This work examines decision-making in high-risk socio-technical systems through an integrated lens of ethics, leadership, organizational culture, and risk governance, rather than limiting analysis to technical failure or regulatory non-compliance. Using the Boeing 737 MAX case as its central empirical reference, the book reframes the crisis not as an isolated software malfunction, but as the cumulative outcome of strategic pressures, normalized deviations, suppressed warnings, and flawed decision regimes.

A core contribution of the study lies in its reconceptualization of decision quality. Decision quality is not equated with favorable outcomes, but defined through defendability, transparency of reasoning, and ethical continuity under uncertainty. The analysis demonstrates that poor decisions may yield good outcomes by chance, while well-reasoned decisions may still lead to failure—thereby underscoring the necessity of process-based evaluation rather than outcome bias.

The book integrates human factors, organizational behavior, leadership dynamics, and governance structures within an Integrated Risk Management Framework (IRMf). Particular attention is given to psychological safety, organizational silence, ethical blindness, and the normalization of risk under performance pressure. In addition, the work addresses algorithmic decision-making systems and human–machine interaction, arguing that automation does not diminish ethical responsibility but redistributes and amplifies it.

Beyond aviation, the insights developed in this study are applicable to a wide range of high-risk sectors, including energy, healthcare, finance, defense industries, digital platforms, and large-scale public infrastructures. The book offers a systemic roadmap for building resilient decision architectures in environments where human life, public trust, and long-term institutional legitimacy are directly at stake.