

## Hegemony under Multipolarity: An Ongoing Relevance?<sup>1</sup>

Coşkun Soysal<sup>2</sup>

### Abstract

“Hegemony” has been a key concept in understanding various forms of domination under capitalist relations of production that might go beyond any particular social formation. Hence it is possible to exercise it at different levels—domestic, regional or international. With its emphasis on attempts at capitalist domination, conceptualisations of it largely rest on the discipline of International Political Economy (IPE). However, some of these conceptualisations tend to degenerate the concept by disrupting its connections with the ruling classes at the domestic level. This led to a misbelief in the wider International Relations (IR) scholarship as though the concept had only idealist connotations and little to do with geopolitical rivalries among nations. This paper argues the opposite and asserts that the concept still holds explanatory power even under a supposedly multipolar order as long as it is not stripped of its domestic and material foundations. As such, the paper seeks to bring the concept into terms with the recent debates over the new character of the emerging international order. In doing this, the paper will also investigate whether the concept shares a common ground with geopolitical economy with a reference to the foundational concepts of the latter such as the “materiality of nations”. The paper argues that the contestations that appear geopolitical in character emanate from struggles for hegemony at the domestic level and are also bound to take the shape of bids for hegemony at regional or international levels by benefiting from the insights that the concepts of “subimperialism” and “imperialism” provides us.

- 1 This study was first presented at the 17<sup>th</sup> Forum of the World Association for Political Economy (WAPE), “Political Economy vs Economics in a Turbulent Multipolar World”, 2-4 August 2024, Panteion University, Athens, Greece.
- 2 Assistant Professor, University of Gaziantep, Faculty of Economic and Administrative Sciences, Department of International Relations, Gaziantep, TURKIYE. E-Mail: csoysal@gantep.edu.tr; ORCID ID: 0000-0001-8389-502X.

## Introduction

The debate as to whether the international order is on the road to multipolarity once again has already intensified. This debate is closely linked to the “decline of the United States” thesis, which is widely in circulation, especially after the 2007–2008 global financial crisis, concomitant with the rise of China as the global industrial powerplant with outstanding GDP growth rates beginning from the early 2000s. Meanwhile, the United States, as the super-imperialist power of the world capitalist system, has increasingly resorted to its coercive apparatuses, foremost among them its military, especially in peripheral regions where the neoliberal hegemony proves to be much thinner and dimmer, leading to discontent in such regions easily bringing about contending actors that refuse to obey, or defy outright, the rules promoted or imposed by the US-led neoliberal international order. This situation casts doubts over the supposed relevance of the concept of “hegemony” in understanding the dynamics of the contemporary international order and the direction it takes. What further complicates the debates around “hegemony” is its analytical misconceptions. The neo-Gramscian IR scholarship has contributed to its misconceptions as though the concept had only idealist connotations and little to do with geopolitical rivalries among nations by underestimating the coercive dimension in it in favour of the consensual dimension. Imperialism as a concept and the most sophisticated coercive instrument of hegemony at the international level has for the most part been relatively neglected in this bunch of literature. The realist school, on the other hand, attributed hegemony only to states and saw it as an extension of state power, and for the large part, an extension of its military power. Yet hegemony contains both consensual and coercive aspects, even the coercive aspect predominates over the consensual one, and as a form of class domination, it is far from being only about intellectual and moral leadership. It is highly difficult to sustain the moment of hegemony, so the concept is relevant to not only its presence in hegemonic international constellations but also its absence in non-hegemonic ones. This paper argues that multipolarity could be understood from the prism of hegemony as the most competitive form of international order within which struggles to obtain hegemony at the international level lead to fierce competition among various social formations in all spheres of the international realm. Multipolarity is not an unknown form of international order for the neo-Gramscian scholarship as the main standard-bearers of the concept of hegemony. It is presented mainly as a non-hegemonic era of rival imperialisms in the founding texts of the neo-Gramscian IR. Hence, this paper argues that the concept of hegemony is still indispensable in

understanding geopolitical competition at the international level insofar as the concept lays bare the connection between national–popular political projects aiming at hegemony at the domestic level and the power projections of the leading class or class fractions articulated through such hegemonic projects. As such, it is not difficult at all to bring the concept to terms with the debates about the new character of the emerging international order as long as its domestic and material foundations are not overlooked. It is on this basis that the concept can also be related to the discussion undertaken around such concepts as the “materiality of nations” by the geopolitical economy approach to international affairs. Although the proponents of the geopolitical economy approach discredit the concept of hegemony as they relate the concept to its realist and neoliberal institutionalist readings and rest rather on the concept of uneven and combined development, the paper argues that the *longue durée* dynamic of uneven and combined development and relatively short-term dynamics of hegemonic projects are far from being mutually exclusive but rather highly related aspects of the same international phenomena—one being historical–economic whereas the other one being conjunctural and political. As the geopolitical economy approach seeks to bend the stick toward combined development and states’ role in capitalist economies due to the negligence on the part of many cosmopolitan Marxist analyses, it is also not possible to put states’ roles in capitalist economies in their proper place without establishing the connections between the exigencies of the capitalist social relations of production in a particular social formation and the particular hegemonic project that ensues out of these exigencies.

### The Concept of Hegemony and IR

Because of its significant consequences for power dynamics, international political interplays, and the maintenance of international order, the concept of “hegemony” occupies a central place in the field of international relations. Hegemony is crucial for understanding the dynamics of international power relations, for instance as discussed by Andreas Antoniadis (2018), who emphasizes that a hegemon or hegemonic power possesses the ability to shape the international system and influence the behaviour of other states. This influence extends to setting agendas, defining norms, and shaping the discourse within the international community from such a viewpoint.

There are broadly two main groups of scholars who employ the concept of hegemony in international relations. The first group consists of realist and neoliberal institutionalist authors. Realist and neoliberal institutionalist international relations scholars offer distinct perspectives on the concept of

hegemony, reflecting their theoretical frameworks and analytical approaches. Realist scholars, as discussed by Hannes Lacher and Julian Germann (2012), view hegemony as a mechanism to explain the perceived decline of American global power. On the other hand, neoliberal institutionalist scholars, as highlighted by Mingtang Liu and Kellee Tsai (2021), provide a different lens through which to understand hegemony. Neoliberal institutionalists contest neorealists' focus on relative capabilities and emphasise the importance of international cooperation and institutions in defining and sustaining hegemonic power structures. This perspective underscores the role of collective action and rational decision-making in shaping hegemonic relations at the global level. The realist conception of hegemony, as discussed by Olusola Ogunnubi and Adeoye Akinola (2017), focuses on the credentials necessary for a state to be regarded as a regional hegemon. Realists prioritise military power and violent conflict as key components of hegemonic dominance, highlighting the importance of hard power in establishing and maintaining hegemony within the international system. In contrast, neoliberal institutionalists, as explored by Michal Onderco (2019), predict that countries seek to establish international institutions to address collective action problems and join them based on their interests. This perspective emphasizes the role of international cooperation and the rational pursuit of shared goals in shaping hegemonic relations and global governance structures. Overall, the realist and neoliberal institutionalist approaches to hegemony offer complementary insights but do not delve into more material underpinnings of hegemony such as their domestic social class base and its relationship to wider social relations of production.

The second main group of scholars who utilise the concept of hegemony in their analyses of international politics consists of neo-Gramscians. The concept of hegemony, apart from its realist and neoliberal institutionalist interpretations, has a history dating back to ancient times. Yet the well-known Italian Marxist political activist and writer Antonio Gramsci gave new content to the concept in his prison. Gramsci (2005, p. 57) distinguishes between the “two ways,” in which “the supremacy of a social group [i.e. class] manifests itself”—“domination” and “intellectual and moral leadership.” He states that intellectual and moral leadership could, “and indeed must,” be exercised even “before winning governmental power” (Gramsci, 2005, pp. 57–58). Departing from the Italian Risorgimento, he formulates hegemony as the specific manifestation of class rule in capitalist societies that combines generating *consent* of subordinate classes by intellectually, morally and politically leading them, and using *coercion* against the antagonistic ones to dominate them. Gramsci uses the term “hegemonic” in opposition to

“economic-corporate” to depict a particular historical phase in which a class “moves beyond a position of corporate existence and defence of its economic position and aspires to a position of leadership in the political and social arena” (Hoare & Nowell-Smith, 1992, p. xiv). Accordingly, the concept could basically defined as “a moment in which the ruling class takes moral and intellectual leadership,” (Uzgören, 2018, p. 288) whereby its “corporate interests, in their present and future development, transcend the corporate limits of the purely economic class, and can and must become the interests of other subordinate groups too” (Gramsci, 2005, p. 181). Its distinctive feature compared with pure domination is the co-optation of subaltern social strata by the leading social group(s) through obtaining consent of those subaltern groups albeit not without resorting to coercive elements against those from which consent cannot, or is too costly to, be generated. Gramsci refers to the “dialectical unity of the moments of force and consent in political action” with the notion of “dual perspective” (Gramsci, 2005, pp. 169, footnote 70).

The concept of hegemony, accordingly, involves the successful mobilisation and reproduction of the “active consent” of dominated groups by the ruling class. Such leadership is articulated and exercised through the development of a national-popular project which specifies a set of policies or goals as being “in the national interest” (Jessop, 1990, p. 181). These policies or goals would serve the long-term interests of capital as they would also “advance certain short-term, narrow economic and social interests and demands of subordinate groups” (Jessop, 1990, p. 181). It is at this point where Gramsci’s later disciples formulate and employ the concept of hegemonic project. Hegemonic projects could be defined as *national-popular projects aimed at generating the active consent of subordinate social groups in favour of the leading social group and at socially mobilising those subordinate groups for political purposes through policies or goals declared as being in the national interest.*

Hegemonic projects are rather more visible in superstructural aspects such as politics, ideology and culture. Yet it requires an overlapping in the form of historical blocs. Anne Showstack Sassoon argues, for instance, that the historical bloc, as “an historically constituted and socially reproduced correspondence between the economic base and the politico-ideological superstructures of a social formation” (Jessop, 1997, p. 56), implies “necessarily the existence of hegemony” (Showstack Sassoon, 1987, p. 123)

At this point, as a possible contribution to the “materiality of nations” thesis of the geopolitical economy approach, the material reason aspect of

any hegemony must be emphasised. Although hegemonic projects need not “be directly economic in character or give priority to economic objectives,” (Jessop, 1990, p. 210) material gains granted to subordinate groups and overall economic productivity would be decisive in their ultimate successes or failures. Successful hegemonic projects are in general the ones that have a close association with an appropriate accumulation strategy. Of course, this must not lead to a crude form of economism. Gramsci himself is also bitterly critical of such an economism. What Gramsci’s arguments over hegemony imply for hegemonic projects is, indeed, that their essential function is “to secure the (integral) economic base of the dominant mode of growth,” (Jessop, 1997, p. 57) and they do this through “the direct, active conforming of *all social relations* to the economic (and *extra-economic*) needs of [that dominant mode of growth]” (Jessop, 1997, pp. 58, emphasis added). Gramsci (2005, p. 258) himself also argues that every State is ethical in as much as one of its most important functions is to raise the great mass of the population to a particular cultural and moral level, a level (or type) which corresponds to the needs of the productive forces for development, and hence to the interests of the ruling classes.

It is in this wider sense that economy is nothing but “the mainspring of history in the last analysis,” (Gramsci, 2005, p. 162) and hence “all feasible organic hegemonic projects need to respect (or take account of) ‘economic determination in the last instance’” (Jessop, 1997, p. 58). As such, Bob Jessop (1997, p. 58) argues that “political forces have a vested interest in securing the productive potential of the economic base which both generates political resources and defines the scope for making material concessions,” since for wealth to be distributed, it “must first be produced.” Thus, although economic growth may not always be the top political priority, other priorities can only be established as long as “the core conditions for capital accumulation are not thereby irrevocably undermined” (Jessop, 1997, p. 58). Overall, all these constitute the material reason aspect of hegemonic projects.

Having defined hegemony along Gramscian lines, we should state that, at least theoretically, there are competing hegemonic projects rather than a singular one at any stage that goes beyond the domestic level. However, this must not lead to an outright denial of the fact that there are striking commonalities as well as variegations among various social formations due to the universal-cum-uneven development processes along capitalist lines.<sup>3</sup> More commonalities emerge among various hegemonic projects in

---

3 Here it is referred to processes generally described as “uneven and combined development”

a vast scale of societies also with the contributions of such factors as the internationalisation of production and new divisions of labour and growing integration among domestic markets. In addition to these, the uneven character of capitalist development and capital accumulation has transformed an already unequal geopolitical setting into one that has generated “core” and “peripheral” countries (Kiely, 2010, p. 119). This has allowed particular core countries to pursue imperialist policies at the international level in order to create and maintain conditions favourable to their own class rule at home (Kiely, 2010, pp. 86, 188, 239). This has further increased commonalities among hegemonic projects of the bourgeoisie in different countries, albeit not without their own spatio-temporal variegations. Thus, it becomes only in this sense possible to speak of particular political projects that are able to achieve *hegemonic* character at the international level.

When we turn to the internal relationship between hegemony and imperialism, while “hegemony” is an all-encompassing form of class rule that exceeds far beyond particular state apparatuses being exercised at either domestic level or both domestic and international levels, “imperialism” is rather related to a particular state apparatus which has the most efficient coercive instruments being exercised solely at the international level. Imperialism involves the “[creation of] an international division of labour . . . through the extension of the conditions of capitalist accumulation on a world scale” (Gülalp, 1986, p. 139) by employing both the capitalist and territorial logics of power as a coercive capacity. The contemporary economic form of it more specifically involves “*depriving developing countries of the right to develop protectionist industrial policies and thereby generate dynamic comparative advantage*” (Kiely, 2010, pp. 188, emphasis in the original). Hence it is less what advanced countries *do* to less developed countries, and more a question of what the former increasingly *do not* allow the latter to do, namely carry out industrial policies (Kiely, 2010, pp. 188, emphasis in the original).

It comes onto the scene with its disciplinary coercive apparatuses including sanctions and military interventions in case of non-obedience on the part of subordinate social formations being designated as “failed” or “rogue” states.

---

(U&CD) in much of the recent literature on “historical sociology of international relations.” Derived from Leon Trotsky’s writings about the history of the Bolshevik Revolution, some IR scholars—most notably Justin Rosenberg—argue that the “international” is “marked by an inherent dynamism as more developed societies interact with less developed ones, causing combined development in backward societies, which reinforce rather than straighten out, the unevenness of world-historical development as a whole” (Teschke, 2011, p. 1101).

If we return to the fundamental aspects of hegemony at the international level, this leadership must be exercised by a particular ruling class or class fraction that is hegemonic over a particular domestic social formation. That leadership is mediated primarily through the political leadership of the imperialist state apparatus at hand as well as through international institutions. Ideological hegemony at the international level is constituted in a rather loose fashion culminating in variegations at different spatial levels. The material aspect of hegemony is provided again through the mediation of either the leading imperialist state apparatus or international institutions in the form of economic and military assistance towards subordinate social formations, but incentives such as political recognition or appreciation, accession to or promotion in international institutions may also help in generating consent from those subordinate social formations. Hegemony becomes thinner and dimmer the further it gets from the leading core towards peripheral regions and towards subaltern social groups (i.e. the proletariat and the peasantry) within those regions. Thus, the generation of consent from those subaltern social groups and incorporation of them into the wider international historical bloc is again mediated through domestic social formations in general and domestic state apparatuses in particular. Overall, the complex and contradictory relationships between uneven capitalist relations of production on a world-wide scale and the superstructural elements such as the leading imperialist state, international institutions as well as other state apparatuses cement an international historical bloc when these two aspects converge or overlap with each other to a certain extent albeit in a non-necessary and contingent fashion.

What makes hegemony dimmer and thinner the further it gets from the leading core is the fact that international hegemonic projects articulated by the organic intellectuals of the ruling domestic class or class fractions of the leading social formation. These take place mostly through the technocratic cadres of international institutions that have direct links with that particular ruling class or class fraction. They have less to offer in material terms the farther such projects are to reach in peripheral regions. Such projects also have the least to offer to the subaltern social groups in those regions, since these are also those subjected to the harshest exploitation of surplus value under capitalist social relations to accumulate capital at the international level albeit in an uneven manner. In addition to these material shortcomings of the international hegemonic projects in peripheral regions, one should also take into account the elite-driven and thus alien, nature of such projects in the eyes of those subaltern social groups in the periphery. Therefore, dissent or counter-hegemonic challenges become likely in such regions of the world

economy. If such tendencies become the actual case, imperialism comes onto the scene as stated earlier. That's why the reception or internalisation of internationally articulated hegemonic projects at the domestic level in peripheral regions is rather realised mostly through non-hegemonic strategies such as passive revolutions. As hegemony becomes dimmer and thinner the further it gets from the leading core, passive revolutions emerge as the chains between the processes of capitalist restructuring at international and domestic levels forging hegemony at the international level.

### **Multipolarity and Hegemony**

There is a hot debate as to whether we are witnessing or not a transition from a unipolar moment of international order to an increasingly multipolar international order. Efe Can Gürcan and Gerardo Otero (2024) summarise these discussions and the pertinent literature in a quite illustrative way. The concept of hegemony is at the very forefront of debates over multipolarity, not least in the works of one of the most prominent representatives of the geopolitical economy school, Efe Can Gürcan (Gürcan, 2020b, 2020a, 2022; Gürcan & Otero, 2024), although he rather prefers to employ a state-centric conceptualisation of hegemony at the international level citing Du Boff's work (Du Boff, 2003, p. 1; Gürcan, 2022, p. 3). Yet Efe Can Gürcan's (2022, p. 2) association of the contemporary form of emerging multipolarity with a "post-hegemonic" moment accounts well for the recent rise in geopolitical tensions.

### **Hegemony as the Chain between the "Materiality of Nations" and Multipolar International Competition**

The neo-Gramscian concept of hegemony serves as a crucial link between Radhika Desai's "materiality of nations" framework (2013, pp. 29–63) and the rising international competition within an emerging multipolar order. Desai's emphasis on the material conditions of nations and the geopolitical economy aligns with the neo-Gramscian perspective on hegemony, which underscores the interplay between material factors, power dynamics, and global political economy.

Desai's "materiality of nations" approach highlights the significance of economic structures, resources, and geopolitical positioning in shaping power relations among states. This material foundation influences nations' capabilities to assert influence and navigate international competition within a multipolar system. The neo-Gramscian concept of hegemony complements this perspective by emphasizing how dominant ideas, institutions, and

material capabilities interact to establish and maintain power structures in the international arena (Ness & Cope, 2021).

In the context of the emerging multipolar international order, the concept of hegemony serves as a critical analytical tool for understanding both material reason and ideational aspects of leadership among multiple actors. Desai's focus on the material conditions of nations would complement the neo-Gramscian view that hegemony is not solely about dominance but also about the reproduction of power through shared ideas, institutions, and material capabilities. This interconnectedness between materiality, hegemony, and international competition underscores the complex dynamics at play in a multipolar world order (Gürcan, 2020a).

By connecting the neo-Gramscian notion of hegemony with Desai's focus on the materiality of nations, how power is exercised, challenged, and justified in the face of intensifying global competition in a multipolar order could be analysed in all of its aspects. The geopolitical economy approach to international relations, which discusses the idea of uneven and combined development, offers a critical lens through which to examine the historical patterns of development, economic disparities, and international orderings.

To put it in a nutshell, Desai's "materiality of nations" framework, the idea of uneven and combined growth, and the escalating global competition within a developing multipolar order can easily be related to the concept of hegemony. Desai (2015, pp. 2–3), in a Valdai Discussion Group paper, dismisses the historical legacies of IR and IPE with the accusation that these disciplines served as legitimisation of a proposed single-power domination. Yet Efe Can Gürcan's (2020b) employment of the term "post-hegemonic" for efforts aiming at multipolarity in wider Eurasia that are led by China and Russia hints that the concept of hegemony could inform any analyses of the supposedly emerging multipolar international order also by its absence as much as by its presence.

One should also acknowledge here the fact that those authors who stress Gramsci's Marxist and Leninist roots criticise the transnationalist strand within the neo-Gramscian scholarship essentially for trivialising state power and neglecting imperialism in particular and the role of coercion in efforts at hegemony in general (e.g., Budd, 2015, pp. 7, 28). These are the points the geopolitical economy scholarship also criticises (Desai, 2013, 2015; Gürcan, 2020b, 2022).

As Efe Can Gürcan (2022, pp. 92–93, 103–104) also rightly points out, the "subimperialism" thesis for the emergence of a series of "post-

hegemonic” groupings such as BRICS and other initiatives gathered around or outside it does not reflect the reality on the ground. Yet where the “subimperialism” literature might genuinely contribute to our understanding of the supposedly “post-hegemonic” moment in international order lies in its theoretical underpinnings that put “imperialism”, not as an outside, but as an intrinsic feature of social formations other than the leading imperialist state. Contemporary US super-imperialism has a “unique” (Panitch & Gindin, 2006) character in the sense that other social formations are continuously “[reconstituted] as integral elements of an informal American empire” (Panitch & Gindin, 2003, p. 17). Since American capital now exists as a material social force inside a good number of other social formations as a result of foreign direct investments (FDI) made by US multinationals with the full support of the US state, the changing nature of international capital flows is a crucial factor in such processes of reconstitution. Through mergers between domestic and US companies or the outright purchase of domestic companies by US multinationals, this process is furthered. Given the magnitude of the US economy overall, it appears doubtful that there will be an opposite trend in the form of other foreign capitals existing as material social forces inside the US social formation, at least for the time being (Panitch & Gindin, 2005, p. 116). Conversely, these other foreign capitals aim to replicate rather than contest the imperialist social formation (Ibid., p. 117). Such social formations internalise, not only neoliberal accumulation forms and their crises, but also imperialist moments, and these culminate in a relation of dependency of a precarious nature among such social formations, which Sabah Alnasseri terms “lower order imperialism” (Alnasseri, 2011, p. 125). Leo Panitch and Sam Gindin (2003, p. 15) highlight the significance of “new propaganda, intellectual, and media networks” in connecting the intelligence and security bureaucracies of most of the major capitalist states to those of the United States. All of these suggest that regional aspirants to become subimperial powers do not necessarily need to have international limitations and constraints imposed upon them from the outside. In fact, one could argue that these limitations and constraints, in the form of “foreign interventions,” are best left for last resort. Only when the aspiring social formation has not fully internalized the dependent social relationship with the imperialist centres, either politically or economically, or in all respects, do such direct foreign interventions become apparent. This was true for a large number of Third World nations during the Cold War, and for certain Middle Eastern nations, such as Iraq and Libya, throughout the post-Cold War era.

Not as an outside phenomenon but as an intrinsic factor, contemporary US super-imperialism endows the US leadership with enormous advantages that

emanate from the “unique” nature of the contemporary international order. This gives the United States the additional leverage of what Susan Strange (1994, pp. 24–32) calls “structural power” over other social formations including its contenders. This was not the case with the Pax Britannica about a century ago. The chances of breaking this deadlock into pieces depend on whether ruling classes in contender states would gain or build a capacity of their own to make other ruling classes in other social formations converge with or consent to the hegemonic project of the particular contender state. Or, subaltern social groups throughout the world, foremost among them the working class, have to put forward a counter-hegemonic project that would incorporate and align other social groups too. To analyse these processes, one should still benefit from the concept of hegemony. That’s why the concept of hegemony still underlies any prospect for change as much as for continuity.

## Conclusion

As the debate as to whether the international order is on the road to multipolarity once again has already intensified, the supposed relevance of the concept of “hegemony” in understanding the dynamics of the contemporary international order and the direction it takes is also being under scrutiny. Although its analytical misconceptions are complicating the debates, it could be confidently put forward that the concept is relevant to not only its presence in hegemonic international constellations but also its absence in non-hegemonic ones. Multipolarity is not a new form of international order for the neo-Gramscian scholarship as the main standard-bearers of the concept of hegemony. It is possible to bring the concept to terms with the debates about the new character of the emerging international order as long as its domestic and material foundations are not neglected. The *longue durée* dynamic of uneven and combined development and the relatively short-term dynamics of hegemonic projects have complementary features. The geopolitical economy approach underlines combined development and states’ role in capitalist economies but as the paper sought to demonstrate through the debate over the unique features of contemporary US super-imperialism, the concept of hegemony still has relevance in scrutinising any prospect of change or continuity in the international order.

## References:

- Alnasseri, S. (2011). Imperialism and the Social Question in (Semi)-Peripheries: The Case for a Neo-National Bourgeoisie. *Global Discourse*, 2(2), 121–144. <https://doi.org/10.1080/23269995.2011.10707913>
- Antoniades, A. (2018). Hegemony and international relations. *International Politics*, 55(5), 595–611. <https://doi.org/10.1057/s41311-017-0090-4>
- Budd, A. (2015). *Class, States and International Relations* (1st edition). Routledge.
- Desai, R. (2013). *Geopolitical Economy: After US Hegemony, Globalization and Empire* (R. Desai & A. Freeman, Eds.). Pluto Press. <https://doi.org/10.2307/j.ctt183gzcl>
- Desai, R. (2015). *Geopolitical Economy: The Discipline of Multipolarity* (24; Valdai Papers). [https://valdaiclub.com/a/valdai-papers/valdai\\_paper\\_24\\_geopolitical\\_economy\\_the\\_discipline\\_of\\_multipolarity/](https://valdaiclub.com/a/valdai-papers/valdai_paper_24_geopolitical_economy_the_discipline_of_multipolarity/)
- Du Boff, R. B. (2003). U.S. Hegemony: Continuing Decline, Enduring Danger. *Monthly Review*, 55(7), 1–15.
- Gramsci, A. (2005). *Selections from Prison Notebooks* (Q. Hoare & G. Nowell-Smith, Eds. & Trans.). Lawrence & Wishart. <https://muse.jhu.edu/book/34838>
- Gülalp, H. (1986). Debate on Capitalism and Development: The Theories of Samir Amin and Bill Warren. *Capital & Class*, 10(1), 139–159.
- Gürcan, E. C. (2020a). The Changing Geopolitical Economy of Transcaucasia under Multipolarity. *World Review of Political Economy*, 11, 533–550. <https://doi.org/10.13169/worldrevipoliecon.11.4.0533>
- Gürcan, E. C. (2020b). The construction of “post-hegemonic multipolarity” in Eurasia: A comparative perspective. *The Japanese Political Economy*, 46(2–3), 127–151. <https://doi.org/10.1080/2329194X.2020.1839911>
- Gürcan, E. C. (2022). *Imperialism after the Neoliberal Turn*. Routledge.
- Gürcan, E. C., & Otero, G. (2024). The Conjunctural Analysis of Multipolarity: Bridging the Bottom-Up and Top-Down Dynamics. *St Antony's Review*, 19(1), 32–62.
- Hoare, Q., & Nowell-Smith, G. (1992). Preface. In Q. Hoare & G. Nowell-Smith (Eds.), *Selections from the Prison Notebooks* (11th ed., pp. ix–xv). International Publishers.
- Jessop, B. (1990). *State Theory: Putting the Capitalist State in Its Place*. Polity Press.
- Jessop, B. (1997). A Neo-Gramscian Approach to the Regulation of Urban Regimes. In M. Lauria (Ed.), *Reconstructing Urban Regime Theory: Regulating Urban Politics in a Global Economy* (pp. 51–73). Sage.
- Kiely, R. (2010). *Rethinking Imperialism*. Palgrave Macmillan.

- Lacher, H., & Germann, J. (2012). Before Hegemony: Britain, Free Trade, and Nineteenth-Century World Order Revisited. *International Studies Review*, 14(1), 99–124. <https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-2486.2012.01100.x>
- Liu, M., & Tsai, K. S. (2021). Structural Power, Hegemony, and State Capitalism: Limits to China's Global Economic Power. *Politics & Society*, 49(2), 235–267. <https://doi.org/10.1177/0032329220950234>
- Ness, I., & Cope, Z. (Eds.). (2021). Financial Inflows. In *The Palgrave Encyclopedia of Imperialism and Anti-Imperialism* (pp. 853–853). Springer International Publishing. [https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-29901-9\\_300361](https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-29901-9_300361)
- Ogunnubi, O., & Akinola, A. (2017). South Africa and the Question of Hegemony in Africa. *Journal of Developing Societies*, 33(4), 428–447. <https://doi.org/10.1177/0169796X17736583>
- Onderco, M. (2019). Variation in delegation size in multilateral diplomacy. *The British Journal of Politics and International Relations*, 21(2), 421–438. <https://doi.org/10.1177/1369148118819695>
- Panitch, L., & Gindin, S. (2003). Global Capitalism and American Empire. *Socialist Register*, 40, 1–42.
- Panitch, L., & Gindin, S. (2005). Superintending Global Capital. *New Left Review*, 2(35), 101–123.
- Panitch, L., & Gindin, S. (2006). The Unique American Empire. In A. Colás & R. Saull (Eds.), *The War on Terror and the American 'Empire' after the Cold War* (pp. 24–43). Routledge.
- Showstack Sassoon, A. (1987). *Gramsci's Politics* (2nd ed.). Hutchinson.
- Strange, S. (1994). *States and Markets*. Pinter Publishers.
- Teschke, B. (2011). Advances and Impasses in Fred Halliday's International Historical Sociology: A Critical Appraisal. *International Affairs*, 87(5), 1087–1106.
- Uzgören, E. (2018). Consolidation of Neoliberalism through Political Islam and Its Limits: The Case of Turkey. *METU Studies in Development*, 45(3), 285–307.