” (Ali Suavi, 1869: 479 cit. Çelik, 2021: 449).

Nevertheless, even when Ali Suavi proposes the simplification and reform of the language, he warns that to maintain cultural ties between the living society and the past, this must be done with such care that individuals are not

deprived of reading books written over many centuries (Ali Suavi, 1869: 1 cit. Çelik, 2021: 450). Another critical element of his thoughts on language was about the Turkification of the language of prayer and the Qur'an. he attempted to bring evidence for this from the Islamic jurisprudence (Ülken, 2014: 94).

Another leading Young Ottoman intellectual was Namık Kemal (1840-1888), who had a “modern” ideology shaped by Muslim-Turkish qualities in the sense as it presented “as a means of mass mobilization and identification” (Karpát, 2002: 55). Just like many of his contemporary intellectuals, he held offices in bureaucracy in addition to being a poet, writer, and publisher. Ülken (2014: 120) states that Kemal was initially closer to the traditional Ottoman mentality, but his ideas developed particularly under the effect of French romantics following his stay in Europe.

Namık Kemal saw the Turkification of all Ottoman Muslims as the recipe for the salvation of the Empire (Karpát, 2001: 358). Mardin (2000: 286-287, 293) mentions that Namık Kemal, whom he described as the name creating the unique, remarkable political philosophy among the works of his time, had two separate sources in political philosophy: Islamic and Western. In fact, concerning the fundamental issues of political theory, in particular, such as power/authority, sovereignty, legitimacy, and representation, his thinking contains traces from traditional Islamic law and political philosophy on the one hand, like Ali Suavi, but also from the Western enlightenment ideas of the time on the other (Mardin, 2000: 287-336; Karpát, 2002: 55).

A typical example of this matter is the combined use of concepts from different political-intellectual traditions in his statements about patriotism, including “homeland,” “Ottoman,” “*ummah*” (Islamic community), “nation,” “Turk,” “race,” and “sect” (Mardin, 2000: 327-329). Therefore, the articles of Namık Kemal primarily address Ottomanness, Turkishness, and Islam as indispensable components of collective identity like in his statement that asks “Are not the Turks that nation... in whose *medresses* [(Eng. Islamic schools)] Farabis, Ibn Sinas, Gazalis, Zemahşeris propagated knowledge?” (Namık Kemal, 1868 cit. Mardin, 2000: 328). Mardin (2000: 331) and Karpát (2001: 330-335) agreed on the fact that the author’s play *Vatan yahut Silistre* (1873) (Eng. Homeland or Silistra) is an example with historical value as it is a pioneer work that combines various themes, particularly on Turkishness and Islam. According to Karpát (2001: 333), this play was propaganda done for the idea of an Ottoman homeland to root among Muslims and mainly Turks. Like Ali Suavi, for him, “‘Ottoman,’ in Namık Kemal’s thinking, was already synonymous with ‘Muslim’ and ‘Turk’ and excluded the non-Muslims” (Karpát, 2001: 332).

On the other hand, it is significant for our subject that Ibrahim Sinasi (1826-1871), a journalist, and a member of the same group, was the first person to use the concept of nation, which used to describe different religious congregations according to the Islamic terminology until then, as “the Ottoman nation” in a manner corresponding to its modern use in the West (Lewis, 1969: 336). Yet, the Ottoman intellectuals used the concept mainly at least until the beginning of the 20th century, in a dual sense, including both religious and ethnic references (Karpat, 2001: 126).

At this stage, it would be appropriate to mention the concrete examples of the approach that combined Turkishness with Islamic themes, which started to develop among some elites of the time, particularly in the works of Young Ottomans. In this respect, one of the patterns that are most frequently seen in various articles is the pride that Turks are Muslims and have contributed to Islam. A detailed quote from Kushner (1977: 33-36) can be given as an example on this subject:

Great as the Turkish contribution to ancient civilization was, so were the services rendered by the Turks to Islam. The Turks, according to the writers, are to be credited with the spread and defense of Islam, as well as its internal revival, especially since decadence and disintegration began to threaten the Islamic world in the later centuries of Abbasid rule... The Arabs, says an article in *Basiret* [newspaper], were, with all their virtues, prone to internal strife, disregard of law and order, and hasty action. The Turks, on the other hand, were characterized by organizational ability, concern for law, and calm consideration before acting, and it was in these traits that their contribution to strength and unity in Islam lay....

The writer Ebuuziyya Tevfik (1848-1913) who, in his views on language and language reform was accused of striking at Arabism, argues that...: “Moreover, the ones to protect the Arab nation, whose national power suffered weakness and injury for many reasons, were Turks. No Arab poems were recited in the wars about these soldiers, but rather Turkish poems. Those who waved the Ottoman banner on the Indian Seas were not Arabs but Turks. Those who bound hundreds of different peoples to the Ottoman sultanate were not Arabs, but Turks. Those who revived justice and virtue turned into corruption and feud with the emergence of the Umayyads, were not Arabs, but Turks...”

The Turkish role in Islamic history was not confined to their contribution to re-establishing Islamic political power in the world but included their part in Islamic civilization. As in pre-Islamic Turkish history, the authors try to discard the notion of the Turks as nomads or warriors and to stress their cultural and religious achievements...

Given the service of Islam to the world, and given the place of the Turks in the creation of Islamic civilization, it was clear to the Turkists that the Turks were among the founders of modern civilization. This notion is brought out in an article on the contribution of the Turks to medicine, written by the head physician of a hospital: “The Turks, who for centuries ruled in Transcaspia and Trans-oxania, spread the light of science from Asia, the cradle of civilization, to the four continents of the world. Those who produced Muslim scholars such as the Ibn Sinas, al-Farabis, Muhammad Ibn Abi Bakr al-Razis, and others... and helped to establish the foundations of modern civilization are the Turks... Those who for six hundred years lived under the wing of justice of the eternal Ottoman State... and rendered outstanding service to civilization and medical progress are, again, the children and descendants of the Turks.”

Mehmet Emin (Yurdakul) (1869-1944), holding offices at various levels of bureaucracy in addition to his poetry, may also be included in the names that adopt the idea that defines Turkishness and Islam as the critical components of Ottoman identity (Karpas, 2001: 361). Ülken (2014: 295) states that this orientation of Mehmet Emin was significantly influenced by his close friend Jemaleddin Afghani (1836-1897), who was hosted in Turkey at the invitation of Abdul Hamid II. Afghani, one of the leading names of Islamic modernism, considers religious and linguistic unity to be founding elements that connect people. For him, “each Muslim nation needs to wake up and gain national awareness separately to realize Islamic union” (Ülken, 2014: 295). The poem *Anadolu'dan Bir Ses yahut Cenge Giderken* (A Voice from Anatolia or on the Way to Battle), which Mehmet Emin wrote in 1897 under this influence, is a poetic piece that is still one of the foremost recited among the contemporary Muslim nationalist groups. Two stanzas of this poem, where the word “Turk” was also used for the first time as the name of the nation according to Yıldız (2001: 67), can be given as an example as it includes a concrete expression of these thoughts:

I am a Turk; my religion and race are supreme;  
 My chest (and) my essence are full of fire,  
 Who is human is the servant of his homeland.  
 Turk's child doesn't stay home; I go!

I won't let the book of the Creator be removed,  
 I won't let the flag of little Osman be taken,  
 I won't let my homeland be attacked by the enemy.  
 House of God won't be ruined; I go! (Tevetoğlu, 1988: 142)

## **6. The Reign of Abdul Hamid II and the Institutionalisation of the Official Discourse Combining Islam, Turkishness, and Westernization**

The era of Abdul Hamid II (1876-1909) was the period when the discourse combining Islam, Turkishness, and Westernization was officially institutionalized and officialized under the umbrella of the collective Ottoman identity. During this period, mass broadcasting and educational services, which were rapidly expanding especially in large cities as part of the comprehensive modernization program, became the most prominent instruments of institutional activity to disseminate this discourse. Thus, with the modernization of society and the state, it can be argued that there was a shift from a process of awakening the ethnic consciousness of Turkishness to a political process in which the Muslim Turkish population, which was to become the majority of the population, gradually began to be identified with the state.

To begin with the characterization of the ideological orientation of the era of Abdul Hamid II, it is striking that a kind of conservative modernism was adopted in state affairs (Koloğlu, 2009: 276). In this context, according to Irem (2011: 30), the modernization policies during this period had two aspects. They included the aspect of administrative-technical innovation and technology transfer that would allow controlling the economy and society, while excluding the liberating aspect of the Western version of modernity, which was based on the principles of political liberalism and parliamentary democracy, as well as the cultural aspect, which was seen as indoctrinating values.

The Sultan himself was described to be a person, concerning his personality and lifestyle, who was both “religious” on the one hand, and “modern-minded” and “attaching great importance to progress and science” on the other hand (Karpas, 2001: 175; Alkan, 2009: 386). According to Karpas (2001: 155-156), “he appears to be conservative from the religious point of view, but he was the most European Sultan about his daily life, lifestyle, and habits. His reforms in the fields of education, administration, communication, and transportation had a deeper effect on the internal texture of the Ottoman society than the reforms of Tanzimat.” Therefore, it seems reasonable to claim that the political and intellectual orientation of the Sultan was much different from the newly emerging middle-class elites of the Empire, for instance, from Young Ottomans, despite the difference in their social ranks. Essentially, as noted by Akçura (2007: 22), one of the prominent intellectuals of the time, “although Abdülhamid II mercilessly

opposed Young Ottomans, he was a student of their politics to some extent [...] His politics showed considerable similarities with the ideas of Young Ottomans.”

In this context, the Islamism of the period was a discourse maintaining the new Ottoman identity and the idea that the Muslim Turks were the dominant element (Landau, 2001; Karpas, 2001; Kara, 2011; Tunaya, 1998; Mardin, 2005). Similarly, Karpas (2001: 229) states that Abdul Hamid II “subtly nationalized, idealized and Turkified” history and therefore state apparatus and society through a series of Islamic and Turkic-originated traditions that were re-shaped in this period. For him, the Sultan began to describe himself, especially in the late period of his reign, “to be both Turkish and Muslim” (Karpas, 2001: 29). Still, accepting that religious and ethnical references were intertwined in this discourse, Alkan (2000) underlines that the emphasis on Islam was more dominant/decisive than Turkishness. For him, this synthesis, as the general characteristics of the official discourse of the era of Abdul Hamid II, was based on the idea that Turkishness, as an ethnic identity, bears a reserved, secondary emphasis that finds meaning with Islam (Alkan, 2000: 76).

Nevertheless, such a political initiation could seem paradoxical at a time when the legal status of non-Muslims was being equalized with that of Muslims through various official regulations and implementations, notably the Constitution (*Kanun-i Esasi*) (1876), in this period. In practice, however, Bozarslan (2018: 169) claims that an official Ottoman identity based on the Turkish-Islamic synthesis, which already had historical roots, would henceforth be expressed and recognized in legal terms, also taking advantage of the changing domestic and international conjuncture. His perspective on this issue allows us to see how official attitudes that have remained at the level of ethnic consciousness to this day began to be politicized henceforth:

The policy of integrating Muslim communities into the empire through oppression and privileges was not only a response to the politicization of identities of the Christian faith but also provides the means for the construction of a Turkish or Turkish-Muslim political majority that is recognized as the real sovereign of the state, the sole holder of the legitimate ownership over its history and territory, and the sole owner of the right to self-determination. In this sense, the Abdülhamid regime cannot be regarded as a simple re-centralization of the post-Tanzimat state in a conservative sense. This regime, by drawing a distinction between Muslims and non-Muslims, especially Christians, gradually turned this distinction into a fundamental basis of hostility. [Thus] [b]eyond being a symbolic template, the “Turkish-Islam” essence of the state was something that was being actively mobilized against

non-Muslims, expressed in political and then military terms (Bozarslan, 2018: 169).

Still, it has to be noted that those steps taken in this direction would gradually become more obvious and systematic beginning from the government of the Party of Union and Progress (*İttihat ve Terakki Fırkası*), the leading political actor after the fall of Abdül Hamid II, and would be further embodied with the ideal of a nation-state that recognized Muslim Turks as the main element during the establishment of the Turkish Republic.

At this point, it would be appropriate to evaluate some of Sultan's writings and statements to support the previous assessments of the dominant discourse of the era of Abdül Hamid II. In this context, we can quote from the memorandum of the Sultan himself as one of the concrete examples of such a discourse where Islam and Turkishness were combined to form the Ottoman identity at the official level:

The great Ottoman State was founded on faith after Yavuz Selim absorbed the Caliphate. But since the original state was established by Turks, in reality, this is a Turkish state... Since the exalted Osman established this sublime state, it has stood on four principles: the ruler [dynasty] is Ottoman, the administration is Turkish, the faith is Islam, and the capital is Istanbul. The weakening or dismissal of any of these principles will affect the foundation of the state (Abdul Hamid II, 1900 cit. Karpat, 2001: 336).

The political memoirs of the Sultan also include important hints on this matter. For example, in one part of his memoirs, Abdul Hamid II (1975: 179-180) stated that the Ottoman Empire consisted of different *millet*s (Eng. nations), and that was Islam, which matters, not the element of the nation. However, in the same memoirs, in another statement he made in 1893, possibly after territorial losses and an intense wave of migration, he developed an exceeding tendency that revealed Turkishness, as well as Islam, as a vital determinant:

It is no longer the period to put those from other religions into ourselves, our own flesh like a splinter. Within our state's borders, we can only accept those from our nation and those who share the same beliefs as ours (Muslim Türk, i.e., Ottoman). We should pay attention to strengthening the Turkish element. We need to bring the exceeding ones of the Muslim population in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Bulgaria and let them settle here regularly... It is a must to strengthen the Turkish element in Rumelia and particularly in Anatolia, and before everything else, we need to cast the Kurds among us in the same mold and arrogate ourselves. The biggest mistake of my predecessors on the Turkish throne was that they failed to Ottomanize the Slav element. Of course, this was not an easy job. Nevertheless, blood relations with the

Anatolian Greeks and Armenians took place easier. But, thank God, our blood maintained its superiority (Abdul Hamid, 1975: 73-74)

Mainly based on the last quote, it is understood that only Muslim Turks were considered Ottoman, and a cultural assimilation process was necessitated for Kurds and Slavs to be taken as an Ottoman since Kurds were Muslims but not Turks, and Slavs were neither Muslims nor Turks. In addition, taking into account the emphasis on “blood” at the end of the quote, it can be noted that the word nation began to exceed a cultural meaning and expand gradually to include a reference based on race.

In a memorandum (1885), Osman Nuri Pasha, the governor of Hejaz and one of the leading bureaucrats of the same period, likened the Ottoman population to a tree. According to him, the Muslims were the principal element and Turks were the “root and trunk of the tree,” while other Muslims like Arabs, Kurds, and Albanians were the “branches and knobs” (Deringil, 2009: 99).

The complementary component of configuring and disseminating the official discourse combining Islam and Turkishness was the reforms that were implemented to re-structure, even partly, the state and society within the framework of a Western social organization. Indeed, Abdul Hamid II “accepted several Western originated implementations from the education system to the modern state structures in return for its contribution for the increase of supervision and control capacity of the state on society and economy” (İrem, 2011: 29). At this point, it would be appropriate to discuss the contribution of the reforms, which are the yield of the modernism of Abdul Hamid II, regarding our topic.

In the Ottoman Empire, “[t]raditionally, all the state territory, all the objects, and living creatures on it were considered to be the property of the dynasty, with all rights embodied to the incumbent sultan” (Karpat, 2001: 224). However, Karpat (2001: 168-172, 223-233, 239-240) argues that, during the reign of Abdul Hamid II, the state achieved autonomy by acquiring an institutional entity separate from the sultanate/dynasty and even from the religious authority and was redefined based on territory (i.e., within the framework of a particular idea of the homeland). This became possible through the reforms that transformed the institutional structure of the state with the bureaucracy and secularized it to some extent, such as the limitation of the power areas of the clergy, revision of judicial institution, and professionalization of civil-military bureaucracy, together with the invention of various authority symbols and rituals such as arms, anthems, and medals. This, following the record of the state as an authority per se, also enabled the

subjugation of (even) the Sultan and dynasty to the state on the one hand and allocation of the state as an institutional organization that performs various public services that it didn't embrace before within its area of sovereignty on the other (Karpaz, 2001: 225). As a result, the word "Ottoman" started to represent the country, people, and collective political identity, rather than the state being the Ottoman family's property like before (Karpaz, 2001: 239).

In this period, education was one of the leading areas affected by the transformation in the institutional structure and functions of the state. As can be understood by the remarkable increase in the schooling ratio in this period, Abdul Hamid II expanded and strengthened the modernization and dissemination of education, which started to be institutionalized during the period of *Tanzimat* (Alkan, 2000: 68). Education was the primary instrument for the Sultan, "to create a modern society through a cultural pattern that still was based on traditional values" (Alkan, 2000: 76). Newly emerging Muslim middle classes, who discovered that education was an essential tool of class-based mobility (and of wealth increase), also pressured the administration of Abdul Hamid II to open intermediate and high-level modern schools and send teachers (Karpaz, 2001: 98). Therefore, said groups didn't refrain from providing financial support and land to build and maintain schools when necessary (Karpaz, 2001: 98).

Another critical step in the field of education taken by Abdul Hamid II's regime was "the compulsory use of demotic Turkish" to generate a population mostly sharing a common culture (Poulton, 1997: 61). For this purpose, an official initiative promoted to make Turkish compulsory in the schools of the Empire in 1894; and the schools were required to use a clear and straightforward language purged from the uncommon Arabic and Persian words (Poulton, 1997: 61).

The importance of these developments, particularly for our subject, is related to the remarkable transformation that they brought to the cultural and intellectual life of the Empire. There was a rapid increase in the number of printed materials like it was in the West, together with the standardization of Turkish in the field of literature and the possibility for more accessible and cheaper access to printed material, also in parallel to the increase of the educated population (Karpaz, 2001: 117-119). This, in addition to the reforms in education, paved the way for the emancipation of information and ideas from the monopoly of the religious field and the clergy and dissemination to a broader population (Karpaz, 2001: 133). As a result of this development, a public community in modern terms started to appear, at least in Istanbul. This community consisted of individuals who indeed

imagined the soil where they lived as a homeland, the people who lived in this homeland as a nation (Karpas, 2001: 136, 149-153).

Perceiving the public composed of subjects with their own identities and different political choices who were autonomous (even partly) from the Sultan, instead of a passive mass who were unconditionally tied to him, caused the power circles of the period to start attempts to provide the control of the cultural/intellectual field to pull the public opinion to their sides (Karpas, 2001: 119). Another complementary component of this process, in particular concerning our subject, was the structuring of an official discourse on collective identity that was designed to be reproduced through mass education and textbooks, in particular within the framework of an official understanding of history for the first time in the Ottoman history (Alkan, 2000: 52).

This way, various religious-ethnic themes with the above examples from the conservative modernist intellectuals of the time were seen to become prominent in the “textbooks that were published for the first time and drafted according to the curriculum determined by the relevant authorities” (Alkan, 2009: 391). Alkan (2000: 76), who started to examine the textbooks of the period, determined that a version of Turkish-Islamic synthesis became dominant, particularly in the history of Islam, Ottoman history, and general history textbooks, with religion being more prominent than ethnic references. One of the two remarkable themes in the textbooks based on this discourse, which was based on “a loose and pragmatic ideology,” is that “the Ottomans are attributed to Turkish race,” and the other theme is the primary function the Ottomans assumed as “the bearer of Islam” Alkan (2000: 76, 83). The findings of the author are as follows:

[The books on the history of Islam]... began with the mythological and the religious sources of the political regime's in the “Turk's descent from Noah via Yafes, then indicated that the Ottoman state began with Islam and narrated the state's foundation with emphasis on the Turkic roots of Ottomans. In this account based on Islam, The Turks were a rebellious disloyal tribe in the pre-Islamic period but became civilized with the adoption of Islam. The Ottoman conquest of Constantinople and the assumption of the Caliphate and thus the leadership of Islam were attributed to religious motives (Alkan, 2000: 76).

Alkan (2000: 53, 86) adds that the emphasis on nationalist themes in general and Turkishness, in particular, was more frequent in the textbooks at the military schools than those in the civilian schools. For him, that was the main reason why ethnic awareness spread more and faster among the youth of military schools rather than the students of the other schools.

As a final note on the dominant discourses in the textbooks of this period, the social identity that brought Turkishness and Islam together under the roof of Ottomanism involved Sunnism, in conformity with the official understanding of Islam in the classical period. According to Deringil (2009: 96), Hanafism, as the official religion of the state, was highlighted as a dominant component of the official discourse during the reign of Abdul Hamid II. Alkan also states that the Islamic themes in the textbooks of the periods included mainly Hanafi-Sunni references. For him, the “cleansing” of Shiites in Anatolia by Sultan Selim the Grim via sword is presented as a “sacred war” against “‘demonic’ Sufis,” which is appraised and deemed to be done “to eliminate the divisions among Muslims and permit control of the Muslims from one center” (Alkan, 2000: 84).

## **7. Conclusion**

The doctrine of the “Turkish-Islamic Synthesis” emerged in the 1970s as an ideological discourse in Turkey. It became the official discourse of the state after the 1980 military coup. The synthesis argues that Turkishness and Sunni Islam are essential components of national identity and ideology, with Islam serving as a unifying force for Turks. While not explicitly stated, modernization or Westernization is also recognized as part of the discourse. Although the Turkish-Islamic synthesis has recently gained prominence, some scholars argue that the foundations of those discursive initiations linking Turkishness, Islam, and Westernization date back to the 19th century. However, none of those scholars provide a comprehensive analysis of those discursive formations during that period as it was not the main focus of their works. In an attempt to fill this gap in the literature, this study analyzes the historical foundations of this synthesis, focusing on the debates in the leading intellectual and bureaucratic circles of the late Ottoman Empire, especially during the second half of the nineteenth century, when the politics of modernization came to the fore.

This period was an era of intense debates within the elite circles for how the state could be saved due to the problems the Ottoman Empire was facing, and how the remaining Ottoman population could be kept together. Islam was still a principal source of reference for many of them in their socio-cultural and political pursuits while some had a growing interest in Turkishness as an ethnic category with Turkish language and history. In addition to these, in an environment where the implications of modernization had reached all spheres of society, it could be noted that Western-originated institutions, concepts, ideas, and ideologies also began to adorn these debates.

In this context, a group of conservative modernists advocated a form of synthesis between tradition and modernity. This group mostly saw the power of the West primarily in its technical and material aspects and aimed to adopt attractive elements from both Eastern and Western cultures. So, Turkishness, Islam, and Westernization were considered interrelated and supporting elements within their political and social agendas. These attempts to combine these three elements can be seen as the historical archetype of the current “Turkish-Islamic synthesis” discourse.

The Young Ottomans are the first generation of those conservative modernists who offered a modern Ottoman identity that combined Islam, Turkishness, and elements of Westernization. Educated in modern schools and holding positions in the bureaucracy, they opposed both the cultural alienation caused by pro-modernist policies and the absolutist tendencies of the Imperial administration. They sought to establish a national representative body, eliminate foreign interference, and pursue reform within an Ottoman and Islamic framework. Among the Young Ottomans, Ali Suavi played a significant role in advocating for a modernized Islam, Turkishness, and Westernization as complementary views. He emphasized the importance of Islamic law and tradition in legitimizing Western concepts and reforms. While he used the term “Turk” broadly to include Muslims and even the Ottoman population, he also showed an ethnic awareness, considering Turkishness as a racial-ethnic term. Namık Kemal, another prominent figure among the Young Ottomans, had a modern ideology shaped by Muslim-Turkish qualities. He saw the Turkification of all Ottoman Muslims as crucial for the Empire’s salvation. Kemal’s thinking incorporated elements from both traditional Islamic law and Western Enlightenment ideas, particularly regarding power, sovereignty, legitimacy, and representation. His writings emphasized Ottomanness, Turkishness, and Islam as essential components of collective identity.

Moreover, it was during the reign of Abdul Hamid II (1876-1909) that the discourse combining Islam, Turkishness, and Westernization gradually became institutionalized and officialized. The Sultan embraced a form of conservative modernism that focused on administrative-technical innovation and technology transfer while downplaying Western concepts of political liberalism and cultural values. Although he was conservative in religious matters, he adopted European habits and lifestyle and implemented reforms in administration, education, communication, and transportation that had a profound impact on Ottoman society.

As a result of these reforms, the state politically gained autonomy, separate from the sultanate and religious authority, and became defined by territory and a particular idea of the homeland. The cultural and intellectual life of the Empire also underwent significant changes during this period, with a rise in printed materials, standardization of Turkish in printed materials and education, and the emergence of a public community. Education played a crucial role in this transformation, with an expansion of schools and the promotion of initiatives to make Turkish the compulsory language, fostering a shared public culture and a more accessible dissemination of information and ideas.

Power elites sought to control the cultural and intellectual field and shape public opinion, leading to the development of an official discourse on collective identity which combined Islam, Turkishness, and Westernization as the founding dimensions of the Ottoman identity. The official promotion of such a discourse was expressed and recognized especially in legal terms, distinguishing Muslims, especially Muslim Turks from non-Muslims by identifying the Muslim Turkish population with the state. Nevertheless, while religious and ethnic references were intertwined, the emphasis on Islam was more significant than Turkishness. This synthesis was based on the belief that Turkishness, as an ethnic identity, was secondary to and found meaning within Islam. As a consequence, this distinction also gradually became a basis of hostility and a means to construct a Turkish-Muslim political majority that saw itself as the rightful sovereign of the state.

## References

- Akçura, Yusuf (2007). *Üç Tarz-ı Siyaset*. Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu.
- Ali Suavi (1868a). "Osman". *Muhbir*, no. 38, Hüseyin Çelik (1993), *Ali Suavi* içinde, Ankara: Kültür Bakanlığı Yayınları içinde.
- Ali Suavi (1868b). "Türk". *Muhbir*, no. 38, Hüseyin Çelik (1993), *Ali Suavi* içinde, Ankara: Kültür Bakanlığı Yayınları.
- Alkan, Mehmet Ö. (2000) "Modernization from Empire to Republic and Education in the Process of Nationalism" in *Ottoman Past and Today's Turkey*. Kemal Karpat (ed.). Leiden: Brill.
- Alkan, Mehmet Ö. (2009). "Resmi İdeolojinin Doğuşu ve Evrimi Üzerine Bir Deneme". (der.) Tanıl Bora vd. *Modern Türkiye'de Siyasi Düşünce (Cilt I)*. İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları.
- Anderson, Benedict (1991). *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origins and Spread of Nationalism*, Rev. Ed., London, New York: Verso Pub.
- Aydemir, Şevket Süreyya (1993). *Suyu Arayan Adam*. İstanbul: Remzi Kitabevi.
- Aydın, Suavi (1999). *Kimlik Sorunu, Ulusallık ve "Türk Kimliği"*. 2nd ed. Ankara: Öteki Yayıncılık.
- Aydın, Suavi (2012). "Türkiye'nin Etnik Yapısı", (der.) Faruk Alpkaya vd. *1920'den Günümüze Türkiye'de Toplumsal Yapı ve Değişim* içinde. Ankara: Phoenix Yayınevi.
- Babahan, Ali (2014). *Nationalism and religion in the textbooks of The Early Republican Period in Turkey*. Unpublished PhD Dissertation submitted to Department of Sociology. Ankara: METU.
- Babahan, Ali (2021). "Modernization And Ideological Divergence Among The Bureaucracy In The Late Ottoman Empire: Suggestion For A New Classification," *Journal of Social and Cultural Studies*, Sayı 8, s. 23-45.
- Bora, Tanıl (2008). *Türk Sağının Üç Hali: Milliyetçilik, Muhafazakarlık, İslamcılık*. İstanbul: Birikim Yayınları.
- Bora, Tanıl vd. (2000). *Devlet, Ocak, Dergâh*. İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları.
- Bozarslan, Hamit (2015). *İmparatorluktan Günümüze Türkiye Tarihi*. tr. Işık Ergüden. İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları.
- Brubaker, Roger. "Religion and Nationalism: Four Approaches", *Nations and Nationalism*, 18(1), 2012, p. 4.
- Copeaux, Etienne (2000). *Tarih Ders Kitaplarında Türk Tarih Tezinden-Türk İslam Sentezine (1931-1993)*. tr. Ali Berktaş, İstanbul: Tarih Vakfı Yurt Yayınları.
- Çelik, Hüseyin (1993). *Ali Suavi*, Ankara: Kültür Bakanlığı Yayınları.
- Çelik, Hüseyin (2021). *Ali Suavi ve Dönemi*. İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları.

- Çetinsaya, Gökhan (1999). "Rethinking Nationalism and Islam." *The Muslim World* 89(3-4): 350-376.
- Çiğdem, Ahmet (2001). "Batılılaşma, Modernite ve Modernizasyon". (Ed.) Uygur Kocabaşoğlu, *Modern Türkiye'de Siyasi Düşünce (Cilt 3)* içinde, İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, s. 68-81.
- Deringil, Selim (2009). *Simgeden Millete: II. Abdülhamit'den Mustafa Kemal'e Devlet ve Millet*. 2.b. İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları.
- Durkheim, Emile (1995). *The Elementary Forms of Religious Life*, Trans. Karen E. Fields, NY: The Free Press.
- Dursun, Çiler (2002). *Ideology and Subject: Turkish-Islamic Synthesis*. Doktora Tezi. Ankara: Ankara Üniversitesi.
- Erdoğan, A. Teyfur (2008). "Osmanlılığın Evrimi Hakkında Bir Deneme." *Doğu Batı Dergisi* 11(45): 19-46.
- Findley, Carter (1980). *Bureaucratic Reform in the Ottoman Empire: The Sublime Porte, 1789-1922*, Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Gellner, Ernest (1983). *Nations and Nationalism*, Oxford: Basil Blackwell.
- Georgeon, François (2006). *Osmanlı-Türk Modernleşmesi (1900-1930)*. (çev.) Ali Berktaş. İstanbul: Yapı Kredi Yayınları.
- Greenfeld, Liah (2006). "Modernity and Nationalism", (der.) G. Delanty vd. *The Sage Handbook of Nations and Nationalism*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Göçek, Fatma Müge (2002). "Decline of the Ottoman Empire and the Emergence of Greek, Armenian, Turkish and Arab Nationalisms" in *Social Constructions of Nationalism in the Middle East*. Fatma Müge Göçek (ed.). Albany, NY: State University of New York Press.
- Güngörmez, Bengül (2014). "Jakoben Modernist'e Karşı 'Endişeli Modern': Türk Muhafazakârlığı Üzerine Genel Bir Değerlendirme." *Muhafazakâr Düşünce* 3: 5-23.
- Güvenç, Bozkurt vd. (1994). *Türk-İslam Sentezi*. İstanbul: Sarmal Yayınevi.
- Hanioglu, M. Şükrü (1995). *The Young Turks in opposition*, New York: Oxford.
- Hanioglu, M. Şükrü (2012). "Modern Ottoman Period" in *The Routledge Handbook of Modern Turkey*. Metin Heper, Sabri Sayarı eds. London; NY: Routledge.
- Hechter, Michael (2000). *Containing Nationalism*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Hobsbawm, Eric (1992). *Nations and Nationalisms since 1780: Programme, Myth and Reality*, 2nd ed., Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Hobsbawm, Eric J. and Terence Ranger (eds.) (2000). *The Invention of Tradition*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

- İnalçık, Halil (2005). *Osmanlı'da Devlet, Hukuk, Adalet*. 2.b. İstanbul: Eren Yayıncılık.
- İnalçık, Halil (2016). *Türklük, Müslümanlık ve Osmanlı Mirası*. 6.b. İstanbul: Kırmızı Yayınları.
- İrem, Nazım (1999). "Muhafazakâr Modernlik, "Diğer Batı" ve Türkiye'de Bergsonculuk." *Toplum ve Bilim* 82: 141-179.
- İrem, Nazım (2011). "Türk Muhafazakâr Modernleşmesinin Sınırları: Kültürçü Özgünlük ve Eksik Liberalizm", *Doğu Batı*, Yıl 14, Sayı 58, Ağustos, Eylül, Ekim 2011, s. 30.
- Jenkins, Richard (2008). *Social Identity*. 3rd ed. London; New York: Routledge.
- Kara, İsmail (2011). *Türkiye'de İslamcılık Düşüncesi: Metinler/Kişiler (2 Cilt)*. İstanbul: Dergah Yayınları.
- Karpat, Kemal H. (2001). *The politicization of Islam: reconstructing identity, state, faith, and community in the late Ottoman state*, (Oxford; New York)
- Karpat, Kemal H. (2002). *Studies on Ottoman Social and Political History*. Leiden: Brill.
- Koloğlu, Orhan (2001). "II. Abdülhamid'in Siyasal Düşüncesi". (Ed.) Mehmet Ö. Alkan, *Modern Türkiye'de Siyasi Düşünce (Cilt 1)* içinde, İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, s. 273-276.
- Kohn, Hans (1944). *Türk Milliyetçiliği*. (çev.) Ali Çetinkaya. İstanbul: Hilmi Kitabevi.
- Kohn, Hans (1946). *The Idea of Nationalism: A Study on Its Origins and Background*. New York: The Macmillan Company.
- Kushner, David (1977). *The Rise of Turkish Nationalism, 1876-1908*. London: Frank Cass.
- Landau, Jacob (2001). *Pan-Islam Politikaları*. (çev.) Nigar Bulut. İstanbul: Anka Yayınları.
- Lewis, Bernard (1969). *The Emergence of Modern Turkey*, 2<sup>nd</sup> ed., London:
- Mardin, Şerif (2000). *The Genesis of Young Ottoman Thought*. Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press.
- Mardin, Şerif (2005). *Türkiye'de Din ve Siyaset*. İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları.
- Ocak, Ahmet Yaşar (2011). *Yeniçağlar Anadolu'sunda İslam'ın Ayak İzleri*. İstanbul: Kitap Yayınevi.
- Özdalga, Elisabeth (2009). "Islamism and Nationalism as Sister Ideologies." *Middle Eastern Studies* 45(3): 407-423.
- Özdoğan, Günay Göksu (2006). "*Turan*"dan "*Bozkurt*"a: *Tek Parti Döneminde Türkçülük (1931-1946)*. (çev.) İsmail Kaplan. İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları.
- Parla, Taha (2002). *Türkiye'nin Siyasal Rejimi 1980-1989*. İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları.

- Poulton, Hugh (1997). *Top Hat, Grey Wolf and Crescent: Turkish Nationalism and the Turkish Republic*. NY: New York University Press.
- Smith, Anthony D. (1991). *The National Identity*. London: Penguin Books.
- Somel, Selçuk Akşin (2009). "Osmanlı Reform Çağında Osmanlılık Düşüncesi (1839-1913)." *Modern Türkiye'de Siyasi Düşünce (Cilt I)* içinde.
- Spiro, Melford E. (2004). "Religion: Problems of Definition and Explanation" in *Anthropological Approaches to the Study of Religion*. (ed.) Michael Banton. Abington: Routledge.
- Sultan Abdül Hamid (1975). *Siyasi Hatıratım*. İstanbul: Dergâh Yayınları.
- Tekeli, İlhan (2005). "Bir Modernleşme Projesi Olarak Türkiye'de Kent Planlaması". (der.) Sibel Bozdoğan vd. *Türkiye'de Modernleşme ve Ulusal Kimlik* içinde. İstanbul: Tarih Vakfı Yurt Yayınları.
- Tevetoğlu, Fethi (1988). *Mehmed Emin Yurdakul: Hayatı ve Eserleri*. Ankara: Kültür ve Turizm Bakanlığı Yayınları
- Tiftikçi, Osman (2003). *Osmanlı'dan Cumhuriyet'e Burjuvazinin Evrimi*. İstanbul: El Yayınevi.
- Toprak, Binnaz (1981). *Islam and Political Development*. Leiden: E. J. Brill Pub.
- Tunaya, Tarık Zafer (1998). *İslamcılık Cereyanı (3 Cilt)*. İstanbul: Y.H.A. Yayıncılık.
- Tunaya, Tarık Zafer (2010). *Türkiye'nin Siyasi Hayatında Batılılaşma Hareketleri*. İstanbul: İ. Bilgi Üni. Yayınları.
- Turan, İltar (1993). "Siyasal İdeoloji Olarak İslam ve Milliyetçilik". Richard Tapper (der.). *Çağdaş Türkiye'de İslam*. İstanbul: Sarmal Yayınevi.
- Ülken, Hilmi Ziya (2014). *Türkiye'de Çağdaş Düşünce Tarihi*. İstanbul: T. İş Bankası Kültür Yayınları.
- Van Dijk, Teun Van Dijk (1989). 'Structures of discourse and structures of power', in J. A. Anderson ed., *Communication yearbook 12* (Newbury Park)
- Yıldız, Ahmet (2001). "*Ne Mutlu Türküm Diyebilene*": *Türk Ulusal Kimliğinin Etno-Seküler Sınırları (1919-1938)*. İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları.
- Zubadia, Sami (1996). "Turkish Islam and National Identity." *Middle East Report* 199: 10-15.

# İsmet İnönü Era: Assessing the Challenges of Democracy in Turkey

İbrahim Yorgun<sup>1</sup>

## Abstract

The aim of study is to analyze the İsmet İnönü era in Turkey during his tenure while concentrating on the challenges and shortcomings of democracy. The study will focus on various dimensions, including political restrictions, limitations on freedom of expression, one-party rule, electoral systems, socio-cultural factors as well as economic policies in order to offer a detailed examination of the complex dynamics which shaped the democratic landscape of Turkey of the time. Studying the mentioned dimensions is expected to uncover the factors which led to the inadequacy of democracy during the İnönü era and eventually to evaluate their implications for Turkey's democratic development, which on the one hand encompasses the succession from Mustafa Kemal Atatürk and the Republican People's Party's (CHP) dominant role and on the other hand emphasizes the consolidation of power and the challenges to political representation. Particularly, the analysis of electoral practices can provide insights into the limitations of democratic processes, such as restrictive laws, voter intimidation, and limited political pluralism. Moreover, the study will examine the impact of these challenges on democratic decision-making which would include but not limited to the centralization of power, the marginalization of opposition voices and their meanings for citizen participation. The study will also try to evaluate the restrictions on freedom of speech and the media landscape, discussing the limitations imposed on critical voices, media control, and its consequences on public discourse and democratic participation. In addition to these, the study is expected to assess the socio-cultural dynamics which would focus on İnönü's modernization policies and their impact on social transformation. The study will explore the tensions between traditional values and cultural constraints, too. This will be carried out by highlighting the challenges faced by less represented groups and the inclusiveness of the political system.

---

1 Dr. Öğretim Görevlisi, METU, iyorgun@metu.edu.tr, ORCID: 0000-0003-4716-4187

The economic policies of the İnönü era, including the economic vision and development strategies will be scrutinized, with particular attention given to the socio-economic disparities and their effects on democratic participation as well as political power dynamics. Furthermore, the study will attempt to examine the international relations and foreign policy approach of İsmet İnönü. This examination will be through the consideration of the implications for democracy and Turkey's international standing. The influence of external factors on democracy in Turkey during the mentioned timeline will also be assessed. Finally, the study will be concluded with the evaluation of the legacy of the İnönü's era, weighing the democratic gains and losses while drawing lessons for Turkey's democratic development and considering the implications for the post-İnönü era. This comprehensive analysis is expected to contribute to a nuanced understanding of the İsmet İnönü era's impact on democracy in Turkey which could highlight the complexities and challenges faced during his tenure. The critical examination of the various dimensions, the study will provide valuable insights for scholars, policymakers as well as for any expert who is interested in Turkey's democratic history and in the ongoing democratic journey.

## **I. Introduction**

İnönü's era has some shortcomings of democracy and this deficiency can be attributed to a variety of factors. On the top of the list comes the legacy of single party regime, which had established a strong and centralized state but had also suppressed its political opposition and dissent. This legacy shaped the Turkish politics even after the establishment of multi-party system in 1946 while Republican People's Party (CHP) remained the dominant political force in the country. As second comes the challenges of nation-building in a diverse and fragmented society in which various ethnic and religious groups competed for political representation and resources. Moreover, other factors usually have been external elements such as the World War II and the Cold War which had exerted significant influence on Turkish politics. This exertion often led to İnönü government to attribute priority on security and stability rather than democracy.

The lack of democratic competence and tradition coupled with the economic and financial conditions in Turkey of the time as well as the conjuncture of international and domestic politics contributed a lot to the deterioration of image of İnönü and his administration in the minds the Turkish society, which is still not recovered today. Such perception may arise from many reasons but it can be claimed that İnönü and his administration paid little attention to the heavy burden on the masses created by the negative effects of the World War II. The problems on the Turks' shoulder had been

accumulated due to the long-standing economic, political and socio-cultural dynamics since the dissolution of the Ottoman Empire. Therefore, İnönü administration failed to communicate its political agenda to the critical mass in the society which was more concerned about the household matters than İnönü's grand but ambivalent international political tactics that aimed to protect their beloved country from the imperialists' games during the World War II.

This era marked a crucial period in Turkish history characterized by political, social, and economic transformations. İsmet İnönü, the second President of Turkey and the leader of the Republican People's Party (CHP), played a central role in shaping Turkey future of the time. Although on the one hand, İnönü is often glorified for his efforts in consolidating the young Turkish Republic and promoting modernization, but on the other hand, it is essential to critically examine the democratic shortcomings that emerged during his tenure. For such an examination, the study will seek to provide an in-depth analysis of the factors hindering the development of democracy during İnönü's tenure.

Therefore, the political landscape of the time is called attention as being one of the key elements; so, the study tries to explore the political restrictions that were in place, limiting the participation of opposition parties and curtailing political pluralism (Karpat, 1959). The dominance of the CHP and its suppression of alternative political voices significantly impacted democratic representation by diminishing chances of citizens to engage in a diverse and inclusive political process (Akşin, 2007). The study also examines the various mechanisms used to stifle dissenting voices, including restrictive laws and regulations, censorship, and the control of media outlets (Karpat, 1996 & Arabacı, 2014).

Furthermore, the study brings forth the issue of one-party rule during the İnönü era. Despite the establishment of a multi-party system after 1945, the CHP continued its domination over the political landscape, often hindering the development of a truly competitive and pluralistic democracy (Karpat, 1959 & Özdemir, 2014 & Bayır, 2011). The concentration of power and the absence of a robust opposition (Çaylak & Nişancı, 2010) had far-reaching implications for democratic decision-making and the accountability of the CHP of the time.

The analysis also encompasses the electoral practices employed during İnönü's era while examining the fairness and transparency of elections, assessing the extent to which democratic principles were upheld. The study will touch upon the socio-cultural dynamics which played a significant

role in understanding the democratic landscape of the İnönü era. To critically comprehend the era, the modernization policies pursued under İnönü's leadership and their impact on social transformation should also be examined. The analysis of social transformation helps us to delve into the tensions that arose between traditional values and cultural constraints by shedding light on the challenges faced by the less represented groups and the inclusiveness of the political system. Furthermore, such analysis would be less comprehensive without the investigation of the economic policies implemented during the İnönü era. Thus, the study assesses İnönü's economic vision and development strategies, analyzing their implications for socio-economic disparities and democratic participation. The assessment also includes the distribution of wealth, access to resources, and the concentration of economic power in relation to their effects on political power dynamics and on the overall democratic landscape.

At the final stage, international relations and foreign policy approach of the time are analysed by pointing out how İnönü's foreign policy stance impacted democracy in Turkey and therefore, influenced the country's international standing. This is carried out through an examination outlining the role of external factors in shaping Turkey's democratic development.

To conclude, the study will attempt to provide a comprehensive analysis of the İsmet İnönü era in Turkey. To reach this aim, it will critically examine the challenges and shortcomings faced by democracy of the time. This study aims to put forth a multifaceted understanding of the lack of democracy during the İnönü era thanks to the exploration of various dimensions such as political restrictions, limitations on freedom, one-party rule, electoral systems, socio-cultural dynamics, economic policies and foreign relations. A comprehensive assessment of the historical, political, social, and economic contexts, the study tries to shed light on the complex interplay of factors which influenced democratic practices at that time. Ultimately, this particular method and analysis aim to contribute to a nuanced understanding of the era's impact on democracy in Turkey and to provide insights and recommendations for future of democracy in Turkey.

### **1.1. Historical Background**

Spanning from 1938 to 1950, the İsmet İnönü era represented a critical period in the early years of the Turkish Republic. After the years under Mustafa Kemal Atatürk during when the fundamental principles of secularism, nationalism, and republicanism were established, İnönü assumed the presidency after Atatürk's death in 1938. His term and tenure presented

a formidable task of upholding and furthering the nation-building project (Shaw & Shaw,2006) while maneuvering through the intricate web of domestic and international politics.

The core aim of İnönü's administration was to consolidate the gains obtained during Atatürk's time and to propel the country through significant socio-political transformations (Karpaz, 1959). This grand agenda encompassed various characteristics such as the modernization of infrastructure, the expansion of educational opportunities, the industrialization of the economy and the promotion of a secular society (Selek, 2020). İnönü's efforts intended to position Turkey as a modern country with a progressive nation on the global stage.

Despite these advancements, the era was also recalled with certain democratic deficiencies and limitations. How hard İnönü government attempted some significant efforts in order to establish and to maintain a stable political system, an overarching dominance of the Republican People's Party (CHP) observed during that time which hindered the development of a vibrant multi-party democracy (Ahmad, 2007) in Turkey. The dominance of CHP led the emergence of an environment where alternative political voices met significant obstacles hindering a gain of representation and an influence on policy decisions.

To comprehensively understand the mentioned challenges of the time, the political, social, economic, and cultural dynamics of the İnönü era should be assessed concerning their implications for democratic governance. Through an examination of both the achievements and shortcomings of İnönü's leadership in fostering a democratic society, multiple valuable insights can be gained regarding the complexities and intricacies of democratic development during this period which may pave the way for a more informed understanding of Turkey's political landscape.

## **1.2. Research Objective and Scope**

The primary aim of this academic work is to assess the challenges of Turkish democracy during the İnönü's era. Thanks to an examination of multiple dimensions, the study will attempt to provide a comprehensive analysis of the democratic deficiencies and limitations which characterized İnönü's tenure. The research also aims to point out the implications of these challenges for Turkey's democratic development.

The time frame of this study is primarily concentrated on the İsmet İnönü era stretching from 1938 to 1950. It tries to analyze the key events, policies, and socio-political dynamics during the mentioned time period. The study

attempts a depiction the time by drawing on historical records, academic research, and scholarly analyses so as to present a thorough examination of the challenges to democracy and their broader implications for Turkey's democratic trajectory.

## **II. Political Landscape during the İsmet İnönü Era**

### **2.1 Succession from Mustafa Kemal Atatürk**

The İsmet İnönü era commenced with the transition of power from Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, the founding father of modern Turkey. Atatürk's visionary leadership (Yangıl & Başpınar, 2022) had set the foundation for a democratic and secular state. He concentrated on principles like nationalism, republicanism, and secularism. Being the general commander of the Turkish War of Independence, he successfully led the country through a period of intense transformation resembling European renaissance (Akgün, 2006) and established the Republic of Turkey in 1923.

Apparently, this transition of power has marked a critical turning point in Turkey's political history. In spite of the similarities of Atatürk and İnönü concerning the leadership styles in the establishment and early years of the Turkish Republic, their approaches to governance differed in significant ways (Aydemir, 1967).

On the one hand Atatürk was known for his firm commitment to democratic ideals and a vision of a modern, Western-oriented state while emphasizing the importance of pluralism, public participation, and the rule of law. He also aimed to create a secular and progressive society (Karal, 1998) which would distance themselves from the constraints of the Ottoman Empire and would choose to align with European values. On the other hand, İnönü followed a more centralized and authoritative style of leadership. As the second president of the Turkish Republic, he faced the challenge of sustaining the nation-building project which started during Atatürk's time. İnönü found himself navigating the complexities of domestic and international politics (Aydemir, 1967). At this point, it should be accepted that İnönü's approach to governance was shaped by the political context of the time, including the challenges of maintaining stability in a volatile region and protecting the gains obtained under Atatürk's leadership. Therefore, İsmet İnönü prioritized the preservation of national unity and security against the external threats such as the World War II and the rise of fascism in Europe (Hale, 2002). Moreover, İnönü's tenure indicated a departure from Atatürk's more pluralistic and inclusive vision of democracy (Aydemir, 1967 & Karpat, 2004 & Hür, 2015). On

the issues like the pursuit of secularism and modernization, İnönü rather tended towards centralization of power within the state apparatus. Such concentration of power required for quick decision-making and effective implementation of policies. However, this method led more restricted political pluralism and the space for alternative voices and perspectives (Karpaz, 2004).

In other words, the mentioned transition also stood for a shift from the charismatic and transformative leadership to a more pragmatic and managerial style of governance (Karpaz, 2004 & Hür, 2015). İnönü's leadership signified a focus on stability and consensus-building as well as a priority over the stability of the newly established republic in contrast to rapid and radical changes (Aydemir, 1967). By doing so, İnönü aimed to solidify the gains obtained during Atatürk's time and guide Turkey through some significant socio-political transformations (Karpaz, 2004).

Furthermore, the centralization of power and the consolidation of authority under CHP limited the checks and balances which would be required for a more vibrant and pluralistic democracy (Karpaz, 1996). Albeit the İnönü's relative success in terms of economic development, infrastructure and social reforms, the democratic deficiencies and limitations during his tenure cannot be overlooked.

In brief, İnönü's era was categorized as a more centralized and authoritative style of governance (Akşin, 2007). Therefore, it is crucial to understanding the transition and its implications when assessing the challenges of democracy during the İnönü era and shaping the trajectory of democratic governance in Turkey.

## **2.2 The Role of the Republican People's Party (CHP)**

It should be once more emphasized that CHP had a key role during the İnönü era since it exerted a significant influence over Turkish politics of the time. It had been the leading force in the struggle for independence and the establishment of the Turkish Republic during Atatürk's time. When İnönü assumed presidency, the CHP also maintained its dominance in Turkish politics, effectively becoming the ruling party. However, during İnönü's rule, he served not only the president of the country but also the leader of the CHP, which was a sort of consolidation of power within a single political entity. Interestingly, the CHP's influence extended beyond the political realm. It exerted its control over the military, the judiciary and the bureaucracy (Karpaz, 1996 & Yılmaz et al., 2013). This power concentration had significant implications for democratic governance in Turkey.

On the top of the list comes the restrictive effect of the dominance of the CHP on the political pluralism and the development of a vibrant multiparty system. CHP's firm control over the space for opposition parties to thrive and effectively challenge the status quo was much restricted (Yılmaz et al., 2013). This inhibited political competition and provided very limited choices available to voters; eventually hindered the democratic representation (VanderLippe, 2005). Second comes the influence of the CHP over state institutions. This raised concerns about accountability and transparency (VanderLippe, 2005) on the government rule in Turkey. It would be claimed that the strong ties between the ruling party and the bureaucracy, the military as well as the judiciary deteriorated the checks and balances necessary for a healthy democratic system (Karpat, 1996). This weakness also limited the ability of these institutions to act independently and undermined their role as impartial arbiters in the political process (VanderLippe, 2005).

Furthermore, the CHP's control over state resources and its patronage networks created a conducive environment so that it would maintain its grip on power (Karpat, 1959). This situation also had implications for the fair representation of diverse interests. Additionally, it hindered the development of a responsive and inclusive political system (Karpat, 1959 & Hür, 2015) until 1946. The dominance of the CHP also had repercussions for the democratic rights of opposition parties and individuals critical of the ruling party. Opposition and alternative political voices were often suppressed. This suppression cultivated only a handful of political pluralism and thus resulted in a curtailment of civil liberties (Karpat, 2004 & Arabacı, 2014).

Nevertheless, it is important to pinpoint that the CHP's influence was not entirely negative during the İnönü era. The party assumed a crucial role in preserving the secular and nationalist principles established by Atatürk (Selek, 2020). It also launched social and economic reforms aimed at modernizing the country and improving living standards of the Turks. These included many initiatives and programs in education such as Village Institutes (Köy Enstitüleri), halkevleri (community houses), etc, women's rights and infrastructure development (Aydemir, 1967 & Ahmad, 2007 & Selek, 2020). No matter how good some policies and reform programs were, the concentration of power within the CHP as well as the limited space for political competition presented significant challenges to democracy during the İnönü era (Karpat, 1959). It restricted the ability of citizens to freely express their political preferences, participate in decision-making processes, and hold the government accountable.

In other words, CHP maintained its dominance in Turkish politics and exerting significant influence over state institutions while the party's role in preserving the principles of secularism and nationalism and its efforts in social and economic development were noteworthy. Yet, its concentrated power restricted political pluralism, accountability and the fair representation of diverse interests (Karpas, 1959 & Karpas, 2004). Understanding the role of the CHP is crucial for assessing the challenges of democracy during the İnönü era and shaping the trajectory of democratic governance in Turkey.

### **2.3 One-Party Rule and Consolidation of Power**

One-party rule under the CHP was the characteristics of the period. Led by İsmet İnönü, the CHP had a dominant position in Turkish politics, which allowed for the consolidation of power within a single political entity (Karpas, 1959). This consolidation had also significant implications for democratic governance during the mentioned period. The space for political pluralism and the development of a competitive multiparty system was much limited (VanderLippe, 2005). Thus, a vigorous opposition lacked which weakened the checks and balances of a healthy democratic system. More so, it gave an opportunity to the CHP to exercise its authority with minimal accountability and oversight (Karpas, 2004 & VanderLippe, 2005). Such a conduct resulted in concerns about transparency, accountability, and the protection of civil liberties and hindered the development of a culture of political competition due to the lack of dissenting voices and alternative political perspectives which were often suppressed (Karpas, 2004 & VanderLippe, 2005) until the establishment of Democrat Party (DP) in 1946. This situation meant the existence of deprived citizens of meaningful choices in the political process (Karpas, 1959 & Özdemir, 2014). But it also had more implications for the functioning of state institutions where and which close alignment between the party and the bureaucracy, military, and judiciary (Karpas, 1996 & Yılmaz et al., 2013) existed during the İnönü era.

## **III. Electoral System and Political Participation**

### **3.1 Analysis of Electoral Practices**

An analysis of the electoral practices during the İsmet İnönü era would provide valuable insights concerning the level and the state of democracy as well as the challenges it faced in Turkey. Although the elections were held at regular period and intervals, the nature of these elections as well as their political context created some controversy regarding their fairness, competitiveness, and representativeness (Karpas, 1959).

The valid electoral system of the period was a sort of proportional representation system. Its aim, based on the percentage of votes received by each political party, was to ensure a fair distribution of seats in the parliament. Albeit this proportional representation system, the dominance of the CHP put barriers to the effectiveness of electoral competition and political pluralism (Sayarı & Esmer, 2002) to a certain extent.

Among the key challenges of the electoral practice analysis during this era was the limited space for opposition parties to operate and effectively challenge the ruling party (Karpaz, 1959 & VanderLippe, 2005). The CHP's stronghold on political power which coupled with restrictions on political freedoms and the suppression of dissent eventually created an uneven play field for opposition parties (VanderLippe, 2005 & Arabacı, 2014). This imbalance apparently disrupted their ability and capacity to gain significant traction and thus, it undermined the democratic principle of political competition particularly during 1946 elections (Sayarı & Esmer, 2002).

Furthermore, the political climate during the elections was not a smooth, flexible and conducive one. On the contrary, it was packed by restrictions on freedom of expression and limitations on the activities of opposition parties. Over and above the independent media circles faced censorship and repression (Arabacı, 2014 & Hür, 2015) which resulted in a lack of diverse voices and perspectives in the public sphere. Additionally, the opposition parties often encountered obstacles while they carried out their campaign efforts. The dissent voices had very limited access to state resources, met with biased media coverage as well as faced with restrictions on public gatherings and rallies (Sayarı & Esmer, 2002 & Arabacı, 2014). All these negative outlooks raised concerns about the fairness of electoral processes and the ability of opposition parties to compete on equal footing (Sayarı & Esmer, 2002 & VanderLippe, 2005).

Moreover, there emerged reports of electoral irregularities and allegations of voter intimidation during this period (Çelebi, 2015). Such situations and practices further undermined the credibility and legitimacy of the electoral outcomes and finally eroded public trust in the democratic process (VanderLippe, 2005). The lack of reliable mechanisms to investigate and to address such allegations contributed, to a certain degree, to the emergence of a sense of disillusionment and frustration among opposition parties and the community which supports them (Karpaz, 2004 & Hür, 2015). It is very important to state that despite all the challenges and limitations faced by the opposition parties, they did participate in elections during the İnönü era. Yet still, their success in the elections was often limited when the CHP

continually maintained a substantial majority in the Turkish parliament. This hegemony was further strengthened the image of the CHP as the one-party rule and it hindered the development of a more pluralistic and competitive political landscape (Sayarı & Esmer, 2002).

### **3.2 Challenges to Political Representation**

One should also examine the challenges to political representation during the İsmet İnönü era which would shed light on the complexities of democratic governance in Turkey. Despite the regular elections, granting a meaningful political representation was a significant hurdle due to various factors which limited the voice and participation of diverse groups and perspectives (Sayarı & Esmer, 2002).

Among the significant challenges was the dominance of the CHP, which hindered the representation of alternative political ideologies and one way or another led the marginalization of dissent voices (VanderLippe, 2005). The CHP firmly controlled the state institutions and its resources which, in return, provided it with a significant advantage. This relative advantage of CHP made it inconvenient for opposition parties to gain significant traction; let alone to effectively represent the interests of their constituents (Sayarı & Esmer, 2002 & Arabacı, 2014). Therefore, voters met with very constrained choices as a result of the limited political pluralism and the absence of an adequate multiparty system until 1946. Furthermore, this lack of viable opposition entity in the form of a political party resulted in a reduction of the diversity of political options. This also limited the ability of citizens to express their preferences and have their voices heard (Sayarı & Esmer, 2002). Interestingly, even after 1946, opposition parties faced hurdles in their campaign efforts, had very limited access to state resources and met with biased media coverage (Arabacı, 2014 & Hür, 2015). As a result of these challenges, their ability to engage with constituents weakened, they were not able convey their policy proposals, and would not mobilize support at the levels they sought for.

The limited inclusion of less represented groups in the political process would be another challenge. Not only women and ethnic minorities but also other marginalized communities faced barriers to political participation and representation (Karpas, 1996 & Karpas, 2004). Apparently, the patriarchal norms of the society and some structural barriers prevented women from fully engaging in politics. This situation resulted in their underrepresentation in elected positions (Caporal, 1982 & Yeşilorman, 2010). Similarly, ethnic minorities both struggled to gain worthwhile representation (Bali, 1998)

and faced challenges during when sought ways in which their specific needs and interests adequately addressed (Zürcher, 2003 & Vanderlippe, 2005).

What's more, the concentration of power within the CHP also limited the influence of individual members of parliament. Besides, decision-making processes often centered around party elites (Sayarı, 2014 & VanderLippe, 2005) leaving little room for individual MPs so as to voice issues related to their constituents and thus, for the contribution to policy-making. Eventually, such practice influenced the patronage networks and clientelism, which triggered further complication on the political representation. Depending on the loyalty to the CHP, access to resources and opportunities would be granted (Sayarı, 2011) which undermined meritocracy and fair representation.

### **3.3 Impact on Democratic Decision-Making**

The İsmet İnönü era had a substantial impact on democratic decision-making processes. Although the decisions were made thanks to the formal institutions, the concentration of power, limited political pluralism as well as the hegemony of the CHP over the politics and policy-making had significant implications for the inclusiveness, transparency and accountability of the decision-making process. CHP under İnönü administration implemented a centralized decision-making structure. İsmet İnönü held two strategic positions at once, as the president of Turkey and as the leader of the CHP (Aydemir, 1967). İnönü's choice consolidated power in his hands and limited the influence of other political actors, which resulted in a top-down approach to decision-making. Within the boundaries of such an implementation, key policies and reforms were often driven by party elites in contrast to some extensive consultation and consensus-building processes (Karpat, 2004 & VanderLippe, 2005 & Arabacı, 2014). The lack of effective opposition and limited political competition further hindered democratic decision-making. Instead of a sound checks and balances system, there existed a lack of rigorous scrutiny and debate over policies and initiatives which were put forth by the ruling party. This understanding eventually limited the diversity of perspectives and alternative policy options which were closely related to the decision-making processes. This method indispensably led to suboptimal outcomes and reduced a meaningful responsiveness to citizen needs (Arabacı, 2014).

Finally, the lack of transparency in decision-making processes further eroded public trust in the government and democratic institutions. Due to the deficiency in adequate mechanisms for public participation and in access

to information, citizens were often informed very little about the rationale behind decisions (Karpat, 1996 & Hür, 2015) and the interests being served. Such unawareness contributed to a sense of disenfranchisement and undermined the legitimacy of the decision-making process (Karpat, 1959).

## **IV. Freedom of Expression and Media Landscape**

### **4.1 Limitations on Freedom of Speech:**

One of the controversial issues during the İsmet İnönü era was the limitations imposed on freedom of speech. Even though, the Turkish Constitution guaranteed freedom of expression, restrictions and practices initiated by the CHP curtailed this fundamental democratic right. The İnönü government, in an effort to maintain control and prevent dissent, enforced laws which restricted freedom of speech, particularly when it came to criticizing state policies and officials (Hür, 2015). Criticism of government actions, political ideologies, and even of the CHP often brought censorship, persecution and legal repercussions (Arabacı, 2014).

Furthermore, limitations on freedom of speech were reinforced by the government's influence over the judiciary and state institutions. Cases involving alleged insults against state officials or contentious political opinions were often prosecuted. This led to self-censorship in the society and among the media entities (Çelikiz & Kuzucanlı, 2019). Such a climate bearing fear and self-censorship had a chilling impact on the open public discourse and the free exchange of ideas.

### **4.2 Media Restrictions and State Control:**

The media during the İsmet İnönü era, particularly before the transition to multi-party period was under a significant state control and was imposed some restrictions. The CHP firmly exerted influence over media entities so as to shape the narrative and to control the dissemination of information (Arabacı, 2014). On the one hand, the İnönü government had and did not hesitate to use the power to grant or revoke broadcasting licenses. This power allowed the İnönü government to control the media landscape and limit the diversity of voices. On the other hand, state-controlled media entities, such as radio stations or newspapers served as mouthpieces for the government and propagated the CHP's ideology (Yeşilçayır, 2011). The dominance of state-controlled media inevitably diminished the availability of diverse perspectives and critical analysis. Additionally, independent media entities faced considerable challenges such as censorship, harassment, and legal obstacles. Interestingly, journalists and media organizations which

criticized the government often ended up with intimidation, arrests and even imprisonment (Yeşilçayır, 2011). Related laws and legislation, particularly during the years before 1946, when the multi-party decision was announced, were made use of in order to suppress independent journalism and to limit the ability of media entities which otherwise would operate freely (Arabacı, 2014 & Çelikiz & Kuzucanlı, 2019).

### **4.3 Implications for Public Discourse and Democratic Participation:**

The restrictions on freedom of expression as well as on media entities had profound implications for public discourse and democratic participation. The deficiency of diverse perspectives and the suppression of opposing views undermined the free ideas required in a vibrant democracy. The controlled media environment and restrictions on freedom of speech deprived the citizens of access to unbiased information and critical analysis which hindered their capacity to make informed decisions. It would be claimed at this point that the lack of open public discourse and the absence of a vigorous exchange of ideas can potentially leave citizens in the dark without proper opportunities to engage in meaningful political discussions and shape public opinion (U.S. Agency for International Development, 1999). Regrettably, the limitations on freedom of expression and media restrictions suppressed democratic participation during İnönü era. Ability to express the opinions belonging to the members of the Turkish society and their right to criticize policies were constrained to a certain degree while it was expected that society would hold their leaders accountable (Arabacı, 2014). The absence of democratic participation eroded the citizen engagement and weakened the responsiveness of the government to the needs and aspirations of the people (VanderLippe, 2005 & Tikveş, 1979).

## **V. Socio-Cultural Dynamics and Democracy**

### **5.1 Modernization Policies and Social Transformation:**

The modernization policies during the İsmet İnönü era aimed to bring about social transformation and align the country with Western norms and values. These policies encompassed various issues of the society, including education, women's rights and urban development (Zürcher, 2003).

When it comes to education, İnönü administration concentrated on expanding access to education services and on improving the literacy rates. His government made efforts in order to establish more schools, particularly in rural areas, and to enhance the quality of education provided to the local

community. The objective of the modernization of the education system was to equip citizens with the knowledge and skills required for economic development and social progress (Karpaz, 1996).

Moreover, women's rights and gender equality also received attention during İnönü's tenure. His government eagerly initiated policies so as to improve women's access to education, healthcare as well as to the employment opportunities. Legal reforms introduced during Atatürk's presidency such as granting women the right to vote and run for public office in 1934 were deeply rooted and exercised during the İnönü's presidency. The reforms launched by both presidents represented important steps towards gender equality, although challenges remained in terms of addressing deep-rooted social norms and cultural constraints that hindered the full realization of women's rights (Caporal, 1982).

In line with women's rights and gender equality, the urban development projects were among the other significant modernization efforts of the time. The İnönü government initiated various projects to improve infrastructure, enhance living conditions and foster economic growth in cities. Urban planning aimed to create modern and organized urban environments which would cater to the needs of a rapidly changing society. However, these projects, too were not without challenges, as they sometimes resulted in the displacement of underprivileged members of the community and the erosion of cultural heritage (Yılmaz, 2022).

## **5.2 Traditional Values and Cultural Constraints:**

Despite the existence of the modernization efforts, traditional values and cultural constraints continued to be enforced during the İsmet İnönü era. Turkey's cultural construction was deeply rooted in long-standing norms, practices as well as values, which often created barriers to democratic ideals and individual freedoms (Karpaz, 1996). Likewise, conservative social attitudes and religious values had a significant role in shaping societal expectations and in limiting the scope of social change (Mardin, 2006). Traditional norms around gender roles, family structures and social hierarchies restricted the autonomy and agency of individuals and even particularly of women and the less represented groups. It was understood that these cultural constraints restricted full participation in public life and delayed the realization of democratic values (Mardin, 2006).

Moreover, the influence of religious institutions and conservative forces remained strong during İnönü's presidency. This situation further limited the recognition of diverse identities and obstructed the progress towards

a more inclusive democracy. The conservative values sometimes clashed with the ideals of individual freedoms, pluralism, and the rights of minority groups (Karpat, 2004 & VanderLippe, 2005).

### **5.3 Inclusiveness and Less Represented Groups:**

The İsmet İnönü era also witnessed varying degrees of inclusiveness for less represented groups in Turkish society. While efforts were made to promote equality and social justice, certain groups, such as ethnic and religious minorities, faced discrimination and marginalization (Bali, 1998). Ethnic groups such as Kurds and minorities like Armenians time to time encountered challenges related to cultural recognition (Uçar, 2018), language rights, and political representation. Certain degree of discrimination, limited access to opportunities and cultural policies caused their demoralization and reluctance for full participation in political and social spheres. The struggles experienced by these groups underlined the importance of eliminating structural inequalities and promoting inclusive policies which would recognize and respect their rights (Serter, 2017). Similarly, religious minority groups faced limitations in terms of religious freedom and the preservation of their cultural heritage (Bakan, Selahattin & Levent, Ramazan, 2018). Orthodox Christians, for example, confronted restrictions on the operation of their religious institutions and the preservation of their religious practices. Such applications negatively influenced their ability to freely practice their faith and fully participate in society.

## **VI. Economic Policies and their Democratic Implications**

### **6.1 İnönü's Economic Vision and Development Strategies:**

Significant economic policies and development strategies which aim to foster economic growth and modernization were observed during the İsmet İnönü era (Karpat, 1996). The Turkish government's economic vision was the result of the principles of state intervention and planned economic development (Şeker, 2011). The emphasis on import substitution industrialization (ISI), one of the key elements of economic policies was extensively implemented. This method aimed to reduce dependency on foreign goods by promoting domestic production and self-sufficiency. The government also used protective measures such as import tariffs, quotas and subsidies to support domestic industries. By doing so, İnönü administration planned to stimulate industrialization, create employment opportunities and eventually and enhance economic independence (Aydemir, 1967 & Pala, 2010)

Furthermore, İnönü's government followed some specific economic policies to strengthen the agricultural sector as it was recognized as one of the strategic sectors for the country's overall development (Pala, 2010). Additionally, land reforms, particularly under Çiftçiyi Topraklandırma Kanunu (Law of Providing Land to Farmer) of 1945, were introduced to redistribute land and promote equity in landownership (Aydemir, 1967). Besides, agricultural cooperatives were established aiming to improve productivity and support rural communities.

## **6.2 Socio-economic Disparities and Democratic Participation:**

On the one hand while İnönü's economic policies planned to foster economic development, they also supported socio-economic disparities within Turkish society. The particular emphasis on industrialization and urbanization gave way to a concentration of economic opportunities in urban areas which exacerbated the rural-urban regions (Pala, 2010). Nonetheless, this disparity intensified challenges in the form of resources, infrastructure, and public services for rural populations.

Furthermore, economic power was concentrated in the hands of a few industrialists and landowners which led to perpetuation of socio-economic inequalities (Metinsoy, 2007). Besides, the elite class kept enjoying privileges and influence over the state and the economy while groups with fewer opportunities and workers ended up with limited economic prospects and struggled to have their voices heard. This situation meant that concentration of wealth and power in the hands of a few would undermine the principles of political equality and would abolish the ability of ordinary citizens to participate meaningfully in political decision-making processes (Metinsoy, 2007). Economic inequalities inevitably led to unequal access to education, healthcare and some other essential services (Pala, 2010), which would put barriers to full democratic participation.

## **6.3 Impact on Political Power Dynamics:**

İnönü's economic policies also influenced political power dynamics in Turkey. The extensive use of state intervention in the economy and the establishment of state-led development institutions (Uluatam, 2023) created an environment where the power in the hands of the state and its bureaucratic apparatus (Metinsoy, 2007). This centralized power structure gave way to political decision-making processes and limited the autonomy of local governments and civil society organizations.

This situation allowed for the manipulation of economic opportunities for political purposes. Political elites received an opportunity to use economic incentives or constraints to influence political outcomes and maintain their grip on power. These dynamics created challenges related to political pluralism and democratic governance (Karpas, 1959 & Karpas, 1996), because it hindered different political actors to compete on an equal footing.

## **VII. International Relations and Foreign Policy**

### **7.1 İnönü's Foreign Policy Approach:**

The foreign policy approach during İnönü's tenure indicated a commitment to neutrality, non-alignment and maintaining peaceful relations with other countries (Aydemir, 1967). İnönü's foreign policy aimed to protect and advance Turkish interests while avoiding entanglement when conflicts of the global powers were concerned (Aydemir, 1967 & Selek, 2020).

İnönü's government kept following a policy of balance and pragmatism. They sought to navigate the complex international landscape and secure Turkey's sovereignty and territorial integrity (Karpas, 2004). In this approach establishing strong diplomatic ties with a diverse range of countries, maintaining relations with both Western powers and neighboring states were prioritized.

However, this approach also faced with many challenges and attempted to navigate through the aftermath of World War II and the emerging Cold War dynamics (Hale, 2002). Yet still the country met with pressures from both Western and Eastern blocs requesting Turkey to align its foreign policy accordingly. İnönü had an extensive experience in his past; therefore, carefully maneuvered between these competing pressures so as to safeguard Turkey's national interests while avoiding direct involvement in the Cold War confrontation (Zürcher, 2003 & Ahmad, 2007).

### **7.2 Democracy and International Standing:**

President İnönü made efforts to enhance Turkey's international standing and desired to create an image of a modern and democratic country in the eye of the western world. He was well aware of the importance of international perception and worked to strengthen Turkey's ties with other nations, particularly in Europe and in North America. For example, Turkey's accession to the Council of Europe in 1949 was one of the significant cornerstones of İnönü's foreign policy. It was believed that this membership gave a signal

to the democratic world that Turkey was committed to democratic values and would eagerly align the country with the principles of the European community. Membership to the Council of Europe provided an opportunity for Turkey to engage in intergovernmental cooperation, fostered cultural exchange and promoted democratic norms (Oran, 2009).

In parallel to the Council of Europe, Turkey's membership in international organizations, such as the United Nations, was significant as these indicated its international standing. Therefore, İnönü's government actively participated in multilateral forums and attempted to advocate for peace, stability, and the protection of human rights on the global stage (Oran, 2009).

Nonetheless, it is important at this stage to note that the perception of Turkey's democracy varied among international actors (Hale, 2002). While some countries recognized Turkey's efforts in democratization, others, such as the Soviet Russia fearing to lose Turkey to the western camp or some others regarding Turkey as non-western, raised concerns about the limitations on civil liberties and political freedoms during the İnönü era. These contradictory perceptions influenced Turkey's standing in the international community and shaped its foreign relations (Tuncer, 2023).

### **7.3 External Influences on Democracy in Turkey:**

Geopolitical situation and location of Turkey as well as its interactions with other countries had influenced the country's domestic politics and democratic development. Particularly, the geopolitical dynamics of the Cold War era had a significant effect on Turkey's democracy journey. Especially, The United States and other Western powers wished and worked to maintain Turkey as a reliable ally against the Soviet Union, which often prioritized Turkey's stability over democratic reforms (Armaoğlu, 2017). This understanding inevitably paved the way for instances where democratic shortcomings were overlooked or tolerated in the interest of preserving the strategic alliance; interestingly enough, this even continued during the Democrat Party (DP) period under Adnan Menderes' period. Furthermore, the geopolitical rivalry between the Eastern and Western blocs also affected Turkey's internal dynamics. For example, the Soviet Union and its socialist ideology influenced some segments of Turkish society which gave way to political polarization and challenges to democratic governance. Additionally, regional conflicts and tensions, such as the Cyprus issue, were not very much in favor of Turkey's democracy (Karpat, 2004 & Oran, 2009). These conflicts and Turkey's reactions had some degree of complicated results for civil liberties, human rights, and the rule of law.

## VIII. Assessing the Legacy of the İsmet İnönü Era

### 8.1 Evaluation of Democratic Gains and Losses:

The İnönü's tenure had an indication of a mixed legacy in terms of democratic gains and losses. On one hand, İnönü's government attempted and worked extensively to establish a modern and secular state, promoted economic development and positioned Turkey on the international stage. A particular emphasis on education, healthcare, and social welfare programs was observed; and these initiatives and programs contributed to improvements in the quality of life for many Turks (Karpat, 1996 & Karpat, 2004 & VanderLippe, 2005). Nevertheless, one should acknowledge the limitations on political freedoms and civil liberties during this period. Moreover, the suppression of opposition parties, restrictions on freedom of expression and limitations on democratic participation barricaded the full realization of democratic ideals. These hardships led the creation of an environment where opposing views were suppressed and political power was concentrated in the hands of the ruling party, if not in the hands of few elites.

### 8.2 Lessons Learned for Turkey's Democratic Development:

The era of this comprehensive study offers valuable lessons for Turkey's democratic development. First of all, the significance of a reliable and viable multiparty system and political pluralism for the functioning of a healthy democracy should be highlighted. On the other hand, the concentration of power in a single party bears a shortcoming. It may lead to the erosion of democratic institutions and hinder the checks and balances system which is required for accountability and transparency.

Finally, the İnönü era emphasizes the importance of protecting civil liberties, freedom of expression as well as the right to dissent. It should be pinpointed that is essential for democratic discourse and the protection of individual rights to have a vibrant and inclusive public sphere in which diverse voices can be heard. The İnönü era also demonstrated the requirement for continuous efforts to strengthen democratic institutions so as to ensure the rule of law and to promote transparent and accountable governance. A democratic system needs a strong foundation which was built on respect for human rights, equality before the law as well as sound checks and balances system.

### **8.3 Implications for the Post-İnönü Era:**

The İsmet İnönü era had left a legacy for the post-İnönü era of Turkey. Apparently, the issues and achievements of this period shaped the political landscape and influenced subsequent governments' policies and approaches to democracy. The İnönü administration's limitations on political freedoms and the concentration of power within the CHP tolled the alarm bells for democratic reforms and a more inclusive political system. The struggles of democracy gained momentum in the following years which paved the way to significant political and constitutional changes.

The experiences and the lessons of the İsmet İnönü era helped us to serve as a reminder of the complexities and trade-offs inherent in democratic transitions, which also highlighted the need for a continuous commitment to democratic values, the protection of human rights as well as the inclusion of less represented groups in the political process.

Finally, the era studied in this comprehensive work left significant marks in terms of democratic gains and losses. On the one hand, it offered important lessons for Turkey's democratic development but on the other hand it also emphasized the importance of political pluralism, safeguarding civil liberties and strengthening democratic institutions. The experiences of this era will continue to shape Turkey's political landscape in the future in order to contribute to the ongoing efforts to build and sustain a vibrant and inclusive democracy.

## **IX. Conclusion**

### **9.1 Recapitulation of Key Findings:**

Stretching from 1938 to 1950, the İsmet İnönü era was a period with significant socio-political changes and challenges to democracy. Throughout this study, we have attempted to analyze various aspects of democratic governance by examining both the achievements and limitations.

Section 2 attempted to explore the succession from Mustafa Kemal Atatürk and İnönü's role in shaping the political landscape. The smooth transition of power from Atatürk to İnönü demonstrated the institutional strength of the Turkish Republic and set a precedent for the peaceful transfer of leadership. This transition laid the foundation for İnönü's policies and provided him with the mandate to continue Atatürk's vision of a modern, secular and democratic Turkey.

Section 3 examined the consolidation of power and the dominance of the CHP during the İnönü's tenure. The CHP, under İnönü's leadership, aimed to establish a single-party rule, which led to limited political pluralism and hindered the development of a sound and sustainable democratic system. The suppression of opposition parties, such as the Democrat Party, through legal and political means further constrained the democratic space.

Sections 4 and 5 tried to put forth the limitations on freedom of expression, media restrictions and socio-cultural dynamics. During the mentioned period, there were notable limitations on freedom of speech. Opposing views which were critical of the government were often silenced or persecuted. This included journalists, intellectuals and political activists who faced censorship, imprisonment or exile.

The media landscape was heavily regulated and controlled by the state. There was a limitation of the plurality of voices and suppression of the critical reporting. State-controlled newspapers and radio broadcasting served as propaganda tools to promote the ruling party's narrative and suppress alternative viewpoints.

Human rights conditions during the İnönü era were mixed. While there were efforts to promote education, healthcare and social welfare programs, certain civil liberties and individual freedoms were restricted. The government's focus on modernization sometimes came at the expense of traditional values. This led to tensions between social transformation and cultural constraints.

Inclusiveness and the rights of less represented groups were also areas where the İnönü era faced challenges. While there were some advancements in education in the forms of Village Institute, community houses, women's rights and gender equality, progress remained limited. Other marginalized groups, such as ethnic minorities, faced cultural restrictions on their rights to preserve their distinct identities.

Section 6 focused on economic policies and their implications for democracy. İnönü's economic vision aimed to modernize Turkey and promote development. This included industrialization, infrastructure projects as well as social welfare programs. While these policies contributed to the overall improvement in the quality of life for many Turks, socio-economic disparities persisted and democratic participation was influenced by unequal access to resources and opportunities. In Section 7, we discussed how Turkey integrated with the western block and used membership mechanisms to improve her democracy and open its regime to a multi-party system.

## **9.2 Final Thoughts on the İsmet İnönü Era and Democracy in Turkey:**

The İnönü era left some legacy with lessons to be utilized for democracy in Turkey. In spite of the notable achievements in terms of modernization, economic development and international standing, there existed significant limitations on political freedoms, civil liberties and inclusive democratic practices.

It is expected to learn from the experiences of the era and draw lessons for Turkey's democratic development. The importance of a vibrant and inclusive public sphere, where diverse voices can freely express their opinions and contribute to democratic discourse, is needed to avoid the limitations on political pluralism, to foster freedom of expression and civil liberties.

This era also reminds one the requirement to continuously strengthen democratic institutions, ensure the rule of law and promote transparent and accountable governance. It should also be pointed out that a democratic system needs a sound checks and balances mechanism, the protection of human rights and equal opportunities for all citizens.

With the passage of decades and time since Turkey moves forward, it is crucial to address the challenges that persist and work towards building a more inclusive and established and viable democracy. It should always be remembered that fostering political pluralism, safeguarding civil liberties, promoting human rights, and ensuring transparent and accountable governance are fundamental pillars for the advancement of democracy in Turkey.

To conclude, the İsmet İnönü era was a period which had both the democratic achievements and the limitations. By reflecting on the experiences of this era and striving for continuous improvement, Turkey is expected to navigate the complexities of democratic governance and work towards a more inclusive and vibrant democracy that upholds the rights and aspirations of its citizens.

## REFERENCES

- Ahmad, Feroz. (2007). *Bir Kimlik Peşinde Türkiye*. İstanbul Bilgi Üniversitesi Yayınları.
- Akgün, Seçil K. (2006). *Halifeliğin Kaldırılması ve Laiklik 1924-1928*. Temel Yayınları.
- Akşin, Sina (2007). *Kısa Türkiye Tarihi*, Türkiye İş Bankası Kültür Yayınları.
- Arabacı, C. (2014). Basın Kanunu ve İnönü Dönemi Türk Basını. *SBE Dergisi*.
- Armaoğlu, Fahir. (2017). *Türk Amerikan İlişkileri 1919-1997*. Kronik Kitap.
- Aydemir, Şevket S. (1966). *İkinci Adam I. Cilt: 1884-1938*. Remzi Kitabevi.
- Aydemir, Şevket S. (1967). *İkinci Adam II. Cilt: 1938-1950*. Remzi Kitabevi.
- Aynı Tarihi*. (1946).
- Bakan, Selahattin & Levent, Ramazan. (2018). Tek Parti Dönemi Alevi Politikası in *İnönü University International Journal of Social Sciences*.
- Bali, Rıfat N. (1998). Cumhuriyet Döneminde Azınlıklar Politikası in *Birikim* (115).
- Bayır, Özgün E. (2011). Türkiye’de Çok Partili Hayata Geçiş Sürecinde Solda Partileşme in *İstanbul Üniversitesi Siyasal Dergisi*, (45).
- Caporal, Bernard. (1982). *Kemalizmde ve Kemalizm Sonrasında Türk Kadını*. Türkiye İş Bankası Kültür Yayınları.
- Çaylak, A., & Nişancı, Ş. (2010). Türkiye’de Çok Partili Siyasal Sürece Giriş: Demokrasiye Geçiş Mi Siyasal Rejimin Restorasyonu Mu? in Adem Çaylak, Mehmet Dikkaya, Cihat Göktepe, Hüsnü Kapu (Editörler), *Osmanlı’dan İkibinli Yıllara Türkiye’nin Politik Tarihi (İç ve Dış Politika)* Savaş Yayınevi.
- Çelebi, Onur. (2015). Painful Birth of Democracy in Turkey: The 1946 Elections in *Journal of Turkish Studies*.
- Çelikiz, Ekrem. & Kuzucanlı, Gökhan. (2019). İnönü Döneminde Basın Özgürlüğü: Cumhuriyet, Akşam ve Vatan Gazeteleri Örneği. *Avrasya Sosyal ve Ekonomi Araştırmaları Dergisi*, 6 (4).
- Center for Democracy and Governance Bureau for Global Programs, Field Support, and Research U.S. Agency for International Development. (1999). *The Role of Media in Democracy: A Strategic Approach*.
- Hale, William. (2002). *Turkish Foreign Policy 1774-2000*. Frank Cass Publishers.
- Hür, Ayşe (2015). *Çok Partili Dönem’in Öteki Tarihi-I: İnönü ve Başarılı Yıllar (1938-1960)*. Profil Yayıncılık.
- Karal, Enver Z. (1998). *Atatürk’ten Düşünceler*. ODTÜ Geliştirme Vakfı Yayıncılık.
- Karpat, Kemal H. (1959). *Turkey’s Politics: The Transition to a Multi-Party System*. Princeton University Press.

- Karpat, Kemal H. (1996). *Türk Demokrasi Tarihi: Sosyal, Ekonomik, Kültürel Temeller*. Afa Yayınları.
- Karpat, Kemal H. (2004). *Studies on Turkish Politics and Society: Selected Articles and Essays*. Brill.
- Mardin, Şerif. (2006). *Religion, Society and Modernity in Turkey*. Syracuse University Press.
- Metinsoy, Murat. (2007). *İkinci Dünya Savaşı'nda Türkiye: Savaş ve Gündelik Yaşam*. Homer Kitabevi.
- Newspapers: Cumhuriyet, Tan, Vatan, Ulus & Times (issues between 1938-1950)
- Oran, Baskın. (2009). *Türk Dış Politikası: Kurtuluş Savaşından Bugüne Olgular, Belgeler, Yorumlar. Vol I: 1919-1980*. İletişim Yayınları
- Özdemir, Ali Ulvi (2014). Çok Partili Hayata Geçiş Sürecinde Türk Solunun DP ve Hükümet İle İlişkileri 1945-1946 in *Ankara Üniversitesi Atatürk Yolu Dergisi*, (55).
- Pala, Hakan. (2010). *İsmet İnönü Dönemi İktisat Politikaları (1938-1950)*. Afyon Kocatepe University Master's Thesis.
- Sayarı, Sabri & Esmer, Yılmaz (Eds). (2002). *Politics, Parties and Elections in Turkey*. Lynne Rienner Publishing.
- Sayarı, Sabri. (2011). Clientelism and Patronage in Turkish Politics and Society in Birtek, Faruk and Toprak, Binnaz (eds.), *The Post-Modern Abyss and the New Politics of Islam: Assabiyah Revisited: Essays in Honor of Şerif Mardin*. Istanbul Bilgi University Press.
- Sayarı, Sabri. (2014). Interdisciplinary Approaches to Political Clientelism and Patronage in Turkey, *Turkish Studies*, 15:4, 655-670, DOI: 10.1080/14683849.2014.985809
- Şeker, Kadir. (2011). Tek Parti Dönemi Ekonomik Politikaları ve Özel Teşebbüs Yatırımlarına Bir Örnek: Nuri Demirağ Tayyare Atölyesi in *SDU Faculty of Arts and Sciences Journal of Social Sciences*, no.23.
- Selek, Sabahattin (2020). *İsmet İnönü Hatıralar*. Bilgi Yayınevi.
- Serter, Yelda T. (2017). Tek Parti Döneminde Azınlık Politikası ve Varlık Vergisi in *Route Education and Social Science Journal*.
- Shaw, Stanford J. & Shaw, Ezel K. (2006). *Osmanlı İmparatorluğu ve Modern Türkiye II-Reform, Devrim ve Cumhuriyet: Modern Türkiye'nin Doğuşu (1808-1975)*. E Yayınları.
- TBMM Tutanak Dergisi (1946) Term: VIII, 1st Legislative Year, Session: 8.
- TBMM Tutanak Dergisi (1946) Term: VIII, 1st Legislative Year, Session: 14.
- Tikveş, Özkan. (1979). *Basın Özgürlüğü ve Sansür Yasası*. İzmir Gazeteciler Cemiyeti Konferansı.

- Tuncer, Hüner. (2023). *İsmet İnönü'nün Dış Politikası (1938-1950)*. Kaynak Yayınları.
- Uçar, Fuat. (2018). Türkiye'de Çok Partili Hayata Geçiş Süreci Demokratikleşme Çabalarının Kürt Sorununa Etkisi (1945-1950) in *Turkish Studies*.
- Uluatam, Özhan. Savaş Yıllarının İktisat Politikaları – Tedbirleri in *İnönü Vakfı İnternet Site* accessed on 15.05.2023, <https://www.ismetinonu.org.tr/savas-yillarinin-iktisat-politikalari-tedbirleri/>
- VanderLippe, John M. (2005). *The Politics of Turkish Democracy: İsmet İnönü and the Formation of the Multi-Party System, 1938-1950*. State University of New York Press.
- Yangıl, Fulya M. & Başpınar, Nuran Ö. (2022). Mustafa Kemal Atatürk'ün Liderlik Tarzının Sürdürülebilir Liderlik Açısından Değerlendirilmesi. *Kırklareli Üniversitesi İktisadi ve İdari Bilimler Fakültesi Dergisi*, vol.11, no.2.
- Yeşilçayır, Neşe. (2011). Çok Partili Döneme Geçiş Sürecinde Türk Basını in *Atatürk Araştırma Merkezi Dergisi*, vol. 27, no.79.
- Yeşilorman, Mehtap. (2010). A Study on Women in Turkish Political Life and the Turkish Women Parliamentarians in *Fırat University Social Sciences Journal*, vol.20, no.2.
- Yılmaz, Ensar. (2022). İnönü döneminde (1938-1950) Demografik Yapının Temel Özellikleri in *Journal of Social and Humanities Sciences Research*, 9(81), <http://dx.doi.org/10.26450/jshsr.3030>.
- Yılmaz, Nihat & Doğan, Kadir & İnankul, Hakan. (2013). *Tek Parti İktidari Döneminde (1923-1946) Bürokrasi Ve Siyaset İlişkisinin Weberyana Değerlendirilmesi*. Atatürk University Economics and Administrative Sciences Journal.
- Zürcher, Erik J. (2003). *Turkey: A Modern History*. I.B. Tauris Publishing.

## The Political Psychology of ‘China Threat’: Perceptions and Emotions

Ulaş Başar Gezgin<sup>1</sup>

### Abstract

In this study we first briefly introduced political psychology of international relations, and moved to the notion of threat perceptions in political psychology which extends from national threats to group threats. Thirdly, we focused on the so-called ‘China threat’ which is mostly considered as a theory, a perception, a discourse or a thesis, but also as an issue, a theme, a hypothesis, a notion, a charge, a narrative, a debate, an image, a coverage, a topic, a school of thought, a public discourse, a story, a perspective, a proposition, a specter, a view, a syndrome, a school, a fear, a sentiment, an idea, a terminology, a rhetoric, a possibility, a mentality, and an atmosphere, in the order of frequency. We also see other scholars preferring to use ‘the so-called China threat’ as they don’t believe it. The notion of ‘China threat’ is mostly associated with China’s military build-up which is visible in South China / East Vietnam Sea territorial disputes. China is at odd with most of its neighbors due to its revisionist moves. Emotions play a role in all parties to the conflict including the Asian neighbors and U.S.. Chinese government, reminiscent of the past humiliations, wants to be respected; but China’s military moves are viewed with fear, mistrust and suspicion among other parties. National threat perceptions are updated accordingly. As a response to China’s rise, conservatives and Republicans support containment policies, while the liberal and Democrat response is engagement. This division is also related to the attitudes towards Chinese people and Chinese government. China has its own logic in its moves, but to what extent it is rational is to be disputed. The study concludes with further discussions about China’s rise, considering the possibility of peaceful rise or confrontation.

---

1 Ulaş Başar Gezgin, Istanbul Galata University, Faculty of Arts and Social Sciences, Department of Psychology, [ulas.gezgin@galata.edu.tr](mailto:ulas.gezgin@galata.edu.tr), ORCID ID: 0000-0002-6075-3501

## Introduction

Views on 'International Relations' from the perspective of political psychology are not new. Even in the past, such views were put to work in the Cold War era to maintain peace, or at least non-aggression. Nevertheless, we need to be careful: Not everything can be explained by psychology. Goldgeier and Tetlock (2001) rightly argue that the application of psychology to 'International Relations' is not necessarily reductionist. Instead, it is possible to discuss the issue by uncovering the hidden psychological assumptions of 'International Relations' theories and frameworks (Kertzer & Tingley, 2018). From a psychological point of view, as listed in Ripley (1993), the primary actors of 'International Relations' are foreign policy elites rather than states; these elites have their own interpretation of situations (Larson, 1988); 'International Relations', then, is a matter of problem solving; and information is the key to 'International Relations' (Ripley, 1993). On the other hand, Mercer (2005) correctly argues that psychology in 'International Relations' is not only about prejudices and errors, but also about making the right decisions.

According to Gildea (2020), the biggest problem in applying the political psychological understanding to 'International Relations' is the problem of aggregates, since psychology includes individuals and 'International Relations' includes the state and others (Stein, 2017). On the other hand, Gildea (2020) considers this to be a minor issue on a deeper analysis. Also, social psychology is more relevant because of its analysis of decision-making within the group. Another perspective would be to classify states psychologically, for example by personality traits.

A potential avenue for a psychological understanding of 'International Relations' goes to game theory; however, this theory has been criticized for not including the interpretations of competitors (Larson, 1988). Prospect theory is another candidate for applying psychological knowledge to 'International Relations' (see Berejikian, 2002; Boettcher III, 1995, 2004; Farnham, 1992; Levy, 1992a, 1992b, 1997; McDermott, 1992, 2004; Schaub Jr, 2004; Shafir, 1992; Vis, 2011); however, the risks, gains and losses in policy making are rarely measurable, unlike in laboratory settings (Gildea, 2020). In this context, there is a practical dilemma: While political psychology-inspired empirical research is increasing in 'International Relations' (see Hyde, 2015; Mintz, Yang, & McDermott, 2011), their validity in real life is a big problem. In a study, different results can be obtained depending on whether the research is conducted before and after events such as September 11 (see Bourne Jr, Healy, & Beer, 2003). It is also debatable to what extent

experiments with average people, and students in particular, can be applied to the elite in foreign policy decision-making positions.

Recently, there has been a movement from cold cognition to hot cognition and emotions in ‘International Relations’ and political psychology (Erişen, 2013a, 2013b; Kertzer & Tingley, 2018). Emotions emerge as a new set of variables that need to be investigated in the political psychology of the field of ‘International Relations’ (Erişen, 2012; Gries, 2005). In this context, Rathbun (2009) defines fear as a generalized lack of trust under social uncertainty; this means a lack of information that includes the intentions of others in the context of ‘International Relations’.

As a result, many clues await to look at ‘International Relations’ from the perspective of political psychology. More research needs to be done, and a blend of scientific knowledge and current politics is needed.

### **The Political Psychology of Threat Perceptions**

The concept of threat perception is one of the concepts that connects political psychology and ‘International Relations’ (Stein, 2013; 1988). In the example of the Iraq War, it can be said that the White House exaggerated the threat posed by the Saddam regime, while Saddam underestimated the American threat (Stein, 2013). Both autocratic and democratic states often exaggerate external threats, as they serve political functions such as building unity (Larson, 1997) or making people forget the real problems of society. Enemies are dehumanized in a political psychological sense, they are not considered human (Herrmann, 2013). Military overconfidence is also a common mistake in foreign policy decision-making (Levy, 2013). Wars are expected to be short-lived, but this rarely happens. The White House had thought that in the invasion of Iraq, the Iraqi people would embrace the American soldiers as the bringers of democracy. This is an example of military optimism...

The perception of threat is actually a situation that makes it difficult to distinguish the real from the unreal in many respects. Politicians may deliberately scratch the threat. The Iran-Iraq War can be given as an example from both sides. On the other hand, sometimes politicians mistakenly exaggerate or underestimate the threat. The basis of some regimes is the perception of threat. The first to come to mind would be North Korea and Cuba. In these countries, the perception of threat is justified.

Traditionally, national threat perceptions are salient in threat perceptions literature (see Blank, 2008; Chourchoulis, 2012; Darwich, 2016; Farnham, 2003; Fordham, 1998; Gries et al., 2009; Jung, 2010; Kimmelmeier,

& Winter, 2000; Minkina, 2011; Ridout, Grosse, & Appleton, 2008; Sinkkonen, & Elovainio, 2020; Tamaki, 2012; Vinayaraj, 2009; Zhu, 2002). Threat of nuclear war had been added to this during the Cold War (see Lebovic, 2009; Mayton II, 1986; Schatz, & Fiske, 1992). However, recently, for many societies, threat perceptions moved from the Cold War mentality towards terrorism (Goodwin, Willson, & Stanley Jr, 2005; Leventhal, & Chellaney, 1988; Malhotra & Popp, 2012; Nissen et al., 2015; Pelletier, & Drozda-Senkowska, 2016; Stevens et al., 2011), foreigners (Watts, 1996), minorities (Canetti-Nisim, Ariely, & Halperin, 2008; Tahir, Kunst, & Sam, 2019; Verkuyten, 2009), refugees (Thomsen, & Rafiqi, 2020), immigrants and/or immigration (Araújo et al., 2019; Badea, Bender, & Korda, 2020; Ben-Nun Bloom, Arikian, & Lahav, 2015; Bianco, Kosic, & Pierro, 2022; Blinder, & Lundgren, 2019; Canetti et al., 2016; Erisen, & Kentmen-Cin, 2017; Escandell, & Ceobanu, 2009; Ha & Jang, 2015; Kiehne, & Cadenas, 2021; Kustov, 2019; Larsen et al., 2009; McLaren, 2003; Paxton & Mughan, 2006; Pereira, Vala, & Costa-Lopes, 2010; Thomsen, & Rafiqi, 2020; Vala, Pereira, & Ramos, 2006; Woods, & Marciniak, 2017), climate change (Carmi & Kimhi, 2015; Davydova et al., 2018; Schwaller et al., 2020), disasters (Bodas et al., 2019; Losee, Smith, & Webster, 2021; Tønnessen, Mårdberg, & Weisæth, 2002) and more recently disease (Covid 19) (Adam-Troian, & Bagci, 2021; Bonetto et al., 2021; Calvillo et al., 2020; Clarke, Klas, & Dyos, 2021; Maftai, & Holman, 2021; Paredes et al., 2021).

Threat perception increases Right Wing Authoritarian (RWA) attitudes and support for authoritarian systems with a vicious cycle from the other direction (Russo, Roccatò, & Merlone, 2020). Political conservatism and racial prejudice predict the threat perceptions (Vala, Pereira, & Ramos, 2006). RWA is associated with negative views of asylum seekers (Onraet et al., 2021), while contact with the immigrants reduces threat perceptions (McLaren, 2003). On the other hand, terror threat perception moves the public opinion towards hawkish foreign policy (Gadarian, 2010), restriction of civil liberties (Sekerdej, & Kossowska, 2011), and even in favor of torture (Conrad et al., 2018). Additionally, higher education level is found to be associated with less support for hawkish policies (Kim, 2015). Against terror threat, partisan divisions are overcome (Malhotra & Popp, 2012). Threat perception and political conservatism are correlated, although definitions broadly matter (Crawford, 2017). People under terrorism threat vote more for right wing parties (Getmansky, & Zeitzoff, 2014). Threat perception is also related with prejudice levels (Sari, 2007).

In the international relations literature, a number of works can be mentioned as examples of interstate threat perceptions (e.g. Almomani,

2019; Balakrishnan, & Varkkey, 2017; Ballard, 2008; Behera, 2021; Fathir, Johan, & Ab Raman, 2018; Gause III, 2003; He, 2012; Katagiri, 2018; Kim, 2013; Lee, 2018; Liao, & Whiting, 1973; Matonytė, & Morkevičius, 2009; Peleo, 2015; Russo, 2016; Sasaki, 2010; Seongji, 2009; Staniland, Mir, & Lalwani, 2018; Viraphol, 1985; Yuan, 1998). The notion of ‘Russian threat’ is a popular subject in the relevant literature (see Thornton, & Karagiannis, 2016). After Ukraine’s invasion, this notion is no longer believed to be a myth (Gezgin, 2022). It appears as a realistic threat in a number of country’s policy considerations (for instance, Lithuania (Nevinskaitė, 2017)) as well as NATO’s (Kendall-Taylor, & Edmonds, 2019). On the other hand, Russia feels threatened by America’s new weapons (Bartles, 2017). Fears and anxieties are bidirectional (Gezgin, 2022). American view of Russia drastically changed after Ukraine invasion in 2014 (Ambrosio, 2017). The United States started to consider Russia as a threat and as a future violator of international norms (Ambrosio, 2017). As early as 1997, Alexandrova (1997) asks “The Russian Threat—Real or Imaginary?” As of 2022, the answer is clear. On the other hand, according to Simons (2019), ‘Russia threat’ is just a narrative seen in Western media, and Russia, in these portrayals is scapegoated. Obviously, there are different sides to the conflict with their own particular views. Tsygankov (2013) reminds us that NATO-Russia mistrust is grounded in the Cold War, so it is hard to fix it.

China’s rise mostly fueled fear and anxiety among world powers and neighboring states. Shiffrinson (2018), for instance, asks “Should the United States fear China’s rise?” Likewise, Zhou (2008) asks “Does China’s rise threaten the United States?” Abe (2003) asks “Is “China Fear” Warranted?” Jiang (2002) asks: “Will China be a “Threat” to Its Neighbors and the World in the Twenty First Century?” Other notable questions in this context are “Will China’s rise be peaceful?” (Toje, 2017), “Will China’s rise lead to war?” (Glaser, 2011), and “Can China’s Rise Continue without Conflict?” (van der Pijl, 2017).

Khoo (2011) notes that key actors in Northeast Asia respond to China’s rise with fear. Chubb, & McAllister (2021), Jain & McCarthy (2016) and Zhixin (2018) argue that Australia views China’s rise with fear and anxiety. Pan (2014) is among those noting anxieties of Indo-Pacific Alliance powers vis-à-vis China’s rise. Zhang Y. (2013) even calls those emotions as ‘China anxiety’. On the other hand, China is also anxious of U.S. military power (Riqiang, 2013).

Pillsbury (2012) lists 16 basic fears of China which are:

“Fear of an island blockade

- Fear of a loss of maritime resources
- Fear of the choking-off of sea lines of communication
- Fear of a land invasion or territorial dismemberment
- Fear of an armoured or airborne attack
- Fear of internal instability, riots, civil war or terrorism
- Fear of attacks on pipelines
- Fear of aircraft-carrier strikes
- Fear of major air-strikes
- Fear of Taiwanese independence
- Fear of insufficient forces to 'liberate' Taiwan
- Fear of attacks on strategic missile forces by commandos, jamming or precision strikes
- Fear of escalation and loss of control
- Fear of cyber attack
- Fear of attacks on anti-satellite capabilities
- Fear of regional neighbours India, Japan, Vietnam and Russia" (pp.152-160).

### **The Political Psychology of 'China Threat'**

Now is the time to ask the key questions of the paper: Is China a threat? To whom? Objectively or subjectively? Psychologically or economically? What are the emotions and perceptions involved in viewing China as a threat? These questions await comprehensive answers.

Before all, what is China threat? Goodman (2017) briefly defines 'China threat' as "the fear of being taken over by China and the Chinese" (p.2). For researchers, 'China threat' is

a theory (Arif, 2021; Aukia, 2017; Broomfield, 2003; Chansoria, 2011; Christensen, 2006; Ding & Huang, 2011; Hsu, 2009; Jain, 2019; Kim, 2016; Kristensen, 2014; Lai, 2021; Larson, 2015; Larson, & Shevchenko, 2010; Lee, 2016, 2010; Liao, 2012; Liff & Ikenberry, 2014; Liu, 2020; Lu, 2011; Okuda, 2016; Oren, 2019; Saalman, 2011a, 2011b; Sun, 2015; Turner, 2013; Wang, 2010; Wang & Shoemaker, 2011; Wei-cheng, 2015; Yang & Liu, 2012; Yermia, 2020; Zhang, 2015, 2013, 2013 October),

a perception (Ambrosio, Schram, & Heopfner, 2020; Chengqiu, 2020; Ding & Huang, 2011; Fitriani, 2018; Gao, 2021; Ikegami, 2009; Jung & Jeong, 2016; Larson, 2015; Liao, 2012; Liff & Ikenberry, 2014; Machida, 2010; Mirilovic & Kim, 2016; Okuda, 2016; Peng, 2009; Saalman, 2011; Sun, 2015; Wang, 2021; Wei-cheng, 2015; Zaffran & Erwes, 2015),

an argument (Chu, 1994; Foot, 2009; Liao, 2012; Machida, 2010; Tsai & Liu, 2019; Yang & Liu, 2012; Zhu & Lu, 2013),

a discourse (Gao, 2021; Goh, 2005; Gries, 2006; Gries, Crowson, & Sandel, 2010; Johnson, 2018; Kim, 2021; Pintado Lobato, 2015),

a thesis (Kim, 2016; Ling, 2013; Machida, 2010; Pintado Lobato, 2015; Zhai, 2019),

an issue (Broomfield, 2003; Oren, 2019; Yeoh, 2019),

a theme (Lee, 2010; Song, 2015),

a hypothesis (Kim, 2016, 2021),

a notion (Jerden, 2014; Liao, 2012),

a charge (Liao, 2019; Shih, 2005),

a narrative (Ambrosio, Schram, & Heopfner, 2020; Oren, 2019)

a debate (Yeoh, 2019; Zhang, 2001),

an image (Szilágyi, 2015; Xiang, 2013),

a coverage (Aukia, 2017; Yang & Liu, 2012)

a topic (Song, 2015),

a school of thought (Broomfield, 2003),

a public discourse (Goodman, 2017),

a story (Goodman, 2017),

a perspective (Machida, 2010),

a proposition (Machida, 2010),

a specter (Zaffran & Erwes, 2015),

a view (Okuda, 2016),

a syndrome (Liao, 2012),

a school (Foot, 2001),

a fear (Lee, 2010),

a sentiment (Lu, 2011),  
 an idea (Foot, 2009),  
 a terminology (Oren & Brummer, 2020),  
 a rhetoric (Pintado Lobato, 2015),  
 a possibility (Brittingham, 2007)  
 a mentality (Goh, 2005), and  
 an atmosphere (Tsai & Liu, 2019).

Thus, China threat is mostly considered as a theory, perception, argument, discourse and thesis which are mostly subjective and psychological characterizations. Other than these, some other researchers such as Abe (1996), Baginda (2021), Bhattacharya (2007), Chen (2021, 2012), Cheng, & Zhang (1999), Chunlai (2002), Das (2013a, 2013b), Gross (2007), Guang (2008), Ikenberry, Parmar, & Stokes (2018), Jung-seung (2012), Kim (2009, 1998), Korolev (2019), Kwan (2003), Lai To (1997), Lam (2005), Lee (2008), Lee, & Haupt (2020), Li (2013), Liu (2016), Machida (2010), Marton, & Matura (2011), McDewitt (2014), Miranda (2017), Nagy (2017), Ondriaš (2018), Qingguo (1996), Rawnsley (2012), Richardson (2010), Sato (1998), Schneider, 2014; Scobell (2009), Shambaugh (1996), Shee (2004), Shichor (1996), Shih (2011), Shih & Huang (2015), Sismanidis (1994), Song (2015), Sukma (1994), Tan (2011), Tarrósy (2017), Tungkeunkunt & Phuphakdi (2018), Turner (2013, 2009), Vuori (2018), Wang (2012, 2011, 2008, 2005, 2000), Wang, & French (2013), Wang, & Rosenau (2009), Yang (2004), Yee & Storey (2013), Yeophantong, & Shih (2021), Yuan (2001), Yuliantoro (2017), Yunling (2016), Zhao (2020), Zhou (2009) don't believe in truth of the statement, thus they say 'the so-called China threat'.

The rise of China is considered to be "a threat to the national interests of the United States and Asian-Pacific security" (Broomfield, 2003, p.265). U.S. media is the carrier of the 'China threat' perceptions as reflected in changes in coverage of China-related news (Yang & Liu, 2012). Zhang (2015) finds that American students do not have negative stereotypes about Chinese, but nevertheless consider 'China threat' as serious. Okuda (2016) discovers that English print media makes the audiences anxious about China's rise and America's decline. Lai (2021) analyzes U.S. media coverage on China and views U.S. media as ethnocentric in this context. However, this study can be considered as incomplete without a comparative study with Chinese media's coverage of U.S. Wang & Shoemaker (2011), in this

context, suggests that more cultural, social, human interest news should be placed in American media about China, instead of political news only, to promote a better understanding of China and a more favorable attitude toward China.

Goodman (2017) proposes that ‘China threat’ perceptions are rooted in early 20<sup>th</sup> century in Australia, but does not make any sense as the two countries are important economic partners. On the other hand, China’s military rise leads to unfavorable attitudes among its neighbors (Jung & Jeong, 2016). Military modernization is at odds with the claims of peaceful rise (Chansoria, 2011). China’s military build-up is viewed as an excuse for more military spending in U.S., Japan and Australia (Zaffran & Erwes, 2015). This leads to a form of escalation very much reminiscent of the Cold War era. China points out that American military involvement around China increased (Liu, 2020). From Chinese side, U.S. appears to act arrogantly, not respecting China (Liu, 2020; Zhang, 2013). For China, the Cold War mentality continues in American foreign policy thinking (Liu, 2020). China claims that U.S. wishes for the collapse of Chinese Communist Party through a color revolution (Liu, 2020).

Arif (2021) “shows how threat assessment could trigger a spiral of conflict through state’s tendency to overestimate threat level and its failure to perceive that defensive behavior can be interpreted as offensive by the belligerent” (p.120). Convergingly, Sun (2015) states that “If the US holds that China’s growing military power threatens US vital interests, it may adopt overly competitive military and foreign policies, which will in turn threaten China and overall bilateral security” (p.94). Nevertheless, Arif (2021) is optimistic: If the communication channels will be opened, misperceptions will be corrected and accordingly, no Sino-American confrontation would take place. Lai To (1997) note that lack of transparency in Chinese security considerations contributes to the conflict through anxieties. On the other hand, Zhang (2013) notes that “But the United States should avoid the conceit that a given mode of behavior can be wrong for every other country in the world but still right for the United States because of the purity of its motives” (p.508).

In this context, Chinese defensive position is more or less the following:

“China has increased its military strength steadily due to its booming economy. However, Chinese military modernization has been modest compared with other countries in the region and its rapidly growing economy. China focuses on economic development; it is not filling the

“power vacuum” because there is no such vacuum left in the Asia-Pacific region” (Chu, 1994, p.77).

Another defense is the following:

“Some people may claim that there is clear evidence of the real “China threat,” such as the ever-increasing Chinese military might, persistent nationalist indoctrination, global hunt for energy, and a market economy. (...) These same events can be represented in a significantly different ways. For example, China has strong reason to increase its national power, for national self-defense and unification and to pursue social and economic development” (Song, 2015, p.164).

Richardson (2010) warns that the so-called ‘China threat’ discussions do not serve American interests, converging with Kim (2016). One should consider looking ahead and try to influence Chinese policies. This can avoid worst outcomes such as open confrontation. In an empirical study, Gries & Crowson (2010) find that American conservatives, Republicans and older respondents feel a higher level of ‘China threat’ and more anti-China. Lowest educated respondents are found to be more negative about China (Gries & Crowson, 2010). Liberals support engagement with China, while conservatives are in favor of containment (Lee, 2016). The personality variable of openness to new experience is found to be negatively correlated with prejudice towards China and positively correlated with negative attitudes towards Chinese government (Gries, Crowson, & Sandel, 2010). Right wing authoritarianism (RWA) and social dominance orientation (SDO) are also found to follow the same pattern (Gries, Crowson, & Sandel, 2010). Obviously, there is a distinction between Chinese people and Chinese government as attitude objects. Additionally, Crowson & Gries (2010) find that RWA and SDO are correlated with the idea of containment. Zhang (2013), on the other hand, argue that those in favor of containment overestimate military strength of China, and underestimate their own. With all its military bases in the region and fast-developing weapons technology, U.S. is much superior than China (Zhang, 2013).

Al-Rodhan (2007) states that “Proponents of the “China threat” theory argue that it is inconceivable for China to have a peaceful rise; a superpower China will inevitably be a threat to the United States” (p.41), and argues that such threat perceptions are exaggeration for various reasons. Jiang (2002) adds that “(...) in terms of China’s low per capita GDP, its comparatively low military budget, and the serious challenges in its domestic affairs, China’s national power has not been increased to such an extent that it will threaten the security of the region (...)” (p.55). Soeya (2002) argues that ‘China

threat' is a myth hiding other developments in the region. Ding (2000) thinks that China can't be a threat to U.S., as the former does not have strong domestic defense industries. For Powles (2010), China can't be a security threat as it focuses on economic development. Xu (2011) does not see China as an expansionist power; and Jalil (2019) views China as a status quo power, not a revisionist one.

Yuan & Fu (2020) analyze U.S. threat perceptions with regard to the Cold War USSR, wartime Japan, and current 'foe' China, and finds continuities in the way American threat perceptions are framed. Additionally, misperceptions lead to mistrust and further insecurity in Sino-American relations (Gries, 2009; Gries & Jing, 2019). Uncertainty about China's plans lead to negative views (Kim, 2019). Furthermore, fundamental attribution error is at play (cf. Beukel, 1992; Markedonov, & Suchkov, 2020; Reynolds, 2015): U.S. attributes China's military build-up to hostile intentions rather than circumstances (Moore, 2010). Same holds for Indonesian officials (Yeremia, 2020). China's military modernization makes U.S. and Taiwanese anxious (Arif, 2021; Ding, & Huang, 2011). In turn, China fears a possible declaration of Taiwanese independence (Lai To, 1997). However, Gries (2005) contends that "Like all peoples, Chinese are neither innately pacifist nor hardwired for conflict. Instead, history and culture shape how individual Chinese will construe the events of world politics" (p.257).

Past terms to characterize the public opinion was 'Yellow Peril' and 'Red Menace' (Chen, 2012), while a relatively new currency is 'Sinophobia' which is shortly defined as "discrimination against Chinese" (Gao, 2021, np). Sinophobia involves hatred which is another emotion that plays a role in international relations. The notion of 'China Threat' is considered to be just reframing of the past expressions (Chen, 2012).

Song (2015) reminds that 'China threat' can be a self-fulfilling prophecy. For Broomfield (2003), Machida (2010), Zaffran & Erwes (2015), and Zhou (2011), it is an exaggeration. For Ling (2013), it is old colonialism. For Turner (2013), it is "contingent upon subjective interpretation" (p.21). Turner (2013) notes that "throughout history 'threats' from China towards the United States, rather than objectively verifiable phenomena, have always been social constructions of American design and thus more than calculations of material forces." (p.1)

Zhai (2018) conducts surveys with Asian youth in 7 societies (Japan, the Philippines, Singapore, South Korea, Taiwan, Thailand, and Vietnam) and finds that they are highly negative about China's rise with the exception of Thailand. Vietnamese, Japanese and Taiwanese youth hold most unfavorable

attitudes towards China (Zhai, 2018). It is predicted that such a public opinion will bring about more military spending among China's neighbors. Interestingly, listening to Chinese music is associated with more favorable attitudes, while no such relationship exists between watching Chinese drama and the attitudes. Zhai (2018) proposes that "China's foreign policymaking should take greater consideration of Asian public opinion rather than be dominated by wishful thinking" (p.1). Likewise, Chu, Kang, & Huang (2015) find that people from China's neighboring countries hold less positive views about China. In another study, Sonoda (2021) finds Vietnam to be the most negative, Singapore and Indonesia more positive, and Japan and South Korea were in-between.

China's rise makes the country more self-confident (Wang, & Cui, 2011). From a social psychological perspective, Lee (2016) argues that China's rise will be peaceful, unlike 'China threat' narratives. Also from a social psychological view, Gries (2005) proposes that Sino-American relations will not necessarily be competitive. Miller and Taylor (2016), Broomfield (2003), He (2017), Kim (2016), and Machida (2010) agree with this position noting the economic interdependence relations. Zhang (2013) converges with Lee (2016) and Miller and Taylor (2016) stating that Sino-American relations have been stable for the last three decades. In the same vein, Jerden (2014) think that assertive China narrative is flawed.

Of course, the perceptions are not unilateral. China feels threatened with America's rebalancing strategy in the region which makes U.S. a revisionist state from Chinese perspective (Arif, 2021). Abbasi, & Khalid (2021) argue that Chinese nuclear program is a direct response to threat posed by American nuclear arsenal. China has its own hardliners (hawks) and moderates (doves) (Zaffran & Erwes, 2015). Lee (2016) provides an emotional description of China's behavior:

"For China, as greatly sensitized it still is to the painful memories of the Century of Humiliation, the feeling of disrespect is likely to encourage a level of anger that negatively biases perceptions, reduces demand for information, and shortens decision times, consequently increasing both the degree and probability of risk prone and aggressive behavior on its part" (p.45).

In that sense, it appears that Chinese state behavior is more emotional and less rational than that of other great powers, comparable to Russia whose Ukraine invasion is viewed as irrational, but emotionally predictable considering the threat level, anxieties and fears (Gezgin, 2022). Lee (2016) adds that "At the same time, however, China is likely to resort to violence when others (especially the United States) show disrespect toward its sovereignty,

even if rational calculations would suggest otherwise” (p.45). China feels to be humiliated in the past (Kim, 2016) which color its judgements.

One point to be pessimistic about China’s rise is South China / East Vietnam Sea dispute (Kim, 2019, 2016). Another is observed in Sino-Indian border clashes (cf. Saalman, 2011). Thirdly, Sino-Japanese territorial dispute is to be noted (cf. Nakano, 2015). Contrary to Broomfield (2003)’s position, these all show that China is a revisionist power as to its borders, although internationally speaking military involvement plays a minor role in its economic investments in foreign countries. China stands as the new regional hegemon, if not a global one yet (Jain, 2019). On the other hand, South China / East Vietnam Sea dispute becomes an excuse for American presence in the region (Kim, 2016). In fact, considering NATO’s expansion, U.S. should also be considered as a revisionist power. Two revisionist powers are more than enough to cause conflict in Asia-Pacific.

### **Conclusion**

In this paper, we introduced political psychology of international relations in short, and presented the notion of threat perceptions in political psychology including national threats and group threats involving not only states, but also immigrants. Then, we moved to the so-called ‘China threat’ which is viewed from different lenses by various scholars. Through providing an overview, we showed how emotions are involved in interstate relations. Further research is needed to learn more about the Chinese position referring to sources in Chinese language.

How can China’s rise be peaceful? Ding, & Huang (2011), in the context of Taiwan-PCR relations, recommends “cooperation with the mainland in the field of non-traditional security, including combating transnational crime, terrorism, drug trafficking, pandemic disease, disaster relief, and humanitarian rescue” as “these areas are less politically sensitive” (p.50). Same can be said for other parties to the conflict.

For the future of China’s rise, emotions and perceptions will continue to influence the politics, as Chinese state is an emotional state doing everything in order not to return to the era of humiliation. Taiwan policy will be the key to other movements. Taiwan is also significant as it reminds China of the past weaknesses of the colonial times. South China / East Vietnam Sea will continue to boil, as China will continue to militarize the islands. On the other hand, we will hear more about China not due to military build-up but Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) (see Gezgin, 2020a, 2020b, 2021, in pressa, inpressb, inpressc, inpressd). BRI has the potential to convince

all powers that China's rise will be peaceful. Although securitization of some of the projects such as China Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) is problematic, overall Chinese influence will be more visible in infrastructure projects. Especially CPEC will make a big difference, as China's South China /East Vietnam Sea route-dependence will no longer be applicable (Gezgin in pressa).

Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) which is an ambitious set of international infrastructure projects may shift Chinese activity away from China's South China /East Vietnam Sea, as the state will be busy in other regions of Asia and the world. Contrary to this expectation, BRI can exacerbate the current conflict at South China /East Vietnam Sea, as the Maritime Silk Road passes through this territory. We will see which expectation will come true.

To sum up, China is expected to be known with international infrastructural projects rather than military confrontations if U.S. would not wage war against China. For China, all out confrontation will be detrimental to economic interests, but as an emotional state, this risk can be taken to avoid humiliation as previously explained.

## References

- Abbasi, K. A., & Khalid, Z. (2021). The US in China's Nuclear Threat Perception. *Policy Perspectives*, 18(1), 53-68.
- Abe, J. I. (1996). Chinese National Security Perception after the Cold War and its Implications for East Asia: Independent Peace Diplomacy and "China Threat" Thesis The Transformation of the Global System. *International Relations*, 1996(112), 63-83.
- Adam-Troian, J., & Bağcı, S. C. (2021). The pathogen paradox: Evidence that perceived COVID-19 threat is associated with both pro-and anti-immigrant attitudes. *International Review of Social Psychology*, 34(1), 11, 1-15.
- Al-Rodhan, K. R. (2007). A critique of the China threat theory: A systematic analysis. *Asian Perspective*, 41-66.
- Alexandrova, O. (1997). The Russian Threat—Real or Imaginary?. In *European Security* (pp. 39-53). Palgrave Macmillan, London.
- Almomani, H. M. (2019). Saudi Arabia's Geopolitical Interests in the Levant and the Threat Perception 2011-2017. *Dirasat, Human and Social Sciences*, 46(4).
- Ambrosio, T. (2017). Russia's Ukraine intervention and changes to American perceptions of the Russian threat: Executive branch testimony to the house and senate armed services committees, 2008–2016. *Journal of Global Security Studies*, 2(2), 104-122.
- Ambrosio, T., Schram, C., & Heopfner, P. (2020). The American securitization of China and Russia: US geopolitical culture and declining unipolarity. *Eurasian Geography and Economics*, 61(2), 162-194.
- Araújo, R. D. C., Bobowik, M., Vilar, R., Liu, J. H., Gil de Zuniga, H., Kus-Harbord, L., ... & Gouveia, V. V. (2020). Human values and ideological beliefs as predictors of attitudes toward immigrants across 20 countries: The country-level moderating role of threat. *European Journal of Social Psychology*, 50(3), 534-546.
- Arif, M. (2021). How threat assessment could become self-fulfilling prophecy: case of US-China relations. *Global: Jurnal Politik Internasional*, 18(2), 120-130.
- Aukia, J., Heimonen, J., Pahikkala, T., & Salakoski, T. (2017). Automated quantification of Reuters news using a receiver operating characteristic curve analysis: The Western media image of China. *Global Media and China*, 2(3-4), 251-268.
- Badea, C., Bender, M., & Korda, H. (2020). Threat to national identity continuity: When affirmation procedures increase the acceptance of Muslim immigrants. *International Journal of Intercultural Relations*, 78, 65-72.

- Baginda, A. R. (2021). Evaluating the China Threat: Between Perceived and Real. In *The Global Rise of China and Asia* (pp. 111-135). Palgrave Macmillan, Cham.
- Balakrishnan, K. S., & Varkkey, H. (2017). The Straits of Malacca: Malaysia's Threat Perception and Strategy for Maritime Security. In *Maritime Security in East and Southeast Asia* (pp. 23-42). Palgrave, Singapore.
- Ballard, K. M. (2008). Doors of perception: national security politics, threat perceptions, and North Korea's pursuit of a credible deterrent. *The Korean Journal of Defense Analysis*, 20(3), 231-246.
- Bartles, C. K. (2017). Russian threat perception and the ballistic missile defense system. *The Journal of Slavic Military Studies*, 30(2), 152-169.
- Behera, A. (2021). India's Internal Security: Threat Perception and Way Forward. *CLAWS Journal*, 14(2), 28-45.
- Ben-Nun Bloom, P., Arikan, G., & Lahav, G. (2015). The effect of perceived cultural and material threats on ethnic preferences in immigration attitudes. *Ethnic and Racial Studies*, 38(10), 1760-1778.
- Berejikian, J. D. (2002). Model building with prospect theory: A cognitive approach to international relations. *Political Psychology*, 23(4), 759-786.
- Beukel, E. (1992). The fundamental attribution error in the cold war: American perceptions of the Soviet Union as a nuclear superpower. *Contemporary Security Policy*, 13(3), 396-420.
- Bhattacharya, A. (2007). Chinese nationalism and China's assertive foreign policy. *The Journal of East Asian Affairs*, 235-262.
- Bianco, F., Kosic, A., & Pierro, A. (2022). The mediating role of national identification, binding foundations and perceived threat on the relationship between need for cognitive closure and prejudice against migrants in Malta. *Journal of Community & Applied Social Psychology*, 32, 172-185.
- Blank, S. (2008). Threats to and from Russia: an assessment. *Journal of Slavic Military Studies*, 21(3), 491-526.
- Blinder, S., & Lundgren, L. (2019). Roots of group threat: anti-prejudice motivations and implicit bias in perceptions of immigrants as threats. *Ethnic and Racial Studies*, 42(12), 1971-1989.
- Bodas, M., Giuliani, F., Ripoll-Gallardo, A., Caviglia, M., Dell'Aringa, M. F., Linty, M., ... & Ragazzoni, L. (2019). Threat perception and public preparedness for earthquakes in Italy. *Prehospital and Disaster Medicine*, 34(2), 114-124.
- Boettcher III, W. A. (1995). Context, methods, numbers, and words: Prospect theory in international relations. *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 39(3), 561-583.

- Boettcher III, W. A. (2004). The prospects for prospect theory: An empirical evaluation of international relations applications of framing and loss aversion. *Political Psychology*, 25(3), 331-362.
- Bonetto, E., Dezechache, G., Nugier, A., Inigo, M., Mathias, J. D., Huet, S., ... & Dambrun, M. (2021). Basic human values during the COVID-19 outbreak, perceived threat and their relationships with compliance with movement restrictions and social distancing. *PloS one*, 16(6), e0253430.
- Bourne Jr, L. E., Healy, A. E., & Beer, F. A. (2003). Military conflict and terrorism: General psychology informs international relations. *Review of General Psychology*, 7(2), 189-202.
- Brittingham, M. A. (2007). The “role” of nationalism in Chinese foreign policy: A reactive model of nationalism & conflict. *Journal of Chinese Political Science*, 12(2), 147-166.
- Broomfield, E. V. (2003). Perceptions of danger: The China threat theory. *Journal of Contemporary China*, 12(35), 265-284.
- Calvillo, D. P., Ross, B. J., Garcia, R. J., Smelter, T. J., & Rutchick, A. M. (2020). Political ideology predicts perceptions of the threat of COVID-19 (and susceptibility to fake news about it). *Social Psychological and Personality Science*, 11(8), 1119-1128.
- Canetti, D., Snider, K. L., Pedersen, A., & Hall, B. J. (2016). Threatened or threatening? How ideology shapes asylum seekers’ immigration policy attitudes in Israel and Australia. *Journal of Refugee Studies*, 29(4), 583-606.
- Canetti-Nisim, D., Ariely, G., & Halperin, E. (2008). Life, pocketbook, or culture: The role of perceived security threats in promoting exclusionist political attitudes toward minorities in Israel. *Political Research Quarterly*, 61(1), 90-103.
- Carmi, N., & Kimhi, S. (2015). Further than the eye can see: Psychological distance and perception of environmental threats. *Human and Ecological Risk Assessment: An International Journal*, 21(8), 2239-2257.
- Chansoria, M. (2011). Rising Dragon: Military Modernization Of China’s PLA in the 21<sup>st</sup> Century. *The Journal of East Asian Affairs*, 15-58.
- Chen, A. (2012). On the Source, Essence of “Yellow Peril” Doctrine and Its Latest Hegemony “Variant”—the “China Threat” Doctrine: From the Perspective of Historical Mainstream of Sino-Foreign Economic Interactions and Their Inherent Jurisprudential Principles. *The Journal of World Investment & Trade*, 13(1), 1-58.
- Chen, C. K. (2021). China in Latin America Then and Now: A Systemic Constructivist Analysis of China’s Foreign Policy. *Journal of Current Chinese Affairs*, 50(2), 111-136.

- Cheng, J. Y. S., & Zhang, F. W. (1999). Chinese foreign relation strategies under Mao and Deng: a systematic and comparative analysis. *Kasarinlan: Philippine Journal of Third World Studies*, 14(3), 91-114.
- Chengqiu, W. (2020). Ideational differences, perception gaps, and the emerging Sino-US rivalry. *The Chinese Journal of International Politics*, 13(1), 27-68.
- Chourchoulis, D. (2012). A nominal defence? NATO threat perception and responses in the Balkan area, 1951-1967. *Cold War History*, 12(4), 637-657.
- Christensen, T. J. (2006). Fostering stability or creating a monster? The rise of China and US policy toward East Asia. *International security*, 31(1), 81-126.
- Chu, S. (1994). The Russian-US Military balance in the post-cold War Asia-Pacific region and the "China Threat". *Journal of Northeast Asian Studies*, 13(1), 77-95.
- Chu, Y. H., Kang, L., & Huang, M. H. (2015). How East Asians view the rise of China. *Journal of Contemporary China*, 24(93), 398-420.
- Chubb, D., & McAllister, I. (2021). Fear and Greed: Australian Public Opinion Towards China's Rise. *Australian Journal of Politics & History*, 67(3-4), 439-453.
- Chunlai, S. (2002). For better Sino-Australian relations. *Australian Journal of International Affairs*, 56(3), 337-346.
- Clarke, E. J., Klas, A., & Dyos, E. (2021). The role of ideological attitudes in responses to COVID-19 threat and government restrictions in Australia. *Personality and individual differences*, 175, 110734.
- Conrad, C. R., Croco, S. E., Gomez, B. T., & Moore, W. H. (2018). Threat perception and American support for torture. *Political Behavior*, 40(4), 989-1009.
- Crawford, J. T. (2017). Are conservatives more sensitive to threat than liberals? It depends on how we define threat and conservatism. *Social cognition*, 35(4), 354-373.
- Crowson, H. M., & Gries, P. H. (2010). Do right-wing authoritarianism and social dominance orientation predict anti-china attitudes?. *Psicología Política*, 40, 7-29.
- Darwich, M. (2016). Ideational and material forces in threat perception: The divergent cases of Syria and Saudi Arabia during the Iran-Iraq war (1980-1988). *Journal of Global Security Studies*, 1(2), 142-156.
- Das, D. K. (2013a). China and the Asian Economies: mutual acceptance, economic interaction and interactive dynamics. *Journal of Contemporary China*, 22(84), 1089-1105.

- Das, D. K. (2013b). China's contribution to recent convergence and integration among the Asian economies. *Journal Of East Asian Economic Integration*, 17(1), 55-79.
- Davydova, J., Pearson, A. R., Ballew, M. T., & Schuldt, J. P. (2018). Illuminating the link between perceived threat and control over climate change: the role of attributions for causation and mitigation. *Climatic Change*, 148(1), 45-59.
- Ding, A. S. (2000). Is China a Threat? A Defense Industry Analysis. *Issues & Studies*, 36(1), 49-75.
- Ding, A. S., & Huang, P. A. (2011). Taiwan's Paradoxical Perceptions of the Chinese Military. More Capable but Less Threatening?. *China Perspectives*, 2011(2011/4), 43-51.
- Erişen, C. (2013a). Emotions as a determinant in Turkish political behavior. *Turkish studies*, 14(1), 115-135.
- Erişen, C. (2013b). The political psychology of Turkish political behavior: Introduction by the special issue editor. *Turkish Studies*, 14(1), 1-12.
- Erisen, C., & Kentmen-Cin, C. (2017). Tolerance and perceived threat toward Muslim immigrants in Germany and the Netherlands. *European Union Politics*, 18(1), 73-97.
- Erişen, E. (2012). An introduction to political psychology for international relations scholars. *Perceptions: Journal of International Affairs*, 17(3), 9-28.
- Escandell, X., & Ceobanu, A. M. (2009). When contact with immigrants matters: threat, interethnic attitudes and foreigner exclusionism in Spain's Comunidades Autónomas. *Ethnic and Racial Studies*, 32(1), 44-69.
- Farnham, B. (1992). Roosevelt and the Munich crisis: Insights from prospect theory. *Political Psychology*, 205-235.
- Farnham, B. (2003). The theory of democratic peace and threat perception. *International studies quarterly*, 47(3), 395-415.
- Fathir, M. F. M., Johan, N. H. M., & Ab Raman, N. A. (2018). New geopolitical order in Northeast Asia: Japan's threat perception in post-cold war era. *Journal of Academia*, 6(1), 79-83.
- Fitriani, E. (2018). Indonesian perceptions of the rise of China: Dare you, dare you not. *The Pacific Review*, 31(3), 391-405.
- Foot, R. (2001). Chinese power and the idea of a responsible state. In Y. Zhang & G. Austin (eds.). *Power and Responsibility in Chinese Foreign Policy*, 21-47. Australia: ANU E Press.
- Foot, R. (2009). China's policies toward the Asia-Pacific region: changing perceptions of self and changing others' perceptions of China?. In *Rise of China* (pp. 147-161). Routledge.

- Fordham, B. (1998). The politics of threat perception and the use of force: A political economy model of US uses of force, 1949–1994. *International Studies Quarterly*, 42(3), 567-590.
- Gao, Z. (2021). Sinophobia during the Covid-19 pandemic: Identity, belonging, and international politics. *Integrative Psychological and Behavioral Science*, 1-19.
- Gause III, E. (2003). Balancing what? Threat perception and alliance choice in the Gulf. *Security Studies*, 13(2), 273-305.
- Getmansky, A., & Zeitzoff, T. (2014). Terrorism and voting: The effect of rocket threat on voting in Israeli elections. *American Political Science Review*, 108(3), 588-604.
- Gezgin, U.B. (2020a). Reception of Chinese Belt and Road Initiative in Vietnam: Between Security Concerns and Infrastructural Financing Needs. *Asya Araştırmaları Uluslararası Sosyal Bilimler Dergisi*, 4(1), 115-124.
- Gezgin, U.B. (2020b). Russian and Central Asian Views on China's Belt & Road Initiative. *Troy Academy*, 5(1), 135-148.
- Gezgin, U.B. (2021). Dünya Savaşı, Dünya Barışı: Asya'dan Latin Amerika'ya [World War, World Peace: From Asia to Latin America]. İstanbul: Yar.
- Gezgin, U.B. (2022). Ukrayna Krizi'nin Politik Psikolojisi: Yansımalar [The Political Psychology of Ukrainian Crisis: Reflections]. *EK Dergi*, 16.03.2022.
- <http://ulasbasargezginkulliyati.blogspot.com/2022/03/ukrayna-krizinin-politik-psikolojisi.html>
- <https://www.ekdergi.com/ukrayna-krizinin-politik-psikolojisi-yansimalar/>
- Gezgin, U.B. (in pressa). South Asian Perspectives on China's Belt and Road Initiative, and China Pakistan Economic Corridor.
- Gezgin, U.B. (in pressb). The Expected Effects of Belt and Road Initiative Projects on the Unity of ASEAN: A Tale of Further Integration or Disintegration?
- Gezgin, U.B. (in pressc). Belt and Road Initiative: Globalization with Chinese Characteristics or the Revival of Historical Silk Road?
- Gezgin, U.B. (in pressd). The Rise of China & Belt & Road Initiative.
- Gildea, R. J. (2020). Psychology and aggregation in International Relations. *European Journal of International Relations*, 26(1\_suppl), 166-183.
- Glaser, C. (2011). Will China's rise lead to war? Why realism does not mean pessimism. *Foreign Affairs*, 80-91.
- Goh, E. (2005). The US–China relationship and Asia-Pacific security: negotiating change. *Asian Security*, 1(3), 216-244.
- Goldgeier, J. M., & Tetlock, P. E. (2001). Psychology and international relations theory. *Annual Review of Political Science*, 4(1), 67-92.

- Goodman, D. S. (2017). Australia and the China threat: Managing ambiguity. *The Pacific Review*, 30(5), 769-782.
- Goodwin, R., Willson, M., & Stanley Jr, G. (2005). Terror threat perception and its consequences in contemporary Britain. *British Journal of Psychology*, 96(4), 389-406.
- Gries, P. H. (2005). Social Psychology and the Identity-Conflict Debate: Is a 'China Threat' Inevitable?. *European Journal of International Relations*, 11(2), 235-265.
- Gries, P. H. (2006). Forecasting US–China Relations, 2015. *Asian Security*, 2(2), 63-86.
- Gries, P. H., & Crowson, H. M. (2010). Political orientation, party affiliation, and American attitudes towards China. *Journal of Chinese Political Science*, 15(3), 219-244.
- Gries, P. H., Crowson, H. M., & Sandel, T. (2010). The Olympic effect on American attitudes towards China: Beyond personality, ideology, and media exposure. *Journal of Contemporary China*, 19(64), 213-231.
- Gries, P., & Jing, Y. (2019). Are the US and China fated to fight? How narratives of 'power transition' shape great power war or peace. *Cambridge Review of International Affairs*, 32(4), 456-482.
- Gries, P. H., Zhang, Q., Masui, Y., & Lee, Y. W. (2009). Historical beliefs and the perception of threat in Northeast Asia: colonialism, the tributary system, and China–Japan–Korea relations in the twenty-first century. *International Relations of the Asia-Pacific*, 9(2), 245-265.
- Gross, D. G. (2007). Transforming the US Relationship with China. *Global Asia*, 2(1), 78-89.
- Guang, Pan (2008). Peace and community building in Northeast Asia. *Asia Europe Journal*, 6(1), 119-127.
- Ha, S. E., & Jang, S. J. (2015). Immigration, threat perception, and national identity: Evidence from South Korea. *International Journal of Intercultural Relations*, 44, 53-62.
- He, K. (2012). Undermining adversaries: Unipolarity, threat perception, and negative balancing strategies after the Cold War. *Security Studies*, 21(2), 154-191.
- He, K. (2017). Explaining United States–China relations: neoclassical realism and the nexus of threat–interest perceptions. *The Pacific Review*, 30(2), 133-151.
- Herrmann, R. K. (2013). Perceptions and image theory in international relations. In L. Huddy, D. O. Sears, & J. S. Levy (Eds.), *The Oxford handbook of political psychology* (pp. 334–363). Oxford University Press.

- Hsu, S. C. (2009). The domestic origin of China's rise and its international impact: The party-state developmental syndicate. In *Rise of China* (pp. 69-98). Routledge.
- Hyde, S. D. (2015). Experiments in international relations: Lab, survey, and field. *Annual Review of Political Science*, 18, 403-424.
- Ikegami, M. (2009). China's Grand Strategy of "Peaceful Rise". *Rise of China*, New York: Routledge, 21-54.
- Ikenberry, G. J., Parmar, I., & Stokes, D. (2018). Introduction: Ordering the world? Liberal internationalism in theory and practice. *International Affairs*, 94(1), 1-5.
- Jain, B. M. (2019). China's Foreign Policy Behaviour: Understanding through the Lens of Geopsychology. *International Journal of China Studies*, 10(2), 157-179.
- Jain, P., & McCarthy, G. (2016). Between centrality and anxiety: China in Australia. *Asian Journal of Comparative Politics*, 1(3), 244-259.
- Jalil, G. Y. (2019). China's Rise. *Strategic Studies*, 39(1), 41-58.
- Jerdén, B. (2014). The assertive China narrative: Why it is wrong and how so many still bought into it. *The Chinese Journal of International Politics*, 7(1), 47-88.
- Jiang, Y. (2002). Will China Be A 'Threat' to Its Neighbors and the World in the Twenty-First Century?. *Ritstumeikan Annual Review of International Studies*, 1, 55-68.
- Johnson, J. (2018). Conceptualizing the United States–China Security Dilemma. In *The US-China Military and Defense Relationship during the Obama Presidency* (pp. 15-36). Palgrave Macmillan, Cham.
- Jung, H. J. (2010). The rise and fall of anti-American sentiment in South Korea: deconstructing hegemonic ideas and threat perception. *Asian Survey*, 50(5), 946-964.
- Jung, H. J., & Jeong, H. W. (2016). South Korean attitude towards China: Threat perception, economic interest, and national identity. *African and Asian Studies*, 15(2-3), 242-264.
- Jung-seung, S. (2012). Another take on prospects for the foreign policy of the Chinese fifth-generation leadership. In *China's Foreign Policy* (pp. 65-83). Palgrave Macmillan, New York.
- Katagiri, N. (2018). Between Structural Realism and Liberalism: Japan's Threat Perception and Response. *International Studies Perspectives*, 19(4), 325-343.
- Kemmelmeier, M., & Winter, D. G. (2000). Putting threat into perspective: Experimental studies on perceptual distortion in international conflict. *Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin*, 26(7), 795-809.

- Kendall-Taylor, A., & Edmonds, J. (2019). IV. The Evolution of the Russian Threat to NATO. *Whitehall Papers*, 95(1), 54-66.
- Kertzer, J. D., & Tingley, D. (2018). Political psychology in international relations: beyond the paradigms. *Annual Review of Political Science*, 21, 319-339.
- Khoo, N. (2011). Fear factor: Northeast Asian responses to China's rise. *Asian Security*, 7(2), 95-118.
- Kiehne, E., & Cadenas, G. (2021). Development and initial validation of the Latinx immigrant threat attitudes scale. *Journal of the Society for Social Work and Research*, 12(3), 521-544.
- Kim, J. (2016). Possible future of the contest in the South China Sea. *The Chinese Journal of International Politics*, 9(1), 27-57.
- Kim, J. (2021). China's Achievements and Challenges: Reflections on a Rising Power's Predicaments. *Journal of Contemporary China*, 30(129), 500-510.
- Kim, M. (2015). Japanese perceptions of territorial disputes: opinion poll surveys in the southwestern part of Japan. *East Asia*, 32(4), 341-360.
- Kim, S. J. (2019). Assessing China's Intentions: Power, Uncertainty, and Subjectivity. *Journal of International and Area Studies*, 27.
- Kim, S. P. (1998). *Is China a Threat to the Asia-Pacific Region?. China's Political Economy*. Singapore: Singapore University Press, National University of Singapore, 339-358.
- Kim, S. S. (2009). China and globalization: Confronting myriad challenges and opportunities. *Asian Perspective*, 33(3), 41-80.
- Kim, Y. (2013). North Korea's Threat Perception and Provocation Under Kim Jong-un: The Security Dilemma and the Obsession with Political Survival. *North Korean Review*, 6-19.
- Korolev, A. (2019). On the verge of an alliance: Contemporary China-Russia military cooperation. *Asian Security*, 15(3), 233-252.
- Kristensen, P. M. (2015). International relations in China and Europe: the case for interregional dialogue in a hegemonic discipline. *The Pacific Review*, 28(2), 161-187.
- Kustov, A. (2019). Is there a backlash against immigration from richer countries? International hierarchy and the limits of group threat. *Political Psychology*, 40(5), 973-1000.
- Kwan, C. H. (2003). Complementarity in Sino-Japanese Relations: Toward a Win-Win Game. *Japanese Economy*, 31(3-4), 60-66.
- Lai To, L. (1997). East Asian assessments of China's security policy. *International affairs*, 73(2), 251-262.

- Lai, Y. A. (2021). A Study of Intercultural Communication Barriers between China and the United States: The Case of American Media Reports on China. *Academic Journal of Humanities & Social Sciences*, 4(7), 47-56.
- Lam, P. E. (2005). Japan's deteriorating ties with China: the Koizumi factor. *China: An International Journal*, 3(2), 275-291.
- Larsen, K. S., Krumov, K., Van Le, H., Ommundsen, R., & van der Veer, K. (2009). Threat perception and attitudes toward documented and undocumented immigrants in the United States: Framing the debate and conflict resolution. *European Journal of Social Sciences*, 7(4), 115-134.
- Larson, D. W. (1988). The psychology of reciprocity in international relations. *Negotiation Journal*, 4, 281.
- Larson, D. W. (1997). Trust and missed opportunities in international relations. *Political Psychology*, 18(3), 701-734.
- Larson, D. W. (2015). Will China be a new type of great power?. *The Chinese Journal of International Politics*, 8(4), 323-348.
- Larson, D. W., & Shevchenko, A. (2010). Status seekers: Chinese and Russian responses to US primacy. *International security*, 34(4), 63-95.
- Lebovic, J. H. (2009). Perception and Politics in Intelligence Assessment: US Estimates of the Soviet and "Rogue-State" Nuclear Threats. *International Studies Perspectives*, 10(4), 394-412.
- Lee, C. C. (2010). Bound to rise: Chinese media discourses on the new global order. *Reorienting global communication: Indian and Chinese media beyond borders*, 260-283.
- Lee, G. (2018). Identity, threat perception, and trust-building in Northeast Asia. In *Identity, Trust, and Reconciliation in East Asia* (pp. 29-46). Palgrave Macmillan, Cham.
- Lee, J. J. (2016). Will China's rise be peaceful? A social psychological perspective. *Asian Security*, 12(1), 29-52.
- Lee, J. J., & Haupt, J. P. (2020). Winners and losers in US-China scientific research collaborations. *Higher Education*, 80(1), 57-74.
- Lee, J. N. (2008). The rise of China and soft power: China's soft power influence in Korea. *China Review*, 127-154.
- Leventhal, P., & Chellaney, B. (1988). Nuclear terrorism: Threat, perception, and response in South Asia. *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism*, 11(6), 447-470.
- Levy, J. S. (1992a). Prospect theory and international relations: Theoretical applications and analytical problems. *Political Psychology*, 283-310.
- Levy, J. S. (1992b). An introduction to prospect theory. *Political psychology*, 171-186.

- Levy, J. S. (1997). Prospect theory, rational choice, and international relations. *International studies quarterly*, 41(1), 87-112.
- Levy, J. S. (2013). Psychology and foreign policy decision-making. In L. Huddy, D. O. Sears, & J. S. Levy (Eds.), *The Oxford handbook of political psychology* (pp. 301–333). Oxford University Press.
- Li, X. (2013). The Taming of The Red Dragon: The Militarized Worldview and China's Use of Force, 1949–2001. *Foreign Policy Analysis*, 9(4), 387-407.
- Liao, K. S., & Whiting, A. S. (1973). Chinese press perceptions of threat: the US and India, 1962. *The China Quarterly*, 53, 80-97.
- Liao, N. (2012). China's regional diplomacy toward Southeast Asia: calculations and constraints of Beijing's engagement in security multilateralism. *American Journal of Chinese Studies*, 29-46.
- Liao, N. (2019). Identity, Role Conception, and Status Dilemma: A Socio-Psychological Account of China-US Relations. *China Quarterly of International Strategic Studies*, 5(03), 343-372.
- Liff, A. P., & Ikenberry, G. J. (2014). Racing toward tragedy?: China's rise, military competition in the Asia Pacific, and the security dilemma. *International Security*, 39(2), 52-91.
- Ling, L. H. (2013). Worlds beyond Westphalia: Daoist dialectics and the 'China threat'. *Review of International Studies*, 39(3), 549-568.
- Liu, F. (2016). China's security strategy towards East Asia. *The Chinese Journal of International Politics*, 9(2), 151-179.
- Liu, W. (2020, December). Reflections on the Construction of New China-US Relations. In *2020 3rd International Conference on Humanities Education and Social Sciences (ICHESS 2020)* (pp. 448-452). Atlantis Press.
- Losee, J. E., Smith, C. T., & Webster, G. D. (2021). Politics, personality, and impulsivity can color people's perceptions of—and responses to—hurricane threats of varying severity. *Personality and social psychology bulletin*, 47(10), 1435-1451.
- Lu, X. (2011). From “ideological enemies” to “strategic partners”: A rhetorical analysis of US-China Relations in Intercultural Contexts. *Howard Journal of Communications*, 22(4), 336-357.
- Machida, S. (2010). US soft power and the “China threat”: Multilevel analyses. *Asian Politics & Policy*, 2(3), 351-370.
- Maftei, A., & Holman, A. C. (2021). SARS-CoV-2 threat perception and willingness to vaccinate: the mediating role of conspiracy beliefs. *Frontiers in Psychology*, 3371.

- Malhotra, N., & Popp, E. (2012). Bridging partisan divisions over antiterrorism policies: The role of threat perceptions. *Political Research Quarterly*, 65(1), 34-47.
- Markedonov, S. M., & Suchkov, M. A. (2020). Russia and the United States in the Caucasus: cooperation and competition. *Caucasus Survey*, 8(2), 179-195.
- Marton, P., & Matura, T. (2011). The 'voracious dragon', the 'scramble' and the 'honey pot': Conceptions of conflict over Africa's natural resources. *Journal of Contemporary African Studies*, 29(2), 155-167.
- Matonytė, I., & Morkevičius, V. (2009). Threat perception and European identity building: the case of elites in Belgium, Germany, Lithuania and Poland. *Europe-Asia Studies*, 61(6), 967-985.
- Mayton, D. M. (1986). Personality correlates of nuclear war threat perception. *The Journal of social psychology*, 126(6), 791-800.
- McDermott, R. (1992). Prospect theory in international relations: The Iranian hostage rescue mission. *Political Psychology*, 237-263.
- McDermott, R. (2004). Prospect theory in political science: Gains and losses from the first decade. *Political Psychology*, 25(2), 289-312.
- McDevitt, M. (2014). The East China Sea: The Place Where Sino-US Conflict Could Occur. *American Foreign Policy Interests*, 36(2), 100-110.
- McLaren, L. M. (2003). Anti-immigrant prejudice in Europe: Contact, threat perception, and preferences for the exclusion of migrants. *Social forces*, 81(3), 909-936.
- Mercer, J. (2005). Rationality and psychology in international politics. *International organization*, 59(1), 77-106.
- Miller, C., & Taylor, H. (2017). Can economic interests trump ethnic hostility? Trading ties versus outgroup hostility in Australian perceptions of China as a security threat. *International Relations of the Asia-Pacific*, 17(1), 67-99.
- Minkina, M. (2011). Evolution of the Perception of Threats to the Security of the Republic of Poland in Polish Strategic Documents. *The Journal of Slavic Military Studies*, 24(4), 621-647.
- Mintz, A., Yang, Y., & McDermott, R. (2011). Experimental approaches to international relations. *International Studies Quarterly*, 55(2), 493-501.
- Miranda, M. (2017). The issue of political reform and the evolution of the so-called 'Deng Xiaoping model' in Hu Jintao and Xi Jinping's China. In *Understanding China Today* (pp. 263-274). Springer, Cham.
- Moore, G. J. (2010). Not Very Material but Hardly Immaterial: China's Bombed Embassy and Sino-American Relations. *Foreign Policy Analysis*, 6(1), 23-41.

- Nagy, S. R. (2017). Japan's proactive pacifism: Investing in multilateralization and omnidirectional hedging. *Strategic Analysis*, 41(3), 223-235.
- Nakano, R. (2016). The Sino-Japanese territorial dispute and threat perception in power transition. *The Pacific Review*, 29(2), 165-186.
- Nevinskaitė, L. (2017). Framing Russia as Threat in the Lithuanian Media: Corpus Analysis. *Lituanus*, 63(4), 28-42.
- Nissen, A., Birkeland Nielsen, M., Solberg, Ø., Bang Hansen, M., & Heir, T. (2015). Perception of threat and safety at work among employees in the Norwegian ministries after the 2011 Oslo bombing. *Anxiety, Stress, & Coping*, 28(6), 650-662.
- Okuda, H. (2016). China's "peaceful rise/peaceful development": A case study of media frames of the rise of China. *Global Media and China*, 1(1-2), 121-138.
- Ondriaš, J. (2018). Issues facing China's soft power in the 16+ 1 Platform. *Економічний часопис-XXI*, 172(7-8), 22-27.
- Onraet, E., Van Hiel, A., Valcke, B., & Assche, J. V. (2021). Reactions towards Asylum Seekers in the Netherlands: Associations with right-wing ideological attitudes, threat and perceptions of Asylum Seekers as legitimate and economic. *Journal of Refugee Studies*, 34(2), 1695-1712.
- Oren, E., & Brummer, M. (2020). Threat perception, government centralization, and political instrumentality in Abe Shinzo's Japan. *Australian Journal of International Affairs*, 74(6), 721-745.
- Pan, C. (2014). The 'Indo-Pacific' and geopolitical anxieties about China's rise in the Asian regional order. *Australian Journal of International Affairs*, 68(4), 453-469.
- Paredes, M. R., Apaolaza, V., Fernandez-Robin, C., Hartmann, P., & Yañez-Martinez, D. (2021). The impact of the COVID-19 pandemic on subjective mental well-being: The interplay of perceived threat, future anxiety and resilience. *Personality and Individual Differences*, 170, 110455.
- Paxton, P., & Mughan, A. (2006). What's to fear from immigrants? Creating an assimilationist threat scale. *Political Psychology*, 27(4), 549-568.
- Peleo, A. I. (2015). Secure in insecurity: The case of threat perception/acceptance in the Philippines. *Cogent Social Sciences*, 1(1), 1060687.
- Peng, Y. (2009). Potential Strategic Risks in China-US Relations. *The Architecture of Security in the Asia-Pacific*, 174, 101.
- Pereira, C., Vala, J., & Costa-Lopes, R. (2010). From prejudice to discrimination: The legitimizing role of perceived threat in discrimination against immigrants. *European Journal of Social Psychology*, 40(7), 1231-1250.
- Pillsbury, M. (2012). The sixteen fears: China's strategic psychology. *Survival*, 54(5), 149-182.

- Pintado Lobato, M. (2015). Identidad y alteridad en un mundo en transformación: Un análisis de las relaciones entre China y Estados Unidos. *Relaciones Internacionales*.
- Powles, M. (2010). The China Threat-Myth or Reality?. *New Zealand International Review*, 35(1), 20-24.
- Qingguo, J. (1996). Reflections on the Recent Tension in the Taiwan Strait. *The China Journal*, (36), 93-97.
- Rathbun, B. C. (2009). It takes all types: social psychology, trust, and the international relations paradigm in our minds. *International Theory*, 1(3), 345-380.
- Rawnsley, G. (2012). Approaches to soft power and public diplomacy in China and Taiwan. *Journal of International Communication*, 18(2), 121-135.
- Reynolds, P. (2015). Past failures and future problems: The psychology of irregular war. *Small Wars & Insurgencies*, 26(3), 446-458.
- Richardson, G. (2010). The China Threat. *Potentia: Journal of International Affairs*, 2, 55-67.
- Ridout, T. N., Grosse, A. C., & Appleton, A. M. (2008). News media use and Americans' perceptions of global threat. *British Journal of Political Science*, 38(4), 575-593.
- Ripley, B. (1993). Psychology, foreign policy, and international relations theory. *Political Psychology*, 403-416.
- Riqiang, W. (2013). China's anxiety about US missile defence: A solution. *Survival*, 55(5), 29-52.
- Russo, F. (2016). The 'Russia Threat'in the Eyes of National Parliamentarians: An Opportunity for Foreign Policy Integration?. *Journal of European integration*, 38(2), 195-209.
- Russo, S., Roccato, M., & Merlone, U. (2020). Actual threat, perceived threat, and authoritarianism: an experimental study. *The Spanish Journal of Psychology*, 23, e3, 1-7.
- Saalman, L. (2011a). Between 'China Threat Theory'and 'Chindia': Chinese Responses to India's Military Modernization. *Chinese Journal of International Politics*, 4(1), 87-114.
- Saalman, L. (2011b). Divergence, similarity and symmetry in Sino-Indian threat at perceptions. *Journal of International Affairs*, 169-194.
- Sari, Ö. L. (2007). Perceptions of threat and expressions of prejudice toward the new minorities of Western Europe. *Journal of International Migration and Integration/Revue de l'integration et de la migration internationale*, 8(3), 289-306.
- Sasaki, T. (2010). China eyes the Japanese military: China's threat perception of Japan since the 1980s. *The China Quarterly*, 203, 560-580.

- Sato, H. (1998). Japan's China Perceptions and its Policies in the Alliance with the United States'. *Journal of International Political Economy*, 2(1), 1-24.
- Schatz, R. T., & Fiske, S. T. (1992). International reactions to the threat of nuclear war: The rise and fall of concern in the eighties. *Political Psychology*, 1-29.
- Schaub Jr, G. (2004). Deterrence, compellence, and prospect theory. *Political Psychology*, 25(3), 389-411.
- Schneider, F. (2014). Reconceptualising world order: Chinese political thought and its challenge to International Relations theory. *Review of International Studies*, 40(4), 683-703.
- Schwaller, N. L., Kelmenson, S., BenDor, T. K., & Spurlock, D. (2020). From abstract futures to concrete experiences: How does political ideology interact with threat perception to affect climate adaptation decisions?. *Environmental Science & Policy*, 112, 440-452.
- Scobell, A. (2009). China's Struggle for Status: The Realignment of International Relations. *Political Science Quarterly*, 124(1), 177-179.
- Sekerdej, M., & Kossowska, M. (2011). Motherland under attack!: nationalism, terrorist threat, and support for the restriction of civil liberties. *Polish Psychological Bulletin*, 42(1), 11-19.
- Seongji, W. (2009). The Park Chung-hee Administration amid Inter-Korean Reconciliation in the Détente Period: Changes in the Threat Perception, Regime Characteristics, and the Distribution of Power. *Korea Journal*, 49(2), 37-58.
- Shambaugh, D. (1996). China's military: real or paper tiger?. *The Washington Quarterly*, 19(2), 19-36.
- Shafir, E. (1992). Prospect theory and political analysis: A psychological perspective. *Political Psychology*, 311-322.
- Shee, P. K. (2004). The Political Economy of Mahathir's China Policy: Economic Cooperation, Political and Strategic Ambivalence. *Ritsumeikan Annual Review of International Studies*, 3, 59-79.
- Shichor, Y. (1996). Demobilization: The dialectics of PLA troop reduction. *The China Quarterly*, 146, 336-359.
- Shiffrinson, J. (2018). Should the United States fear China's rise?. *The Washington Quarterly*, 41(4), 65-83.
- Shih, C. Y. (2005). Breeding a reluctant dragon: can China rise into partnership and away from antagonism?. *Review of International Studies*, 31(4), 755.
- Shih, C. Y. (2011). A rising unknown: rediscovering China in Japan's East Asia. *China Review*, 1-26.

- Shih, C. Y., & Huang, C. C. (2015). China's Quest for Grand Strategy: Power, National Interest, or Relational Security?. *The Chinese Journal of International Politics*, 8(1), 1-26.
- Simons, G. (2019). The anatomy of a moral panic: Western mainstream media's Russia scapegoat. *Changing Societies & Personalities*, 3(3), 189-206.
- Sinkkonen, E., & Elovainio, M. (2020). Chinese perceptions of threats from the United States and Japan. *Political Psychology*, 41(2), 265-282.
- Sismanidis, R. D. (1994). China and the post-Soviet security structure. *Asian Affairs: An American Review*, 21(1), 39-58.
- Soeya, Y. (2002). The China Factor in the US-Japan Alliance: The Myth of a China Threat. *Journal of East Asian Studies*, 2(2), 37-66.
- Song, W. (2015). Securitization of the "China Threat" discourse: A poststructuralist account. *China Review*, 15(1), 145-169.
- Sonoda, S. (2021). Asian views of China in the age of China's rise: interpreting the results of pew survey and Asian student survey in chronological and comparative perspectives, 2002-2019. *Journal of Contemporary East Asia Studies*, 1-18.
- Staniland, P., Mir, A., & Lalwani, S. (2018). Politics and threat perception: Explaining Pakistani military strategy on the North West Frontier. *Security Studies*, 27(4), 535-574.
- Stein, J. G. (1988). Building politics into psychology: The misperception of threat. *Political psychology*, 245-271.
- Stein, J. G. (2013). Threat perception in international relations. In L. Huddy, D. O. Sears, & J. S. Levy (Eds.), *The Oxford handbook of political psychology* (pp. 364-394). Oxford University Press.
- Stein, J. G. (2017). The micro-foundations of international relations theory: Psychology and behavioral economics. *International Organization*, 71(S1), S249-S263.
- Stevens, G., Agho, K., Taylor, M., Jones, A. L., Jacobs, J., Barr, M., & Raphael, B. (2011). Alert but less alarmed: a pooled analysis of terrorism threat perception in Australia. *BMC public health*, 11(1), 1-11.
- Sukma, R. (1994). Recent Developments in Sino—Indonesian Relations: An Indonesian View. *Contemporary Southeast Asia*, 35-45.
- Sun, J. (2015). The Construction of Uncertainty and Threat: Theoretical Debates on China's Rise. In *Responding to China's Rise* (pp. 77-97). Springer, Cham.
- Szilágyi, A. (2015). "Threatening other" or "role-model brother"? China in the eyes of the British and Hungarian far-right. *Journal of Language Aggression and Conflict*, 3(1), 151-172.

- Tahir, H., Kunst, J. R., & Sam, D. L. (2019). Threat, anti-western hostility and violence among European Muslims: the mediating role of acculturation. *International Journal of Intercultural Relations*, 73, 74-88.
- Tamaki, T. (2012). 'Surrounding Areas' and The Recalibration of Japan's Threat Perception. *East Asia*, 29(2), 187-213.
- Tan, Q. (2011). The change of public opinion on US-China relations. *Asian Perspective*, 35(2), 211-237.
- Tarrósy, I. (2017). China's Foreign Policy. *The Round Table*, 106(1), 115-116.
- Thomsen, J. P. E., & Rafiqi, A. (2020). Ideological biases weaken the impact of social trust on ethnic outgroup threat. *Political Studies*, 68(2), 523-540.
- Thornton, R., & Karagiannis, M. (2016). The Russian threat to the Baltic States: The problems of shaping local defense mechanisms. *The journal of Slavic military Studies*, 29(3), 331-351.
- Toje, A. (Ed.). (2017). *Will China's rise be peaceful?: security, stability, and legitimacy*. Oxford University Press.
- Tsai, T. C., & Liu, T. T. T. (2019). From Great Power to Hegemon: China's strategic planning in the new century. *Thammasat Review*, 22(1), 121-136.
- Tsygankov, A. P. (2013). The Russia-NATO mistrust: Ethnophobia and the double expansion to contain "the Russian Bear". *Communist and Post-Communist Studies*, 46(1), 179-188.
- Tungkeunkunt, K., & Phuphakdi, K. (2018). Blood Is Thicker Than Water: A History of the Diplomatic Discourse "China and Thailand Are Brothers". *Asian Perspective*, 42(4), 597-621.
- Turner, O. (2009). China's Recovery: Why the Writing Was Always on the Wall. *The Political Quarterly*, 80(1), 111-118.
- Turner, O. (2013). 'Threatening' China and US security: the international politics of identity. *Review of International Studies*, 39(4), 903-924.
- Tønnessen, A., Mårdberg, B., & Weisæth, L. (2002). Silent disaster: a European perspective on threat perception from Chernobyl far field fallout. *Journal of traumatic stress*, 15(6), 453-459.
- Vala, J., Pereira, C., & Ramos, A. (2006). Racial prejudice, threat perception and opposition to immigration: A comparative analysis. *Portuguese Journal of Social Science*, 5(2), 119-140.
- van der Pijl, K. (2017). Can China's Rise Continue without Conflict?. *Changing Regional Alliances for China and the West*, 291.
- Verkuyten, M. (2009). Support for multiculturalism and minority rights: The role of national identification and out-group threat. *Social Justice Research*, 22(1), 31-52.
- Vinayaraj, V. K. (2009). India as a Threat: Bangladeshi Perceptions. *South Asian Survey*, 16(1), 101-118.

- Viraphol, S. (1985). The Soviet Threat: Development of the Thai Perception. *Asian Affairs: An American Review*, 11(4), 61-70.
- Vis, B. (2011). Prospect theory and political decision making. *Political Studies Review*, 9(3), 334-343.
- Vuori, J. A. (2018). Let's just say we'd like to avoid any great power entanglements: Desecuritization in post-Mao Chinese foreign policy towards major powers. *Global Discourse*, 8(1), 118-136.
- Wang, H. (2000). Multilateralism in Chinese foreign policy: the limits of socialization. *Asian Survey*, 40(3), 475-491.
- Wang, H. J. (2021). Chinese IR Scholarship as a Relational Epistemology in the Study of China's Rise. *The China Quarterly*, 245, 262-275.
- Wang, H., & French, E. (2013). China's participation in global governance from a comparative perspective. *Asia Policy*, (15), 89-114.
- Wang, H., & Rosenau, J. N. (2009). China and global governance. *Asian Perspective*, 5-39.
- Wang, V. W. C. (2011). "Chindia" or rivalry? Rising China, rising India, and contending perspectives on India-China relations. *Asian Perspective*, 35(3), 437-469.
- Wang, W., & Cui, Y. (2011). The Propagation and Construction of China's National Image in 21<sup>st</sup> Century. *Journal of Digital Convergence*, 9(3), 47-58.
- Wang, X., & Shoemaker, P. J. (2011). What shapes Americans' opinion of China? Country characteristics, public relations and mass media. *Chinese Journal of Communication*, 4(01), 1-20.
- Wang, Y. (2005). China and the North Korean nuclear issue. *International Studies*, 42(3-4), 265-275.
- Wang, Y. (2008). Public diplomacy and the rise of Chinese soft power. *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, 616(1), 257-273.
- Wang, Y. (2012). Domestic constraints on the rise of Chinese public diplomacy. *The Hague Journal of Diplomacy*, 7(4), 459-472.
- Wang, Y. K. (2010). China's response to the unipolar world: the strategic logic of peaceful development. *Journal of Asian and African Studies*, 45(5), 554-567.
- Watts, M. W. (1996). Political xenophobia in the transition from socialism: Threat, racism and ideology among East German youth. *Political Psychology*, 97-126.
- Wei-cheng Wang, V. (2015). The eagle eyes the dragon and the elephant: American perspectives on the rise of China and the rise of India. *Asian Politics & Policy*, 7(3), 347-377.

- Woods, J., & Marciniak, A. (2017). The effects of perceived threat, political orientation, and framing on public reactions to punitive immigration law enforcement practices. *Sociology of Race and Ethnicity*, 3(2), 202-217.
- Xiang, D. (2013). China's image on international English language social media. *Journal of International Communication*, 19(2), 252-271.
- Xu, J. (2011). China: Collapse or threat?. *New Zealand International Review*, 36(6), 13-16.
- Yang, J. (2004). Cross-Strait Relations in a New International Setting. *American Foreign Policy Interests*, 26(5), 403-408.
- Yang, Y. E., & Liu, X. (2012). The 'China threat' through the lens of US print media: 1992–2006. *Journal of Contemporary China*, 21(76), 695-711.
- Yee, H., & Storey, I. (2013). *China threat: Perceptions myths*. Routledge.
- Yeoh, E. K. K. (2019). Malaysia: Perception of contemporary China and its economic, political and societal determinants. *The Pacific Review*, 32(3), 395-418.
- Yeophantong, P., & Shih, C. Y. (2021). A Relational Reflection on Pandemic Nationalism. *Journal of Chinese Political Science*, 26(3), 549-572.
- Yeremia, A. E. (2020). Indonesian diplomats' and foreign policy scholars' perceptions and their implications on Indonesian foreign ministry bureaucratic responses to a rising China. *The Pacific Review*, 1-27.
- Yuan, J. D. (1998). Threat perception and Chinese security policy after the cold war. *Pacific Focus*, 13(1), 55-78.
- Yuan, J. D. (2001). India's rise after Pokhran II: Chinese analyses and assessments. *Asian Survey*, 41(6), 978-1001.
- Yuan, Z., & Fu, Q. (2020). Narrative framing and the United States' threat construction of rivals. *The Chinese Journal of International Politics*, 13(3), 419-453.
- Yuliantoro, N. R. (2017). Managing differences and building trust: Challenges to US–China relations. *Global South Review*, 1(2), 123-132.
- Yunling, Z. (2016). China and its neighbourhood: transformation, challenges and grand strategy. *International Affairs*, 92(4), 835-848.
- Zaffran, R., & Erwes, N. (2015). Beyond the Point of No Return? Allied Defence Procurement, the 'China Threat,' and the Case of the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter. *Asian Journal of Public Affairs*, 8(1), 64-88.
- Zhai, Y. (2019). A peaceful prospect or a threat to global order: How Asian youth view a rising China. *International Studies Review*, 21(1), 38-56.
- Zhang, F. (2013). The rise of Chinese exceptionalism in international relations. *European Journal of International Relations*, 19(2), 305-328.

- Zhang, H. (2013, October). A Neo-realist American China Foreign Policy. In International Academic Workshop on Social Science (IAW-SC-13) (pp. 505-511). Atlantis Press.
- Zhang, L. (2015). Stereotypes of Chinese by American college students: media use and perceived realism. *International Journal of Communication*, 9, 20.
- Zhang, Y. (2013). 'China anxiety': discourse and intellectual challenges. *Development and Change*, 44(6), 1407-1425.
- Zhang, Y. (2001). China's security problematique: critical reflections. In Y. Zhang & G. Austin (eds.). *Power and Responsibility in Chinese Foreign Policy*, 250-271. Australia: ANU E Press.
- Zhao, T. (2020). Conventional long-range strike weapons of US allies and China's concerns of strategic instability. *The Nonproliferation Review*, 27(1-3), 109-122.
- Zhixin, C. (2018). Australia's fear and greed over China's rise: A discourse analysis of mainstream news coverage of the Belt and Road Initiative. *International Relations*, 6(8), 436-448.
- Zhou, J. (2008). Does China's rise threaten the United States?. *Asian Perspective*, 32(3), 171-180.
- Zhou, J. F. (2009). China is Not a Threat: A Critical Discourse Analysis of an Editorial. *Sino-US English Teaching*, 6(8), 35-39.
- Zhu, T. (2002). Developmental states and threat perceptions in Northeast Asia. *Conflict, Security & Development*, 2(01), 5-29.
- Zhu, J., & Lu, J. (2013). One Rising China, Multiple Interpretations: China's 60th anniversary celebration through the lens of the world's printed media. *Journal of Contemporary China*, 22(84), 1067-1088.

## Usage of Local Foods in Regional Restaurants: Sinop Example

Hasibe Yazıt<sup>1</sup>

Tuğçe Sivri<sup>2</sup>

### Abstract

In recent years, it has been seen that tourists are curious about the local foods in the regions they travel to and want to taste, as well as sightseeing, seeing and entertainment activities. With the concept of gastronomy gaining importance in recent years, it is understood that there has been an increase in the interest of both local and foreign tourists for local foods. At this point, especially accommodation and food and beverage businesses are trying to meet this demand of both domestic and foreign tourists. For this reason, it is seen that businesses tend to give more place to local tastes in their menus recently. As a result of the literature review, no study was found on the use of local dishes in the regional restaurants in Sinop Province. At this point, the study was considered important and it was thought that it should be done. The main purpose of this study; The aim is to determine the extent to which the local dishes of the cuisine of Sinop are included in the menus of the food and beverage businesses operating in Sinop and to reveal the forgetfulness of the local dishes. The research was carried out by examining the menus of 16 food and beverage companies located in the city center of Sinop. The study was carried out using content analysis, one of the qualitative research methods.

### Introduction

Because people are social beings; In addition to being a phenomenon where biological needs are met throughout history, eating has been a social tool

---

1 Assistant Professor, Sinop University, School of Tourism and Hotel Management, Department of Gastronomy and Culinary Arts, hyazit@sinop.edu.tr, ORCID ID: 0000-0003-1055-5192

2 Sinop University, School of Tourism and Hotel Management, Department of Gastronomy and Culinary Arts, tugcesivri3@gmail.com, ORCID ID: 0009-0008-5296-7703

where individuals mingle with each other, share their joys and sorrows, and carry out celebration and entertainment activities (Cığırım, 2001).

Every society has a different cultural structure. The biggest factor in the formation of this cultural structure is tradition, geographical feature, cuisine, cooking techniques and eating and drinking habits. Eating habits, which have continued since ancient times, since the existence of man, have the same mentality, no matter how much they have changed today. Today, the reason why local dishes are not preferred less than world cuisines is that local dishes are not known and old recipes are not accessible.

Within the scope of this study, it is aimed to recognize and know the food and beverage businesses operating in Sinop, how much Sinop includes local dishes in their menus and to what extent the local dishes of the region are recognized.

### **The Concept of Local Cuisine and Its Features**

The word kitchen has passed into the Turkish language from the Arabic word “matbah”, it means “the place where food is cooked, stored and preserved”. Turkish cuisine has unique characteristics with its kitchen structure-architecture, tools used, types of food, cooking styles, table setting, serving styles, and foods prepared for winter (Çölbay and Sormaz, 2015: 1730).

The Turkish food culture, which was formed as a result of the blending of the grains of Mesopotamia, the vegetables and fruits of the Mediterranean, the spices of South Asia, and the use of meat and fermented dairy products by the Central Asian nomadic people, has led to the formation of a rich culinary culture due to the historical process (Güler, 2010: 25).

“The concept of local cuisine; We can define it as all of the foods and beverages that are created as a result of combining local products and local customs, cooked in their own ways by the local people, and designed with religious or national feelings” (Şengül & Türkay, 2015:600). The concept of local cuisine; Since it is a concept that includes local food and local food, it cannot be considered separately from each other. Therefore, it would be right to talk about the concept of local wherever there is a kitchen.

In the formation of local cuisines (Şengül and Türkay, 2015: 600);

- Traditions,
- Seasonal conditions,
- Geographical conditions,

- National effects,
- Religious influences,
- Local food and beverage products
- The accumulation gained in the historical process can be effective.

### **Importance of Local Cuisine for Gastronomy Tourism**

One of the most important factors that encourage people to travel is that they want to know and experience the culinary culture of that country (Pekyaman, 2008; Aslan et al., 2014). As a matter of fact, Pekyaman (2008) states that most of the tourists visiting Turkey want to get to know and try the foods of Turkish Culinary Culture. The fact that our country's local food culture offers rich options with regional differences creates an important attraction point for foreign tourists as well as domestic tourists (Soner, 2013).

### **Sinop Culinary Culture**

Sinop province is located between the Eastern and Western Black Sea regions. It was founded on a peninsula surrounded by seas on three sides at the northernmost tip of Turkey extending to the Black Sea (Provincial Directorate of Tourism, 1992: 1). Due to the fact that different cultures live in Sinop, the nutrition structure is basically based on grain products. It is known that together with winter vegetables, quince and chestnut fruits are also used in meals. In addition, it is seen that local dishes such as stewing, spoon stickers, nokul, corn cake, islama, folding in Sinop cuisine are loved and consumed in the region (Karaçar, Doğancılı and Ak, 2018: 439).

The traces of Black Sea Cuisine and Marmara Cuisine can be seen among the factors that make up the dishes of Sinop. Varieties of vegetable and pastry dishes are dominant in Sinop region. However, meat dishes and fish dishes are also prominent due to the fact that it is on the coast of the Black Sea. At the same time, mountain herbs in the Sinop region are often used to sweeten dishes.

Making and storing for the winter still continues in the Sinop kitchen. For the winter, tomato paste, tomato juice and pickles are commonly made. Generally, canned products are not used in Sinop cuisine.

When it comes to Sinop local dishes, the first things that come to mind are; Sinop ravioli, Sinop Nuklu, Princess dessert are not limited to these. In the tables below, there is a local menu and regional dishes / foods that have geographical indication.

**Table 1. Sinop Dishes / Foods With Geographical Indication**

Local Dishes / Foods With Geographical Indication
Sinop Spotted (2017)
Boyabat Stick Kebab (2020)
Boyabat Gazidere Tomato (2020)
Sinop Ravioli (2021)
Sinop Chestnut Honey (2021)

Source: *ci.turkpatent.gov.tr*

**Table 2. Sinop Local Dishes**

Traditional foods
Folding
Islama
Stuffed Pan
Leek with Vinegar
Bonito Steak
Keşkek
Pumpkin Pie (Squash Pie)
Chestnut Stuffed Rice
Spoon Sticker (Mamalika)
Corn soup
Corn Tarhana
Passover Dessert
Squeezed Dessert
Corn Cake
Princess Dessert

## Method

In this research, it was aimed to determine the levels of Sinop Cuisine Local Dishes in the menus of businesses operating in the province of Sinop that provide food and beverage services. The research was carried out by examining the menus of 16 food and beverage companies located in the city center of Sinop. The study was carried out using content analysis, one of the qualitative research methods.

Content analysis is the careful, detailed and systematic examination and interpretation of data with the aim of identifying patterns, themes, biases and meanings related to the core of the research. The purpose of content analysis is to reach concepts and relationships that can explain the data obtained through the views of the participants and the file and document review. (Baltacı, 2017; Guba and Lincoln, 1994; Maxwell, 2008; Pope et al., 2006).

In the method, whether the local dishes of Sinop from past to present are included in the menus of food and beverage businesses in Sinop was made by creating a table. These findings are stated in the conclusion part.

## Results

A table was created to indicate whether the soups, main courses and desserts of Sinop province are included in the restaurant menus. In this context, 16 restaurants included in the sample are given in Table 3.

*Table 3. Inclusion of local dishes in Sinop province in restaurant menus*

Sinop Yöresel Yemekleri	Restoranlar																
	Gaziantep Südem Pastanesi	Deniz Cafe	Şen Pastanesi	Kökt Pastanesi	Örnekt Mariti	Okyanus Balık Evi 57	Saray Restoran	Sakız Cafe	Villa Pasta	Karainci Fırın	Angelico Cafe /Bistro	Kahve Durağı	Çalkuğu	Karainci Pasta	Beyaz Ev	Nihavent Restoran	
Sinop Mantısı		✓				✓		✓		✓	✓	✓					
Sinop Nokulu	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓												
Boyabat Sırık Kebabı																	
Katlama																	
İçli Tava						✓											
İslama																	
Sirkeli Pirasa																	
Palamut Dilaki						✓	✓										
Keskek																	
Kabak Milleşi																	
Kestane İlg Pilav																	
Kaşık Çıkartma																	
Misir Çorbası																	
Misir Tarhanası																	
Hamursuz Tatlı																	
Sakmık Tatlısı																	
Misir Pastası																	
Prenses Tatlısı	✓		✓	✓					✓								

It has been observed that most of the restaurants included in the research have Sinop ravioli, which is the local dish of Sinop province. However, Boyabat pole kebab, folding, soaking, leeks with vinegar, keskek, pumpkin noodle, stuffed rice with chestnut, spoon stickers, corn soup, pastry dessert, squeezed dessert, corn cake were not found in any restaurant included in the study.

## Conclusion and Recommendations

In this research, which aims to determine the level of the local dishes of Sinop cuisine in the menus of the restaurants operating in the province of

Sinop, it has been determined that most of the restaurants included in the research have been operating for many years.

It was determined that in none of the restaurants included in the study, there were no local dishes of Sinop province such as Boyabat stick kebab, folding, soaking, leek with vinegar, keskek, zucchini mince, chestnut stuffed rice, spoon stickers, corn cake, and Sinop ravioli was the most local dish in the menus of the restaurants. However, it was concluded that the local soups of Sinop province, corn soup and corn tarhana, were not found in any of the restaurants included in the research. It has been determined that most of the restaurants included in the research have princess dessert, one of the local desserts of Sinop, but not doughless dessert and squeezed dessert.

As a result of the negotiations with the restaurants, the reason why local dishes are not included in the restaurant menus:

- Businesses think that they can make more profit by serving meals such as fast food, the customer profile is in the plurality of students, and these products are at the forefront in the menus due to their low cost and high profit margin,
- The fact that local dishes are made at home and restaurants want to produce and sell dishes that are different from home-cooked meals,
- Due to the difficult process steps and production stages of local dishes,
- The fact that the original local food recipes are not accessible,
- Not knowing all the local dishes of Sinop province by the tourists can be shown as a reason.

As a result of the interviews with the restaurants, the following suggestions can be made to include local dishes in the restaurant menus:

- Local dishes can be promoted more, and their recognition by the public and tourists can be increased.
- Authorized institutions and organizations may issue incentive certificates to businesses that make local food.
- Local food festivals can be organized in Sinop province to promote local dishes.
- Gastronomy and Culinary Arts Department at Sinop University can organize a local food day in Sinop and make presentations in a public place.
- Geographical indication of all Sinop local dishes can be ensured.
- Efforts can be made to preserve the original recipes of the local dishes of the province of Sinop and to remain faithful.

## References

- Baltacı, A.; (2019). Qualitative Research Process: How to Conduct a Qualitative Research, Ahi Evran University Journal of Social Sciences Institute, 2019, Vol 5, No 2, Page 368-388
- Erdem, Ö.; Metin, M. and Kemer, K. (2018). Usage of Local Foods in Regional Restaurants: The Case of Mengen, International Journal of Turkish World Tourism Research, July-2018 Volume: 3 No: 1
- Karaçar, E. ; Doğancahı, O. and Ak, S. (2018). A Value Unique to Sinop Cuisine within the Scope of Gastronomic Values: Nokul, VII. Eastern Mediterranean Tourism Symposium.
- Nebioglu, O. ; (2021) . A Meta-Synthesis Study on Local Literature Examining Local Dishes in the Menus of Restaurant Businesses, Alanya Academic Review Journal, C:5, P:2, pp.1031-1047
- Özel, G; Yıldız, F and Vulture, M. (2017). Determining the Level of Inclusion of Local Foods in Restaurant Menus: The Example of Kilis, Section Academy Magazine, No.11, December 2017
- Seçim, Y. ; (2019) . A Study on the Culinary Culture of Sinop, 1st International Gastronomy and Culture Congress At: Malatya
- Şengul, S. ; Turkay, O. (2016) . The Role of Local Cuisine Elements in Selecting a Tourism Destination: The Example of Mudurnu, International Journal of Management, Economics and Business, Vol 12, No 29, 2016
- <https://ci.turkpatent.gov.tr/> ( Access date: 15.06.2022)
- <https://blog.biletbayi.com/sinopun-yoresel-yemekleri.html/> (Access date: 15.06.2022)
- <https://www.gezinomi.com/gezi-rehberi/sinop-un-meshur-yemekleri-ve-restoranlari.html> (Access date: 15.06.2022)
- <https://sinop.ktb.gov.tr/> (Access date: 03.07.2022)



# From Happy Country to Happy City: The Case of Bhutan for Sinop Tourism<sup>1</sup>

Ali Turan Bayram<sup>2</sup>

Yavuz Çetin<sup>3</sup>

## Abstract

This study aims to determine to Sinop tourism development from the perspective of non-marketing approach, based on the example of Bhutan. The efforts of Bhutan and Sinop to create a tourism brand from the perspective of happiness provide an opportunity to compare these two destinations and see the pros and cons. Within the scope of the study, the positive and negative aspects of Bhutan tourism strategies were discussed, and which applications should be used in terms of Sinop tourism development and which applications should be avoided. In this context, the importance of developing proposals restricting tourist movements to Sinop under certain conditions was emphasized. The efforts of Bhutan and Sinop to create a tourism brand from the perspective of happiness provide an opportunity to compare these two destinations and see the pros and cons.

## Introduction

Sinop is considered as one of the important destinations for tourism with its cultural and natural beauties. Especially its natural beauties come to the forefront as an issue that increases its preferability. The results of the “Daily Visitor/Tourist Satisfaction Survey” conducted in 2019 by the local authorities also show that visitors who prefer Sinop primarily aim for natural beauties. For this reason, it can be said that ensuring the sustainability of Sinop tourism depends on the preservation of existing attractions. In this

---

1 This study is an extended version of the study presented as a paper in the Sinop Culture and Tourism Symposium.

2 Assoc. Prof., Sinop University, School of Tourism and Hotel Management, Department of Tourism Guidance.

3 Researcher

context, taking measures, determining strategies and realizing tourism within the framework of a model are seen as a necessity in order to sustain Sinop tourism. This study offers suggestions from the perspective of demarketing, based on the example of Bhutan, for the development of Sinop tourism.

### **Demarketing**

When the concept of marketing is mentioned, the idea of making as much sales as possible by reaching all consumers with an aggressive sales technique is widely mentioned. Sometimes it is desirable to reduce or restrict the sale and use of goods and services. The concept of demarketing, which was first introduced to the literature by Kotler and Levy in 1971 with an article, is defined as “the set of activities aimed at reducing the desire to buy, temporarily or permanently removing a general customer mass or a certain group of customers from demanding” (Altınay ve Sert, 2012: 70). Demarketing is an approach that can be applied in different ways. Demarketing can be used to reduce demand when a limited product is produced, or to focus on customers that it can serve better, to create a perception of scarcity (Memiş, 2017: 772) or to prevent the sale of a harmful product. In general terms, the concept of demarketing includes obtaining maximum benefit from the sale of goods and services by using resources efficiently. When the concept of non-marketing within the tourism industry is considered on a destination basis, the issue of carrying capacity comes to the fore. Destinations may impose restrictions on tourist entry to protect their resources. Sometimes, they can take advantage of various tax and bureaucratic obstacles to prevent the carrying capacity from being exceeded. Carrying capacity is not only seen as a concept that includes the number of visitors, but also social, psychological and economic carrying capacity is important for destinations as well as environmental carrying capacity (Bayram and Erkol Bayram, 2016: 26). The concept of demarketing can also be seen as an approach that will prevent the environmental, social, psychological or economic carrying capacity from being exceeded. In this context, the demarketing approach can be used in order to get rid of the tolerance level of the local people, tourist satisfaction or economic dependency. At this point, more studies and practical applications are required to determine the effectiveness and impact of demarketing tools on tourism patterns, physical environment and economic environment (Beeton ve Benfield, 2002: 512).

### **Bhutan Tourism Policy**

In the case of Bhutan, which is considered as an example of Sinop tourism, some activities for demarketing have taken place, but over time, there has

been a tendency towards mass tourism. Although there is a gradual move away from demarketing activities, examining the Bhutan example has been seen as a contributing subject to Sinop tourism. Bhutan is a small landlocked Himalayan Buddhist kingdom, with a total land area of 38,394 square kilometers, located between two giant and populous nations, China to the north and India to the south. It is considered one of the most outstanding travel destinations in the World, as there was no tourist activity in Bhutan until it opened its doors to the outside World for the coronation of the fourth King in 1974 (Bhutan National Bureau of Statistics, 2021). The first tourism activity started with 287 tourists visiting Bhutan in 1974. The only existing international airport was opened in 1983. (Bhutan Tourism Council, 2021). Due to Bhutan's unique culture and pristine environment, and the uncertainty of protecting it from tourism's undesirable effects, the country's leaders have over the years been careful not to become too dependent on tourism. Therefore, the Royal Government of Bhutan (RGOB) has not approved the tourism policies and guidelines currently implemented in the country to prevent mass tourism (Nyaupane and Timothy, 2010).

Bhutan has earned a tremendous reputation in international markets as the happiest nation in the world. This is because Bhutan follows the unique development philosophy known as Gross National Happiness (GNP) rather than Gross Domestic Product (GDP). However, with this, a great expectation has arisen for tourists who have heard of the GNP. The concept of GNP is built on four key items that give the happiness of individual citizens a higher priority than the material wealth of the country alone. Bhutan Tourism Council now uses GNP in its marketing strategies by developing a destination brand slogan around the GNH philosophy: "Happiness is a place" with the slogan aiming to become a unique tourism destination (Bhutan Tourism Council, 2021). With this effective slogan, Bhutan is trying to dispel the perception that Bhutan is expensive to reach and entry is made only with an authorized visa and is also tightly controlled as a tourism destination. The basis of tourism policy is based on the overall development philosophy of Gross National Happiness (GNI) and aims to promote sustainable tourism that meets the needs of current visitors and destinations while increasing and providing opportunities for the future. Bhutan strives to provide cautious tourism development that is within its socio-cultural and environmental carrying capacity. Fees such as the Minimum Daily Package Fee (MGP) and the Sustainable Development Fee are charged to tourists visiting the country in accordance with the Bhutan Tourism Tax Law 2020 (Bhutan Tourism Council, 2021). National policies implemented in Bhutanese tourism have been shaped by the active participation of the public. In this way, the fact that

the people have a say in tourism development will prevent the social carrying capacity and, accordingly, the psychological carrying capacity from being exceeded. Bhutan, which has a tourism understanding beyond sustainable mass tourism, has succeeded in developing tourism by preserving its natural and cultural tourism resources (Song, 2019: 9). Teoh (2013) reports in the study that Bhutan's unique 'controlled tourism' model is based on the principles of Gross National Happiness (GNH) and states that Gross National Happiness includes indicators of protection of the natural environment, promotion and development of culture, good governance, sustainable and equitable socio-economic development. According to Khamrang (2013), the community-based approach supported by the development philosophy of Gross National Happiness (GNH) remains important for the success of the tourism industry in the country. The effective and understanding planning policy of tourism, the principle of "high value low volume", has made the country one of the most successful countries in the world in the tourism sector.

After 2019, and especially with the increase in the popularity of the destination, the low impact started to give way to the high impact and "guests and pilgrims turned into tourists", so the change in the tourist profile started to change the shape of the industry not only in terms of numbers but also in terms of behavior. The fact that the tourist profile that respects the destination, local people and local culture is replaced by the standard mass tourist has started to make Bhutan a luxury destination. With the increasing number of visitors, problems such as traffic, security problems, decrease in service quality, income smuggling, illegal tourism facilities, environmental pollution, unguided tours, unethical practices have begun to come to the fore (A Deep Dive into Tourism in Bhutan, 2019:2; Dhradhul, 2019:7).

### **Conclusion and Recommendations**

Considering the Bhutan example, the early periods contain positive examples for tourism development, but the events experienced in recent years contain the points that destinations should pay attention to. When considered at the scale of Sinop, an approach that is compatible with the carrying capacity expressed in the Bhutan example and that embraces the local culture should be adopted for tourism development period and the protection of natural and cultural riches. A plan for Sinop tourism should be determined with visitor restrictions in some regions and a general demarketing approach in order to protect natural resources. For the development of Sinop tourism, together with the "high value low impact" philosophy in the example of Bhutan, the number of tourists should be limited and

high economic, social and environmental gains should be obtained from tourism movements. A general demarketing strategy is suggested for the development of Sinop tourism. Within the framework of this strategy, it is possible to achieve high value through issues such as entrance fees for certain areas in the city, accommodation and travel taxes to be collected from visitors, and visa application. However, at this point, issues such as finding solutions to problems such as landscaping, cleaning, traffic, restoring and protecting cultural structures in accordance with their originality, increasing the quality of service, highlighting the local people and local culture, increasing the satisfaction by increasing the tourist experience should be carried out. The demarketing strategy, which will try to be implemented before these issues are realized, may adversely affect the tourism movements in the destination rather than giving the expected effect.

The happy city slogan may not have much meaning on its own. In a happy city, the happiness of not only those who live but also those who work and earn from tourism is important. The happiness of tourism employees, as the segment that provides the most interaction with tourists, creates the perception of tourists. Then happiness is realized not only in local people but also in all stakeholders. As in the case of Bhutan, GNH should be developed for Sinop as well. In this regard, issues such as developing policies for employees, improving working conditions, and providing trainings emerge as a necessity.

As a result, the advantages and disadvantages of tourism planning, which aims the economic development in Bhutan together with ecological elements, constitute an important example for Sinop. The example of Bhutan, a niche non-seaside destination, would be more fortunate to be taken as a model for Sinop tourism, as it has more tourism diversity than Bhutan, as its ecological, historical and local population allows. With the correct and effective construction of these issues, Sinop tourism will have the potential to gain as much as Bhutan's gains from the tourism sector. However, these potential demarketing applications can be turned into gains by applying at least in the designated areas of the destination. At this stage, in which areas restrictions will be made for the development of Sinop tourism, and on which issues taxation systems will be built, the Ministry of Culture and Tourism, academics, tourism entrepreneurs, local people and all other stakeholders should participate and approve.

## References

- A Deep Dive into Tourism in Bhutan, 2019). Editörial, The Druk Journal, 5(2), 2-6.
- Altınay, A., Sert, S. (2012). Pazarlasak Da Mı Satsak Pazarlamasak Da Mı Sat-sak? Pazarlamada Yeni Bir Boyut: De-Marketing (Pazarlamama) Kavramı, Sosyal Ve Beşeri Bilimler Dergisi Cilt 4, No 1.
- Bayram, A.T. ve Erkol Bayram, G. (2016), Sürdürülebilir Turizm Politikası ve Planlaması (Editörler: Yaylı, A. Sürücü, Ö.) Özel İlgi Turizmi içinde, De-tay Yayıncılık: Ankara.
- Becton, S. ve Benfield, R. (2002). Demand Control: The Case for Demarketing as a Visitor and Environmental Management Tool, Journal of Sustainable Tourism, 10(6), 497-513.
- Bhutan National Bureau of Statistics (2021). (Erişim tarihi: 25/07/2021), <https://www.nsb.gov.bt/>
- Bhutan Tourism Council. (2021). (Erişim tarihi: 27/07/2021), <https://www.tourism.gov.bt/>
- Dhradhul, D. (2019). Tourism Policy-The Way Forward, The Druk Journal, 5(2), 7-10.
- Khamrang, L. (2013). Modernisation, Globalisation and Development in Bhutan: Tourism as a Catalyst, Journal of Management & Public Policy Vol. 5, No. 1, December 2013, Pp. 5-11.
- Kotler, P. and Levy, S.J. (1971) Demarketing? Yes, Demarketing! Harvard Business Review 49 (6), 74-80.
- Memiş, S. (2017). Demarketing Kavramı Ve Uygulamadaki Bazı Örnekler, Uluslararası Sosyal Araştırmalar Dergisi, Cilt: 10 Sayı: 50.
- Nyaupane, G. P., Timothy, D, J. (2010). Power, Regionalism And Tourism Policy in Bhutan, Annals of Tourism Research, Vol. 37, No. 4, pp. 969-988, 2010.
- Song, K.B. (2019). The Bhutan Brand. The Druk Journal, 5(2), 11-14.
- Teoh, S. (2013). The governmentality approach to the business of sustainable tourism: Bhutan's tourism governance, policy and planning, Curtin University, The Business of Sustainable Tourism Symposium, Avustralia, 2013.

# A Wetland Management Planning: Problems and Threats Affecting Gökçeada (Aydıncık-Salt Lake) Lagoon

Mehtap Bayrak<sup>1</sup>

## Abstract

Gökçeada Lagoon is located in the southeast of Gökçeada, the largest island of Turkey. The lake, which is also called Aydıncık Lake or Salt Lake, showing the characteristics of a typical coastal lagoon with its fresh / salt water transition, coastal cords and its ecosystem, was included in the list of “Wetlands of National Importance” with 3.491 ha on 07/02/2019 and gained protection status. Agricultural activities are carried out on fertile alluvial lands around the lake, which was formed as a result of filling a depression area in the south of the island, which has a generally defective structure, with materials carried by waves, winds and rivers, and tourism activities are intensively carried out in the summer months on the coastal coast and dunes. In the lake, which is the centre of attention of local and foreign tourists, the salt layer that emerges with the withdrawal of water due to drought and evaporation in the summer season is used for health purposes by local and foreign tourists, but the use of salt has not yet been introduced to health tourism with certain laws. In the study, it is aimed to prepare a “lagoon management planning” for the solution of environmental and ecological problems that arise despite the protection status of the lake and the framework of coastal laws. It has been determined that the greatest pressure on the ecological, biological and morphological system around the lake is caused by intensive tourism activities, agricultural activities, pollution from domestic wastes and recently increasing construction works. In order to determine the use of the lagoon and the surrounding area, a land use map was prepared using the data of 2022. For coastal change detection, 1985, 2004, 2012 and 2020 satellite images were used to determine the shoreline change and it was determined that there was no change in the lake level. The lack of level change indicates that the lake is fed from different sources. For the management planning of

the lagoon and its surroundings, SWOT analysis was applied, each land cover and use types were analysed separately and a wetland management plan was prepared.

## **1. Introduction**

Wetlands have an important ecological value with their plant and animal species. They constitute an important resource potential such as providing water environment for living organisms with fresh/salt water transitions, feeding groundwater, protection from flooding, and creating economic value with the surrounding land use types. Wetlands, which form a transition zone between land and sea, consist of many morphological units such as marshes, lakes, peatlands, rivers, flood plains, deltas, mangroves, salt flats, corals, sea coastal areas with a depth not exceeding 6 metres. There are various definitions about wetlands. Wetlands are defined according to the Regulation on 'Protection of Wetlands' of the Presidency of Forestry and Water Affairs dated 4.04. 2014 dated 4.04.2014, according to the communiqué numbered 28962 of the Official Gazette dated 4.04.2014, in Article-4 (ü), wetlands are defined as "all waters, marshes, reeds and peatlands, natural or artificial, permanent or temporary, with still or flowing waters, fresh, brackish or salty, covering depths not exceeding six metres during the ebb of the tidal movements of the seas, which are important as a habitat for living creatures, especially water birds, and the ecologically wetland areas of these areas from the coastal edge line towards the land side". In the 1971 Ramsar Convention, the definition of wetland is defined as "all waters, marshes, reeds and turbieries, natural or artificial, permanent or temporary, still or flowing, fresh, brackish or salty, covering depths not exceeding six metres at low tide, are wetlands" (Official Gazette, 1994, Article 1/1).

Many studies have been carried out in Turkey in recent years in order to determine the shrinkage, disappearance and environmental problems in wetlands and to develop solutions to the problems arising as a result of these determinations.

In these studies, different plans and reports have been prepared and put into practice by various institutions and organisations (ministries, associations and foundations) in the creation and adoption of correct and rational land use awareness in the sustainability and protection of wetlands, in the preparation and implementation of wetland management plans. At the same time, the problems experienced in wetlands have been constantly on the agenda in different newspapers and news websites related to many wetlands and meetings have been held with various official organisations. However, despite all these efforts, the pressure of the rapidly increasing

population in our country, the rapid consumption of natural resources by people, this consumption has attracted people to the coasts and wetlands, especially for the purpose of creating natural landscape beauty and benefiting from their economic values.

In this study, taking Gökçeada Lagoon, one of the important wetlands of Turkey, which has been flooded by local and foreign tourists especially after 1990s, as an example, the ecological, morphological and environmental changes around it were tried to be determined, and the wrong land use patterns in the context of environmental land use were identified and mapped. It has been observed that the protection status and laws are insufficient to eliminate the misuse and anthropogenic pressure on the lake and its surroundings and that new plans and programmes are needed. In this context, geographical field observations were made and a new management plan was prepared for the lagoon and its surroundings. The boundary of the area around the lake was tried to be examined within the framework of the natural and archaeological protected area based on the buffer zone within the scope of the Gökçeada Wetland Management Plan Project. The study is important in terms of providing a geographical observation and perspective to other management plans.

### **1.1. Current Wetland Management and Conservation Scope in Turkey**

Wetlands are divided into 3 classes among themselves: Saltwater environments, freshwater environments and man-made wetlands. With their habitats, biodiversity and productive ecosystems, wetlands are divided into three classes: Saltwater environments include the sea, estuaries, lagoons and saltwater lakes; freshwater environments include river banks, ponds, marshes and peatlands; and man-made wetlands include salt enterprises, water collection areas and dams (Dugan;1990:12). Wetlands are associated with the coast and need to be protected in accordance with coastal laws. While the first legal regulations and legislation related to the coast were published in the Official Gazette on 04/04/1926, a special article was included in Article 4 of the 'Municipality, Roads and Building Law' law on 10.06.1993 as "a 10 m wide area from the dock or the point where the dock can be built on the waterfront will be left free for the benefit of the public." (Turoğlu, 2017a:46). The legal regulations of the Coastal Law covering the sea, lakes and rivers were determined by Articles 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13 and 14 of the Land Registry Law No. 2644 adopted in 1934 (Turoğlu, 2017b.46). The 1982 coastal law was on public benefit and utilisation of the coast, and the 1990 and 1994 coastal laws were on legal regulations on the coast, definition

of coastal terms and determination of the coastal edge line. According to the amendments made in 1994, Article-8 is regulated as determination of land on the coastal edge line and its transfer to maps, Article-14 is regulated as land acquisition through filling and drying, Article-17 is regulated as planning on the coast and coastline and annotation to the title deed (Coastal Law, 1990: 3621 no-20495).

In Turkey, official regulations based on various laws and rules have been made in order to ensure the protection and sustainability of wetlands.

The Ramsar Convention (Convention on Wetlands of International Importance Especially as Waterfowl Habitats) is an important international convention signed in Ramsar, Iran on 2 February 1971 for the protection and sustainability of wetlands. Turkey's accession to this convention was announced in the Official Gazette dated 17 May 1994, Tuesday, 94/5434: "Our accession to the annexed "Convention on Wetlands of International Importance, especially as Waterfowl Habitats", which was approved by Law No. 3958 dated 28/12/1993, was decided by the Council of Ministers on 15/3/1994, pursuant to Article 3 of Law No. 244 dated 31/5/1963, upon the letter of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs dated 4/3/1994 and numbered EIUK-1012-2189." (Official Gazette, 1994). The Regulation on the Protection of Wetlands was announced in the Official Gazette of the Ministry of Environment and Forestry with 'Wetlands Communiqués' on different dates. These communiqués are respectively according to years;

- 1. Wetlands Communiqué (Official Gazette dated 28. 05. 1994 and numbered 21943)
- 2. Wetlands Communiqué (Official Gazette dated 05. 04. 1995 and numbered 22249)
- 3. Wetlands Communiqué (Official Gazette dated 15. 04. 1998 and numbered 23314)
- 4. Wetlands Communiqué (Official Gazette dated 09. 02. 2005 and numbered 25722)
- 5. Wetlands Communiqué (Official Gazette dated 20. 06. 2009 and numbered 27264)
- 6. Wetlands Communiqué (Official Gazette dated 31. 01. 2013 and numbered 28545).

Based on the communiqués, in accordance with the Law No. 28962 published in the Official Gazette on 4 April 2014, the purpose of the protection of wetlands is "to determine the principles of protection, management and

development of wetlands within the territorial borders and continental shelf of Turkey and the principles of cooperation and coordination between the institutions and organisations in charge in this regard.” According to the Wetland Communiqués, different wetlands in our country are taken under protection in each communiqué. According to the communiqués on the protection of wetlands, while determining the procedures and principles for protection in the communiqué numbered 1; according to Articles 2 and 3 of the Ramsar Convention, Articles 23 and 24 of the Regulation on the Protection of Wetlands, and according to Communiqué numbered 2. According to Articles 2 and 3 of the Ramsar Convention and Articles 23 and 24 of the Regulation on the Protection of Wetlands, Burdur Lake, Bird (Manyas) Lake, Seyfe Lake, Göksu Delta and Sultan Reed wetlands were included in the protection list in Communiqué No. 2; Yumurtalık Lagoon (Annex-1), Meke Maarı (Annex-2) and Kızören Obruğu (Annex-3) were included in the protection list in Communiqué No. 4; Kars Kuyucuk Lake was taken under protection in Communiqué No. 5, and Nemrut Kalderası Wetland was taken under protection in Communiqué No. 6. According to the Regulation on the Protection of Wetlands (Official Gazette, dated 04.04.2014, No. 28962), the protection of wetlands other than the Ramsar Convention is realised by the principles and laws of ‘Wetlands of National Importance’ and ‘Wetlands of Local Importance’.

While determining these areas with Article-18, “Wetlands of national importance: Wetlands having at least one of the “Wetland of International Importance Criteria” adopted at the Meeting of the Parties to the Convention” and wetlands of local importance include “wetlands not included in the list of wetlands of national importance and Ramsar Sites”.

Limitations for the protection of wetlands are also defined in the Official Gazette as follows: According to the Communiqué No. 28962 of the Official Gazette dated 4.04.2014, Article-4 (v, y, z) of the Regulation on ‘Protection of Wetlands’ of the Presidency of Forestry and Water Affairs defines the wetland boundary, wetland management plan, artificial wetland and sustainable use zone.

Wetland boundary is defined as “the line passing through the buffer zone boundary in wetlands of national importance, and the line passing through the maximum point of the water surface for wetlands of local importance or artificial wetlands, taking into account seasonal changes”, and wetland management plan is defined as “the line passing through the maximum point of the water surface in order to ensure the rational use of wetlands, plans that define all activities and measures such as monitoring and supervision with


a holistic approach”, as artificial wetland, “man-made water structures that have at least one of the criteria of wetlands of international importance, such as dams and ponds built for the purpose of drinking, using and irrigation water supply and electricity generation, and the wetland ecosystem formed around them”, Article-4 (aa) defines sustainable use zone as “natural or semi-natural open water surfaces, lagoons, lagoons, estuaries, salt pans, temporary and permanent fresh and salt water marshes, wet meadows, reeds and peatlands, and dune ecologically supporting these ecosystems, the area in which people are traditionally allowed to continue their economic activities such as fishing, reed, peat extraction, forestry, gathering, agriculture and animal husbandry in habitats such as beaches, scrub, woodland, floodplain forests”.

The main Ramsar protected areas in Turkey are Adana Akyatan Lake (14.700 ha, 1998), Burdur Burdur Lake (24.800 ha-1994), İzmir Gediz Delta (14.900 ha-1998), Mersin Göksu Delta (15.000 ha-1994), Samsun Kızılırmak Delta (21.700 ha-1998), Konya Kızören Obruğu (127 ha-2006), Kars Kuyucuk Lake (416 ha-2009), Balıkesir Manyas Kuşgözü (20.400 ha-1994), Konya Meke Maar (202 ha-2005), Bitlis Nemrut Lake (4.589-2013), Kırşehir Seyfe Lake (10.700 ha-1994), Kayseri Sultan Reed (17.200 ha-1994), Bursa Ulubat Lake (19.900 ha-1998) and Adana Yumurtalık Lagoon (19.853 ha-2005). The number of Wetlands of National Importance is 59 and the number of Wetlands of Local Importance is 32 (DKMP, 2022; DKMP, 202).

## **2. Materials and Methods**

The maps and literature review used in the preparation of the study were used as the main material in the analysis and evaluation processes. 1985, 2004, 2012 and 2020 satellite images were used to determine the lagoon shore and level change. Images were overlapped with the image overlay method and the level difference was tried to be determined. While preparing the land use map, the raw land (soil) data obtained from the Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Affairs were used and these data were digitised using ArcGIS 10.3 software. In order to create the current land use on the basis of the data, all land cover units were classified and the values belonging to similar classes were combined. The classification of each land cover was determined manually by using the “Image classification” tool for controlled classification processes. Maximum likelihood classification tool was used for controlled classification and colour assignments were made for each land cover. The data were converted to vector for area and numerical calculations.

While preparing the wetland management plan, different wetland management plans, especially the literature similar to the study area, were utilised. With the management plan of Gökçeada Lagoon, it is aimed to determine the basic strategies and action plans that offer solutions for the future of the wetland, prevent threats and risks, and achieve these goals. SWOT analysis was used as a method in the preparation of the management plan. SWOT analysis is one of the most appropriate strategy methods that makes internal and external analyses in determining the critical threats and opportunities of the environment in any field, and examines and addresses how opportunities and threats will develop mutually (Gürel and Tat, 2017a:994). It consists of four components: strengths, weaknesses, opportunities and threats (Sarsby, 2012a:6; Taş, 2010a:81) (Figure 1). Based on this analysis, the strengths and weaknesses in Gökçeada Lagoon were determined and the threats and opportunities in the wetland were mutually evaluated with geographical recommendations. Some of the figures used in the study were taken from Google Earth and arrangements were made on them.



*Figure 1. Swot analysis analytical components (revised; Sarsby, 2012b:6; Gürel and Tat, 2017b:994; Taş, 2010b:81).*

### 3. Findings

#### 3.1. General Characteristics of Gökçeada (Aydıncık-Tuz Lake) Lagoon and Environment

Gökçeada Lagoon is located in the Aegean Sea in the southeast of Gökçeada (Kahraman, 2006:25; Cengiz et al., 2009a:14), the largest island of Turkey (285.5 km<sup>2</sup>) and the most extreme border in the northwest of

Turkey (İnce-Aylaka) between 40° 05' 12"- 40° 14' 18" N, 25° 40' 06"-26° 01' 05" E coordinates (Kahraman, 2006:25; Cengiz et al., 2009a:14), on the coast of Aydıncık district. The lake is bordered by Aydıncık (Kefalos) Bay to the northeast, Efelek district centre to the northwest, and Kefalos coastal beach and the Aegean Sea to the south (Figure 2). According to the data obtained from the 2020 satellite image, the lake area is 193 ha and the lake perimeter length is 5.7 km. The lake is 2.2 km in the widest area on the west-east axis and 1.3 km on the north-south axis.




Figure 2. Location map of Gökçeada Lagoon.

In and around the lagoon, Quaternary alluvial deposits and slope rubble surfaced on the slopes of the domes, loose sandstone, claystone, siltstone, mud, etc. belonging to the Upper Miocene aged Kirazlı Formation in the limited area south of Aydıncık Bay, shallow marine deposits in the west and north, and Middle Miocene aged Ayvacık Formation called Eşelek volcanics, basaltic andesite, andesitic proclastics, agglomerates, etc. shallow marine deposits, and to the west and north, the Middle Miocene aged Ayvacık Formation, which consists of Eşelek volcanics, basaltic andesite, andesitic proclastics, agglomerates and tuff (subvolcanic) and occasional dark grey proxen andesitic lavas (Kesgin and Varol, 2003:50; Sarı et al, 2015:3; Temel and Çiftçi, 2002:22; Ündül and Aysal, 2016:129). While

the north of Gökçeada rose, the south of Gökçeada descended due to tectonic movements, and Gökçeada Lagoon, also known as Salt Lake, completed its formation in this tectonic but shallow depression (Öner and Vardar, 2017b:209).

The lagoon, which is located between 0-3 metres in elevation in a plain between sea level and approximately 50 metres in the north, was formed on a shallow, low coastal plain 3 metres deep from the bedrock. Gökçeada Lake is located on Aydıncık Peninsula within the tombolo formed as a result of the connection of an island formerly called Kefalo to the land (Gökçeada) with a double cordon, and is surrounded by dune plains located on two cords formed to the north and south (Öner and Vardar, 2017a:206). According to Yücel (1966), the dune plain in the north developed rapidly in Aydıncık Bay where Değirmen Stream reaches the Aegean Sea (Photo 1) due to the alluvium carried by the stream, and the marshes formed as a result of the disappearance of the old lagoons thought to be located in the north along the coastal promenade were filled in time and completed their development by forming and expanding faster than the dune plain in the south (Yücel, 1966:68,69). In addition to the detritic elements carried by Değirmen Stream, the prevailing wind direction was also effective in the rapid development of the tombolon in the north (Kurter, 1989a:59). Today, the width of the tombolon in the north is 1.6 km at its widest point and 1.5 km from the easternmost end of the lagoon to the shore of Aydıncık Bay. The width of the coastal cordon in the south is 0.3 km at its widest point and its length is approximately 1.8 km. The formation of the lake continued until the end of the Pleistocene and the dead cliffs extend steeply on the shores of Aydıncık Bay (Yalçınlar, 1980:251). The slope in the northeast-southwest direction around the lagoon varies between 0-2°% and between 2-30°% in the Aydıncık Peninsula and in the areas where the elevation increases in the northwest (Cengiz et al., 2009b:20).



*Photo 1. Aydıncık Bay (yesilgazete.org).*

In Aydıncık Peninsula, the land covered with sand dunes to the north of Tuz Lake and reclaimed from the sea is called Ovacık, and this plain is used for agricultural activities. Apart from the plain area, the plateau area in the same peninsula gradually descends to the river bases with terraces, and the river slits exceed 20 m in places (Kurter, 1989b: 49-50; Yaşar, 2006:10).

Gökçeada Lagoon is a coastal area with a special hydrological structure that is a transition area between fresh and salt water inflow with its unique ecosystem and is also an important wetland ecosystem (Çelik, 2021:70). On the island, where the northeast-southwest sector winds are effective, salty water enters the lagoon from the sea to the lagoon in winter months with the effect of southwest winds, overcoming the dune wall in the south, and fresh water enters the lagoon through the channel opened by DSİ. The lake drainage area is 31.34 km<sup>2</sup> and the total area of 4.13 km<sup>2</sup> in the lagoon, which is fed by precipitation, water from the sea and fresh water channel, constitutes only the precipitation surface area (Aslan et al., 2021:3).

The island, which is under the influence of the Marmara transition regime, is warm, dry and clear in summer and cold, rainy, windy and partly cloudy in winter. According to Gökçeada Station data, the maximum amount of precipitation falling in December, January and February is 6-21 mm, and the dominant wind direction is northeast characterised by the northeastern

characteristic, while the southwest characterised Lodos is effective in the spring and autumn months (Acar et al., 2014a:190). The average annual temperatures vary between 4°C and 29°C and rarely fall to -2°C or rise above 32°C. The highest temperature measured is 39.7°C in August and the lowest temperature is -11.5°C in February (www.mgm.gov.tr).



*Photo 2. Salt layer on the mud on the surface of Gökçeada Lagoon during the dry period.*

The lagoon and its surroundings have important economic and socio-cultural values on the island. While tourism activities are carried out at Aydınçık Beach on the dune plain in the north and Kefalos Beach on the dune in the south, agricultural activities are carried out in the plain area between Eşelek in the northwest, Aydınçık Beach in the east and the lagoon in the south. The salt that emerges with the evaporation of water in the lagoon due to the summer drought meets the salt need of the people in Gökçeada (Photo 2), and at the same time, the black mud (consisting of quartz, sulphur, sodium, potassium, calcium, iron, barium, magnesium, carbonate, sulphate, sulfate, quartz, sulphur, sodium, potassium, calcium, iron, barium, magnesium, carbonate, sulphate) formed in the lake is used in the mud cure treatment, which is thought to be good for some diseases, and is interesting for tourists (gokceada.gov.tr).

### **3.2. Gökçeada (Aydınçık-Tuz Lake) Lagoon Land Cover/Use**

According to the land use map prepared according to the data of the Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry, 10 classes of land cover types were identified in and around the lagoon. According to the data obtained from the lagoon lake water surface 2020 satellite image, 193 ha, non-irrigated arable agricultural lands in the north 171.76 ha, mixed agricultural areas in the south of Efelek settlement area cover an area of 52.46 ha. Mixed agricultural areas are located together with fruit trees, vineyards and olive

groves. Agricultural activities constitute the main economy on the island, olive farming activities are carried out in the form of organic agriculture, and there are olive oil producers with organic agriculture certificates. In addition, vintage events are organised. The natural vegetation around the lake is spread over a large area of 1162.9 ha and covers 75.5 % of the land. Natural meadows extending in the east of the lake in the NW-SE direction are also spread in large areas along the north of Efelek. The area covered by natural grasslands is approximately 676 hectares in the vicinity of the lake. Sparsely vegetated areas in the west and sclerophyll vegetation in the northwest of the lake. The sclerophyllous vegetation is composed of heathland and maquis vegetation in the form of evergreen shrubs (Figure 3, Table 1).

*Table 1. Spatial distribution of land cover classes in Gökçeada (Aydıncık-Tuz Lake) Lagoon.*

Land Cover Classes	Field (ha)	(%)
Mixed agricultural areas	52,46	3.4
Non-irrigated arable land	171,76	11.1
Natural grasslands	675,98	43.9
Broad-leaved areas	14,39	0.9
Mixed forests	11,24	0.7
Low vegetation cover	230,69	15
Sclerophyll vegetation	178,07	11.6
Plant exchange areas	52,46	3.4
Coast and dunes	152,97	10
<b>Total</b>	<b>1540,02</b>	<b>100</b>

The total population in Eşelek settlement located in the north of the lagoon is 186 people according to TURKSTAT 2022 data. The total population of Gökçeada is 10.348. Agricultural activities and ovine breeding activities in pastures are carried out in small village settlements with less population. The alluvial soils with good drainage around the lagoon are fertile soils and agricultural activities are carried out on these soils. According to Dönmez 1985, reeds grow on the soils where drainage is disturbed, where there is no flow and which become swampy. It is not possible to grow plants in alluvium where salt accumulates, that is, in hydromorphic salty alluvium, in swampy areas (Dönmez, 1985:78). In the area where Tuz Lake is located and the surrounding dunes, in the marshy areas remaining from the old lagoon on the coastal cordon in the north, heathland and herbaceous plants grow,

and no forest formation is encountered. Aptesbozan (*Pimpinella saxifraga*, *Poterium spinosum*), one of the herbaceous plants with a spiny structure, which spreads in the areas where there are pastures, spreads in large areas in and around the lagoon and even throughout the island. With the reduction of goat breeding, which is thought to damage agricultural soils and pastures, this plant has spread to wider areas, limiting the development area of other herbaceous plants (Gökkuş, et al., 2013:68). Although the breeding of this Imbros sheep breed, which belongs to the island, is not suitable for intensive breeding due to the temperament of the sheep, it is carried out in almost every part of the island in the form of breeding conditions defined as “wild”, damaging herbaceous plants, pasture areas and agricultural areas (Konyalı et al., 2004:2; Aktürk et al. 2005:229).

Although the tourism potential in Gökçeada is very high, its development potential is limited due to certain factors (Yaşar, 2006b:3). In addition to coastal tourism as sea tourism, the interest in water sports increases the importance of the beaches on the coasts. Coastal tourism activities start in June and end in September according to the sunbathing time. The average sunbathing time in Gökçeada is approximately 10 hours in June and approximately 11 hours in July and August ([www.mgm.gov.tr](http://www.mgm.gov.tr)). In addition, amateur fishing activities are also carried out on the sea coasts. The coast and dunes around Tuz Lake, where coastal tourism and water sports are carried out, cover an area of approximately 152.97 ha and 10% (Figure 3, Table 1). Kefalos Beach extends approximately 1.7 km along the coastal promenade in the south, Aydıncık Beach extends 1 km along the coastal promenade in the north and İncekum Beach extends approximately 1 km in the southeast. Tourism activities are carried out at Aydıncık Beach, Kefalos and İncekum Beach. Kefalos Beach is more active than Aydıncık and İncekum Beaches due to the facilities, restaurants and the presence of Gökçeada Windsurfing Training Centre (Photo 3).




Figure 3. Land use map of Gökçeada Lagoon.

Every year, many local and foreign tourists come to the island from different countries to see historical and natural beauties, surfing, and coastal tourism. According to the data of the Ministry of Culture and Tourism, the number of domestic tourists coming to the island in 2020 was 270,189 people and the number of tourists staying overnight was 446,09. While the number of foreign tourists entering the island is 35,858 people, the number of foreign tourists staying overnight is 47,321. In 2020, the total number of domestic and foreign tourists arriving and staying on the island is 799,456. There are 81 tourism business certified facilities on the island (canakkale.ktb.gov.tr).



Photo 3. View of Kefalos Beach (sandy beach) and the facilities on it (Google Earth Pro, Photo: Burak Ulukan and taken by İsmail Akpınar in 2016).

### 3.3. Coastal Change in Gökçeada (Aydıncık-Tuz Lake) Lagoon

According to the data obtained from the images analysed using Google Earth satellite images on the shores of Gökçeada Lagoon and overlapped by applying the image overlay method, the perimeter length of the lake area, which was approximately 1.83 km<sup>2</sup> in 1985, was approximately 5.38 km; in 2004, the lake area was 1.91 km<sup>2</sup> and the perimeter length was 5.72 km; in 2012, the lake area was 1.90 km<sup>2</sup> and the perimeter length was 5.54 km; in 2020, the lake area was 1.90 km<sup>2</sup> and the perimeter length was 5.66 km (Figure 4, Figure 5). Lake coastal areas and perimeter lengths are approximately close to each other. The data obtained in the 35-year period between 1985-2020 show that there are no major changes in the lake area and perimeter length over the years. Considering the land use map, it was determined that irrigated agricultural activities are not carried out in the agricultural areas in the north of the lake. Agricultural areas in Gökçeada are irrigated by rivers, dams and ponds. In addition, the continuous inflow of salty water from the sea to the lake and the inflow of fresh water to the lake through the canal constructed by DSİ ensure the protection of the water surface of the lake area.



*Figure 4. Spatial change in Gökçeada Lagoon over the years (between 1985-2020-Google Earth).*

The reason for the small-scale changes in the lake area and perimeter length is the seasonal climatic changes. In the summer months, the surface of the lake is covered with a layer of salt after the surface water evaporates

due to drought, and in the rainy season (especially in winter months due to rains) the lake is covered with water again. The depth of the lake is not much (about 3 m on average) and high temperatures due to summer drought are the main factors in the high evaporation. As the water recedes with the drought, the land in the centre of the lake rises to the water surface in the form of an island (Figure 5). The water surface area in the lake does not carry any apparent pressure and risk. However, it is under the danger of unplanned and irregular construction due to tourism and agricultural activities as well as population density. Hundreds of unlicensed structures built around the lagoon cause environmental pollution. The construction and existence of these structures cause pollution in and around the lagoon waters.



*Figure 5. Spatial change of Gökçeada Lagoon overlaid image (between 1985-2020-Google Earth).*

### **3.4. Preparation of Management Plan for Wrong Field Utilisation in Wetland and Surrounding Areas**

#### **3.4.1. Preparation of Wetland Management Plan by Applying SWOT Analysis**

Tuz Lake was declared a “Wetland of National Importance” in 2019 with an area of 3491 hectares with the NUTS (1) - Level 3 SR(1) - Level 3, 222 code and Protected Area National Classification 06.02.02.0050 code (İlgar, 2021:619). In 2014, it gained its national identity after its “Wetland of Local Importance” status (Aslan, et al., 2021b:1) (Figure 6). The lagoon, which is one of the 135 important wetlands in our country and hosts important bird

species as a marine and coastal wetland, is brackish/salty (tarımorman.gov.tr). The lake, which is an important bird nesting area as in all wetlands, is especially a flamingo (*Phoenicopterus roseus*) accommodation and longfinch (*Himantopus himantopus himantopus*) incubation area (tvk.csb.gov.tr).

Tuz Lagoon, one of the most important wetlands of Gökçeada, is one of the coastal lagoons that provides biological production and has a high socio-economic potential value. It is home to pelicans, wild ducks, geese and migratory birds, especially flamingos. The increasing population in recent years and the natural attractions and historical beauties of Gökçeada attract local and foreign tourists to the island, but also create many problems. Misuse of land in and around Salt Lake can be listed under certain headings: The existence of new constructions that will create pollutants such as hotels or andesite quarries, the existence of wild garbage storage areas and the mixing of garbage into the water, the unconscious use of the sludge that emerges on the surface area of the lagoon, and the lack of necessary management and planning for its use in the field of health, pressures of local and foreign tourists visiting the lagoon on the ecology of the lake, presence of illegal and illegal wells around the lagoon, unplanned tourism activities, domestic, chemical and sewage wastes, agricultural pollution (pesticides, insecticides and unconscious irrigation activities), uncontrolled and irregular construction, air pollution, privatisation of coastal areas, lack of infrastructure.




Figure 6. Gökçeada Lagoon Wetland Management Plan, Natural and Archaeological Site Map.

In Gökçeada Lagoon, which is under serious risks and threats in the future despite its protection status, SWOT analysis was used to identify and plan these risks and threats in advance and to create new opportunities. SWOT analysis is a simple method that is easy to understand, has a strategic method, and enables to reach the desired goal with fast and correct use. Generally, the data prepared based on qualitative and subjective data are more general and variable according to different interpretations since they are based on the subject. Therefore, data collection, evaluation and decision-making processes should be managed very well (Sarsby, 2012c:7).

While applying SWOT analysis, it was tried to find answers to the following questions about the study area: where is the area to be planned, in which way planning is needed in this area, what is the potential of the area to be planned, and what are the criteria for success in planning (Mugabi, Kayaga and Njiru, 2007:3; Taş, 2010c:81). Land use characteristics in and around Gökçeada Lagoon are the basic material used in the development of planning. Agricultural areas, forest, herbaceous areas, heathland and pastures, tourism areas, coast, beach and beaches, water body, settlement areas will be analysed separately within the scope of SWOT analysis and then the lagoon and its surroundings will be considered as a general planning.




Figure 7. Adaptation of the components determined according to the “SWOT Analysis” analytical method to Gökçeada Lagoon.

#### *3.4.1.1. Planning of Gökçeada Lagoon Wetland with SWOT Analysis and Solution Suggestions*

No significant areal change was detected in the determination of coastal change on the water surface of the lagoon using satellite images (see Figure 4, Figure 5). The level changes in the lagoon are water withdrawals caused by evaporation due to summer drought. The salt and the mud under the salt that emerges with the withdrawal of water is an opportunity for the economy of Gökçeada. Salt is produced from the lake and the mud is used for health purposes. At the same time, there is a threat for the salt layer and mud formed in the lake. The intense pressure of tourists coming in the summer months on the lake surface causes pollution of the lake and disturbs the birds in the lake. The lake surface is a nesting and accommodation centre for water birds. The fresh water input canal opened to the lake by DSI is a positive direction to increase the lake water level. However, water inflow should be under control. Excessive freshwater input will cause changes in the water chemical parameters of the lagoon, which is in salty-fresh water interaction, and will pose a threat especially for fish and other aquatic animals. Water withdrawal for agricultural purposes does not seem to be serious. However, if the construction of illegal wells is not taken under control, it will cause the groundwater level to decrease. The lake drainage supply with groundwater flow will be adversely affected by this situation. Water analyses should be carried out regularly for the pollution of lake water and chemical parameters should be measured continuously.

As recreational activities, water regulation, drinking water supply, use as irrigation water, terrestrial drainage, tourism activities continue to be carried out in and around the lagoon, the good condition of the water will gradually deteriorate and pose a threat to the wetland. Therefore, it is necessary to determine the water quality status as a priority. The initial and final state of the water should be monitored. Supervised water treatment facilities should be provided to remove chemical inputs, biological pollutants, solids and gases from the water.

Another threat to the lake is the change in its morphological structure. The coastal dunes in the coastal areas are the coastal cordon of the lagoon lake. Under intense settlement and tourism pressures, if artificial wooden and stone jetties and culverts are built around the coastal promenade and sand is extracted from the sandy areas for construction purposes, the morphological development of the lake will be adversely affected. Although there is no such problem today, it is necessary to take precautions in advance for future pressures and legal regulations should be taken into consideration.

### 3.4.1.2. *Planning and Solution Suggestions for Forests, Heaths, Pastures and Grasslands around Gökçeada Lagoon with SWOT Analysis*

The presence of vegetation has always been a positive aspect for settlements, ecosystem, air cleanliness and wetlands. As you go up to higher altitudes around the lagoon, you pass to forested areas due to the increase in precipitation. Forested areas start after 50 metres in the south of Efelek. However, in the northeast of the lagoon, where the elevation decreases and the climate becomes more arid, sclerophilous vegetation (heathland and pastures) and grass communities cover a large area in the sandy areas. The wide distribution of heathland and pastures is also a favourable aspect for animal husbandry activities. The heathland and pastures cover a wide area between the lagoon and the area between Aydıncık Bay and the lagoon between sea level and 5 m (see Figure 3). While the decrease in slope is a negative aspect for the growth of forest areas, pastures and heathlands are an opportunity for the spread of grass communities. In the south of the lagoon, vegetation development is limited by agricultural areas. Fertile and wetlands are very suitable for vegetation development. Although the geological structure is composed of Quaternary alluvial deposits, the geomorphological slope is low, and the flat plain area is extremely suitable for vegetation development, vegetation development is affected by the adverse conditions of climatic characteristics in the plain area.

Another favourable factor for vegetation is the wide distribution of the herbaceous plant aptesbozan (*Pimpinella saxifrage*, *Poterium spinosum*), which has a spiny structure, in the areas where pastures are spread. The reduction of goat breeding and Imroz sheep breed with the idea that it damages agricultural lands and pastures has accelerated the spread of this plant species and turned into an opportunity. However, the fact that it is a limiting factor for the development of other plant species is a negative aspect. The rubbish left in the environment by tourism activities is a threat to vegetation.

When the SWOT analyses on forest, heathland, pasture and grassland are evaluated, no serious planning is required for forest areas. The threat due to ovine breeding activities on pasture and grassland areas has been reduced. Only in order to prevent the increase in domestic and environmental wastes due to tourism activities, it would be appropriate to establish garbage collection units in and around the lake and to increase the frequency of this activity, to prevent the burning of the collected garbage in the lake protection area, and to build garbage storage and transformation areas on bare lands that are not suitable for agriculture in terms of land capability.

### *3.4.1.3. Planning of Agricultural Areas around Gökçeada Lagoon with SWOT Analysis and Solution Suggestions*

The issue to be considered in agricultural planning is spatial planning. It is necessary to determine the areas suitable and unsuitable for cultivated agriculture according to the land use capability class. The most important economic activity around Gökçeada Lagoon is agriculture. In addition, the island is called 'organic agriculture island' as one of the best examples of organic agriculture. Agricultural activities are intensively carried out in and around Gökçeada in the form of indiscriminate intensive agriculture. In the study conducted by Cengiz et al. (2013), areas suitable for agricultural land use for Gökçeada were identified by mapping. While the land in the eastern part of the lagoon is moderately suitable for agriculture, the northern part and fragmented areas are determined as very good for agriculture. The areas suitable for agriculture are the alluvial floodplain carried by Büyükdere, which flows towards the southeast and flows into the Aegean Sea from Aydınçık Bay and is very fertile. The sandy areas where Kefalos Beach and Incekum Beach are located, where shallow marine deposits such as loose sandstone, claystone, siltstone, mud, etc. are spread, have been identified as unsuitable areas for agriculture. The geological structure of the land forms a strong direction in and around the lagoon.

Natural environmental conditions determined the distribution of agricultural areas in Gökçeada lagoon. Gökçeada consists of hilly areas with an average elevation above 650 metres above sea level, and areas with high elevation limit agricultural activities. Agricultural activities are carried out in the flooded alluvial deposits (Kaleköy and Aydınçık Bay) where Büyükdere's tributaries spread, in the southwestern coastal plain where Ballı Stream flows into the sea and in flat areas on the slopes. The diversity of the land and the limitation of hilly terrain affect the agricultural planning and proposals.




Figure 8. "Agricultural Land Use Suitability Status" (Cengiz et al., 2013c:155).

Agricultural activities are carried out as irrigated and dry agriculture on the island. The purpose of irrigated agriculture is to increase the quality of the yield. Agricultural activities in Ovacık in the north of Gökçeada Lagoon are determined as dry agricultural area in the land use map (Figure 3). There are non-irrigated arable agricultural lands in Ovacık. There are 100-150 wells with depths ranging between 3-18 m and spring waters with flow rates ranging between 0.1-2.0 L/s (Oğuz and Beyribey, 1995:18). While the positive aspect for cultivated and planted areas is irrigation resources, the areas with high elevation seem to be the weak side for agricultural activities. Gökçeada is rich in terms of water resources. Lagoon water surface and the presence of Büyükdere are positive aspects for agricultural areas.

In agricultural areas, there may be floods in Büyükdere Basin. Improvement works carried out in the Büyükdere beds, wrong positioning of the meanders made to reduce the flow rates of the stream, wrong engineering designs, inadequacy of culverts, narrowing of the stream flow area with the constructions on the stream bed (Acar et al., 2014b:187) can be seen as other weaknesses around the island and lagoon as they will facilitate flooding. In addition to flooding, the high slope in Gökçeada increases the erosion risk potential. With erosion, the top layer of soil is transported and

the land becomes inefficient. For this reason, plans and recommendations for the protection of soil for the planning to be made in agricultural areas will be a positive direction for agricultural areas. Looking at the slope values on the island, 64.72% of the land has slope values above 12% and 13.63% of the land is flat to nearly flat (İlay and Kavdır, 2018:69; İlay, 2016:31). The low slope in and around Gökçeada lagoon reduces the risk of erosion and appears as an opportunity for soil protection.

In addition to the effects of geological and geomorphological elements on agricultural areas, climatic characteristics also constitute a strong direction for determining agricultural yield and potential. Summer drought in and around the lagoon is a negative aspect as it increases the need for irrigation in agriculture.

When the SWOT analysis on agricultural areas is evaluated, the following suggestions are made for planning. The biggest problem in agricultural areas is the illegal wells used for irrigation purposes and excessive consumption of groundwater. These wells should be formalised and monitored and a quota should be set for irrigation. In addition, more economical choices such as drip irrigation technique should be made instead of indiscriminate irrigation in agriculture. Artificial ponds can be created by DSI close to agricultural areas in order to utilise surface water during periods of high rainfall. In addition, instead of only lowland plains, the productivity of the soils on the slopes of the slopes can be increased and agricultural areas where products suitable for the climate can be cultivated can be opened.

#### *3.4.1.4. Planning of Coast, Beach and Beach Areas of Gökçeada Lagoon with SWOT Analysis and Solution Suggestions*


When we evaluate the dune areas in terms of geological, geomorphological and climatic aspects, the sandy areas on Kefalos Beach and İncekum Beach and Aydıncık Bay coastal beaches are areas where shallow marine deposits such as loose sandstone, claystone, siltstone, mud etc. are spread and are not suitable for agriculture. In addition, the beaches are on the plains where the slope is low. Elevation values on the beaches are between 0-2 metres. There is no area that has been converted into agricultural land in order to gain agricultural land from the dunes around the lagoon. This is a favourable situation for the dunes. In addition, during the formation of the lagoon, the filling of the swampy areas in the northeast was not caused by human impact but by geomorphological developments. Currently, the most important economic activity on the dunes is the tourism activities between June and September. Although tourism activities are seen as an opportunity

in terms of contributing to the island economy, the danger that has started now and the intense population pressure that will increase in the future pose a serious threat to the beaches and sandy beaches. Hotels, restaurants and other businesses established around the lagoon (Figure 9), especially illegal and unlicensed structures not only spoil the natural appearance, but also unplanned tourism activities in the dune areas and garbage thrown into the environment (Photo 4) cause pollution and pose a threat by damaging the lake ecosystem, especially flamingos.



*Photo 4. The rubbish left behind the beach around Gökçeada Lagoon is a threat to the beach and lagoon ecosystem as well as environmental pollution.*

The fact that the beaches can be used for tourism activities and make a significant contribution to the economy of Gökçeada can be considered as opportunities created by the beaches and sandy beaches. The beaches around the coastal lagoon are one of the few surfing areas in Turkey (Figure 9).



*Figure 9. Gökçeada Lagoon, Kefalos beach, Surf Training Centre Application School and other constructions on the beach in the vicinity.*

When the SWOT analysis made on the beaches and coasts is evaluated, the coastal law should be observed very well in order not to fill the coasts with unlicensed structures due to the increasing tourism activities in recent years. Article-4 of the Coastal Law (1990) reads as follows: “Supplement: (1/7/1992 - 3830/2 Art.) Structures to be built on the coastlines can approach the coastal edge line by a maximum of 50 metres. Additional: (1/7/1992 - 3830/2 Art.) The areas between the approach distance and the coastal edge line can only be arranged for pedestrian paths, promenade, recreation, rest, cruise and recreative purposes.” The lagoon and its surroundings should be structured by taking into consideration the law, for this purpose, a very good tourism master plan should be prepared for the lagoon and its surroundings, and local administrations, especially geographers and urban regional planners, geologists should be used in cooperation in this plan. As seen in Figure 9, the constructions established before 50 metres should be removed from the shore.

#### *3.4.1.5. Planning of Settlement and Industrial Areas around Gökçeada Lagoon with SWOT Analysis and Solution Suggestions*

The closest settlement to the lagoon is Eşelek. Agriculture and animal husbandry activities are carried out in the settlement which is 8 km from the centre and 2 km from Aydınçık Bay. Due to its proximity to the beach due to the development of tourism activities, low-rise houses used for accommodation in the form of hotels and pensions in recent years, fruit and vegetable stalls on the roadside, and two restaurants offer diversity in economic activities. Tourism activities, agricultural activities and animal husbandry are positive opportunities for Efelek settlement. The presence of settlements, domestic and sewage wastes always cause environmental pollution. In this sense, settlements are a risk for the beach and lagoon water body. The settlements that do not comply with the law “settlements can approach 50 m to the coastal edge line” as per the “Coastal Law” from the coastal line on the beach edges are shown in Figure 10 and Figure 11. The settlement in Figure 10 is located only 115 metres from the shoreline.



Figure 10. Gökçeada Lagoon, Kefalos beach is 115 metres inland from the shoreline.

In Figure 11, settlement number 1 is only 29 metres from the shoreline. Settlement number 2 starts at 45 metres from the shoreline and continues until approximately 200 metres. Settlement number 3 is located only between 15-60 metres, settlement number 4 between 65-250 metres and settlement number 5 between 270-300 metres. These structures are a threat to coastal dunes. It is very likely that such structures will increase in the future if no measures are taken.



Figure 11. Construction on the shore of Kefalos beach, Gökçeada Lagoon.

The ‘Andesite Quarry’, which is planned to be built on an area of 20 thousand hectares a few hundred metres away from the lagoon, which has been frequently reported in the news in recent years, is located within the borders of the important nature area to the east of Gökçeada Lagoon (Photo 5). The construction of this quarry, which is wrong in terms of land use, is an ecological and biological threat to the ecology of the lagoon, the agricultural lands and health of the people living in the surrounding settlements, water birds, especially falamingos, and fish in the lagoon.



*Photo 5. Quarries and construction sites around Gökçeada Lagoon (Yeşil Gazete, 2022).*

When the SWOT analysis on settlements and industrial areas is evaluated, there are not many populated settlements in the immediate vicinity. The population of Efelek settlement increases according to the number of local and foreign tourists coming in summer months. Although the reason for the establishment of Efelek settlement was agriculture and animal husbandry, tourism activities contributed to the economy of the settlement. The settlement centre is located at an elevation of 30 metres. It is very likely that the settlement and the agricultural areas in the southeast of the settlement will be affected by the possible flood risk of Büyükdere. In addition, there is an erosion risk on the bare sloping surfaces to the west of the settlement, as determined from satellite imagery. This area is devoid of vegetation cover. Efelek settlement should not be allowed to spread over very large areas.

Illegal and unlicensed structures on the coast of Aydıncık Bay in the south and northeast on Kefalos beach should be removed in accordance with the 'Coastal Law'. In addition, law amendments should not be allowed for licence permission. As it is known, the beach areas are included in the lagoon protection status.

In general, while the settlements around the lagoon have more strengths, landscape and sea tourism are favourable for the settlements established on the coast. However, the presence of settlements and the quarry to be built pose a threat to natural morphological development and biodiversity. The quarry should be built on bare land at higher elevations, or it should be completely prevented. In addition to the environmental pollution, air pollution and health problems caused by the quarry, the removal of the rocky area will leave a large area of bare land. It is impossible to restore this land to the natural process. Since the lagoon is located within the protected area, it is unnecessary to make a separate planning for the development of settlements.

### **Conclusion**

Planning is important in terms of taking the necessary measures in a timely manner, eliminating uncertainties, eliminating confusion and creating a division of labour in the lagoon and its surroundings in order to look into the future and ensure continuity. Strategic planning will contribute to the success of public institutions and organisations by encouraging future-oriented thinking. Management, on the other hand, is the coordination and planning of the rules established for the organisation of the positive course within the framework of the flow of affairs and making the right decisions.

The main geomorphological units in the lagoon and its immediate vicinity consist of water body, shore, beach and beaches, hilly areas, river valley and floodplain, plain area, cliffs, hilly areas and slopes. The geological units are Quaternary and Miocene aged and mostly consist of Quaternary aged alluvium. On the beaches, there are marine and terrestrial deposits, sandstone, clay and silt sized elements. Volcanic elements are encountered in the western and northwestern parts where the slope increases.

In the land use map prepared according to the data of the Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry in and around the lagoon, 10 class land cover types were identified. The water body covers 193 ha, non-irrigated arable agricultural land covers 52.46 ha, natural vegetation covers 1162.9 ha, natural meadows cover 676 ha. Sclerophyll plants spreading in the north-west of the lake are heath and maquis in the form of evergreen shrubs.

According to the coastal level change measurements obtained from the images analysed by using Google Earth satellite images on the shores of Gökçeada Lagoon and overlapped by applying the image overlay method, the area of the lake area in 1985 was 1.83 km<sup>2</sup> and the perimeter length of the lake area was 5.38 km; in 2004 the area was 1.91 km<sup>2</sup> and the perimeter length was 5.72 km; in 2012 the area was 1.90 km<sup>2</sup> and the perimeter length was 5.54 km; in 2020 the area was 1.90 km<sup>2</sup> and the perimeter length was 5.66 km. There are no major differences in coastal level change. In the study area, which is under the influence of the Marmara transition climate, there are recessions in the lake level due to evaporation due to summer drought. Although there is no areal change of anthropogenic origin, there is a canal that provides fresh water input to the lake by DSİ.

In the study, it is planned to prepare a management plan by utilising the SWOT analysis method in and around Gökçeada Lagoon. It has been determined that the problems in and around the lake are caused by tourism activities, agricultural activities, settlement and industrial activities. Main threat and risk factors;

- The presence of new constructions such as hotels or andesite quarries that will create pollutants,
- Existence of wild landfill sites and mixing of garbage with water,
- Unconscious use of the sludge generated in the lagoon surface area, lack of necessary management and planning for its use in the field of health,
- The pressures of local and foreign tourists visiting the lagoon on the ecology of the lake,
- Presence of illegal, illegal wells around the lagoon,
- Unplanned tourism activities,
- Domestic, chemical and sewage waste,
- Agricultural pollution (pesticides, insecticides and unconscious irrigation activities),
- Uncontrolled and irregular construction,
- Air pollution,
- Privatisation of coastal areas,
- It can be listed as infrastructure inadequacy.

Tourism activities and agricultural activities are also the most important economic activities in and around the lake. They constitute an opportunity with their contribution to the economy. Since the amount of water required for the quarry planned to be built on the island will be met from the water potential of the area, it is not deemed appropriate to be established in and around the lagoon.

The lagoon and its surroundings are extremely suitable to be recognised in national and international status in terms of formation. While its promotion and advertisement constitute a positive aspect for tourism activities, it will pose a great threat to the lagoon and its surrounding area if proper tourism planning is not made. This study is important as a source for the local administration for the plans and suggestions developed.

## References

- Acar, Z., Gönençgil, B. & Öztürk, B. (2014). Flood disaster in Gökçeada: 2014. *Turkish Journal of Geography*, 77, 183-194. doi: 10.17211/tcd.943015.
- Aktürk, D., Savran F., Hakyemez, H., Daş, G. & Savaş, T. (2005) Socio-Economic Investigation of Livestock Breeding Enterprises Under Extensive Conditions in Gökçeada. *Journal of Agricultural Sciences*, 11 (3) 229-235, Ankara. Retrieved from <https://dergipark.org.tr/tr/pub/ankutbd/issue/59744/861306>.
- Aslan, H., Elipek, B., Gönülal, O., Baytut, Öz., Kurt, Y. & İnanmaz, Ö. E. (2021). Gökçeada Salt Lake: a Case Study of Seasonal Dynamics of Wetland Ecological Communities in the Context of Anthropogenic Pressure and Nature Conservation. *Wetlands* (2021) 41: 23. doi: 10.1007/s13157-021-01401-0.
- Cengiz, T., Özcan, H., Baytekin, H., Altınoluk, Ü., Kelkit, A., Özkok, F., Akbulak, C., Ayhan & K. Ç. (2009). *Gökçeada Land Use Planning. TÜBİTAK ÇAYDAG RAPID SUPPORT PROJECT*, Project no: 107Y337, Çanakkale. Retrieved from file:///C:/Users/mehtap/Downloads/TUBITAK\_PROJESI\_GOKCEADA\_ARAZI\_KULLANIM.pdf.
- Çelik, S. K. (2021). A Preliminary Metabarcoding Study of Prokaryotes in Gökçeada Salt Lake Lagoon, Turkey. *Eur J Biol*, 80(1): 69-74. doi: 10.26650/EurJBiol.2021.0088.
- DKMP, (2022). *Wetlands*. Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry, 21 Eylül 2022 dated source archive. Retrieved from <https://www.tarimorman.gov.tr/DKMP/Belgeler/Korunan%20Alanlar%20Listesi/sulakalanlar240423.pdf>.
- DKMP, (2023). *Wetlands*. Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry. 13 Ocak 2023 dated source archive. Retrieved from <https://www.tarimorman.gov.tr/DKMP/Belgeler/Korunan%20Alanlar%20Listesi/SA-WEB-09012023.pdf>
- Dönmez, Y. (1985). *Plant Geography*. Güryay Printing Services, İstanbul.
- Dugan, P. J. (1990). *Protection of Wetlands: A Review on Current Issues and Necessary Studies*. IUCN (The World Conservation Union), Gland, Switzerland. ISBN:2-8317-0015-9.
- Gökkuş, A., Parlak, A. Ö., Baytekin & H., Alatürk, F. (2013). Aptesbozan (*Sarcopoterium spinosum* (L.) Spach) in Scrub Pasture Ecosystems of Gökçeada Challenge. *COMU Journal of Agriculture Faculty*, 1 (1): 67-72. Retrieved from <https://dergipark.org.tr/tr/download/article-file/237488>.
- Gürel, E. & Tat, M. (2017). SWOT Analysis: A Theoretical Review. *International Journal of Social Research*, Volume: 10 Number: 51, 994-1006. doi: <http://dx.doi.org/10.17719/jisr.2017.1832>.

- İlgar, R. (2021). Wetlands of Çanakkale Province. *Journal of Strategic and Social Research*, Volume:5, Number:3, November 2021 p.613-629. ISSN: 2587-2621.
- İlay, R., 2016. *Determination of Some Quality Parameters and Erosion Risk of Gökçeada Soils*. Çanakkale Onsekiz Mart University, Institute of Science and Technology, PhD Thesis, Çanakkale.
- İlay, R. & Kavdır, Y. (2018). Erosion Susceptibility of Gökçeada Soils. *Anatolian Agricultural Science*. Journal, 33, p.68-72. doi: 10.7161/omuanajas.329204.
- Kesgin, Y. & Varol, B. (2003). Tertiary Geology of Gökçeada and Bozcaada. *MTA Journal*, 126, 49-67. Retrieved from [https://dergi.mta.gov.tr/dosyalar/images/mtadergi/makaleler/tr/20150512164458\\_299\\_227f5ed2.pdf](https://dergi.mta.gov.tr/dosyalar/images/mtadergi/makaleler/tr/20150512164458_299_227f5ed2.pdf).
- KK (1990). *Coastal Law*. Law No:3621, Date of Acceptance:04.04.1990, Official Gazette Date:17.04.1990, Official Gazette Issue No: 20495.
- Konyalı, A., Daş, G., Savaş, T. & Yurtman, Y. İ. (2004). Imroz Sheep Breeding in Gökçeada: Potential for Organic Husbandry. *1st International Organic Animal Production and Food Safety Congress*, Retrieved from [https://www.researchgate.net/profile/AynurKonyali/publication/266144193\\_Gokceada%27da\\_Imroz\\_Koyunu\\_Yetistiriciligi\\_Organik\\_Hayvancilik\\_icin\\_Potansiyel/links/5b506f41a6fdcc8dae2cf6fd/Goekceadada-Imroz-Koyunu-Yetistiriciligi-Organik-Hayvancilik-icin-Potansiyel.pdf](https://www.researchgate.net/profile/AynurKonyali/publication/266144193_Gokceada%27da_Imroz_Koyunu_Yetistiriciligi_Organik_Hayvancilik_icin_Potansiyel/links/5b506f41a6fdcc8dae2cf6fd/Goekceadada-Imroz-Koyunu-Yetistiriciligi-Organik-Hayvancilik-icin-Potansiyel.pdf).
- Kurter, A. (1989). Geomorphology of Gökçeada. *I.Ü. Marine Sciencesve Coğ. Enst.*, Bulletin, 6, 47-60, Istanbul.
- Mugabi, J., Kayaga, S. & Nijru, C. (2007). Strategic Planning for Water Utilities in Developing Countries. *Utilities Policy*, 15, 1-8. Retrieved from [file:///C:/Users/mehtap/Downloads/Strategic\\_planning\\_for\\_water\\_utilities\\_i.pdf](file:///C:/Users/mehtap/Downloads/Strategic_planning_for_water_utilities_i.pdf).
- Oğuz, M. & Beyribey, M. (1995). Monitoring and Evaluation of Gökçeada Irrigation. *Journal of Agricultural Sciences*, (1) 17-26. doi: 10.1501/Tarimbil\_0000000600.
- Öner, E. & Vardar, S. (2017). Palaeogeography and Geoarchaeology of Gökçeada (Çanakkale). *Journal of Awareness, International Refereed and Open Access Eloktronik Journal*, Volume 2, Issue: Special Issue, p.203-220.E-ISSN: 2149-6544.
- Ramsar Sözleşmesi (1994). Convention on Wetlands of International Importance, Especially as Waterfowl Habitat. Official Gazette Date:17.05.1994, Official Gazette Issue:21937.
- Sarsby, A. (2012). *A Useful Guide to SWOT Analysis*. Pansophix, Nottingham. ISBN:978-1-906460-89-1.

- SAKY (2014). *Regulation on the Protection of Wetlands*. Official Gazette Date:04.04.2014, Official Gazette Issue: 28962.
- SAT (1995). *Wetlands Communiqué*. Official Gazette Date:05.04.1995, Official Gazette Issue:22249, Communiqué No:2.
- SAT (2002). *Wetlands Communiqué*. Official Gazette Date:30.01.2002, Official Gazette Issue: 24656, Communiqué No:4.
- SAT (2005). *Wetlands Communiqué*. Official Gazette Date:17.05.2005, Official Gazette Issue:27264, Communiqué No:5.
- SAT (2011). *Wetlands Communiqué*. Official Gazette Date:29.06.2011, Official Gazette Issue:645, Communiqué No:6.
- Sarı, R., Türkecan, A., Dönmez, M., Küçükefe, Ş., Aydın, Ü. & Özmen, Ö. (2015). Geology of Gökçeada (Çanakkale). *MTA Journal*, 150: 1-17. Retrieved from file:///C:/Users/mehtap/Downloads/Gkeadayay\_MTA\_2015.pdf.
- Taş, B. (2010). *Land Use and Planning Suggestions in Sandıklı District*. Ümit Ofset Printing, Afyonkarahisar. ISBN:978-975-605-61664-7.
- TC. Ministry of Environment, Urbanisation and Climate Change (1929-2022). *Official Statistics. Seasonal Normals for Provinces (1991-2020)*, General Directorate of Meteorology. Retrieved from <https://www.mgm.gov.tr/veridegerlendirme/il-ve-ilceleri-istatistik.aspx?m=CANAKKALE>.
- TC. Gökçeada District Governorate (2023). Gökçeada Salt Lake. Retrieved from <http://www.gokceada.gov.tr/gokceada-tuz-golu>.
- TC. Ministry of Culture and Tourism (2022). *Tourism Statistics. Domestic and foreign visitor status 2003-2020*, Retrieved from <https://canakkale.ktb.gov.tr/TR-70507/bakanligimizdan-belgeli-konaklama-tesisi-istatistikleri.html>.
- Temel, Ö. & Çiftçi İ., 2002. Deposits of the Gallipoli Peninsula, Gökçeada and Bozcaada. *Bulletin of the Association of Petroleum Geologists of Turkey*, 14 (2), p.17-40.
- Turoğlu, H. (2017). *Coastal Legislation and Geomorphological Assessment*. Legal and Scientific Dimensions of the Coast, (Ed. Hüseyin Turoğlu, Hakan Yigitbaşoğlu), Geomorphological Society Publication, No:1, Anka Printing, Istanbul. ISBN:978-6067576-0-0.
- Ündül, Ö. & Aysal, N. (2016). The Effects of Internal Structural Properties on Strength and Deformation Properties of Andesite and Riodacite Composite Rocks Surfaced in Gökçeada. *Journal of Geological Engineering*, 40 (2), p.123-147. Retrieved from [https://www.jmo.org.tr/resimler/ekler/9374739a68bcc4d\\_ek.pdf](https://www.jmo.org.tr/resimler/ekler/9374739a68bcc4d_ek.pdf).
- Yalçınlar İ. (1980). Geomorphology of Gökçeada, *Journal of Istanbul University Geography Institute*, 23, p.239-256, İstanbul.

- Yaşar, O. (2006). A Research in terms of Tourism Geography: Gökçeada (Imbros). Fırat University Journal of Social Sciences, Volume: 16, Issue: 1, p.1-32. Retrieved from file:///C:/Users/mehtap/Downloads/Firat\_TURIZM\_COGRAFYASI\_ACISINDAN\_BIR\_AR.pdf.
- Yeşil Gazete (2022). Gökçeada Lagoon is Invaded by Quarries and Construction. Retrieved from <https://yesilgazete.org/gokceada-lagunu-tas-ocaklari-ve-insaatlarla-istila-altinda/>.
- Yücel, T. 1966. Geographical Observations in Imbros. *Journal of Geography Research*, 1, A.Ü.Language and History-Cogr.Fak.Geography Research Institute Publication, p.65-108, Ankara.



## 6 Trends over Management Theory: Decolonization, Sinification, Empowerment/ Precarization, Degendering, Transdisciplinarity, and Environmental/Natural Challenges

Ulaş Başar Gezgin<sup>1</sup>

### Abstract

What would be the future of management theory? To answer this question, we explain 3 factors behind the heterogeneity of management theory from a sociology of science perspective. Then we present and discuss 6 trends that are expected to be influential over management theory in our future estimation. These are: Decolonization; Sinification; empowerment and precarization; feminization, degendering and egalitarianism; transdisciplinarity; and environmental and natural challenges and issues (including global warming, increasing number of disasters, peak oil, energy crisis, renewable energy, sustainability, green management etc.). We make the distinction between risk-averse mainstream core academia and risk-accepting critical peripheral academia. These 6 trends we claim are already gaining power in the periphery, and it is highly like that they would be parts of the mainstream science in 50-100 years. Firstly, although the old-fashioned colonialism is over, decolonization of management theory is under progress. Secondly, the rise of China and Chinese scholars will bring the wave of Sinification. Thirdly, the industrial relations oscillate between empowerment and precarization. Fourthly, with the rise of gender equality, degendering of management theory will be visible. Fifthly, the sciences including management science will move more and more towards transdisciplinarity. Finally, environmental and natural challenges will be more influential.

---

1 Ulaş Başar Gezgin, Istanbul Galata University, Faculty of Arts and Social Sciences, Department of Psychology, [ulas.gezgin@galata.edu.tr](mailto:ulas.gezgin@galata.edu.tr), ORCID ID: 0000-0002-6075-3501

## 1. Introduction

What would be the future of management theory? Before answering this question, we need to set time limits for a discussion of future. It can range from a few years to a millennium (e.g. Tonn, 2004) and even million years from a cosmological, geological and evolutionary points of view by focusing on inorganic and organic matter. However, in human sciences, the time limit we set fatally determines our discussion: For example, if we would think about language development in a century, we can identify a set of trends, but if the scale is a millennium then we can't even know whether our languages English, Spanish or Russian will survive as they are or evolve into some other languages and thus go extinct (as in the case of how European languages evolved from Latin historically). So it is better to have narrow time limits for precision, but wider enough to predict long-term possibilities. That is why, in this article, we decided to concentrate on 50-100 years ahead.

### 2.3 Factors behind the heterogeneity of management theory

From a philosophy and sociology of science point of view, we need to keep in mind that management theory is far from a heterogeneous monolith. In fact, it is hard to agree with the singular characterization of the area rather than a plural one. This heterogeneity can be due to 3 factors, when management theory is reconceptualized with an onion model:

#### 2.1. Normal, risk-averse core vs. revolutionary, risk-accepting periphery

Management theory consists of a core and outer layers which can also be called as periphery. The core is always more resistant to change compared to the periphery. Since in our times, the change in everyday reality is the norm, rather than exception; the core had to be more dynamic for higher fidelity. But this is rarely the case. Analogous to the sticky prices and wages of Keynesian economics, the core has its reasons to be more dogmatic and resistant to the dynamic character of everyday reality. The core is in full control of the funds, tenure, other key positions and other sources of prestige and monetary returns. For the core, to think differently may be risky, as it would easily be translated into loss of prestige and monetary returns through getting rejections from the top journals, fund agencies and research institutes of Kuhnian normal science which expect the contributor to be more or less normal and similar to each other, rather than revolutionary and inherently different. This can also mean loss of funds and in some cases even tenure. Let us remember the story of Ignaz Semmelweis (1818-1865) who had reasons to propose a relationship between childbirth deaths and dirty hands

but no sufficient proof to convince his colleagues. He had lost his positions and prestige (Best & Neuhauser, 2004). One can't be in both the normal, risk-averse core of scientific community and the marginalized periphery that is more eager to recognize the facts. Of course we have more remarkable cases of revolutionary science such as Galileo which corroborates our central thesis here.

So when we think about the future of management theory, we need to take note of the fact that there is no single scientific community producing and re-producing management theory, but two: Normal, risk-averse core and revolutionary, risk-seeking (or in better terms, risk-accepting) peripheries. Their future responses to the changes in reality will be different.

2.2. The mainstream core vs. critical periphery: This distinction has implications for critical and self-critical approaches to management theory. The periphery can be more critical and self-critical, criticizing the theory as well as their own role in, for example, social control. Management theory, as critical and self-critical thinkers know very well, is never science alone; it always involves values which open the gates for politics. Again critical and self-critical thinkers are aware of the influences of the world wars in particular and military motivations in general over the origins and history of management theory. The aim of management theory, in that sense, is not only maximizing efficiency and accordingly boosting financial indicators such as profit, revenue, return of investment etc., but also pacifying resistance to authorities, authoritarianisms and norms. Thus, the way the future dynamics will be received and responded to will be different among the mainstream core and the critical periphery.

2.3. The fields, sub-fields and overlaps: Another major source of heterogeneity for management theory is due to the fact that there is no management theory with capital 'M' and 'T' that has the explanatory and predictive powers over all fields and sub-fields of management. A few candidates for such a comprehensive theory making appeared such as systems theory, chaos and complexity models, but so far they are far from full-fledged, thus we don't consider them as MT. Rather than a single theory explaining everything in management, which is the case in, for example, physics, we have tens of theories in management with differing scope, and explanatory and predictive power, and considerable overlaps. So a question concerning the future of management theory is based on the false assumption that there is a single management theory. Contrary to this singular view, if we take it in its plural, then we need to concentrate on each, to come up with satisfactory responses.

A way to stick to a singular management theory would be periodization of the history of management theory on the basis of the most common approach for each period. This typical textbook point of view, seen for instance, in Pearson (2018) brings about 4 major periods of management theory: Classical view which is characterized by “[e]mphasis on purpose, formal structure, hierarchy of management, technical requirements, and common principles of organisation” (p.43), human relations view which can be summarized by “[a]ttention to social factors at work, groups, leadership, the informal organisation, and behaviour of people” (p.43), systems view which relies on “[t]he integration of the classical and human relations approaches, [i]mportance of the socio-technical system, [and] [t]he organisation within its external environment” (p.43), contingency view which proposes that there is “[n]o best design of organisation. Form of structure, management, and ‘success’ of the organisation [are] dependent upon a range of situational variables” (p.43). However, this point of view is not comprehensive enough. Its focus is only about organizational aspects, but management theory covers many areas other than organizations such as supply chain management, operations management, project management etc. Secondly, we should keep in mind that historically speaking, overlaps are likely. Thirdly, these are rather characterizations of the mainstream academic core rather than marginalized peripheries, which lack the description of the mechanisms that lead to transition to another approach, in other words, it does not provide a dynamical account.

Nevertheless, a number of future studies of some of the management theories can be noted in this context. Kessels (2001) states that the time for traditional management theory is over, as we have been moving to knowledge economy. The knowledge work needs to be up to date. That is why to survive in the future, the companies have to be learning organizations. In the same vein, Koski (2001) proposes companies to be intelligent organizations.

While these kinds of studies partially explain how the economy will be transformed, it is not the case for management theory. As explained above, there is no deterministic relation between everyday reality and management theory. Management theory usually falters, and delays are typical of the theory due to the resistance and risk-averseness of the core. At the same time, we need to remind that this article was written in 2001 which means well ahead of theory construction in this area, which makes it one of the precursors of these idea but not that of the conclusive ones. This is the price to be paid when you think earlier and faster than the mainstream academic core.

In fact, future-oriented discussions on structural changes of the economy seem to be popular among the futures scholars: García-Olivares & Solé (2015), for example, discusses how we would ultimately move “from capitalism to a symbiotic economy”; while Cohen (2013) claims that we have already moved from consumerism to post-consumerism “expressed in terms of stagnating wages, persistently high unemployment, widening income inequality, sluggish consumer demand, volatile financial markets, contracting middle-class security, and general public malaise” (Cohen, 2013, p.42). Let us also note that this futurological interest in structural changes of the economy is not recent; it dates back to 1970s and onwards with discussions of the role of informal economy in post-industrial society (Gershuny, 1979), “services in the new industrial economy” (Miles, 1993, p.653), and the post-Fordist economy (Belussi & Garibaldo, 1996). But even in these comprehensive accounts, how these changes will influence management theory is missing. Likewise, another popular topic among futures scholars appears to be innovation. These works cover diverse areas such as entrepreneurial innovation (Colwell & Narayanan, 2010), corporate innovation management (Gracht, Vennemann & Darkow, 2010), national systems of innovation (Archibugi & Michie, 1997), how innovation would affect human resource strategies (Johnson, Baldwin & Diverty, 1996), innovation networks (Duin, Heger & Schlesinger, 2014) etc. Again, the focus is on how to support innovation, but not about how management theory would respond to these recommendations. Thus, we need to shift our interest from future studies about management to research on theory building in management.

In the case of theory building in management, converging with our characterization of academic communities above, Trim & Lee (2004) state that “[a] researcher may also need to adopt a rather “risky” research strategy that encapsulates the critical theory approach, if they are to achieve something unique” (p.473). On the other hand, they have a more cognitivist understanding of theory building:

“However, gaps in our knowledge do arise and prove challenging with respect to motivating us to eradicate our deficiencies and at the same time spur us to find new solutions. This implies that it is necessary to generate new insights into management theory and at the same time broaden the parameters of management development” (p.474).

Dent & Bozeman (2014), from a historical point of view provides a more colored and realistic description of theory building in management. They list “*social Darwinism and religion, the rise of social science, the promise*

of the scientific method, and the perspectives of the business tycoons” as “the social ideas and influences that created the conditions for modern management to be formed and established” (p.145). Although this list is far from full-fledged (for example it does not include funders) it is more social than the account provided by Trim & Lee (2004) which was based on the widespread assumption of ‘a curious individual scientist’ rather than aggressive needs of the corporate interests. Theory building in management is not cognitive only, social factors can be said to be stronger, as these theories serve a set of vital social functions such as maintaining the status quo and social control.

Dent & Bozeman (2014) reminding us that in fact the first management theories emerged during slavery period in the United States state that

“What was undecided in mid-nineteenth century America was whether wage-earners would be treated more like partners, apprentices, slaves, or in some other manner. Modern employment has largely forged a different form, often providing health insurance, pensions, and other benefits. Modern management, in its approach to the employed work force, is primarily designed to operate objectively and instrumentally toward human “resources”” (p.147).

### 3. Trends to influence the future of management theory

Before presenting and discussing the trends to influence the future of management theory, let’s listen to what Scott (2007) says about peer review which is the foundation of the modern science:

“[Peer review] is the main form of decision-making around grant selection, academic publishing and the promotion of individual scientists within universities and research institutions. It also underpins methods used to evaluate scientific institutions. Yet, peer review as currently practiced can be narrowly scientific, to the exclusion of other pressing quality criteria relating to social relevance. It is often also controlled and practiced by scientists to the exclusion of wider groups that might bring valuable perspectives” (p.827).

Furthermore,

“[p]eer review plays a significant role in many of the key moments in science, as it is the main form of decision-making around: who receives money to do what science; who gets to publish in the scientific literature; and which individual scientists are selected and promoted within research institutions” (Scott, 2007, p.828).

In fact, this is no longer completely true. Some of the functions usually attributed to peer review are now assigned for non-academic actors of the neo-

liberal model such as CEO of the university, Human Resource Departments etc. Nevertheless, even in the ideal situation, peer review can't be 100% reliable. It is where some of the ideas are marginalized and underfunded especially in social and administrative science fields.<sup>2</sup> Recognizing this fact and summarizing the relevant reports, Scott (2007) adds that

“other problems with peer review include fraud, bias (i.e., institutional bias, bias in favour of positive results, bias against women or young researchers), ‘cloning’ (i.e., favouring topics and researchers with characteristics similar to those of incumbent paradigms and researchers), and inefficiency” (p.834).

Within this context of imperfect peer review systems, a set of trends are expected to influence the future of management theory. Some of these have been very-well recognized by futurologists while some others have rarely been under the spotlights. Let us stress the fact that they are not only influential over management and companies, but also management theory. The reason is that there are already a reasonably high number of marginalized researchers mostly in the academic peripheries that form a loose coalition of heterodox voices in academic circles of management. In our next time horizon (i.e. in half-century or in a century) they can be a part of the mainstream if the conditions will be ripe for their academic revolutions. These trends are:

- Decolonization
- Sinification
- Empowerment and precarization
- Feminization, degendering and egalitarianism
- Transdisciplinarity
- Environmental and natural challenges and issues (including global warming, increasing number of disasters, peak oil, energy crisis, sustainability, green management)

---

2 As a reviewer for some other scholarly journals, of course I am not against peer review, however I think we need to find better ways to do it. The reviewers in all the occasions listed by Scott (2007) need to be aware of their own blind spots, biases and other forms of subjectivities; and never think for a moment that they are infallible. Secondly, I feel lucky that we have futures studies journals that are more receptive, if not accepting for heterodox views. Finally, let us also note that in a considerably high number of countries, the endowers of research funds are explicitly or implicitly ideologically-oriented in their funding decisions. This is the case in almost all undemocratic countries which corresponds to more than half of the world population. In those countries, in addition to reviewers' blind spots, biases and other forms of subjectivities, the researchers also need to tackle with discrimination, mobbing, threat of unemployment and hunger, civil death, and other forms of social and political repression.

Some of these are belated and some others are just-in-time responses to the outdated model of *the* management theorist: This theorist is a Western patriarchal, colonial, individualistic, anti-egalitarian, anti-democratic, narrow-disciplinary male theorist which take natural and environmental resources and conditions as granted. This model is challenged through these trends to be presented and discussed below.

### 3.1. Decolonization

Management theory still has colonial relics in its workings. Usually we have Western-originated theories which claim universality without considering non-Western work settings. In fact, these theories can be applicable only if its assumptions about society hold true. Western-originated theories are useful in former colonies only if those distant lands were completely colonized not in terms of military and economic relations, but also through sociological and psychological dimensions. When non-Western people act as if they are Westerners, and if they act so well that their act becomes the reality, then the Western management theory is applicable for a former colony. This shows the hidden connection of management theory and colonialism. Despite of the enormous harm inflicted on colonized, subjugated subjects and countries as a whole, with the rise of countries like BRICS, management theory will be forced to question itself as a response to the challenges posed by former colonies. Research viewing management theory from a post-colonial perspective is rare (e.g. Banerjee & Prasad, 2008), but some other vocal critiques using other terms are notable such as Fang (2010):

“Hofstede’s cross-cultural paradigm has stimulated academic interest in value and behavioral variations across national borders and helped practitioners to capture national cultural stereotypes in concrete and measurable terms. Nevertheless, the Hofstede paradigm with its focus on cultural differences can hardly capture today’s new cross-cultural management environment characterized by change and paradox in borderless and wireless cultural learning, knowledge transfer, and synchronized information sharing. In the twenty-first century, management faces new challenges because people in the twenty-first century are increasingly no longer bipolarized and isolated creatures but of multicultural identities and multicultural minds. Asian management researchers need to learn from the West but at the same time need to have self-confidence and courage in using indigenous knowledge to make contributions to theory building with global relevance” (Fang, 2010, p.155).

Likewise, Blunt & Jones (1997) compare and contrast ‘current Western leadership ‘ideal’ with leadership in East Asia and Africa on the basis of

“influences on leadership practices”, authority, uncertainty and relationships (p.19), and concludes that the differences are paradigmatic, in other words the Western leadership theories largely diverge from the real situation in East Asia and Africa.

Jack et al. (2013) ask a timely and useful question which will be relevant for the next trend as well (i.e. Sinification):

“Is it possible and desirable to create a universal theory of management and organization? Scholarship about the boundary conditions of endogenous theory and the need for indigenous theories of management as well as geopolitical changes in the world order have animated this debate” (p.148).

### 3.2. Sinification

The rise of China is discussed usually in international relations, politics, economics, trade and military circles. But futurological discussions of the implication of this Sino-rise is rare in the discipline of management. Chinese management scholars are quite active. They have their own journals in which the implicit, underlying discussion is the following: Should we fix the false and self-proclaimed universality of Western-oriented management theory by introducing Chinese inputs including concepts, methodologies, approaches, facts, findings etc. or should we rather develop our own Chinese management theory? This question will be even more meaningful as China will progress in One Belt One Road project (also known as the New Silk Road) (see State Council, 2018), merger and acquisitions operations directed towards European and American companies (cf. Drahoukoupil, 2017; Yang et al., 2011), and investments elsewhere such as in Latin America and Africa (cf. Narins, 2018). So Chinese management research (e.g. Cao, Zhang & Xi, 2011; Li & Peng, 2008; Qi, 2012; Stening & Zhang, 2007; Xi, Cao & Xiangli, 2010; Xi, Zhang & Ge, 2012), following these economic trends will stop being a matter of Chinese only. The first answer for the question above will be the strongest challenge against Western-originated management theory, as it will not only question its epistemology, but also cultural givens and hidden motivations.

These discussions will be coupled with those asking whether China is the new colonialist power considering its interest in buying raw materials from low and middle income countries and selling processed products (Larmer, 2017; Mourdoukoutas, 2018).<sup>3</sup> In this way, the argument goes, and with

---

3 A Forbes article was provocatively, unfairly and unrealistically entitled ‘China is treating Africa the same way European colonists did’; however possibly due to world-wide reaction it was revised as ‘What is China doing in Africa?’ after release. However, the extension of the article

the infrastructure projects, China makes these needy countries economically dependent on himself. However, Chinese would reply stating that the data are distorted with a Western bias (Yafei, 2014), they have no military goals to conquer the world and they committed no massacres among Africans in the name of colonialism nor involved in slave trade, unlike what Western colonialists did. So overall, this analogy is not applicable, but obviously it serves ideological functions for Western and pro-Western commentators through hiding the brutal history of Western colonialism. In summary, one thing we can be sure of for the next century is that China will be more powerful, Chinese will have larger share of media time, and Chinese management scholars will publish more works that will be even more influential in global management circles.

### 3.3. Empowerment and Precarization

Let us note that management theory was developed by managers and employers without any participation of employees. Thus it needs to be debunked to come up with a more democratic and egalitarian theory that empowers employees. However, recent forms of capitalism is increasingly getting more characterized by the notion of precarization, while struggle for empowerment continues. Precarization means labors' forced transformation into becoming 'copy-paste' elements of insecure job conditions, usually without a contract or with an unfavorable one (i.e. zero-hour contracts or adjunct positions or sessional lecturing in academia). Precaria, as the new proletariat has no job security, they can be fired any time without any compensation. They are not offered permanent contracts which also mean that neither social security nor health insurance are provided. This is the best arrangement for the employers as the labor force will be docile, easily replaced (i.e. made to function as a copy/paste element) and will not be associated with costly payments such as social rights. Increasing number and percentages of people are precarized all over the world with the obvious example of higher education where adjuncts, part-timers and sessionals are plenty and appear to constitute most of the academic staff in the future. From a different perspective, but with a similar result, Williams & Windebank (1999) discuss informalization and post-formalization of labor in our times of high formal and informal unemployment and underemployment.

How did we come to these dire conditions for labor? We have mainly 3 interconnected reasons: The decline in trade union membership, the collapse

---

still reveals the original title: china-is-treating-africa-the-same-way-european-colonists-did/ (Mourdoukoutas, 2018).

of Soviet Union and almost all of its ideological allies, and the implementation of neo-liberal policies. With a higher number of ununionized labor, each worker became more expendable. European bourgeoisie had been afraid of a Soviet-like revolution in Europe, and by then labor and social rights movements were strong, that is why European governments had granted social rights to people. With the collapse of Soviet Union, this 'red scare' ended. Finally, neo-liberal policies cut government funds over schools and hospitals which were supposed to operate for public benefit rather than profit. They turned all sectors into profit-making companies, success of which was evaluated on the basis of private profit rather than public benefit. As a result of these 3 factors, precarization is fast approaching unexpectedly high proportions. Let's also add the fact that China's inhumane work conditions also dovetail with worldwide precarization. The rise of China will be the 4<sup>th</sup> factor behind this process.

We can change its name, we can call it in another way, but it doesn't matter: Class struggle is a reality of life and it persists in different forms in different centuries. A higher level approach to the notion of class struggle would focus on the relations of hierarchy in work settings to cover not only economic differences, but also social ones. Contrary to what the mainstream human resource management discipline tries to convince us, the interests of the employer, managers and employees are irreconcilable. With due respects to exceptions, in most of the capitalist enterprises of the world, the workers are made to believe that the company interest is identical with their own interest. So if the company wins, they win. We incisively saw that that was not the case considering the bonus schemes the CEOs were entitled to for failing their companies in 2008 Economic and Financial Crisis.<sup>4</sup> The notion of class struggle will pop up again and again, and a future outlook without considering this is far from reality. So we will see whether empowerment and industrial/economic democracy movements which apply the notion of political democracy to work settings will prevail or not (cf. Johannisova & Wolf, 2012). The class struggle, as well as the trends towards precarization vs. empowerment will be influential over management theory. A theory aiming for precarization would focus on how to motivate staff although they are stripped of all their rights, while another for empowerment will focus on humane work conditions. That is a big difference.

---

4 Why are we insisting that the crisis was both economic and financial, why don't we say financial only? If a crisis is economic, we should be able to find the reasons in the real economy such as oversupply of housing which was applicable for 2008 in addition to the financial reasons.

### 3.4. Feminization, Degendering and Egalitarianism

The management theory was developed by predominantly male theorists. A number of challenges posed by feminists are to be noted. For example, under capitalism the low-paying jobs are mostly allotted to women; support workers which are mostly women such as cleaners are demeaned; house work is not counted as productive activity (but in fact it helps labor to refresh for the next day) etc. Women's studies scholars are expected to come up with even more radical criticisms of the male theorist behind the management theory. While currently, feminist and pro-feminist future studies are rare (e.g. Milojević, 2008; Szalai, 1975), the disconnect between women's studies in general and feminist studies in particular and future studies will likely be mended in the future through the collaboration of scholars from both sides.

### 3.5. Transdisciplinarity

While the mainstream academia is getting more and more specialized, transdisciplinarity is also recognized as a drawer of a more realistic picture. In fact, in the future some of the management theories may go extinct as they are too narrowly engaged with their subject forgetting to look at a greater picture. This move towards transdisciplinarity is also visible in future studies (e.g. Cilliers & Nicolescu, 2012; Darbellay, 2015; Jahn & Keil, 2015; Klein, 2014; Serrao-Neumann et al., 2015). Transdisciplinarity requires team work as each individual scientists' cognitive capacity is more limited than needed. As a result, transdisciplinarity emerges as a way to refute the individual and individualist theorist behind management theory.

### 3.6. Environmental and Natural Challenges and Issues

A number of environmental and natural challenges and responses such as global warming, increasing number of disasters, peak oil, energy crisis, sustainability, renewable energies, green management etc. are on the table, and how these can transform the management theory should be discussed. A high number of future studies articles address these issues (e.g. Abas, Kalair & Khan, 2015; Almeida & Silva, 2011; Crivits et al., 2010; Eastin, Grundmann & Prakash, 2011; Enserink, Kwakkel & Veenman, 2013; Floyd & Zubevich, 2010; Heinonen, Jokinen & Kaivo-oja, 2001; Hjorth & Bagheri, 2006; Hughes & Johnson, 2005; Jamison, 2003; Jokinen, Malaska & Kaivo-oja, 1998; Kemp, 1994; Maiteny, 2000; Mathews, 2012, 2013; Moriarty & Honnery, 2015; Newman, 2006; Roy, 2000), but discussions about their implications for management theory is rare.

Economically speaking, management theory is usually based on the notion of homo economicus championed by classical economics. According to this approach, human beings are rational, they pursue their self-interest following a simple hedonistic algorithm: Pursue joy, avoid pain; or get rewards, avoid punishment. This approach further assumes that markets are naturally self-balancing. However we have seen on every occasion that these two assumptions are not true. As Freud and many other psychodynamically and cognitively oriented psychologists showed us, unconscious, subconscious and preconscious processes are more important than publicly recognized in decision making and human behavior. So irrationality can't be discarded. Furthermore, for numerous times, the so-called 'free markets' fail and their failure may lead to even worse problems such as economic crisis. Despite of these deficiencies peaked on 2008 Economic and Financial Crisis, the homo economicus assumption of the management theory persists in the mainstream academic core, but it may change in the future with increasing pressure from the marginalized peripheries.

A statement closely tied with this outdated notion of homo economicus was that "the resources are scarce". But this scarcity was a relative and conditional one: Our needs were infinite, thus we could never have sufficient resources to meet our needs. This hedonistic assumption is also problematic. The whole idea of Buddhism and the discussions of degrowth are based on the idea that we can minimize our needs. The notion of needs is not a universal and ahistorical given. Our needs depend on our times. However, in the next century or so, this notion of scarcity will have another form with the recognition of the fact that the scarcity is not relative or conditional, but absolute and universal. Why? That is because the environmental and natural resources that were taken for granted, for example clean air will be recognized to be vulnerable to anthropogenic harms such as ozone depletion.

Other likely trends can be noted as well. For example, the exploding uses of AI for production will be another trend for management theory to reckon. To what extent the epistemic assumptions reserved for human workers will be granted to AI would be one of the questions to consider. Let us remember one of our discussions above which reminds us that management theory emerged during slavery in the United States. This situation may have its parallel in AI discussions.

One view is that in fact the prevalence of AI does not bring a categorical, qualitative difference for capitalism: Machines are always used in capitalism, and in fact they are the basis of capitalism. So use of more machines in production does not make any difference. Whereas some others claim it

to be a major difference (e.g. Makridakis, 2017). Whatever the conclusion would be, this discussion will be one of the agenda items of management theory in the future.

Other than Makridakis (2017) and AI as a trend, we can also mention social media as another trend. Pang (2010), rather than talking about social media use, propose to study social media contents to come up with new information; while Kostakis et al. (2015)'s arguments revolve on 'commons-based peer production' which is expected to take place in the post-capitalist future.

#### **4. Conclusion**

In this article, we tried to reflect on the future of management theory. We proposed that it is not homogeneous. We mentioned 3 factors behind this situation. We proceeded to present and discuss 6 trends that have been affecting management theory: Decolonization, Sinification, degendering, empowerment and precarization, transdisciplinary, and environmental and natural challenges and issues. Of course there may be other factors that are not discussed here. However, as a starting point, the presentation of these 6 trends would hopefully help the interested readers to reflect on their implications for the future.

## References

- Abas, N. Kalair, A. & Khan, N. (2015). Review of fossil fuels and future energy technologies. *Futures*, 69, 31–49. doi: 10.1016/j.futures.2015.03.003
- Al-Saleh, Y. (2009). Renewable energy scenarios for major oil-producing nations: The case of Saudi Arabia. *Futures*, 41, 650-662. doi: 10.1016/j.futures.2009.04.005
- Almeida, P. & Silva, P.D. (2011). Timing and future consequences of the peak of oil production. *Futures*, 43, 1044-1055. doi: 10.1016/j.futures.2011.07.004
- Archibugi, D. & Michie, J. (1997). Technological globalization or national system of innovation? *Futures*, 29(2), 121-137. doi: 10.1080/09692290110101126
- Banerjee, S. B. & Prasad, A. (2008). Introduction to the special issue on critical reflections on management and organizations: A postcolonial perspective. *Critical Perspectives on International Business*, 4(2/3), 90-98. doi: 0.1108/17422040810869963
- Belussi, F. & Garibaldi, E. (1996). Variety of pattern of the Post-Fordist economy: Why are the ‘old times’ still with us and the ‘new times’ yet to come? *Futures*, 28(2), 153-171. doi: 10.1016/0016-3287(95)00087-9
- Best, M. & Neuhauser, D. (2004). Ignaz Semmelweis and the birth of infection control. *Quality & Safety in Health Care*, 13(3), 233-4. doi: 10.1136/qshc.2004.010918
- Blunt, P. & Jones, M.L. (1997). Exploring the limits of Western leadership theory in East Asia and Africa. *Personnel Review*, 26(1/2), 6-23. doi: 10.1108/00483489710157760
- Cao, X., Zhang, X. & Xi, Y. (2011). Ambidextrous organization in harmony: A multi-case exploration of the value of HeXie management theory. *Chinese Management Studies*, 5(2), 146-163. doi: 10.1108/17506141111142799
- Cilliers, P. & Nicolescu, B. (2012). Complexity and transdisciplinarity – Discontinuity, levels of Reality and the Hidden Third. *Futures*, 44, 711-718. doi: 10.1016/j.futures.2012.04.001
- Cohen, M.J. (2013). Collective dissonance and the transition to post-consumerism. *Futures*, 52, 42-51. doi: 10.1016/j.futures.2013.07.001
- Colwell & Narayanan, (2010). Foresight in economic development policy: Shaping the institutional context for entrepreneurial innovation. *Futures*, 42, 295-303. doi: 10.1016/j.futures.2009.11.015
- Crivits, M., Paredis, E. Boulanger, P.M., Mutombo, E.J.K., Bauler, T. & Lefin, A.-L. (2010). Scenarios based on sustainability discourses: Constructing alternative consumption and consumer perspectives. *Futures*, 42, 1187–1199. doi: 10.1016/j.futures.2010.07.002

- Darbellay, F. (2015). Rethinking inter- and transdisciplinarity: Undisciplined knowledge and the emergence of a new thought style. *Futures*, 65, 163–174. doi: 10.1016/j.futures.2014.10.009
- Dent, E.B. & Bozeman, P. (2014). Discovering the foundational philosophies, practices, and influences of modern management theory. *Journal of Management History*, 20(2), 145-163. doi: 10.1108/JMH-09-2012-0056
- Drahokoupil, J. (eds.) (2017). Chinese Investment in Europe: Corporate Strategies and Labour Relations, Brussels: European Trade Union Institute. Retrieved from <https://www.etui.org/content/download/32418/300918/file/17+Chinese+investments+in+Europe+Drahokoupil+Web+version.pdf>
- Duin, P., Heger, T. & Schlesinger, M.D. (2014). Toward networked foresight? Exploring the use of futures research in innovation networks. *Futures*, 59, 62-78. doi: 10.1016/j.futures.2014.01.008
- Eastin, J., Grundmann, R. & Prakash, A. (2011). The two limits debates: “Limits to Growth” and climate change. *Futures* 43(1), 16–26. doi: 10.1016/j.futures.2010.03.001
- Enserink, B. Kwakkel, J.H., Veenman, S. (2013). Coping with uncertainty in climate policy making: (Mis)understanding scenario studies. *Futures*, 53, 1-12. doi: 10.1016/j.futures.2013.09.006
- Fang, T. (2010). Asian management research needs more self-confidence: Reflection on Hofstede (2007) and beyond. *Asia Pacific Journal of Management*, 27, 155–170. doi: 0.1007/s10490-009-9134-7
- Floyd, J. & Zubevich, K. (2010). Linking foresight and sustainability: An integral approach. *Futures*, 42, 59-68. doi: 10.1016/j.futures.2009.08.001
- García-Olivares, A. & Solé, J. (2015). End of growth and the structural instability of capitalism - From capitalism to a Symbiotic Economy. *Futures*, 68, 31-43. doi: 10.1016/j.futures.2014.09.004
- Gershuny, J.I. (1979). The informal economy: Its role in post-industrial society. *Futures*, 11(1), 3-15. doi: 10.1016/0016-3287(79)90065-X
- Gracht, H.A., Vennemann, C.R. & Darkow, I.-L. (2010). Corporate foresight and innovation management: A portfolio-approach in evaluating organizational development. *Futures*, 42, 380-393. doi: 10.1016/j.futures.2009.11.023
- Heinonen, S., Jokinen, P. & Kaivo-oja, J. (2001). The ecological transparency of the information society. *Futures*, 33, 319-337. doi: 10.1016/S0016-3287(00)00073-2
- Hjorth, P. & Bagheri, A. (2006). Navigating towards sustainable development: A system dynamics approach. *Futures*, 38, 74–92. doi: 10.1016/j.futures.2005.04.005

- Hughes, B.B. & Johnson, P.D. (2005). Sustainable futures: policies for global development. *Futures*, 37, 813-831. doi: 10.1016/j.futures.2005.01.017
- Jack, G., Zhu, Y., Barney, J., Yoko Brannen, M., Prichard, C., Singh, K. & Whetten, D. (2013). Refining, reinforcing and reimagining universal and indigenous theory development in international management. *Journal of Management Inquiry*, 22(2), 148-164. doi: 10.1177/1056492612458453
- Jahn, T. & Keil, F. (2015). An actor-specific guideline for quality assurance in transdisciplinary research. *Futures*, 65, 195-208. doi: 10.1016/j.futures.2014.10.015
- Jamison, A. (2003). The making of green knowledge: the contribution from activism. *Futures*, 35, 703-716. doi: 10.1016/S0016-3287(03)00023-5
- Johanisova, N. & Wolf, S. (2012). Economic democracy: A path for the future? *Futures*, 44, 562-570. doi: 10.1016/j.futures.2012.03.017
- Johnson, J., Baldwin, J.R. & Diverty, B. (1996). The implications of innovation for human resource strategies. *Futures*, 28(2), 103-119. doi: 10.1016/0016-3287(95)00083-6
- Jokinen, Malaska & Kaivo-oja, 1998. The environment in an information society: A transition stage towards more sustainable development? *Futures*, 30(6), 485-498. doi: 10.1016/S0016-3287(98)00054-8
- Kemp, R. (1994). Technology and the transition to environmental sustainability: The problem of technological regime shifts. *Futures*, 26(10), 1023-1046. doi: 10.1016/0016-3287(94)90071-X
- Kessels, J.W.M. (2001). Learning in organisations: a corporate curriculum for the knowledge economy. *Futures*, 33, 497-506. doi: 10.1016/S0016-3287(00)00093-8
- Klein, J.T. (2014). Discourses of transdisciplinarity: Looking Back to the Future. *Futures*, 63, 68-74. doi: 10.1016/j.futures.2014.08.008
- Koski, J.T. (2001). Reflections on information glut and other issues in knowledge productivity. *Futures*, 33, 483-495. doi: 10.1016/S0016-3287(00)00092-6
- Kostakis, V., Niaros, V., Dafermos, G. & Bauwens, M. (2015). Design global, manufacture local: exploring the contours of an emerging productive model. *Futures*, 73, 126-135. doi: 10.1016/j.futures.2015.09.001
- Larmer, B. (2017, May 02). Is China the World's New Colonial Power? The New York Times Magazine. Retrieved from <https://www.nytimes.com/2017/05/02/magazine/is-china-the-worlds-new-colonial-power.html>
- Li, Y. & Peng, M.W. (2008). Developing theory from strategic management research in China. *Asia Pacific Journal of Management*, 25, 563-572. doi: 10.1007/s10490-007-9083-y

- Maiteny, P. (2000). The psychodynamics of meaning and action for a sustainable future. *Futures*, 32, 339-360. doi: 10.1016/S0016-3287(99)00101-9
- Makridakis, S. (2017). The forthcoming Artificial Intelligence (AI) revolution: Its impact on society and firms. *Futures*, 90, 46–60. doi: 10.1016/j.futures.2017.03.006
- Mathews, J.A. (2013). The renewable energies technology surge: A new techno-economic paradigm in the making? *Futures*, 46, 10-22. doi: 10.1016/j.futures.2012.12.001
- Mathews, J.A. (2012). Green growth strategies - Korean initiatives. *Futures*, 44, 761–769. doi: 10.1016/j.futures.2012.06.002
- Miles, I. (1993). Services in the new industrial economy. *Futures*, 25(6), 653-672. doi: 10.1016/0016-3287(93)90106-4
- Milojević, I. (2008). Timing feminism, feminising time. *Futures*, 40, 329-345. doi: 10.1016/j.futures.2007.08.008
- Moriarty, P. & Honnery, D. (2015). Future cities in a warming world. *Futures*, 66, 45-53. doi: 10.1016/j.futures.2014.12.009
- Mourdoukoutas, P. (2018, August 04). What Is China Doing In Africa? Forbes. Retrieved from <https://www.forbes.com/sites/panosmourdoukoutas/2018/08/04/china-is-treating-africa-the-same-way-european-colonists-did/#778b1e81298b>
- Narins, T.P. (2018). Chinese Trade in Latin America Compared to the European Union and the United States: The Case of Technology-Intensive Exports. *The Professional Geographer*, 70(2), 219-229. doi: 10.1080/00330124.2017.1347797
- Newman, L. (2006). Change, uncertainty, and futures of sustainable development. *Futures*, 38, 633-637. doi: 10.1016/j.futures.2005.09.011
- Pearson (2018). Approaches to organisation and management. Pearson. Retrieved from [https://catalogue.pearsoned.co.uk/assets/hip/gb/hip\\_gb\\_pearsonhighered/samplechapter/0273757342.pdf](https://catalogue.pearsoned.co.uk/assets/hip/gb/hip_gb_pearsonhighered/samplechapter/0273757342.pdf)
- Qi (2012). A case study of globalized knowledge flows: Guanxi in social science and Management theory. *International Sociology*, 27(6), 707–723. doi: 10.1177/0268580912453729
- Roy, R. (2000). Sustainable product-service systems. *Futures*, 32, 289-299. doi: 10.1016/S0016-3287(99)00098-1
- Scott, A. (2007). Peer review and the relevance of science. *Futures*, 39, 827-845. doi: 10.1016/j.futures.2006.12.009
- Serrao-Neumann, S., Schuch, G., Harman, B., Crick, F., Sano, M., Sahin, O., von Staden, R., Baum, S. & Low Choy, D. (2015). One human settlement: a transdisciplinary approach to climate change adaptation research. *Futures*, 65, 97–109. doi: 10.1016/j.futures.2014.08.011

- Stening, B.W. & Zhang, M.Y. (2007). Methodological challenges confronted when conducting management research in China. *International Journal of Cross Cultural Management*, 7, 121-142. doi: 10.1177/1470595807075179
- Pang, A. S.-K. (2010). Social scanning: Improving futures through Web 2.0; or, finally a use for Twitter. *Futures*, 42(10), 1222-1230. doi: 10.1016/j.futures.2010.09.003
- Szalai, A. (1975). Women's time: Women in the light of contemporary time-budget research. *Futures*, 7(5), 385-399. doi: 10.1016/0016-3287(75)90017-8
- The State Council (2018). The Belt and Road Initiative. Retrieved from <http://english.gov.cn/beltAndRoad/>
- Tonn, B.E. (2004). Integrated 1000-year planning. *Futures*, 36, 91-108. doi: 10.1016/S0016-3287(03)00068-5
- Trim, P.R.J. & Lee, Y.-I. (2004). A reflection on theory building and the development of management knowledge. *Management Decision*, 42(3/4), 473-480. doi: 10.1108/00251740410518930
- Williams, C.C. & Windebank, J. (1999). The formalisation of work thesis: a critical evaluation. *Futures*, 31(6), 547-58. doi: 10.1016/S0016-3287(99)00013-0
- Xi, Y., Cao, X. & Xiangli, L. (2010). A Chinese view on rebuilding the integrity of management research. The evolving He-Xie management theory. *Chinese Management Studies*, 4(3), 197-211. doi: 10.1108/17506141011074101
- Xi, Y., Zhang, X. & Ge, J. (2012). Replying to management challenges: Integrating oriental and occidental wisdom by HeXie Management Theory. *Chinese Management Studies*, 6(3), 395-412. doi: 10.1108/17506141211259104
- Yafei, H. (2014, March 11). Unfair to paint China as a colonialist in Africa. Retrieved from <https://www.scmp.com/comment/insight-opinion/article/1445328/unfair-paint-china-colonialist-africa>
- Yang, H. & Sun, S. & Lin, Z. & Peng, M.W. (2011). Behind M&As in China and the United States: Networks, learning, and institutions. *Asia Pacific Journal of Management*, 28, 239-255. doi: 10.1007/s10490-009-9188-6



# Current Approaches in Social Sciences

Editors:

Assoc. Prof. Ali Turan Bayram

Asst. Prof. Andi Asrifan

Asst. Prof. Neha Sharma

Asst. Prof. Muthmainnah

