This study aims to analyze the historical and institutional evolution of central banking in the context of digitalization and to evaluate the implications of central bank digital currencies (CBDCs) for monetary sovereignty, monetary policy, and regulatory frameworks from a comprehensive perspective. The study argues that money is not merely a technical medium of exchange but a core institutional component of state sovereignty, financial stability, and economic order. Accordingly, the emergence of central banks is examined historically through the gold standard, the Bretton Woods system, and the fiat money regime, highlighting the transformation of trust from material backing to institutional credibility. Within the framework of classical and modern monetary theories, the functions of money and its relationship with uncertainty and expectations are discussed, emphasizing that central banks are institutional actors responsible not only for price stability but also for maintaining the stability of the financial architecture. Digitalization is evaluated within this historical continuity, and the study questions whether CBDCs represent a natural extension of the existing monetary order or a structural transformation. The design options of CBDCs and their effects on monetary transmission mechanisms, financial stability, and the banking system are analyzed. Furthermore, the regulatory dimension is examined in terms of legal status, central bank independence, data protection, and AML/CFT frameworks. The study concludes that digital currencies signify not merely a technological innovation but a redesign of monetary institutions, and that the future of central banking will be shaped by the balance between institutional trust, legal legitimacy, and monetary sovereignty.